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Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone.
‘But which is the stone that supports the bridge?’ Kublai Khan asks.
‘The bridge is not supported by one stone or another’, Marco an-
swers, ‘but by the line of the arch that they form.’
Kublai Khan remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: ‘Why do you
speak to me of the stones? It is only the arch that matters to me.’
Polo answers: ‘Without stones there is no arch.’
Italo Calvino, The Invisible Cities
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations will be used in the footnotes for Spinoza’s
works, which are based on the Spinoza Series (Edinburgh Univer-
sity Press): Ethics, followed by the Roman numeral of the part, and
Praef. (preface), Def. (definition), Exp. (explanation), Ax. (axiom),
App. (appendix), DA # (Definitions of the Affects from part three), or
the Arabic numeral of the proposition, and Schol. (scholium), Dem.
(demonstration), Cor. (corollary), Lem. (lemma), Post. (postulate);
Theological-Political Treatise: TTP, followed by the Roman numeral
of the chapter and by the Arabic numeral of the paragraph accord-
ing to Karl Hermann Bruder’s edition; Political Treatise: TP, followed
by the Roman numeral of the chapter and the Arabic numeral of
the paragraph; Letters: Ep., followed by the Roman numeral of the
corresponding letter and the addressee of the letter between square
brackets; Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect: TdIE, followed by
the Arabic numeral of the paragraph added by Bruder; Metaphysical
Thoughts: CM; followed by the Roman numeral of the chapter. In all
case, references are to The Collected Works of Spinoza, ed. and trans.
by Edwin Curley, 2 vols (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1985–2016), abbreviated as CWS i for volume i (1985) and CWS ii
for volume ii (2016), and followed by the Arabic numeral of the page.
When relevant, the authors will also refer to the standard critical edi-
tion of Spinoza’s Latin works — Spinoza opera, ed. by Carl Gebhardt,
4 vols (Heidelberg: Winter, 1925) — followed by the Roman numeral
of the volume and the Arabic numeral of the page.
For the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, MEW refers to
Marx-Engels-Werke, 44 vols (Berlin: Dietz, 1956–2018) and MECW
to Marx & Engels Collected Works, 50 vols (London: Lawrence and
Wishart, 1975–2004). The Werke are for the most part available
online at <http://www.mlwerke.de/me/me_mew.htm> [accessed
12 September 2020] and <https://marx-wirklich-studieren.net/
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From ‘Materialism’ towards ‘Materialities’
THE EDITORS
THE ACTUALITY OF MATERIALISM
What is the relevance of materialism for thinking politics? Throughout
modernity, materialism has been associated with fatalism, naturalism,
heresy, atheism, and linked to political ideas such as republicanism,
democracy, and communism. In the nineteenth century, the field of
confrontation in which materialism was engaged shifted beyond the
theoretical and political dimensions to encompass the economic and
the social as well. Materialism dethroned the conception of an abstract
political subject and the centrality of state institutions in favour of a
materialist critique centred on the materiality of social relations. How-
ever, the development of contemporary capitalism transformed the
meaning of such a critique. The policies of neoliberal capitalism have
sought to expand control beyond the state to regulate the materiality
of social reproduction itself. Through multiple forms of expropriation,
neoliberal policies have aimed at controlling the bodies and, more
broadly, the materialities underlying the processes of capitalist dom-
ination.
This context has led to a reconsideration of the notion of ‘matter’,
which is once more at the heart of the political arena — whether
in the form of subject’s bodies or of rivers and mountains endowed
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with legal personality. In this sense, materialism has regained influence
at the centre of philosophical debates as the doctrine most suitable
to embrace the various and at times dissonant, even contradictory,
interpretations of matter and its activity.
Far from representing a unified discourse or trend, materialism has
multiple definitions and uses. In the contemporary discursive field we
can observe two main currents: on the one hand, what has recently
been called ‘New Materialism’,1 and on the other a ‘(post‐)Marxist
materialism’ (or a renewed ‘historical materialism’, or ‘dialectical ma-
terialism’).2 Although these two interpretations are not completely op-
1 See, in particular, the collective volumes edited by Diana Coole and Samantha Frost,
NewMaterialisms:Ontology, Agency, andPolitics (Durham,NC:DukeUniversity Press,
2010) as well as by Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, New Materialism: Interviews
& Cartographies (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press, 2012). They both offer a
genealogy of the expression ‘New Materialism’, as well as an overview of its authors
and internal debates. According to the editors of the latter, the term appeared in the
second half of the 1990s and was first used by authors suchManuel DeLanda and Rosi
Braidotti, themselves echoing themes developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,
Donna Haraway, and Bruno Latour. Among the most prominent and representative
publications of this trend, we could also mention Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe
Halfway:QuantumPhysics and the Entanglement ofMatter andMeaning (Durham,NC:
Duke University Press, 2007) and Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of
Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).
2 The renewal of Marxism and Marxist-based materialism is surely an older movement
and can be traced back to the end of the 1960s. It is a far less homogenous trend and
in fact appears in several different modes. All of them address, however, the limits of
traditional Marxism and acknowledge the need to redress it. It is strongly represented
in France, for example, by Louis Althusser and his group of students (see Reading
Capital: The Complete Edition (London: Verso, 2016)). Even if this collective volume
has mostly privileged readings from this French tradition, the contemporary return to
Marx and the notion of materialism can also be traced back to other trends, such as,
first, the Frankfurt School— and the renewal of ‘philosophical materialism’, ‘historical
materialism’, ‘dialectical materialism’, or even ‘interdisciplinary materialism’, through
which the earlywritings byMaxHorkheimer have tried todefine the Institute for Social
Research; second, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s ‘discursive materialism’ and
the revision of ‘historical materialism’ understood as ‘radical relationalism’ (cf. Fac-
undo Vega’s contribution to this volume); third, Robert Kurz’s further development
of Marx’s ‘theory of value’ and ‘the general truth of the materialist thesis as it pertains
to the process of human development as a whole’ (‘The Crisis of Exchange Value:
Science as Productive Force; Productive Labour; andCapitalist Reproduction (1986)’,
in Dossier: Marxism and the Critique of Value, ed. by Neil Larsen, Mathias Nilges, Josh
Robinson, and Nicholas Brown (=Meditations: Journal of the Marxist Literary Group,
27.1–2 (2013–14)) <https://www.mediationsjournal.org/toc/27_1> [accessed: 15
November 2020]); fourth, AntonioNegri’s engagementwith the notion ofmaterialism
and the critique of the ‘transcendental foundation of power’. Negri’s work goes in the
direction of a reappraisal of materialism’s classic reductionism (including those of the
‘dialectical materialism’) towards what he calls a ‘materialism of praxis’ or a ‘rigorous
materialism’ capable of maintaining ‘the tension between actual determination and
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posed, they do highlight different dimensions of what one understands
by materialism and, above all, they employ different argumentative
strategies. Proponents of New Materialism tend to return to physics to
re-found an ontology that stresses the activity of things, thus expanding
political agency far beyond the human realm and criticizing anthropo-
centric policies. On the other hand, (post-)Marxist proponents tend
to revise and renew the Marxist tradition by addressing other forms
of domination that were not traditionally taken into account, such as
gender, race, colonialism, and ecological exploitation.
The aim of this book is not to propose a reconciliation or a syn-
thesis of these different materialist tendencies, but to portray their
great variety and even contradictions without excluding the possibil-
ity of an encounter between them. As the reader will notice in the
organization of our sections, we have chosen some main areas of en-
counter or common ground among the many possible ones, including
the actuality of Baruch Spinoza’s materialism, the renewal of theories
of the ‘milieu’, feminist theories on matter, and critical reappraisals
of historical materialism.3 Other encounters, such as the crossroads
between materialism and ecology as well as with post- and de-colonial
perspectives, are still engaged with, despite not being the main areas of
focus of this volume (for example, in the contributions from Frieder
Otto Wolf and Alex Demirović).
Regarding Spinoza’s materialism, a consideration must be made.
Historians of philosophy have clarified the restricted sense in which
Spinoza can be said to be a ‘materialist’. He never used the term ‘mater-
ialism’ (that was posterior to his work) and more readily writes ‘exten-
sion’ instead of ‘matter’. In this sense, they have argued that one can say
only that he is a materialist if one understands by materialism a ‘prin-
ciple of intelligibility of reality based on extension’ (though extension
cannot give a principle of intelligibility for the whole reality).4 Since
constitutive project within the fullness of subjects’ (Time for Revolution (London:
Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 128).
3 Each part has an introduction: Stefan Hagemann for Part i, Marlene Kienberger and
Bruno Pace for Part ii, Alison Sperling for Part iii, and Daniel Liu for Part iv. The
starting point of this book is the conference Materialism and Politics held at the ICI
Berlin and the Centre Marc Bloch in Berlin in April 2019, where each session was
introduced by moderators, who agreed to once again introduce a part here.
4 Chantal Jaquet, Les Expressions de la puissance d’agir chez Spinoza (Paris: Publications
de la Sorbonne, 2005) <https://doi.org/10.4000/books.psorbonne.127>, in particu-
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the end of the seventeenth century, Spinoza’s association with materi-
alism was especially based on the identification of his philosophy with
the critique of religion, in the form of either atheism or pantheism. This
identification became central for some of his eminent readers such as
Pierre Bayle, Denis Diderot, and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, as well as in
the whole quarrel of pantheism. It seems that this critique of religion,
which was so central, is nowadays relatively secondary amongst schol-
ars in their analysis of Spinoza’s materialism. Since Louis Althusser’s
Lire le Capital, from 1965, and Antonio Negri’s Savage Anomaly, from
1981 — which mobilized Spinoza within Marxist perspectives in order
to offer a non-Hegelian reading of Marx —, the interest in Spinozist
thought has nonetheless continued, as its adoption by authors such as
Étienne Balibar or Frédéric Lordon demonstrates. These uses are far
from being able to be unified, but what Althusser and Negri still have
in common is that they seek to establish a link between Marxist criti-
cism, in a political perspective, and Spinozist ontology.5 These uses
are still important enough today for us to have dedicated a whole part
of this volume to them and for a number of contributions to return,
for example, to the importance, from a materialist perspective, of the
concepts of ‘immanence’, ‘multitude’, and ‘transindividual’ in Spinoza’s
philosophy, as we will discuss later in the introduction. Here too, the
post-Marxist field does not exhaust the question of the materialist
legacy of Spinoza, and renewed references to Spinoza are also to be
found in neo-materialist authors such as Jane Bennett,6 who see in it
a possible critique of an overly anthropocentric Marxist materialism
through the notion of ‘conatus’ which applies to all beings and allows
us to think of a non-inert matter.
The selective thematic focus of this volume reflects the fact that
materialism cannot and should not be reduced to a single definition
lar pp. 211–15. See also André Tosel,Dumatérialisme, de Spinoza (Paris: Kimé, 1994);
Dimitris Vardoulakis, Spinoza, the Epicurean — Authority and Utility in Materialism
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020). Pascal Sévérac also returns to this
point in his contribution to this volume and, more broadly, in his book Qu’y a-t-il de
matérialiste chez Spinoza? (Paris: H Diffusion, 2020).
5 Florence Hulak analyses the difference between what she calls Althusser’s structur-
alist and Negri’s subjective Spinozism (cf. ‘Spinoza après Marx, ou le problème de
l’ontologie marxienne’, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 56.4 (2007), pp. 483–98).
6 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, p. x.
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and theme. The fact that materialism has often — depending on the
relevant period and its dominant schools of thought — been reduced
to one thesis such as mechanism, fatalism (as discussed in Ayşe Yuva’s
contribution), or, in the Marxist variant, economism, is a problem
in itself. These variegated reductions alert us to the fact that ma-
terialism needs to be approached in a non-reductionist way, or that
such reductions must, in the final analysis, be explained in terms of
their theoretical reasoning, practical goals, or historical basis. Mater-
ialism cannot be reduced to one single factor, scale, or explanatory
model, whether it be atoms or the relations of production.7 Many
contributions in this volume (such as those by Chiara Bottici, Mari-
anna Poyares, Émilie Filion-Donato, Christoph Holzhey, and Wolf)
acknowledge and develop this necessarily pluralistic perspective.
Therefore, as a collective endeavour, this volume pursues the
opening up of materialism towards a critical and non-reductionist
form. This is not only a question of saying that there are a plurality
of materialisms which are sometimes in competition, as was already
the case in the nineteenth century between the scientist and Marxist
materialist positions. Rather, the plurality of materialist approaches
reflects the diversity of matter itself and of its conceptions, as well
as the plurality of the political problems it raises. These problems are
just as diverse as they are connected, for example through reflections
on women’s bodies, labour conditions, or the historical context of a
theory. Not wanting to reduce these pluralities to a unity and to stress
their historical, geographical and concrete situatedness, we chose to
principally use the term ‘materialities’.
7 Methodologically speaking, Althusser’s concept of ‘overdetermination’ was useful to
us.With it, he does not mean the reduction of all planes of reality other than economic
reality to a pure phenomenon or reflection: on the contrary, he means to oppose the
reduction of the dynamics of reality to a single simple contradiction, as the simplified
Hegelianism of certain variants of Marxism might suggest. Cf. Louis Althusser, For
Marx, trans. by Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 2005), p. 101 and subsequent pages.
He therefore opposes the ‘mechanist-fatalist temptation in the history of nineteenth-
centuryMarxism’ (ibid., p. 105). He refers to Engels on this point and quotes the letter
to Josef Bloch of 21 September 1890, to conclude with ‘the accumulation of effective
determinations […] on the ultimate determination by the economic’ (ibid., p. 113),
which is why he adopts the term ‘overdetermination’.
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AGENCY AND ACTIVITY
Materialism in this volume is fundamentally linked to the idea that
matter is not inert but acts upon, and therefore changes, itself and
its surroundings. However, the definition of both matter and activity
cannot be set once and for all.
For a long time, materialist authors were accused of conceiving of
human agency as entirely determined by material causes. According
to the opponents of modern materialism, this determinism did not
make it possible to fundamentally distinguish human agency from
the movements of inanimate bodies, since both would be subjected,
according to this paradigm, to the same physical laws. Marx, in turn,
added a layer of complexity, stressing the primacy of the relations of
production, which eventually gave rise to the accusation of economic
fatalism. The question of whether human existence is doomed to de-
terminism or even fatalism plagued materialism throughout history.
Cornelia Möser’s and Poyares’s contributions challenge this classic
problem by showing that determinism does not imply fatalism, which
is understood as an extreme form of the submission of human activity
to necessity, or even to destiny. In this way, it is precisely by pluralizing
the modes of determination that materialism counters fatalism. In par-
ticular, in recent years, factors other than socioeconomic ones became
central to materialist analysis through the understanding of the body.
Catherine Perret’s contribution to this volume, for example, proposes
a way out of this apparent fatalism by suggesting a reconceptualization
of social bonds beyond the logic of value. She addresses a certain tra-
dition of critical theory that reifies what it tried to criticize and that as
such ended up commodifying social bonds. This tradition, according
to her, has overlooked that within the organization of labour, human
bodies are not simply ‘automatons’, but through their techniques, al-
ways keep an inventive quality.
This is not the only way out of fatalism proposed in the volume.
Stefano Visentin’s, Ericka Itokazu’s, and Holzhey’s contributions re-
flect on the relationship between freedom, contingency, and necessity
at the crossroads of politics and (meta)physics. By stressing the radical
determinism of God’s power in Spinoza’s philosophy, Visentin under-
scores that it does not preclude political freedom, whereas Itokazu
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argues that such an argument does not suppress the experience of
contingency in human life. Holzhey’s contribution, in turn, challenges
the distinction between determinism and fatalism. But he does not
question the existence of a contingency which, according to him, lies
at the point of transition between the realms of physics and action:
political action is not founded on any ontology.
The question of fatalism and determinism introduces a reflection
on the way human bodies act. This is an eminently political question
which several contributions in this volume are engaged with. That
is, they take on the task of redefining our understanding of human
bodies and of matter in general, challenging our traditional view of
them as non-inerts. In other words, bodies are not, according to these
contributions, only passive receivers of movement coming from an
external cause (which would possibly be spiritual), but have within
themselves a principle of movement understood as ‘force’ or ‘energy’.
Following this problem, Bottici, who also re-reads Spinoza, proposes
that women’s bodies cannot be thought of as objects that are given once
and for all — a claim which echoes Judith Butler’s understanding of
matter and the body8 — and should rather be thought of as processes.
She argues that distinct conceptions of gendered bodies can structure
the socio-political reality differently.
This idea of ‘processuality’ and the non-inert nature of bodies
leads to a rethinking of individuality, as well as to the very division
between activity and passivity. Hence the reference in Filion-Donato’s
and Bottici’s contributions to Gilbert Simondon’s concept of ‘transin-
dividuality’,9 according to which an individual, in the broad sense, that
is, a person, but also an object and a collectivity, does not exist as
such outside of its encounters with other individuals. Here, again, this
materialist conception is often inspired by Spinoza — Étienne Balibar
8 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’, Routledge Classics
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p. 7: ‘In both the Latin and the Greek, matter (materia
and hyle) is neither a simple, brute positivity or referent nor a blank surface or slate
awaiting an external signification, but is always in some sense temporalized. This is
true for Marx as well, when “matter” is understood as a principle of trans-formation,
presuming and inducing a future. The matrix is an originating and formative principle
which inaugurates and informs a development of some organism or object. Hence, for
Aristotle, “matter is potentiality [dynameos], form actuality”’.
9 Gilbert Simondon, L’Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique (Paris: PUF, 1964), p. 31.
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being one of the most prominent proponents of such an argument.10
Accordingly, ‘transindividual’ desires and passions, rather than indi-
viduals, are the fundamental methodological elements to understand
social relations.11 In this vein, Mariana Gainza’s contribution to this
volume formulates a critique of the misuse of Spinoza’s theory of the
passions12 and warns against the dangers of aligning Spinozist ethics
with neoliberal imperatives and its submission to ‘desires’.
However, while this transindividuality goes far beyond the sphere
of the human, it highlights, more fundamentally, the political implica-
tions of relating human agency to the activity of matter. On this point,
one can indeed observe a debate in the volume between the positions
presented by the contributions of Möser and Poyares, on the one hand,
and Filion-Donato’s contribution, on the other.
The conception of social life as intra-active and co-constitutive
is elaborated in the New Materialist viewpoints of the kind found in
Filion-Donato’s contribution. It can be said that while Marx under-
scored, by means of his materialist conception of history, that nature
is active, insofar as it changes and is changed through human action,
the New Materialists have insisted, through their focus on ‘actants’, on
a conception of activity independent of human action.13
However, this broadening of the concept of ‘activity’, as Möser
puts it, can blur the distinction between human agency and the ‘effi-
ciency of things’. As she writes, ‘a substance does not choose to impact
its environment the way a human can choose to go on strike’. Rethink-
ing the activity of things, of matter, is not enough to challenge the
organization of the world where women are dominated. Poyares via
Susanne Lettow also warns us against the danger of transferring agency
onto ‘anonymous, meta-historical forces like matter or life’.14 She re-
10 Étienne Balibar, Spinoza politique. Le Transindividuel (Paris: PUF, 2018), p. 199.
11 Following Frédéric Lordon, Capitalisme, désir et servitude. Marx et Spinoza (Paris: La
Fabrique, 2010), Marx’s analysis of domination under a capitalist mode of production
can be supplemented with a Spinozist theory of passions, which can prove to be a way
out of the economic fatalism alluded to above.
12 Lordon, Capitalisme, Désir et Servitude, p. 10.
13 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, Clar-
endon Lectures in Management Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
14 Susanne Lettow, ‘Turning the Turn: New Materialism, Historical Materialism and
Critical Theory’, Thesis Eleven, 140.1 (2017), pp. 106–21 (p. 111) <https://doi.org/
10.1177/0725513616683853>.
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proaches some neo-materialist authors like Rosi Braidotti for assuming
‘ontological parity between the vitality of atoms in their exchange of
electrons and the vitality of social interactions, equating them under
generic descriptions such as “agential assemblages”’: for her, this may
lead to the assertion that power relations and physical forces are ‘onto-
logically analogous’.
Responding to this objection, Filion-Donato shows that these
critiques are not entirely justified. In fact, it would be too hasty to
say that New Materialism equates non-humans to humans in terms of
agency. Though some New Materialists indeed attempt to widen the
notion of the subject, it is essential to remember that not all argue that
non-humans acquire subjectivity or agency — which is why they are
called ‘actants’ and not ‘agents’.15 New Materialists would simply invite
us to take the potency and effects of matter and objects upon humans
seriously.
The notions of ‘actants’ and ‘agents’ highlight the existence of mul-
tiple scales of action and determination relevant for politics. It is not
new that the scale of the state and that of the nation are judged insuf-
ficient, even mystifying, for materialist criticism. This can be shown
through a broad comparison of different contributions to this volume.
For example, Elena Vogman, analysing Nikolai Y. Marr’s theory of lan-
guage, proposes to go beyond the ‘national’ scale of language in favour
of an analysis of social and class strata. In a different fashion, Bottici
and Demirović criticize an idea of political action conceived through
the sole macro-scale of the state. But, while Bottici suggests not to wait
for the state’s recognition, Demirović instead proposes not to wait for
the state to pursue the common interest or the ability to exercise a
common political goal. Facundo Vega, in his contribution, criticizes
Ernesto Laclau for not appropriately considering the importance of the
action of the ‘many’ and for (over)emphasizing, instead, the role of the
15 Latour writes in Reassembling the Social that ‘ANT is not the empty claim that objects
do things “instead” of human actors: it simply says that no science of the social can
even begin if the question of who and what participates in the action is not first of all
thoroughly explored, even though it might mean letting elements in which, for lack of a
better term, we would call non-humans’ (p. 72; emphasis in the original). He therefore
prefers the term ‘actant’ to speak of the action or affordances of ‘non-humans’ and ‘actor’
when speaking specifically of human actants. Bennett also speaks of actants: ‘an actant
is a source of action that can be either human or nonhuman’ (Vibrant Matter, p. 8).
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leader’s body, which unifies popular will, in the beginning of a process
of emancipation. In Vega’s view, this would restrain Laclau’s previous
materialist project.
Finally, this question of the scales of action allows us to grasp, in
all its multiplicity and equivocity, the conventional materialist idea of
an action of the ‘milieu’. Marlon Miguel’s contribution addresses the
problem of the local scale of action through the politicization of educa-
tion. He analyses the social re-education work with young delinquents
undertaken by the Soviet pedagogue Anton Makarenko. Rather than
a directive relationship between master and student, Miguel conceives
of pedagogy as a materialist emancipative and local process entirely
structured and mediated by a collectively constructed milieu.
NON-REDUCTIONIST MATERIALIST EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE
MULTIPLICITY OF CAUSES
The claim that no scale of activity can be reduced to another brings us
to the consideration of a political gesture that is central to the present
volume: a non-reductionist definition of materialism. The critique of
reductionist materialism takes different forms in this volume, but what
they have in common is the affirmation that the intelligibility of social
existence and political life cannot be subordinated to an underlying
given reality, be it in the form of a more fundamental level of existence
or an ultimate purpose.
We find this perspective synthesized in Balibar’s recovery of the
idea of a ‘materialism without matter’, introduced in 1993 in his text
Marx’s Philosophy. By borrowing the concept from Friedrich H. Jacobi,
Balibar identifies a kind of materialism in Marx that ‘has nothing to
do with a reference to matter’.16 This expression, which is extensively
analysed by Poyares (and referred to by Bernardo Bianchi), is im-
plicitly present throughout the entire volume. In general, we argue
16 Étienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx (London: Verso, 1995), p. 23. His concep-
tualization is based on Marx’s opening thesis on Feuerbach, and, therefore, on the
distinction regarding the ‘old materialism’ from Marx’s own attempt to redefine the
concept of materialism: ‘the chief defect of all previousmaterialism (that of Feuerbach
included) is that things, reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the
object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not sub-
jectively’. See Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, in MECW [Marx & Engels Collected
Works, see abbreviations], v (1976), pp. 3–5 (p. 3).
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that Marx’s gesture has been much overlooked in the Marxist and
even post-Marxist traditions, which have, in turn, given rise to forms
of dogmatism responsible for reintroducing stadialist ideologies and
teleology in socio-political analysis.17 By contrast, Balibar’s theoret-
ical insights represent a red thread in this volume uniting analyses
concerned with both the broader contemporary renewal of Marxist
debate, as well as the reappraisal of the meaning of materialism in
this tradition, which is addressed by the contributions from Vittorio
Morfino, Poyares, Wolf, and Vega. In addition, the implicit or explicit
engagement with the challenge of stadialist conceptions in the Marxist
tradition is addressed by Miguel, Perret, Pascal Sévérac, and Vogman.
Both dimensions are articulated in Bianchi’s contribution, as he pro-
poses to identify the development, in Marx, of a non-reductionist kind
of materialism that refuses every form of stadialism, especially in view
of the relationship between knowledge and political action.
Through its reference to practice, Marx’s materialism entails the
refusal of any unidirectional conception regarding the relationship
between nature and human existence:18 here matter is not a ‘first
17 In our account, stadialist arguments amount to the parallel between the evolution
of societies and that of individuals, whereby they progress through identical stages
organized according to a linear upward movement, from an original infantile stage
of indolence to the ‘mature’ stage of action and self-determination. In the history of
Marxism, stadialist arguments were favoured in the Second International, largely due
toGeorgi V. Plekhanov, who argued that onemust first fight for a bourgeois revolution
so that a socialist revolution can take place in a further moment. After the influence
of Stalin’s Dialectical and Historical Materialism, published in 1938, this perspective
became a dogma of Marxism-Leninism. In this perspective, all peoples must invari-
ably go through five successive and linearly organized modes of production: primitive
communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism. Stadialism has been largely
criticized for imposing a model brought from the outside and for overlooking local
circumstances, as well as for justifying domination on the basis of the claim of a ‘lower’,
and therefore deficient, stage of evolution. Sévérac’s contribution to this volume invites
us to criticize, however, the very metaphor at the basis of stadialist arguments: the
difference between the child and the adult. In taking precautions against the preco-
nization of childhood as an absolute value, as if rational and emotional development
had no value, Sévérac nevertheless proposes a positive interpretation of it, insofar as
the child is a being that challenges us to reflect upon the ways their aptitudes can be
increased (a task for which adulthood does not offer a model).
18 Ludwig Feuerbach’smaterialism instead implied a sort of idealism, insofar as it restated
a series of dichotomies between passivity and activity, representation and subjectivity,
and essence and existence. One can, therefore, understand Gérard Bensussan’s argu-
ment of describing Feuerbachian philosophy as a ‘translational thought’. See Gérard
Bensussan, ‘Feuerbach et le “Secret” de Spinoza’, in Spinoza au xixe siècle, ed. by André
Tosel, Pierre-François Moreau, and Jean Salem (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne,
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nature’ that is employed as an arche. Still, it is also not a layer of reality
subordinated to external principles — this argument echoes Visentin’s
usage of the Spinozist expression ‘non defuit materia’. Even though
Marx, following Hobbes, states in the Holy Family that ‘matter is the
substratum of all changes going on in the world’,19 this understanding
needs to be complemented by his other considerations, such as those
expressed in the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, stating that matter cannot be
reduced to object or to subject; it cannot exist outside of processes in
which it is modified and modifies things. For this very reason, Marx’s
philosophy entails a non-reductionist approach to materialism, which
is to be understood as a non-contemplative materialism, leading to a
‘materialist conception of history’.
Our understanding of a non-reductionist definition of materialism
concerns not only a refusal of unidirectional explanations about the
relationship between nature and human existence, but also the rejec-
tion of any explanation in terms of linear models of causality. In the
sixth thesis ad Feuerbach, Marx claims: ‘but the essence of man […]
is the ensemble of the social relations’.20 This gesture points to a new
direction concerning materialism, whereby the notion of the human
is to be defined through practice, among which one can include ‘tool-
making’,21 as well as all human activity, which should be analysed at
the collective scale rather than on the individual one. Both Perret and
Vogman highlight this shift in their contributions. According to this
view, toolmaking — and, more broadly, all transformation of nature
by human action — should not be regarded as the outcome of the
emergence of a highly developed brain, just as human activity is not
the effect of the emergence of homo sapiens, but its cause. Socialized
activity in the world is the basis of the process of ‘hominization’ —
a thesis that resonates throughout this volume. In this thesis we can
2007), pp. 111–23 (p. 119) <https://doi.org/10.4000/books.psorbonne.158>. By
this he meant that Feuerbach always intended to ‘turn the predicate into the subject
and thus as a subject into object and principle […] in this way, we have the uncon-
cealed, pure, and untarnished truth’. See Ludwig Feuerbach, ‘Preliminary Theses on
the Reform of Philosophy’, in The Fiery Brook (London: Verso, 2012), pp. 153–73 (p.
154). Marx’s materialism is not translational just as it is not reductionist.
19 Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism, in
MECW, iv (1975), pp. 3–211 (p. 129).
20 Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, p. 4; emphasis added.
21 Karl Marx, Capital, 3 vols (London: Penguin, 1976), i, trans. by Ben Fowkes, p. 286.
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observe yet another strong Spinozist characteristic: just as humanity
should not be understood as prior to social action, the mind is not prior
to the affects of the body.22 In Spinoza, the process of singularization
is inseparable from a process of composition and decomposition with
other bodies, which is the basis of an understanding of history sub
durationis and not under the perspective of time — an idea developed
in Itokazu’s contribution to this volume, where, in opposition to the
concept of time, she associates ‘duration’ to singularization, therefore
proposing a positive conception of finitude.
Therefore, our political understanding of materialism is insepar-
able from two features: a theory of causality that underscores the
multiplicity of factors, and the refusal of any idea of origin or founda-
tion.23 While the latter feature is clearly posited by Althusser’s writings
from the 1980s, he developed the former in the 1960s.24 In TheUnder-
groundCurrent of theMaterialism of the Encounter, Althusser introduces
the concept of ‘taking hold’ (prise), which is a corollary of the concept
of ‘encounter’. ‘Taking hold’ here refers to the process of individuation
(autonomization): to the mayonnaise that takes hold when it emulsi-
fies or a SARS-CoV-2 which, coming from a different species such as a
bat, infects and takes hold in a human body. This critique of the founda-
tion of the late Althusser can be connected to his writings concerning
‘structural causality’, understood in opposition to linear causality, from
22 According to Spinoza, ‘theMind does not know itself, except insofar as it perceives the
ideas of the affections of the Body’. SeeEthics ii, 23;CWS i, p. 468.Thismeans that the
mind is the ensemble of ideas stemming from the fortuitous encounters of one’s body
with external things, bymeans ofwhich it is constantly affecting and being affected. See
Ethics ii, 28; CWS i, p. 470. The fact that these affections are not accidents external to
us, but constitutive of our own bodies (and therefore of ourselves) has led Lorenzo
Vinciguerra to the development of the concept of ‘field of traceability’. See his Spinoza
et le signe. La Genèse de l’imagination (Paris: Vrin, 2005), p. 118.
23 As Althusser asserts, ‘the whole that results from the “taking hold” of the “encounter”
does not precede the “taking-hold” of its elements, but follows it; for this reason, it
might not have “takenhold”, and, a fortiori, “the encountermight not have takenplace”’.
See Louis Althusser, ‘The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter’,
in Philosophy of the Encounter: LaterWritings, 1978–87, ed. by François Matheron and
Oliver Corpet, trans. by GeoffreyM. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 163–207
(p. 197).
24 Although complementary, these two moments can be identified with two moments
in the work of Althusser, as Morfino discusses in this volume. Morfino nevertheless
identifies in the texts of the 1980s an eschatological tendency which is not to be
confused with the materialist tendency, as ‘it affirms communism as simple parousia
to-come’.
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the 1960s.25 An effect is not merely assignable to a cause, as existing in
itself, but to a cause insofar as it is intertwined with other relations that
constitute the structure in which it is situated. In the political field, this
problem brings Vega to reflect on Laclau’s post-foundational definition
of politics. According to him, Laclau remains too fascinated by ‘the
extraordinary’, itself based on the Heideggerian ontological concept
of ‘political difference’. Instead, Vega rejects a theory that would re-
new the mythical origins of emancipation and proposes to rethink the
ordinary irruption of the ‘many’ in politics. This conception of the
political is no longer conceived as a ‘superstructure’ but as an ‘ontology
of the social’. This perspective resonates with Mauricio Rocha’s contri-
bution. By underscoring the importance of Deleuze’s discovery in the
late 1960s of ‘expression’ as a decisive concept in Spinoza’s philosophy,
Rocha demonstrates how this finding allows Deleuze to develop a non-
hierarchical conception of reality, which ultimately leads to the idea of
‘plane of immanence’ and to the valorization of politics in his work.
All in all, ‘materialism without matter’ does not mean the refusal
of matter. It entails the rejection of a foundational ontology that would
inevitably exhaust other ontological levels, including that of the polit-
ical, that is, no level of reality can be totally reduced to another. In this
vein, ‘materialism without matter’ implies an anti-reductionist analysis
of the political, of the discourses, and even of philosophical activity.
MATERIALISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE
This volume proposes that materialism should be understood in
a broader sense to include discourse which, although incorporeal,
relates to matter and acts upon bodies. A number of contributions
to the volume (such as those from Bianchi, Demirović, Gainza,
Perret, Sévérac, Wolf, and Yuva) address this relationship between
materialism and the criticism, even subversion, of ‘ideology’, which is
a concept that must also be problematized.
25 SeeLouisAlthusser, ‘OnGenesis’, inHistory and Imperialism:Writings, 1963–1986, ed.
and trans. by Geoffrey M. Goshgarian (Cambridge: Polity, 2020), pp. 33–36 (p. 34).
As an example, Althusser refers to the physical concept of ‘causality of a field’, which
we propose to think in connection with Vinciguerra’s concept of ‘field of traceability’
(see note number 22 above).
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In 1970, Althusser rehabilitated the question of ‘ideology’ by
indicating its centrality to political thought. According to the philo-
sopher, if ideology represents an imaginary relation between individu-
als it nevertheless has a ‘material existence’.26 Ideology materializes
itself in theories, apparatuses, and practices that can and should be the
object of analysis. Althusser’s gesture to read Marx against Marx and
to ‘open him up’ was taken over by contemporary authors. Balibar, for
example, in a text about both Althusser and Marx, characterizes the
latter’s materialism not as theoretical content or method but through
‘the fact that Marx inscribed in theory itself the limits, and thus the
conditions, imposed on its historical efficiency by the fact that theory
consist of “ideas”’.27 Balibar points towards the crucial idea of a ‘finite
theory’ as developed in this volume by Wolf ’s contribution.
According to Michel Foucault, the Althusserian project concern-
ing the question of ‘ideology’ remained too dematerialized, abstract,
and intellectual, too ‘state-centred’.28 But despite his criticisms, it is
precisely Foucault who, in a certain sense, developed an analysis of the
materialities that constitute and modulate subjectivity. Furthermore,
in TheOrder of Discourse he also introduced the idea of an ‘incorporeal
materialism’ in order to rethink the notion of ‘event’.29 Foucault’s thesis
is that there is a materiality of discourse: while it is certainly a ma-
teriality very different from that of bodies and things, he nevertheless
claimed that ‘discursive events’ take effect on the material level. The
relation of things and discourses are not to be thought according to a
mechanical causality nor an ideal necessity; instead, the philosopher
26 Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an In-
vestigation)’, in ‘Lenin and Philosophy’ and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1971), pp. 127–86.
27 Étienne Balibar, ‘Althusser’s Object’, trans. by Margaret Cohen and Bruce Robbins,
Social Text, 39 (Summer 1994), pp. 157–88 (p. 177; emphasis in the original); French
original as ‘L’Objet Althusser’, inPolitique et philosophie dans l’œuvre de Louis Althusser,
ed. by Sylvain Lazarus (Paris: PUF, 1993), pp. 81–116 (p. 110).
28 PierreMacherey clearly shows the importance of this critique of Foucault: the ‘power’,
the ‘energy’ of the ideology is so efficient because ‘it is not diffused from a unique
centre that would be the State’ (PierreMacherey andOrazio Irrera, ‘Michel Foucault et
les critiques de l’idéologie. Dialogue avec Pierre Macherey’, Methodos. Savoir et textes,
16 (2016) <https://doi.org/10.4000/methodos.4667>.
29 Michel Foucault, ‘TheOrder of Discourse: Inaugural Lecture at the Collège de France,
givenDecember 2, 1970’, inUntying theText: APost-Structuralist Reader, ed. byRobert
Young (London, Routledge, 1981), pp. 51–78 (p. 69).
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proposes to analyse the ‘relation, the coexistence, the dispersion, the
overlapping, the accumulation, and the selection of material elem-
ents’.30 Although the discursive order is characterized by hazardous,
aleatory, contingent, and discontinuous events, they can all still be
retraced and analysed.31 The idea of ‘materialities’ in the plural, which
is utilized by many contributions to this volume, emphasizes the im-
portance of resisting the temptation of reductionism in all its forms.
It shows the necessity of philosophically taking into account ‘worlds
feelings, of practices, organizations, institutions, and even ideas’, as
Wolf remarks in his contribution.
In this sense, philosophical analysis should be enriched by mater-
ials that come from other disciplines, such as those obtained through
ethnographic work. In this way it can enlarge its discursive field, avoid-
ing some risks contained in pure abstraction, while at the same time
employing critical tools that can de-naturalize or de-essentialize the
immediacy of those same materials.32 The study of materiality and the
materialist approach do not imply giving up on philosophy, but it cer-
tainly means broadening the task of philosophy in order to reconsider
30 Ibid.
31 The idea of ‘incorporeality’ is inspired by Foucault’s readings of the Stoic philosophers.
It is very present also in the nearly contemporaneous book from Deleuze entitled
Logic of Sense. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze (with Guattari) takes over the notion
and provides very intelligible examples of it. The enunciative act pronounced by
a judge that transforms the accused into the guilty is described as an incorporeal
attribute, though decisive for the body of the individual (Gilles Deleuze and Félix
Guattari,AThousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by BrianMassumi
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 81). Lorenzo Vinciguerra’s
re-reading of Spinoza and the problem of the sign also further develops the idea of
a semiotic materialism or, in his words, of a ‘sémiophysics’ (Spinoza et le signe, p.
136). Finally, one can alsomention the neologism ‘motérialisme’ (themateriality of the
word), invented some years later, in 1975, by Jacques Lacan (‘Conférence àGenève sur
le symptôme’, texte établi par Jacques-Allain Miller, La Cause du Désir, 95 (2017), pp.
7–24 <https://doi.org/10.3917/lcdd.095.0007>.
32 Cf. Althusser, For Marx: ‘Others, of more scientific bent, proclaimed the “end of
philosophy” in themanner of certain positivistic formulations inTheGerman Ideology,
in which it is no longer the proletariat or revolutionary action which take in charge the
realization and thereby the death of philosophy, but science pure and simple: does not
Marx call on us to stop philosophizing, that is, stop developing ideological reveries so
that we can move on to the study of reality itself?’ (p. 28) and ‘The German Ideology
sanctions this confusion as it reduces philosophy, as we have noted, to a faint shadow
of science, if not to the empty generality of positivism. This practical consequence is
one of the keys to the remarkable history ofMarxist philosophy, from its origins to the
present day’ (pp. 33–34).
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the historical and, in every sense of the word, the material situatedness
of any philosophical problem.
Even though this volume adopts a rather contemporary perspec-
tive, it nonetheless begins with a reflection on the return to Spinoza, as
well as the return to other past materialist movements — Althusser’s
work, for example, belongs to a historical moment that is no longer
entirely ours. While the understanding of the historical, social moment
to which philosophical works belong is a part of the materialist project,
their re-actualization is equally important — an approach which is ex-
emplified in Bottici’s contribution to this volume and its actualization
of an anarchist tradition in feminist theory. This approach supposes a
philosophical reading of past texts which, without being teleologically
oriented towards our time, actualizes relevant potentialities contained
in ‘thinking’ the present, while helping to reveal radical discontinuities
in the ways of posing a problem in contemporary or past terms — as
we see, for example, in Miguel’s, Vogman’s, and Yuva’s contributions.
While their efforts to analyse the materialisms of the Soviet era, or even
older materialisms from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, may
seem outdated, they offer, in fact, contemporary reflections on how to
redefine the role and nature of the ‘milieu’ in education, of the gesture
in human exchange, work, and language, or of ideology in the history
of materialism.
What is ultimately at stake is the fact that old theories, whether
philosophical or not, should not automatically be considered outdated
simply because they do not belong to our historical moment. On
the one hand, the historical horizon of some past authors is still, to
some extent, ours; on the other hand, the identification of new prac-
tical problems leads to the discovery of original theoretical territories
which, even if they constitute something ‘new’, may still nevertheless
be located in the past. Materialism, whether it arises from the philo-
sophers who have claimed this label or the kinds of methods we discuss
in this volume, does not imply a form of theoretical ‘presentism’ pos-
tulating that only contemporary theories can help us in the urgency of
rethinking the present.
The history of materialism is full of controversies which involve
both the materialist authors themselves as well as the insufficiently
emancipatory dimension of certain so-called materialist theories and
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their uses. Rather than seeking to provide the final word, this volume
aims at giving expression to the tensions and irresolvable polemics
of the complex materialist discursive field. As such, we have aimed,
above all, to show the multiplicity of paths, tools, and strategies that
materialism both in the past and in the present offers to critically
rethink political activity.
I. THE ACTUALITY OF SPINOZA’S
MATERIALISM

Introduction to Part i
STEFAN HAGEMANN
Thinking about the philosophical foundations of a concept of eman-
cipatory politics leads inevitably to the problem of materialism. Ac-
cording to such a perspective, in order for political practice to be
understood as emancipatory, it cannot be conceived as an action that
is a priori conditioned by the (moral as well as juridical) freedom of its
subjects. On the contrary, political action should be conceived as the
process in which the subjects realize their (individual and collective)
freedom. Each of the chapters in this part delve into this intricate re-
lation between philosophy, politics, and materialism. They start from
the insight that it is necessary to reflect on the material conditions
upon which a processual realization of freedom is based. In such a
view, the actuality of freedom is inseparable from the process of its
realization, and this is why such a realization should not be conceived
as a liberation from the material conditions on which it is based, but
instead as an immanent process.
The chapters in this part illuminate various aspects of Spinoza’s
philosophy that are significant for a materialist concept of politics.
Mariana de Gainza’s contribution, which also provides an overview
of the newer interpretations of Spinoza, addresses the relationship
between the Spinozian idea of immanence and the concept of dialect-
ical negativity. If, within the discussion on the theoretical foundations
of emancipatory political practice, Spinoza’s thought was considered
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to provide the conceptual resources to break with the predominance of
Hegelian Marxism and its insistence on negativity as the driving force
of political and historical processes, this positioning of Spinozism as an
anti-dialectical, immanentist school of thought opposed to dialectical
negativity runs the risk of simply affirming the status quo when it does
not also offer the theoretical means to draw a line between right and
wrong political practice. By discussing the relation between morality
and ethics, Gainza now shows that there can be a productive dialogue
between the dialectical thought of Critical Theory and Spinoza’s im-
manentist thought.
In order to develop a concept of emancipatory practice, it is de-
cisive to determine the relation between freedom and necessity. Here
too, the appeal to Spinoza can provide substantial insights, as Stefano
Visentin shows in his contribution. Spinoza’s denial of free will in
favour of a reconciliation between freedom and necessity proves to
be productive. Visentin shows that Spinoza’s doctrine of the identity
of freedom and necessity has an eminently political meaning, both
for criticizing deficient forms of government and with regard to the
foundations of a true political governance. According to Visentin’s
reconstruction of Spinoza, political freedom can be conceived as the
process of transforming individual freedom into the collective freedom
of the multitude. This is the basis of Spinoza’s doctrine of the practical
predominance of democracy. In this perspective, political practice can
finally be conceived as a continuous transformation of historical real-
ity.
However, the very concept of history seems to pose serious prob-
lems in the context of Spinozian thought, since with Spinoza’s denial
of finalism the concept of historical progress could be radically ques-
tioned, if not rendered impossible. In her contribution,Ericka Itokazu
shows that this is by no means the case, but that, on the contrary,
a substantial concept of history as a non-teleological process can be
gleaned from Spinoza’s ontology. The Spinozian concept of duration
is at the centre of her argument: In contrast to the negativity of time,
duration should be understood as a positive process of individuation in
the sense of an immanent causality. From this perspective, the process
of history can then be understood as the tension between imaginary
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time and the positive duration which is constitutive for human prac-
tice.
The two concluding contributions in this part deal with the au-
thors who were responsible for the renewal of Spinoza Studies in the
second half of the twentieth century, namely Gilles Deleuze and Louis
Althusser. Mauricio Rocha investigates the importance of Deleuze’s
appropriation of Spinoza in the forging of a political Spinozism, which
was neglected in France until the end of the 1960s. Accordingly,
Rocha discusses the central concepts of Deleuze’s Spinozist investi-
gations, such as ‘expression’, ‘immanence’, and ‘power’. Furthermore,
Rocha focuses on the importance of the Sephardi philosopher for
the development of Deleuze’s own philosophical system. Meanwhile,
VittorioMorfino’s contribution reconstructs the different tendencies
that can be identified in the work of Althusser. The first of these ten-
dencies is materialist and based on the concept of structural causality,
whereas the second is eschatological and grounded on the idea of a par-
ousia. Both tendencies deal with questions that are inevitably related
to Althusser’s writings on Spinoza, and which resonate with themes
present in the other contributions, such as the refusal of teleology and
the concept of encounter.

Materialist Variations on Spinoza
Theoretical Alliances and Political Strategies
MARIANA DE GAINZA
MORAL PHILOSOPHY OR ETHICS?
In his 1963 lectures, Theodor Adorno said that it was important not
to abandon reflection on the ‘good life’ in terms of a moral philosophy
and to resist the temptation of replacing its concepts with those of an
ethics.1 In broad strokes, his argument was the following: It is clear
that the notion of morality rests on an essential conformism because it
presupposes an ideal convergence between individual behaviour and
public customs, so that the good life amounts to an obedience to com-
munity norms and acceptance of its actual forms. What is more, this
conformism (a respect for a petrified facade of opinion and society) is
redoubled by the affinity between morals and Puritan values: the Pur-
itan subject’s rigidity and narrow conventionalism is perfectly suited to
a reactive defence against any questioning of the status quo. That is why
a preference instead for the notion of ethics — as a call to live according
to one’s own nature — would thus seem admissible. If the definition
of the ethical good life refers to the capacity to deploy, according to
1 TheodorW. Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2001).
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one’s own time and dispositions, each ethos or mode of singular being,
then it seems to offer a sort of antidote against an externally imposed
morality.
However, this call for an ethics of the ‘good life’, while understand-
able, is just ‘pure illusion and ideology’.2 Beyond the emptiness of the
assertion that one must live in harmony with one’s own being lies the
fact that the contents of one’s self-identity, which are thought to be
genuinely spontaneous, are in fact provided by the dominant culture.
Congruence with one’s own constitution or nature is nothing more
than a form of compliance with certain cultural values. A naturalist
ethics would thus be a kind of ‘bad conscience of morality’, a ‘morality
that is ashamed of its own moralizing’ that still behaves as morality but
no longer wishes to be a ‘moralizing morality’.3
For these reasons, Adorno prefers to retain the concept of ‘mor-
ality’, which, despite its anachronism and evident limitations, has the
advantage of avoiding further adulterations of the true problem: the
contradiction between the particular and the general, between free-
dom and law, or better still, between empirical existence and the good
life, which is an unrealizable aim in the context of an oppressive norm.
If we were to accept certain prejudices supposing the incompati-
bility between critical-dialectical philosophies and Spinozism,4 then it
would follow that Spinoza’s Ethics can also be subject to the Adornian
critique of ethics. Indeed, there is a contemporaneous sort of neo-
Spinozism which is perfectly in line with a neoliberal ethos that is
associated with a pervasive rhetoric revolving around desire and affect.
Along with the political and communicative strategies of global right-
wing parties and tendencies, these neo-Spinozist perspectives imagine
individuals as subjects of an affective self-consciousness that knows
how to recognize what it loves and hates, a self-consciousness that
defends the freedom to determine what it shall consume. But the items
that one ‘spontaneously’ prefers or chooses (which can be such differ-
ent things as commercial goods, political ideas, current information,
or beliefs) tend to coincide, in point of fact, with a preference that
2 Ibid., p. 10.
3 Ibid.
4 Prejudices associated, in particular, to the tradition of readings of Spinozism that
comes from Gilles Deleuze and passes through Antonio Negri.
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has already been defined in another scene as the most suitable for
that given profile. As an ideological mode, contemporary capitalism
both reflects and reinforces the demand for accumulation, on the one
hand, and the affective dispositions of the subjects, on the other, in a
kind of virtuous convergence of differences that intends to uphold the
expansion of global financial power.
This convergence is a fitting illustration of precisely what Adorno
was concerned with in his critique of ethics. This is why I think it is
imperative to assert — against those prejudices that rigidly separate
dialectics and immanence — that Spinoza’s Ethics can and should be
approached with the Adornian gesture that denounces the purported
identity between particular and universal, and replaces it with contra-
diction, a contradiction that can still be found in moral philosophy
today despite its conservative tendencies.
SPINOZA’S MATERIALISM
The approach of combining Adorno and Spinoza that I attempt here
is based on a materialist reading of Spinoza, whose articulating axes
are worth explaining. The term ‘materialism’ is a problematic one. It
does not help us to form a clearly shaped perspective because it was
used to designate very different theories which are, in many cases,
mutually incompatible. It is a noun traversed by the echoes of various
controversies (between realism and idealism, empiricism and innat-
ism, objectivism and subjectivism) that have been present as tensions
within philosophy from the beginning; to put it more precisely, they
have been present as tensions ever since Hegelian philosophy retro-
actively (and controversially) organized the history of philosophy
into the confrontation of opposing positions. In any case, I want to
cautiously assume this heritage, albeit in the way in which a certain
Spinozian Marxism has re-signified it.
To consider how a modern sense of ‘materialism’ reached Spinoza,
it is worth recalling that Robert Boyle (whose experiments on nitro
were discussed in Spinoza’s Correspondence) was the first to intro-
duce the term, in 1674, in his work The Excellency and Grounds of the
Corpuscular or Mechanical Philosophy. Between theorists and chemists
that embraced the postulates of corpuscular-mechanical philosophy,
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‘materialists’ were those that reduced phenomena to a few material
components. This sense of the noun was consolidated when Cartesian
dualism rewrote the old controversies about matter and form as an
assertion of the existence of two substances: extended reality and
thinking reality. Since that transformation, three major traditions, sep-
arated by their ontological emphasis, can be identified within modern
philosophy: one that assigns a privileged reality to the ideal or psychic
(spiritualism), to the material or physical (materialism), or to the
balanced character of a reality that encompasses both ontological di-
mensions (monism).
In addition, in terms of Spinozist philosophy it is also relevant
to consider the ‘ancient materialism’ represented by the atomism of
Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius — a philosophical current that
also interested Marx, who wrote his doctoral thesis on ‘The Differ-
ence between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature’.
Spinoza vindicated the ancient materialists in an explicitly controver-
sial way when he wrote against the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition:
To me the authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates is not
worth much. I would have been amazed if you had mentioned
Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius, or any of the Atomists, or de-
fenders of invisible particles. But it’s no wonder that the people
who invented occult qualities, intentional species, substantial
forms, and a thousand other trifles contrived ghosts and spirits,
and believed old wives’ tales, to lessen the authority of Demo-
critus, whose good reputation they so envied that they had
all his books burned, which he had published with such great
praise.5
Furthermore, in relation to contemporary discourse, let us consider
the statement about Spinoza’s materialism made by Pierre-François
Moreau:
We can talk about a materialism in Spinoza on the condition
that we do not thereby understand a determination of the
mind by the body. To those who object that Spinoza […]
maintains the balance between mind and body, [and therefore
is] as spiritualist or idealist as he is materialist, we must answer
5 Ep. lvi [to Hugo Boxel]; CWS [TheCollectedWorks of Spinoza, see abbreviations], ii,
p. 423.
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that, precisely, tradition does not maintain that balance, and
the simple fact of giving the body as much importance as
the mind already constitutes an enormous effort of materialist
rebalancing.6
Let us retain what Moreau calls here a rebalancing effort, that is to
say, a kind of compensatory endeavour that uses the same conceptual
elements of a philosophical tradition but adjusts the importance given
to them. When that rebalancing — as in the case of Spinoza — works
by rescuing the body from its traditional subordination to the mind,
such an effort can legitimately be considered materialist. However,
the image of a balance that must be restored, of a compensation or
counterweight that works by levelling out an imbalance, does not fit
Spinozist materialism as I understand it. Such a metaphor supposes
that the elements whose relative weights must be equalized are already
constituted and that it is only necessary to modify the weights in the
balance to stabilize it.
This model is overly simplistic where a ‘materialist rebalancing’ is
concerned. The Spinozian valuation of the body, rather than compen-
sating with an undervaluation (giving the body as much importance
as the mind), constitutes a theoretical innovation that transforms the
idea of the body, insofar as thought is capable of doing justice to the ir-
reducible reality it faces. This means that the body can be apprehended
in its own corporeal being when it is understood through the absolute
quality or attribute that explains it — without referring it to a mind.
The effort to understand a particular thing is made on the basis of
the recognition of its irreducibility (without homologating it to other
things or realities).
With this in mind, the terms of Moreau’s statement can be re-
formulated as follows: Spinoza’s enormous effort of materialist re-
balancing consists of an anti-hierarchical ontological equalization of
essentially unequal realities, an ‘adjustment’ made through the rec-
ognition of an essential imbalance: in this way, he has achieved a
theoretical justice for heterogeneous realities. So this Spinozian effort
is materialist, not because the body is its object (it is clear that we
can elaborate a materialist understanding of the ideas, as it is common
6 Pierre-FrançoisMoreau,Problèmesdu spinozisme (Paris:Vrin, 2006), p. 65;my translation.
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to find idealist theories of the body), but because it builds the just
perspective that takes each reality into account, considering its irredu-
cibility. Therefore, materialism is an ontological way of conceiving the
power of thought to understand the singular quality of a reality.
TOWARDS A CARTOGRAPHY OF CONTEMPORARY SPINOZISM
With this notion of materialism in mind, we can now redirect the dis-
cussion back to our initial aim of relocating the question of ethicswithin
materialism and in dialogue with critical theory. I will develop a sort
of cartography of contemporary Spinozism, taking as a starting point a
citation from Pierre Macherey, who said that ‘Spinoza obsesses and
haunts us as if his work were a theoretical unconscious that condi-
tions and guides a large part of our intellectual choices and effective
commitments; and that helps us to reformulate most of the problems
that concern us’.7 Using Macherey’s idea, I will assert that a set of
contemporary readings of Spinoza can be grouped under the head-
ing ‘Spinozism’, understood as the response to something condensed
in the name ‘Spinoza’ that both obsesses, haunts, and conditions us:
something that orients intellectual alternatives and practical commit-
ments, and that lends a particular contour to certain inquiries, both
ethical-political and theoretical.
While determining the Spinozist camp in this way it is possible
to distinguish different interpretations. We can reproduce those inter-
pretations and distribute them along an axis, the purpose of which
would be to measure how the haunting of Spinoza is acknowledged
by his readers, or what kind of relationship is established between a
given thought and a Spinozist idea. Firstly, I would like to imagine
the pure form wherein a thought considered to be a ‘theoretical un-
conscious’ would manifest itself: as an explicit absence, or a merely
implicit presence. There thus exists a mode of ‘thinking in Spinoza’,
where ‘Spinoza’, rather than being the object addressed by thought for
further examination, instead constitutes a sort of speculative element, a
terrain or medium in which thinking takes place. This mode of inter-
pretation appears, for example, in Freud’s declared affinity for Spinoza,
7 Pierre Macherey, Avec Spinoza. Études sur la doctrine et l’histoire du spinozisme (Paris:
PUF, 1992), p. 7; my translation.
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when he writes in a letter: ‘I readily admit my dependence on Spinoza’s
doctrine. There was no reason why I should expressly mention his
name, since I conceived my hypotheses from the atmosphere created
by him, rather than from the study of his work. Moreover, I did not
seek a philosophical legitimation’.8 Secondly, there are researchers in
the history of philosophy who have produced an enormous amount of
texts in a field identified as Spinoza Studies. In these cases, Spinoza is
the explicit object of the inquiry, and the haunting force of his name
manifests itself in the rigorous and in-depth efforts of researchers to
reconstruct the conceptual framework of his system.
Between these two extremes of interpretation (Spinoza as an ex-
plicit object of study, and Spinoza as a speculative element, absent
from the actual research) a reading such as Althusser’s explicitly asserts
the Spinozian perspective as the supporting framework for his own
theoretical interventions — yet he does so without elaborating the
specific connections that were useful for him. Althusser effectively dis-
plays a mode of ‘being Spinozist’ that consists in taking from Spinoza
certain hypothesis that he never proclaimed but did authorize;9 in
fact, these Spinozist coordinates can be seen all throughout Althusser’s
texts, where they act as a type of channel for his own discourse that
then flows — while contained by that immanent structure — onto
other vital and urgent matters.
Another famous interpretation of Spinoza, in this case by Deleuze,
also responds to the interpellation produced by the name ‘Spinoza’.
Deleuze became the explicit interlocutor of a philosophical conver-
sation that creates a common discursive groundwork. I would say
that the terms of Deleuze’s philosophy emerge through a composi-
tion with other voices (among which Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s voices
figure prominently), while they also display an analysis whose plasti-
8 Sigmund Freud to Lothar Bickel, 28 June 1931, quoted fromYirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza
andOtherHeretics:TheAdventures of Immanence (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1989), p. 139; English translation in H. Z. Winnik, ‘A Long-Lost and Recently
Recovered Letter of Freud’, Israel Annals of Psychiatry, 13 (1975), pp. 1–5.
9 ‘We were guilty of an equally powerful and compromising passion: we were Spinozists.
In our own way, of course, which was not Brunschvicg’s! And by attributing to the
author of the Tractatus Theologico- Politicus and the Ethics a number of theses which
he would surely never have acknowledged, though they did not actually contradict
him’. Louis Althusser, ‘On Spinoza’, in Essays in Self-Criticism, trans. by Grahame Lock
(London: New Left Books, 1976), pp. 132–41 (p. 132).
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city seeks to distil the conceptual content of things themselves. And
different results arise from the reciprocal contamination of these spe-
cific interlocutions: a Deleuzian Spinoza, a Deleuzian Nietzsche, a
Spinozian/Nietzschean Deleuze; but also a Nietzschean Spinoza and
a Spinozian Nietzsche.
From a different angle, we can observe that while Deleuze’s read-
ing is more philosophical than political, a reading such as Antonio
Negri’s, which draws directly on Deleuze, is more political than philo-
sophical. Negri’s interpretation has inspired a whole series of contem-
porary uses of Spinoza that renew his concepts as a kind of stimulant
for political action in the present. Responding to the urgent nature of
such multivalent interventions, the name ‘Spinoza’ is wielded as a kind
of ontological guarantee for the emancipation of humanity.
The underlying benefit of understanding these different ways of
relating to Spinoza is that they represent different ways of actualiz-
ing immanence, and this is true whether his philosophy appears as a
speculative atmosphere favouring the production of ideas, or as an
underlying structure explaining a series of argumentative moves, or
as the theoretical-political inspiration for an imagination that trusts in
concrete horizons of collective happiness.
To return to the polarity that organizes this argument, I would say
that the works in the history of philosophy that address Spinoza as
their explicit object of study principally focus upon the immanence of
history in his philosophical texts. Spinoza’s thought is reconstructed as
a situated thought that participates in the life of his time and all the de-
bates that traverse it; and this reading, which extends from the present
back to seventeenth-century thought, argues for a universal dimension
of certain human dilemmas. Of course, the readings I have located at
the opposite side of the spectrum do not suppress history, but they
relate immanence to the power of the human intellect to produce ef-
fects. When Freud admits his dependence on Spinoza’s philosophy,
he means that immanence is connected to the power of the singular
and a certain dimension of universal experience. But now immanence
refers to an ethics whereby ‘knowledge is the most powerful affect’.10
10 ‘I am really amazed, really delighted! I have a precursor, andwhat a precursor! I hardly
knew Spinoza: what brought me to him now was the guidance of instinct. Not only
is his whole tendency like my own — to make knowledge the most powerful passion
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Thus, methodological precautions around historical distance are not
of any great concern for this type of Spinozism, wherein everything
that may emerge from the reader’s sensibility and acuity is suitable for
discovering or inventing other realities and concepts.
The range of readings that I have briefly sketched out are dis-
tributed according to the nuances resulting from the tension between
the presence or absence of Spinoza. This same series of contempor-
ary readings (whose shared affinity, as I have said, can be considered
from Macherey’s idea of Spinoza as a theoretical unconscious) can be
further interrogated by analysing their position in relation to Marxist
philosophical and political debates from the 1960s onward. This is
especially important because these ‘Spinozisms’ were essential for this
period’s response to the hegemony of Hegelian philosophy in critical
theory (that is to say, in the theory that was affected, under various
modes, by the theoretical revolution of Marx). Within this new virtual
axis, which intercepts the aforementioned one, the relevant polarity
distinguishes two positions vis-à-vis Hegelian dialectics: an open re-
jection (Deleuze) and a critical revision (Althusser).
It was Deleuze who most decisively responded to the challenge
of breaking with dialectical negativity, and instead asserted the central
concept of his project as difference. According to Deleuze, the concept
of contradiction began to reveal its conservative core when compared
to the potentialities that came with a politics of difference: he argued
that contradiction revealed itself as a constellation of sad passions as-
sociated with the interiorization of subjection, a culture dominated
by the specular dynamic of resentment, and a logic that ultimately
served as an accomplice to the state’s quest to capitalize on social
conflicts for the accumulation of power. By contrast, Althusser was
more cautious in his questioning of dialectics and, in his self-critical
writings, ultimately recognized that ‘a Marxist cannot make the detour
— but also in five main points of his doctrine I find myself; this most abnormal and
lonely thinker is closest to me in these points precisely: he denies free will, purposes,
the moral world order, the nonegoistical, evil; of course the differences are enormous,
but they are differences more of period, culture, field of knowledge. In summa: my
solitariness which, as on very highmountains, has often, oftenmademe gasp for breath
and lose blood, is now at least a solitude for two. Strange!’. Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘To
Franz Overbeck [Postmarked Sils Engd., July 30, 1881]’, in Christopher Middleton,
Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996),
pp. 176–77 (p. 177).
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via Spinoza without paying for it. For the adventure is perilous, and
whatever you do, you cannot find in Spinoza what Hegel gave to Marx:
contradiction’.11 Given Althusser’s commitment to the renovation of
Marxist thought, he performed an incisive critique of the contempor-
ary versions of Marxism — especially those whose response to the
determinist suffocation of the ‘laws of history’ was a subjectivist vol-
untarism that placed its faith in the end of oppression — while still
never claiming outright that dialectical thought should be abandoned.
The complexity of immanent causality was arraigned in order to coun-
teract the simplifying and homogenizing nature of Hegelian dialectics,
wherein the object of critique became the specific structures of idealist
dialectics (that is, the simple negation, the negation of the negation,
the identity of contraries, the transformation of quantity into quality,
and the logic of the dialectical overcoming). Althusser pursued all this
without eliminating the notion of contradiction from the conceptual
horizon, which remained necessary for thinking of politics in its con-
stitutively conflictual dimension.
Having offered this sort of cartography of contemporary Spinozist
materialism, I must confess my own affinities: in the axis that displays
the presence or absence of a direct reference to Spinoza in discourses
attempting to address the present conjuncture, my sympathies lie with
the Freudian strategy. I think the potency of the Spinozian perspec-
tive is at its most uniquely productive when one assumes it as one’s
own —without accepting the interdictions that come with speak-
ing a ‘Spinozist langue’. Along the other axis distributing positions
facing dialectics, my sympathies are with the Althusserian strategy:
the acceptance that one must be anti-dialectical in order to think on
Spinoza’s terms not only impoverishes the conceptual universe, but
also leads to serious political limitations if it means to renounce incis-
ive moments of twentieth-century emancipatory thought (especially
works such as Adorno’s, which sought to combat fascism in its several
manifestations that included those of Western democracies).
Furthermore, a certain negative dialectics becomes necessary
when, as I have suggested, there exists (as there does today) a type of
neo-Spinozism that is functional to the neoliberal ethos. The manage-
ment of affects by the global right-wing movements and governments
11 Althusser, ‘On Spinoza’, p. 141.
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is evinced in two complementary ways. On the one hand, stoking and
channelling social hatred, which in turn becomes the affective infra-
structure required to demonize social policies and their beneficiaries
and to spread an anti-political attitude among the masses (in Latin
America, the right-wing forces have sought, in this way, to delegitimize
the politics pursued by progressive governments — who are disquali-
fied as populists— over the last decade). On the other hand, cultivating
false emotions and banal happiness as the support for positive thinking
that disposes people to deny pain (their own and that of others) and
inhibit their sensitivity to the point that they become numb and are
unable to recognize any kind of distress. This form of positive think-
ing reinforces adaptation to ever more hostile conditions of life and
neutralizes any critical reflexivity that would allow for a questioning of
the purported inevitability of the neoliberal course of the world. The
resulting disposition is one in which people trust and wait for busi-
nessmen and post-fascist leaders to join up with the individual efforts
of those who deserve the good life (that is, the part of the population
that ‘puts in the effort’ and struggles to survive ‘without outside assist-
ance’). Against both tendencies, it would be useful to exercise a certain
Adornian dialectical negativity.
Now I will attempt to assimilate the Adorno/Spinoza intersection
into this schema that presses for the importance of certain theoretical
alliances in the name of a materialist critique of the contemporary
world.
SPINOZA AND ADORNO, ALLIES IN CRITICISM
Adorno and Spinoza can be regarded as materialist critics of moral
philosophy because both of them depart from the Platonic tradition
in a similar way. The model of the subject that emerges from Platonic
philosophy — as the theoretical response to a practical need to justify
the existing social order — is replicated across Western philosophical
moralism right up until the present day. When that moralism seeks to
justify the social order by relying on the identitybetween particular and
general, Adorno responds by emphasizing the falsehood of that iden-
tification and re-establishing the legibility of the contradiction hidden
by the idealist operation.
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Spinoza’s political anti-moralism, which he asserts as anti-
Platonic,12 goes with his Machiavellianism. His assertion that ‘no
men are less suitable to guide Public Affairs than Theorists, or
Philosophers’13 is in direct conflict with the Platonic model of the
Philosopher King. But against the temptation of a vulgarly pragmatic
interpretation of this defence of politics against philosophical
idealism, Spinozian ethics is far from any immediate facticity (that is
to say, far from the affirmation of the things and men in their existing
state) and instead produces something that is explicitly labelled as a
‘model’: one must ‘form an idea of man, a model of human nature
which we may look to’. This is then a theoretical-practical necessity
that is upheld by straining the system’s own postulates: although
nature does not work in favour of ends or models, and despite the
fact that nothing in it can be regarded as either perfect or imperfect,
‘we shall say that men are more perfect or imperfect, insofar as they
approach more or less near to this model’.14
So, while Spinoza’s ethics is anti-moralist on the practical terrain,
and anti-Platonic on the philosophical terrain, it nevertheless calls for
the need to use ideal models (analogous to what moral philosophy
conceives of as the ‘ought’ that guides all behaviour). The counterpoint
between reality and model, between the actual functioning of things
and the invocation of another, sought-after mode of being, is deployed
in order to think of human types and forms of life capable of condensing
the critical energies of the present. And that operation allows for non-
conventional modes of conceiving of the meaning of realism within
philosophical-political discussion.
Therefore, the opposition between reality and model in Spinozian
ethics can be schematized in the following manner: if the image of
man evoking an inexistent human nature corresponds to norms of an
existing social order, the idea of man, arising from what an actually
existing human nature can do, would correspond to a non-existent
social order, since it would emerge from the transformation of the
present.
12 See Ep. lvi [to Hugo Boxel]; CWS ii, p. 423.
13 TP i, 1; CWS ii, p. 504.
14 Ethics iv, Praef.; CWS i, p. 545.
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I would argue that this counterpoint coincides precisely with the
‘contradiction’ that Adorno says we must not abandon: the short-
circuit at the heart of reality itself. But if we think this alongside
Spinoza, we are able to see that this ‘contradiction’ does not assume the
form of a logical contradiction. Instead, it has the complex structure of
a chiasmus, which contrasts a false reality with a true model. Against
the false reality — where the idealized, non-existent individual (whose
free self-determination is based on his desire, will, and understanding)
responds to the imperatives of an existing order (which requires the
aforementioned falsity for its own reproduction) — a true model is
invoked, one which connects the power of the collectively existing
individual with the possibility of a just, non-existent order.
However, it must be said that this model is not an utopian one:
efforts of thought aimed at this transformation are not guided by an
image of a future society to be obtained (‘a Fantasy, possible only in
Utopia’15) but rather by the attempt to think the actual given condi-
tions and developments unfolding from a situation in the sense of its
subversion.
The idea of a ‘model’, which serves the role of imagining a real-
ity more perfect than the present reality, constitutes a peculiar type
of realism which is far from all pragmatic reproductive possibilism.
Thinking rigorously from the conditions of a present conjuncture does
not mean, however, that the political response to this concrete situ-
ation is conceived of as the political expression of those conditions, that
is, as a political ratification of facts. Quite the contrary: this political
response is motivated by the desire to transform those conditions, a
desire which is recognized in an imperative: suffering must cease. Such
an imperative is clearly not derived from the norms that organize this
given order, but rather from the sensibility associated with another
ethics or morality.
To conclude, what I am suggesting here is that this anti-Platonic,
Spinozian/Machiavellian realism is compatible with the Adornian cri-
tique of facticity and administrative utopianism that tries to spiritualize
it; and it is compatible with the fragile promise of emancipation that
emerges from the determinate negation of this actuality.
15 TP i, 1; CWS ii, p. 503.

Non Defuit Materia
Freedom and Necessity in Spinoza’s Democratic Theory
STEFANO VISENTIN
INTRODUCTION: ONTOLOGY AND POLITICS IN SPINOZA
One of the most relevant novelties introduced by the studies of the
last decades on Baruch Spinoza’s political philosophy concerns the
emergence in his works of a profound connection between politics
and ontology. Just to give an example, in a recent book Antonio Negri
wrote: ‘The political thought of Spinoza is to be found in his ontology’,
since ‘in Spinoza the political is […] a potency exceeding all measure,
an accumulation not of substantial (individual) segments but of modal
(singular) potencies’.1 It is a statement which can be read within a
specific historical context, namely the birth of modern capitalism,
which Negri described with the following words:
When modernity inaugurated the capitalist development, the
new productive forces (and above all the living labour) had to
be subjected to an ancient, eternal seal of power, to the abso-
luteness of a command that legitimized the new relations of
production. From then on every attempt to break this frame
1 Antonio Negri, Spinoza for our Time: Politics and Postmodernity, trans. by William
McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), pp. 9–10.
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was considered reprehensible and heresiarch […]. With this it
was affirmed that modern metaphysics (and when we say meta-
physics, we always mean in some way theology) sharpened its
political claim. Since then, in fact, metaphysics has always been
political.2
Despite the great relevance of this new interpretation, which is a radical
innovation in terms of reading Spinoza’s two political treatises, this
chapter maintains that such a reading can be developed in two further
directions: on the one hand, by fostering the dialogue with a more
historically contextualized perspective; on the other hand, by theor-
etically problematizing the implicit (and in some case even explicit)
teleologism of this interpretation. In this direction, an important step
has been made by Étienne Balibar in his seminal essay on the fear of
the masses,3 but there are still some more issues to take into account.
One of these issues is certainly the political meaning of the identity
Spinoza establishes between necessity and freedom. This identity has
been studied at length by the scholars of Spinoza’s ontology,4 but it
has never received the attention it deserves from scholars of Spinoza’s
political philosophy. The issue concerning the political relationship
between freedom and necessity or, in other words, the relationship
between subjective and objective conditions of collective action, is a
real ‘raw nerve’ of modern political theory. This is because it brings
into question the very possibility of whether humans can modify their
(collective) lives: in a certain way, the meaning of concepts like eman-
cipation, progress, reform, and revolution depends on the resolution
of the problem of the complex connection between freedom and ne-
cessity.
2 Antonio Negri, ‘Politiche dell’immanenza, politiche della trascendenza. Saggio
popolare’, in Storia politica della moltitudine, ed. by Filippo Del Lucchese (Rome:
DeriveApprodi, 2009), pp. 86–96 (p. 87; my translation). See also Stefano Visentin,
‘A ontologia política de Espinosa na leitura de Antonio Negri’, Cadernos Espinosanos,
38 (2018), pp. 151–70.
3 Étienne Balibar, ‘Spinoza, the Anti-Orwell: The Fear of the Masses’, Rethinking Marx-
ism, 2.3 (1989), pp. 104–39.
4 Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984) is one of the most relevant essays on this subject published in the last
decades; but another significant example is also provided by Don Garrett, Nature and
Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
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Compared to the approach taken by the vast majority of modern
political philosophers, Spinoza followed quite an original path when
attempting to address this problematic, which depends on the peculi-
arity of his ontology. His provocative perspective can be summarized
by the corollary of Ethics ii, Def. 6: ‘By “reality” and “perfection” I
understand the same thing’:5 a definition which never ceased to haunt
his readers, because, if it is very difficult to accept that the world in
which we live is perfect, it is almost unacceptable to consider human
actions, both individual and collective, as such, especially when their
consequences are negative — not to say catastrophic — for other
people, even when they simply diverge from the intention of the agent
subject(s). It is a well-known fact that, from the very beginning of the
Ethics, Spinoza emphasizes the distinction between his conception of
freedom and the idea of free will, stating that ‘that thing is called free
which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined
to act by itself alone’;6 from this perspective, the consequences which
this distinction produces on men’s collective lives and actions, that is
on their history, must be taken into account. Three fundamental issues
must be highlighted: Firstly, what are the political effects of the illusory
character of free will, i.e. how is such an illusion used politically, and
by whom? This issue is taken into account by Spinoza both in Ethics
i, App., and in Theological-Political Treatise, Praef., where it is exposed
as the dilemma of voluntary servitude. Secondly, given the ontological
identity of reality and perfection, how can a form of government which
limits its subjects’ freedom be considered a perfect government (this is
the case of absolute monarchy or tyranny, which Spinoza deals with in
the Political Treatise)? Thirdly, as a consequence of this second point,
how a free multitude is created is something that must be understood,
especially how it differentiates itself from a subjugated one and, even
more so, how a subjugated multitude can develop in a free one. This
last point plays a fundamental role in the definition and fulfilment of
5 ‘Per perfectionem et realitatem idem intelligo’ (CWS [The Collected Works of Spinoza,
see abbreviations], i, p. 447; Gebhardt ii, 85). It is worth noting that this definition
is not enclosed within Ethics i, devoted to the discussion of God’s nature, but within
Ethics ii, which takes ‘The Nature and the Origin of the Mind’ (CWS i, p. 446) into
account; therefore, this identity concerns not only the infinite nature of God, but also
the finite nature of his modes.
6 Ethics i, Def. 7; CWS i, p. 409.
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a democratic regime, i.e. of the most absolute and desirable form of
political organization7 (although some scholars, e.g. Alexandre Math-
eron and Riccardo Caporali, have shown that Spinoza’s democracy is
far from being perfect).8 What is at stake here is the new materialist
approach to both individual and collective behaviours, which Spinoza
tries to elaborate: an approach which, anticipating Marx’s reading of
Feuerbach,9 aims to overcome the radical dichotomy between free-
dom and necessity established by Descartes, thus revealing a new
philosophical and political path within the conceptual framework of
modernity.10
THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMAGINARY NATURE
OF FREE WILL
In the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza remarks that
Now if nature had so constituted men that they desired nothing
except what true reason teaches them to desire, then of course
a society could exist without laws; in that case it would be
completely sufficient to teach men true moral lessons, so that
they would do voluntarily, wholeheartedly, and in a manner
worthy of a free man, what is really useful.11
On the one hand, this statement expresses the idea that a civil and
political organization is needed for humans to live in peace, but, on
7 See TP xi, 1; CWS ii, p. 601; Gebhardt iii, p. 358: ‘I come, finally, to the third and
completely absolute state [omnino absolutum imperium], which we call Democratic’.
8 Alexandre Matheron, ‘Women and Servants in Spinozist Democracy’, in his Politics,
Ontology and Knowledge in Spinoza (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020),
pp. 260–79; Riccardo Caporali, ‘La moltitudine e gli esclusi’, in Spinoza: individuo e
moltitudine, ed. byRiccardoCaporali, VittorioMorfino, and StefanoVisentin (Cesena:
Il Ponte Vecchio, 2007), pp. 93–104.
9 See Karl Marx, ‘Thesen über Feuerbach’, in MEW [Marx-Engels-Werke, see abbrevi-
ations], iii (1958), pp. 5–7. Spinoza’s heritage in the thought ofMarx has been extens-
ively debated in the last decades: see Karl Ritter, Prozesse der Befreiung. Marx, Spinoza
und die Bedingungen eines freien Gemeinwesens (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot,
2011); Frédéric Lordon, Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire (Lon-
don: Verso Books, 2014); Franck Fischbach, La Production des hommes. Marx avec
Spinoza (Paris: Vrin, 2014).
10 The idea of ‘another’ modernity, different if not opposed to the mainstream one
developed by Descartes, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel, is very present in Negri’s
thought; see, e.g.MichaelHardt andAntonioNegri,Commonwealth (Cambridge,MA:
Harvard University Press, 2009).
11 TTP v, 20; CWS ii, p. 144.
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the other hand, it also emphasizes the many risks threatening the
construction and duration of the same, especially the very difficult task
to transform the choices of irrational individuals into rational ones.
Humans are not born rational and free, as the seventeenth century
doctrine of natural law — especially Hugo Grotius’s — used to claim;
instead, they are naturally subjugated by affects, as the title of Ethics iv
asserts.12 This enslavement coincides with human beings’ impotence
to moderate their passions and with their constant exposure to the
power of external phenomena they cannot govern.13 Nevertheless,
humans imagine they possess natural freedom according to which
they believe that they consciously want what they desire and what
they try to achieve: ‘[humans] think themselves free, because they are
conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even
in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to wanting
and willing, because they are ignorant of [those causes]’.14
Imagination is a constitutive element of human impotence, as it
promotes the transformation of the human ‘internal’ subjugation to
passive affects (i.e. passions) into an ‘external’ enslavement to those
who are able to take advantage of such passivity and use it to estab-
lish political authority based upon ignorance and superstition (above
all the clergy and the monarchs). Spinoza remarks upon this in Eth-
ics I, App.: ‘For they [the priests] know that if ignorance is taken
away, then foolish wonder, the only means they have of arguing and
defending their authority is also taken away’.15 It could be said that
the more humans imagine they are endowed with free will, the more
they are enslaved or at risk of being enslaved. The alliance between
priests and kings instrumentally manipulates the natural illusion of
freedom, which affects all human beings, and establishes, in Spinoza’s
own words, ‘the greatest secret of monarchic rule’.16 This manipulation
12 Ethics iv; CWS i, p. 543; Gebhardt ii, p. 205: ‘On Human Bondage, or the Power of
the Affects’ (De servitute humana seu de affectuum viribus).
13 Ibid.
14 Ethics i, App.; CWS i, p. 440.
15 Ibid.; CWS i, pp. 443–44.
16 TTP Praef.; CWS ii, p. 68; Gebhardt iii, p. 7: ‘The greatest secret of monarchic
rule [regiminis Monarchici summum arcanum], and its main interest, is to keep men
deceived, and to cloak in the specious name of Religion the fear by which they must
be checked, so that they will fight for slavery as they would for their survival’.
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induces humans to fight for their servitude as if they ‘freely’ accepted
a single individual’s dominion who then goes on to become the one
and only reference point for all their hopes and desires. Moreover,
the passivity of such an imagination reinforces the idea (or better, the
image) of a God promoted by the theological-political apparatus, as
Ethics ii, 3, Schol. confirms in an extraordinary analysis which com-
bines anthropology, psychology, and theology:
By ‘God’s power’ ordinary people understand God’s free will
and his right over all things which are, things which on that
account are commonly considered to be contingent. For they
say that God has the power of destroying all things and re-
ducing them to nothing. Further, they often compare God’s
power with the power of kings. But we have refuted this […].
Again, if it were agreeable to pursue these matters further, I
could also show here that the power which ordinary people
fictitiously ascribe to God is not only human (which shows that
ordinary people conceive God as a man, or as like a man), but
also involves lack of power.17
Spinoza’s criticism of free will involves a radical calling into question of
God’s ‘vulgar’ image — here the term vulgus, i.e. the common people
or plebs, does not refer to a determinate social group, but rather to
all those who are subject to the hallucinatory power of imagination
— and especially of the view that God is considered to possess an
absolutely undetermined will, the ‘power of destroying all things’. This
alleged power over life and death leads to the attribution of a divine
origin for monarchs, such that their freedom reveals itself in the right
to condemn their subjects to death. However, according to Spinoza,
God’s freedom has nothing to do with such a nihilist representation.
Spinoza’s God is an infinite power (potentia, notpotestas) strictly deter-
mined in every action, a productive force which actually realizes every
single potentiality, since it ‘non defuit materia [did not lack material]’,
that is, in the words of Ethics i, App., God has the capacity ‘to create
all things, from the highest degree of perfection to the lowest’. To be
even more precise, Spinoza’s God is an infinite power ‘[b]ecause the
laws of his nature have been so ample that they sufficed for producing
all things that can be conceived by an infinite intellect’.18 This is also
17 Ethics ii, 3 Schol.; CWS i, p. 449.
18 Ethics i, App.; CWS i, p. 446; Gebhardt ii, p. 83.
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why one of the most relevant aspects of Spinoza’s republicanism can
be found in his criticism of the superstitious and alienating structure of
monarchy.Nondefuitmateria can thus be read as the motto of Spinozist
materialism, since it means that the infinite power of God is far from
being circumscribed by the finite power of the human mind, which
can only understand it, so to say, ‘intensively’ but not in its entire
extension; moreover, non defuit materia also implies that this power
is materialist and continuously produces concrete transformations of
reality, including human reality, by means of an internal intervention
into the structure of the body (again, including collective bodies).
TYRANNY AS A ‘PERFECT’ POLITICAL REGIME
In Ethics iii, Praef., Spinoza states that humans cannot be considered
‘a dominion within a dominion [veluti imperium in imperio]’,19 or as
those who must not follow the laws of nature as if they were part of a
different realm. This assertion is not only true for common people but
also for kings, who, as the Political Treatise points out, ‘are not gods, but
men, who are often captivated by the Sirens’ song’.20 In Spinoza’s view,
kingdoms are founded on subjects’ weaknesses rather than on king’s
strengths, since ‘a whole multitude would never transfer its right to one
or a few people, if its members could agree among themselves and not
go from the kind of controversy generally aroused in large Councils
to a rebellion’.21 Thus, the existence of monarchical governments does
not depend on the qualities of a single exceptional person but rather on
the passivity of popular imaginations and affects, which expresses the
(relative) impotence of a multitude which is unable to create a more
developed and rational regime. In other words, a kings’ authority is
produced by the fear the multitude incites in itself much more than
by the fear incited by kings over the populace. This reflexive fear22
comes from the natural (that is: necessary) complexion of human im-
19 Ibid., CWS i, p. 491; Gebhardt ii, p. 137.
20 TP vii, 1; CWS ii, p. 544.
21 TP vii, 5; CWS ii, p. 547.
22 See Stefano Visentin, ‘Paura delle masse e desiderio dell’uno. Considerazioni
sull’ambivalenza della potentia multitudinis’, in Storia politica della moltitudine, ed. by
Del Lucchese, pp. 181–98.
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agination, which prevents the multitude from peacefully resolving the
inevitable disputes and conflicts that arise internally. For this reason,
Spinoza emphasizes that ‘a multitude freely transfers to the king only
what it cannot have absolutely in its power, i.e., an end to controver-
sies and speed in making decisions’,23 in order to avoid the threat of
uninterrupted sedition within the citizenry; this is also the reason why
‘a Commonwealth is always put at greater risk on account of its citizens
than on account of its enemies’.24
Because the conferral of absolute power upon the monarch derives
from a collective hallucination, it follows that the ‘perfection’ of mon-
archies and even tyrannies originates from very natural and necessary
causes that define the history of these regimes, including their birth,
developments, and crises. Moreover, this identification between real-
ity and perfection plays a fundamental political role because it rejects
any moralistic justification of monarchy that would consider the mon-
arch’s power as the result of an ethical superiority of one man over the
masses, or of tyrants’ authority as God’s punishment for citizens’ sins.
On the contrary, Spinoza removes the monarch-tyrant from the centre
of the stage and integrates them into a wider causal configuration in
terms of a collective subject (the multitude), which then appears as the
main political actor, even within the historical circumstances where
this collective subject appears to be at the lowest level of its capacity.
The imperium (that is, the articulated structure of power relationships
within an organized collectivity)25 is thus always ‘defined by the power
of a multitude (potentia multitudinis)’,26 even when this power ap-
pears to be a sort of impotence or incapacity to give birth to free and
democratic regimes.27 However, this impotence is necessary, and this
necessity frees politics of any moralistic or voluntaristic overdetermin-
23 TP vii, 5; CWS ii, p. 547.
24 TP vi, 6; CWS ii, p. 534.
25 The Latin term is hereby maintained because translating the Spinozist meaning of
imperium with a single English word is very difficult, if not impossible, since neither
sovereignty (as in Curley’s translation), nor ‘State’, nor ‘dominion’, nor ‘government’
are fit to express the complexity of a political structure which is composed by laws and
institutions, but also by (collective) imagination and affects.
26 TP ii, 17; CWS ii, p. 514.
27 In his Imperium. Structures et affects des corps politiques (Paris: La fabrique, 2015),
Frédéric Lordon points out that ‘there is no tribunal for the peoples’ merit or fault,
there is only the entirely positive measure of their power’ (p. 157; my translation).
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ation: there is neither a God to reward or punish humans, nor a devil
to deceive them, nor original sin to cloud their free willingness to do
good; there is only the natural constitution of a finite mode — or a
composition of finite modes — which expresses the divine power in
a dynamic and continuously transforming historical reality. It is not
a coincidence that, in Ethics iv, Praef., Spinoza once again takes into
account the meaning of perfection in a different context from the quo-
tation already given in Ethics ii, Def. 6. The emergence of this new
definition of perfection is preceded by several references in Ethics iii
to a gradation of perfection in terms of it being lesser or greater, as
in the following example: ‘We see, then, that the mind can undergo
great changes, and pass now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection.’28
Therefore, the concrete existence of minds (and bodies) can modify
their reality — that is, their perfection — insofar as they affect and are
affected by other minds (and bodies), and this is true so long as minds
and bodies are seen as equally enmeshed in this process:
Perfection and imperfection therefore are only modes of think-
ing, i.e. notions we are accustomed to feign [fingere] because we
compare individuals of the same species or genus to another.
But the main thing to note is that when I say that someone
passes from a lesser to a greater perfection, and the opposite,
I do not understand that he is changed from one essence, or
form to another […]. Rather, we consider that his power of
acting [agendi potentiam], insofar as it is understood from his
nature, is increased or diminished.29
With this meaning, the word ‘perfection’ expresses the measure of the
power of an individual (or a collective) to act in a specific moment of
their lives, therefore it indicates the intersection between reality as the
essence of a God’s finite mode and the same reality as the indefinite
perseverance in existence, that is, as a continuous and necessary trans-
formation.
28 Ethics iii, 11 Schol.; CWS i, p. 500. See also Ethics iii, DA 2 and 3; CWS i, p. 531;
Gebhardt ii, p. 191: ‘2. Joy [Laetitia] is a man’s passage from a lesser to a greater
perfection. 3. Sadness [Tristitia] is aman’s passage from a greater to a lesser perfection.’
29 Ethics iv, Praef.; CWS i, pp. 545–46; Gebhardt ii, pp. 206–08.
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THE NECESSARY FREEDOM OF THE MULTITUDE
The third and last point concerns the meaning of political freedom
in Spinoza’s thought, and the conditions by which a multitude can
concretely realize it. In a fascinating essay, François Zourabichvili has
called this issue ‘the enigma of the free multitude’.30 To face this issue
(from a different but complementary perspective to Zourabichvili’s),
a brief summary of Spinoza’s conception of natural law must be taken
into account, in order to highlight the original and profound connec-
tion between freedom and necessity it contains. In the Theological-
Political Treatise, Spinoza writes that every individual is ‘naturally
determined to existing and having effects in a certain way’ by his natural
right, therefore this right is the expression of a ‘determinate power’
(determinata potentia),31 which defines a real and effective space of
action, legitimately included (to maintain a juridical lexicon) within
the infinite effects and connections caused by divine power. From this
perspective, as André Tosel once noted in a fundamental essay,32 the
mode’s finitude is a positive one, since it expresses an operative part of
an infinite power to act. The ethical problem par excellence is thus, to
use Tosel’s words, ‘to become active on the foundation of an irremov-
able passivity’,33 since every human, just as every finite mode, is ‘both
a product and a producer of transitive indefinite operations, which at
the same time express themselves as intrinsic determinations’.34 To
put it in a slightly different manner, the issue becomes how to relate
to other humans who affect us from a perspective which, although
unable to entirely overcome this otherness, nevertheless tries to build
connections on the basis of what is common by promoting both the
internalization of positive affections and the externalization of what
affects others in a positive way. Obviously, such positivity is far from
being absolute, because it is delimited by the power of other modes,
30 François Zourabichvili, ‘L’Énigmede lamultitude libre’, inLaMultitude libre.Nouvelles
lectures du ‘Traité Politique’, ed. by Chantal Jaquet, Pascal Sévérac, and Ariel Suhamy
(Paris: Amsterdam, 2008), pp. 69–80.
31 TTP xvi; CWS i, p. 282; Gebhardt iii, p. 189.
32 André Tosel, ‘La Finitude positive’, in his Spinoza ou l’autre (in)finitude (Paris:
L’Harmattan, 2008), pp. 157–72.
33 Ibid., p. 163; my translation.
34 Ibid., pp. 165–66; my translation.
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and, as far as humans are concerned, by the ambivalent character of
affects and imagination; nevertheless, since every individual occupies a
specific place within the spatio-temporal continuum, they also develop
the capacity (in Spinoza’s words, the aptitudo)35 to compose their bod-
ies and ideas — including their imagination and affects — strategically
(to recuperate the military metaphor used by Laurent Bove).36 They
do this in order to resist the external forces which try to break up their
cohesion and which would therefore weaken the common power they
want to build. Consequently, the ability to be active (that is, to be an
adequate cause of one’s own actions), and thus to be free, depends
on the permanent confrontation and collision with the external world,
driven by the striving to modify the relationships towards it (and in
particular towards other humans), to increase our power, and to resist
the power of others according to our capacity. Hence, everyone’s de-
terminate potentia materializes within an existential and indeterminate
framework in a continuous variation of its increments and reductions.
Nonetheless, as Ethics ii, 45 Schol. states, ‘even if each thing is de-
termined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the
force by which each one persists in existing follows from the eternal
necessity of God’s nature’.37 As Christopher Skeaff recently noted in
his book Becoming Political, this persistence cannot be interpreted as a
‘norm’ in the legal sense, that is, as the conformity to a predetermined
rule, but rather as ‘the power to transform the conditions of one’s activ-
ity’.38 Here the ‘extrinsic [and extensive] finitude’ of a mode’s power
coincides with its ‘intrinsic [and intensive] infinitude’, producing an
indefinite striving to persevere — that is, to increase one’s power — in
existence.
35 In TP iv, 4; CWS ii, p. 526; Gebhardt iii, p. 293, ‘capacity’ (aptitudo) is defined
with the following words: ‘When we say each person can decide whatever he wishes
concerning a thing of which he is the master, this power must be defined not only by
the power of the agent [non sola agendi potential], but also by the capacity of what he’s
acting on [ipsius patientis aptitudine]’.
36 Laurent Bove, Affirmation and Resistance in Spinoza: Strategy of the Conatus (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020).
37 CWS i, p. 482.
38 Christopher Skeaff, Becoming Political: Spinoza’s Vital Republicanism and the Demo-
cratic Power of Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), p. 84.
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The same existential indefinite nature of a mode’s finite power,
which Spinoza calls ‘vacillation of mind [fluctuatio animi]’,39 is trace-
able in the life of a mode’s aggregate, since, as Spinoza states in Ethics ii,
Def. 7: ‘if a number of individuals so concur in one action that together
they are all the cause of one effect, I consider them all, as to that extent,
as one singular thing’.40 The political existence of a multitude develops
as a transition from a degree of power to a different degree of power;
therefore, the different political regimes analysed by the Political Treat-
ise cannot be understood as rigid and monolithic realities, but rather
as the effects of a continuous variation of the potentia multitudinis,
which produces what could be called a fluctuatio imperii, that is, the
uninterrupted transformation of a political regime into another.41 In
this perspective, the relationship between the power (potentia) of the
multitude and the imperium, as defined in the Political Treatise ii, 17,
can assume two different configurations: on the one side, it can be
represented as an internal determination — so that the potentia mul-
titudinis coincides with the imperium’s laws and commands; but, on
the other side, in specific circumstances, this determination emerges
from the ‘outside’, so that the action of the multitude on the imperium
assumes the shape of a form of resistance to its laws and commands.
Two examples of this second relationship can be found in the
Political Treatise: the first one concerns the aristocratic regime, the
second one the political consequences of the affect of indignation.
Regarding his analysis of aristocracy, Spinoza points out that this kind
of imperium is based upon the clear distinction between the patricians
and the rest of the multitude who are excluded from institutions and
even from the rights of citizenship.42 Therefore, the only instrument
the multitude possesses to obtain political visibility is that of instilling
fear in the rulers: ‘The only reason its [aristocratic] rule is not in
practice absolute is that the multitude is terrifying to its rulers. If it [the
multitude] doesn’t claim that freedom for itself by an explicit law, it still
39 Ethics iii, 17 Schol.;CWS i, p. 504;Gebhardt ii, p. 153: ‘This constitution of theMind
which arises from two contrary affects is called “vacillation of mind”’.
40 CWS i, p. 447.
41 Skeaff defines thismovement as a ‘scalar, as opposed to dichotomous, understanding of
freedom and power that finite individuals [and finite ensemble of individuals as well]
are capable of achieving’ (Skeaff, Becoming Political, p. 86).
42 See TP viii, 3; CWS ii, p. 566.
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claims it tacitly and maintains it’.43 The potentia multitudinis applies
an affective ‘pressure’ on the institutional framework, determining it
from the outside, and thus constituting an apparent otherness which
cannot be integrated unless it is through the transformation of the
institutions themselves. The second example concerns the emergence
of a collective aversion to the ruler(s), due to their behaviours which
strongly collide with citizens’ imaginative constitution:
So for the Commonwealth to be its own master, it is bound to
maintain the causes of fear and respect. Otherwise it ceases to
be a Commonwealth […]. To slaughter and rob his subjects,
to rape their young women, and actions of that kind, turn fear
into indignation, and hence turn the civil order into a state of
hostility.44
The transformation of the multitude’s fear into indignation (which
is defined as ‘hate toward someone who has done evil to another’
in the Ethics)45 produces a radical change in the political order of
the imperium and creates the conditions for the emergence of a ‘state
of hostility’ (status hostilitatis), which resembles the Hobbesian state
of nature/state of war, with the relevant difference that the conflict
is now polarized between those who were formerly ruled and the
former rulers in a sort of reinterpretation of the Machiavellian theory
of humours.46
In these two examples, the multitude expresses its power through
an affective dynamic which is not integrated into political institutions
but rather obeys a very natural law that can be summarized in the
43 TP viii, 4; CWS ii, p. 567. See also Stefano Visentin, ‘La parzialità dell’universale. La
moltitudine nell’imperium aristocraticum’, in Spinoza: individuo e moltitudine, ed. by
Riccardo Caporali, Vittorio Morfino, and Stefano Visentin (Cesena: Il Ponte Vecchio,
2007), pp. 373–90.
44 TP iv, 4; CWS ii, p. 527. But see also TP iii, 9; CWS ii, p. 521: ‘Because the
Commonwealth’s Right is defined by the common power of a multitude, it’s certain
that its power and Right are diminished to the extent that it provides many people
with reasons to conspire against it.’
45 Ethics iii, DA 20; CWS i, p. 535.
46 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince [1513], ed. by William J. Connell (Boston, MA:
Bedford, 2005): ‘For in every city these two different humours are found, whence it
arises that the people desire to be neither commanded nor oppressed by the great, and
the great desire both to command and to oppress the people’. And this situation arises
because the people do not want to be dominated or oppressed by the nobles, and the
nobles want to dominate and oppress the people’ (ch. 9).
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statement: ‘being frightening in order not to be afraid’ (the reversal of
the famous Tacitan saying: terret vulgus, nisi metuat).47 Nevertheless,
the externality of this power to the imperium does not only involve neg-
ative consequences for the existence of a political subject, which could
appear to be the case at first sight, since the power itself expresses the
relentless and necessary (that is, it stems from the multitude’s nature)
movement of the collective imagination and passions. The institutional
framework must continuously adapt itself to these passions, producing
a collection of different institutions that replace one another without,
however, denying the very essence of the political body. In fact, in the
Political Treatise, Spinoza reminds us:
When disagreements and rebellions are stirred up in a Com-
monwealth — as they often are — the result is never that
the citizens dissolve the Commonwealth — though this of-
ten happens in other kinds of society. Instead, if they can’t
settle their disagreements while preserving the form of the
Commonwealth, they change its form to another. So when I
speak of the means required to preserve the state, I understand
the means necessary to preserve its form without any notable
change.48
An important consequence of this statement is that every transition is
caused by an increase or decrease in the multitude’s power, and every
political regime can be seen as a determinate (both ontologically and
historically) expression of the democratic natural structure of a polit-
ical organization. Thus, democracy takes on a dual meaning: it reveals
the political regime which expresses the highest degree of collective
power (although it is known that even within a democratic regime
some transitions of potentia are still present), but it also exhibits the
immanent movement of this power within every form of government.
In a similar way, freedom is never a ‘natural’ property of human
beings but rather a process of liberation: being free in an absolute
47 TP vii, 27; CWS ii, pp. 558–59: ‘What we’ve written may be ridiculed by those who
think the vices common to all mortals belong only to the plebeians — those who
think “that there’s nomoderation in the commonpeople; that they’re terrifying, unless
they themselves are cowed by fear”; or that “the plebeians either serve humbly or rule
proudly, like despots”, and that “there’s neither truth nor judgment in [the plebeian
class]”, etc. But everyone shares a common nature, we’re just deceived by power and
refinement.’
48 TP vi, 2; CWS ii, p. 562.
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sense means to be able to use one’s own power, principally reason but
also affects and imagination, insofar as they help to unify every indi-
vidual’s strength. That is why freedom and necessity coincide, since
everyone’s natural power derives from a necessary causal chain which
involves a basically infinite network of relations and mutual trans-
formations. However, another definition of freedom can be found,
in which Spinoza expresses the (imaginary) discordance between the
essential determination of the mode’s power and the existential indef-
inite nature of the same power, and at the same time the attempt to
overcome it both individually and collectively. Given this situation,
how can the multitude escape the threat of an infinite conflict among
humans while promoting the transitions which increase power and
cooperation to the detriment of those which produce impotence and
divisions? How can the multitude become free? In the Theological-
Political Treatise, Spinoza states that ‘we’ve never reached the point
where a state is not in more danger from its own citizens than from its
enemies, and where the rulers don’t fear their citizens more than their
enemies’.49 Therefore, a political process aiming at collective emanci-
pation should begin with unmasking the phantasmagorical nature of
the regimes which disempower the multitude’s affects and imagination
— that is, all regimes, such as monarchy, tyranny, and oligarchy, which
are founded on negative passions, primarily on fear (fear which rulers
and the ruled inspire in each other, but also an overall fear which
the multitude inspire in themselves). The second step (only logic-
ally, not chronologically) should consist in implementing common
spaces (spaces of rights, communication, exchanges, even of conflicts,
provided that they are regulated by laws),50 so that positive affects can
find a way to develop into a rational form (since rationality always
derives from a collective development). In the Theological-Political
Treatise, Spinoza calls a ‘republic’ the process of gradual transforma-
tion of individual liberty into a ‘general freedom [communis libertas]’.51
49 TTP xvii, 17; CWS ii, p. 299.
50 See Filippo Del Lucchese, Conflict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza:
Tumult and Indignation (London: Continuum, 2009); Stefano Visentin, ‘From Secur-
ity to Peace andConcord:TheBuilding of a Free Commonwealth in Spinoza’s Political
Treatise’, Theoria, 66.2 (2019), pp. 71–90.
51 TTP Praef., 10; CWS ii, p. 69; Gebhardt iii, p. 7: ‘For it is completely contrary to the
general freedom to fill the free judgment of each man with prejudices, or to restrain it
in any way.’
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The republic’s aim is ‘to free each person from fear’:52 not simply to
guarantee a supposed natural freedom to everyone, but rather to foster
the shift from an imaginary independency of the will — which is al-
ways at risk of being turned into voluntary servitude — to a network
of powerful relationships among individuals who are able to free them
from their fears and illusions, or at least to prevent these fears and
illusions from being dominant. Freedom can thus reveal itself as both
the quest for security and the organization of popular surveillance; as
both the freedom of judging, as well as the resistance of the many to
the oppression of the few.
To conclude, freedom, especially political freedom, can acquire
different meanings in Spinoza’s philosophy, but it is always deeply
connected to the necessity of the causal process generating the body,
the imagination, and the affects of the multitude. Such a dynamic
identity of necessity and freedom causes both the practical predom-
inance of democracy (which is meant as the immanent movement of
the multitude) and the theoretical superiority of a democratic political
science, which is based upon the refusal of any transcendent legitimacy
of authority or individualistic perspectives. This is an ontological and
materialist conception of democracy. For this reason, Spinoza states
that ‘[a] man who is guided by reason is more free in a state, where
he lives according to a common decision, than in solitude, where he
obeys only himself ’:53 in fact, obeying oneself, within the solitude of
an abstract individualism, generates an imaginary and thus unstable
freedom, which must be replaced by a progressive freedom, engaging
all citizens in a common process of emancipation from their fear and
passivity.
52 TTP xx, 11; CWS ii, p. 346; Gebhardt iii, pp. 240–41: ‘From the foundations of
the Republic explained above it follows most clearly that its ultimate end is not to
dominate, restraining men by fear, and making them subject to another’s control, but
on the contrary to free each person from fear, so that he can live securely, as far as
possible, i.e., so that he retains to the utmost his natural right to exist and operate
without harm to himself or anyone else.’
53 Ethics iv, 73; CWS i, p. 587.
Temporality and History in Spinoza
The Refusal of Teleological Thought
ERICKA MARIE ITOKAZU
INTRODUCTION: SPINOZIST ISSUES BETWEEN MATERIALISM
AND IDEALISM
Some remarkable studies have shown Baruch Spinoza’s influence
on various materialist traditions and even on idealist philosophies.1
Wherever he is quoted there seems to be some sort of dispute over
the recognition of Spinoza as a predecessor of that particular tradi-
tion. However, there is a general consensus of the idea that Spinozism
implies the refusal of any transcendent entity and the assertion of a
radical immanence inextricably linked to the denial of final causality
and teleology.
All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this
one: that men commonly suppose that all natural things act,
as men do, on account of an end; indeed, they maintain as
1 Vittorio Morfino, Genealogia di un pregiudizio. L’immagine di Spinoza in Germania da
Leibniz a Marx (Hildesheim: Olms, 2016); The New Spinoza, ed. by Warren Montag
and Ted Stolze (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1997); Yirmiyahu Yovel,
Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Adventures of Immanence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1989); André Tosel, Du matérialisme, de Spinoza (Paris: Kimé,
1994).
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certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end,
for they say that God made all things for man, and man that
he might worship God. […] Thus this prejudice was changed
into superstition, and struck deep roots in their minds. This was
why each of them strove with great diligence to understand and
explain the final causes of all things.2
Given this striking statement from the Ethics’ Appendix, Spinoza’s re-
jection of finalism is almost undisputed. The foundation of the New
Science as a modern project seems to depend on taking finalism out
of the laws of nature (Philosophia naturalis). This teleology was pre-
served, however, by René Descartes in regard to God’s will and human
free will (Primaphilosophia) — in which cases freedom determines the
possible and the contingent.
The refusal of the teleological explanations for both Prima philo-
sophia and Philosophia naturalis could be the key to understanding
why Spinoza’s philosophy is of interest to so few scholars of history.3
After all, by refusing to give any ontological status to the categories of
possibility and contingency, his philosophy seems to reduce human
actions to fatalism, especially if understood in terms of the rigid law
of Philosophia naturalis. By a mistaken understanding of the efficient
cause, the laws of nature are reduced to a restrictive form of necessary
causality, thus making human freedom almost impossible to conceive.
Moreover, the idealist tradition of Spinozism has often rejected his
Prima philosophia precisely because there is no place for free will and
a fundamental notion of the theories of history, i.e. time.4 On the
2 Ethics i, App.;CWS [TheCollectedWorks of Spinoza, see abbreviations], i, pp. 440–41.
3 For example, Yovel recognizes that Spinoza’s radical immanence and the refusal of all
transcendent entities influenced Ludwig Feuerbach’s concept of self-alienation as man
projecting his essence outward into a separate, divine world, from which this essence
then confronts him as external and oppressive (see Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics,
pp. 73–74); nevertheless, Yovel alsowrites: ‘meanwhile, we should address the broader
question of teleology, which prompted our discussion of Marx in first place. Based
upon the foregoing analysis of man-in-nature, how does Marx’s philosophy of imman-
ence — lacking an inherent teleology while maintaining a historical perspective —
trace its own way between Hegel and Spinoza’? (ibid., p. 93).
4 As Vittorio Morfino notes in Plural Temporality: Transindividuality and the Aleatory
between Spinoza and Althusser (Leiden: Brill, 2014), ‘The powerful acosmic interpret-
ation of Spinoza [is] magnificently expressed in the following lines by Bloch’ (p. 14):
‘Theworld stands here as a crystal, with the sun at its peak, so that nothing casts a shadow.
[…] Time is missing, history is missing, development is missing and especially any
concrete multiplicity in the one ocean of substance. […] Spinozism stands there as if
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one hand, under the rigid laws of nature and necessary causality, we
have a materialist fatalism (and the impossibility of freedom); on the
other hand, by refusing free will and the notion of time, we have the
impossibility of temporality in human history.
This chapter’s proposal is to rethink Spinoza’s rejection of finalism,
and to relate the question of time to the problem of the final cause. I ask
whether our understanding of Spinoza’s critique of time as a refusal of
teleological thought is successful or not, and whether thinking history
as a non-teleological process could be possible. Furthermore, I clarify
whether or not this can be done without the central notion of time.
To avoid creating any anachronisms, I shall only propose a
hypothetical outline as to what the Spinozist critique of a historico-
teleological thinking could be. After all, the theory of history is not a
seventeenth-century problem. However, it is precisely that century
that may provide the only philosophy actually capable of countering
the kind of finalism which theories of history rely upon.5 This is the
case insofar as one considers all historico-teleological thinking to
depend upon the following four conditions:
1. the linearity of time;
2. a temporality that is progressively determined towards the fu-
ture;
3. a continuity of time established by means of a relation between
successive instants external to each other (in order to get rid
of fatalism). That is, the connection between past, present, and
future should not be determined by necessary causality but by
free causality;
4. as a result, and in order to be able to conceive of praxis, human
actions must be determinable, by themselves or accidentally,
because they are possible actions. They are determinable by free
therewas eternal noon in the necessity of theworld, in the determinismof its geometry
and of its both carefree and situationless crystal— sub specie aeternitatis’ (Ernst Bloch,
The Principle of Hope, trans. by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight, 3 vols
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), ii, pp. 852–53).
5 The following arguments are a tentative attempt to reproduce, with a Spinozist lexicon,
the thesis that ‘democracy is a historical question’ made byMarilena Chaui, ‘A questão
democrática’, in her Cultura e democracia: o discurso competente e outras falas (São
Paulo: Cortez, 2006), pp. 144–69 (p. 145).
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will, but they are not necessary actions, that is, they are not
already determined by nature. If these actions carry out their
final goal, such an outcome would therefore be unpredictable
and have to be explained in contingent terms.
This being said, I’d like to highlight the most important arguments
of Ethics i. In this section, Spinoza demonstrates that the infinitely
infinite, the one unique substance, is the cause of itself and operates by
immanent, necessary, and efficient causality over the whole of nature
(be it the Natura Naturans or the Natura Naturata). Extension and
Thought are thus no longer independent substances, but attributes of
the same unique and absolutely infinite substance. In other words, this
viewpoint eliminates contingency, possibility, and finalistic causality.
In the famous Appendix, such categories (the contingent, the
possible, and the final cause) appear as substitutes accomplished by
human (imaginary) projections in two ways: firstly, the understanding
of necessity is replaced by the imagination of the accomplishment of
final causality; secondly, the inexorable interiority of immanent caus-
ality is imaginarily replaced by the impregnable exteriority of transitive
causality. I argue here that these projections and replacements are
made from a single instrument of imagination: time.
THE PROBLEM OF TEMPORALITY IN SPINOZA: THE NEGATIVITY
OF TIME
The most important texts to analyse Spinoza’s definitions of time are
his early writings. In the MetaphysicalThoughts, Spinoza’s own position
seems to be nothing but an account of Descartes’s philosophy, who
defined time as a being of reason (ens rationis) or a mode of thought
that serves to measure duration in the same way as number measures
motion. According to Descartes’s Meditations, if one exists, one is a
possible existence, and one’s duration therefore will need a continuous
creation to actualize its possible existence. That is why an external
force, or in Descartes’s terms, God as an external and transcendent
causality, is required to maintain these created things in existence.
For a lifespan can be divided into countless parts, each com-
pletely independent of the others, so that it does not follow
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from the fact that I existed a little while ago that I must exist
now, unless there is some cause which as it were creates me
afresh at this moment — that is, which preserves me. For it is
quite clear to anyone who attentively considers the nature of
time that the same power and action are needed to preserve
anything at each individual moment of its duration as would
be required to create that thing anew if it were not yet in exist-
ence. Hence the distinction between preservation and creation
is only a conceptual one.6
Hence, duration consists of a linear, homogeneous, continuously and
punctually recreated existence. The same action and force is indeed
required at any instant, no matter how short this instant might be, to
recreate such an existence again and again, making all instants inde-
pendent from each other and thus detaching the present instant from
that which immediately preceded it. Moreover, because duration is
composed of parts and is divisible, it becomes measurable in the same
way that geometric space is measurable. That is, it becomes a geomet-
rized duration measured by geometric time.
In Spinoza’s early writings, therefore, time, number, and measure
seem to be legitimate beings of reason. This is why one finds a certain
transitivity between duration and that which measures it. Time and
duration, like Siamese twins, thus become neutral, homogeneous, and
perfect doubles of Extension as presented by Descartes’s Principles of
Philosophy in the section dedicated to physics.
Despite making use of Cartesian terminology, however, Spinoza’s
argument does not allow us to speak properly of an essence of time, for
it is neither an objective essence (i.e., an idea inside of us) nor a formal
essence (i.e., a condition of things outside of us). Although Spinoza
calls it a ‘being of reason’, he adds to this nomenclature the proviso
that, in spite of this choice of words, time cannot properly be called
a ‘being’.7 According to Spinoza, time has no formal reality. That is,
it has no existence outside of us. Furthermore, time has no objective
reality: it does not possess the status of an idea, be it true, false, or
fictitious. Time is not an essence inside of us, while outside of us it
6 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes, trans. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoot, and Dugald Murdoch, 3 vols
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984–91), ii (1985), pp. 1–62 (p. 33).
7 CM i; CWS i, pp. 299–310.
60 TEMPORALITY AND HISTORY
has no existence. That is, it has no ontological density of any kind. To
summarize this idea, we can say that for Spinoza time is on the verge of
non-being.8
However, in 1663, Spinoza changed his position on this topic.
Duration, henceforth conceived as indivisible, resists the measures
that time would apply to it.9 After Spinoza’s Letter xii,10 it becomes
clear that those who explain duration through time fail to conceive of
it properly, for time is but a mere abstraction. Time loses its epistemo-
logical value and ceases to be a legitimate being of reason to become,
on a path of no return, one of the ‘aids of the imagination’ (auxilia
imaginationis). In the following section, we will see what changed in
Spinoza’s concept of duration.
THE POSITIVITY OF DURATION
Following the demonstrations of the Ethics, we understand that there
is no transcendent God above all ‘created things’, for they are now
called ‘finite things’ or just finite modes (or affections) of the infinite
substance, that is, God or Nature (Deus sive Natura). In the definitions
of the Ethics, Spinoza argues that eternity and the duration of finite
modes are indivisible. This is the main difference with his earlier writ-
ings.
To understand what it is to be a finite mode requires apprehending
how, in this philosophy of immanence, Spinoza abandons the rela-
tion of transcendent causality between the infinite substance and its
finite modes. The necessity of the substance’s efficient cause is now
determined by immanent causality, which displays the inner relation
of substance’s power to the power of the substance’s finite modes,11
that is, the inner force of conatus: ‘each thing, as far as it can by its own
8 See Ericka Itokazu, ‘Au-delà du temps mesure. La question du temps chez Spinoza’, in
Ontologia e temporalità. Spinoza e i suoi lettori moderni, ed. by Giuseppe D’Anna and
Vittorio Morfino (Milano: Mimesis, 2012), pp. 387–98.
9 The displacement of the role of time in Spinoza’s philosophy is admirably explored
in the works of Chantal Jaquet (see especially her Sub specie æternitatis. Études des
concepts de temps, durée et éternité chez Spinoza (Paris: Kimé, 1997).
10 Ep. xii [Lodewijk Meyer]; CWS i, p. 200.
11 On this subject, I recommend the work of Nicolas Israël, Spinoza. Le temps de la
vigilance (Paris: Payot, 2001).
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power, strives to persevere in its being’ and ‘the striving by which each
thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence
of the thing’.12
Duration, therefore, is no longer understood as a succession whose
continuity is homogeneously neutral and which is characterized by an
existential linearity restored instant after instant through continued
creation. Instead, duration is understood as continuous, no longer as
homogeneous or uniform, and certainly not as measurable by means
of the operations of time. On the contrary, duration itself is the ex-
pression of diverse, multiple, and heterogeneous movements, insofar
as the conatus — the constitutive inner power of duration — is also its
actual essence. Indeed, every variation of power — every simultaneous
affection of the body and of the mind — of this essence implies the
diverse, multiple, and heterogeneous passages of this very body and
this very mind. This is why, as is the case with the substance, duration
is not divisible. Because it is the very characteristic of finite modes,
duration can only be conceived of as a whole from which no parts can
be divided.
In fact, after Spinoza’s Letter xii, it is perfectly clear that duration
can no longer be related to time. Not only is immanent causality the
very core of Spinoza’s thought, but it also constitutes a profound shift
away from Cartesian philosophy. In Spinoza, one no longer has to
cope with the complex problem of a divisible duration conceived as
a succession of instants external to each other, precisely because this
succession of instants requires the action of an external cause without
which we simply could not understand how we continue to exist.
Hence, with Spinoza, finite modes are no longer understood as instant-
aneous possible existences, and duration ceases to be dependent on
God’s continued creation (contra Descartes). The relation between
the infinite and the finite is no longer that of an opposition between
the eternal and the instantaneous, nor is it an external relation. Rather,
the relation between the infinite and the finite is an internal or, better
yet, an immanent relation.
12 Ethics ii, 6 and 7; CWS i, p. 499.
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In such a philosophy, a finite thing is defined as that which ‘can
be limited by another of the same nature’.13 Using this definition —
certainly one of the finest in the history of philosophy — Spinoza
explains finitude as simply the fact of being among and in relationship
with other finite beings. Thus, finitude is no longer characterized by
ephemerality or mortality, and instead thought of as the fact that all
existences are always interconnected. To be a finite thing means simply
to co-exist, to exist with other singular things: finitude is precisely the
reciprocal determining factor of the existence of finite things.
The co-existence of this conatus with and among other finite
modes is shaped and characterized by multiple movements of body
compositions, re-compositions, and decompositions, interwoven
through many encounters and disagreements, and through the
immeasurable production of desires (conatus-cupiditas), joys, and
sorrows of affective life, be they individual or collective.
If duration is no longer understood as succession, if it cannot be
reduced to a mere linear continuation — i.e. to a continuity whose
ability to be measured comes from its being emptied of any of the
movements that are proper to its existence — then how should one
understand Spinoza’s definition of duration as ‘an indefinite continu-
ation of existing’?14 To be clear, here, the term ‘indefinite’ does not
mean indeterminate. Spinoza uses this adjective (‘indefinite’) to define
duration because a finite existence is not determined by its actual es-
sence. That is, the limitation of a finite existence is not determined by
its inner efficient cause (derived from the immanence of the substance
within the conatus’ essence) that makes it exist and, in itself, could
never make it cease to exist.15
Here we can apply some lessons we have learned from Letter xii to
the Ethics, for in that letter Spinoza presented various definitions of the
‘infinite’: there are things we call ‘infinite, or if you prefer, indefinite’,16
he says, ‘because they cannot be equated with any number’ and we
might say, to no measure of time, ‘though they can be conceived to be
greater or lesser’ as in the case of conatus. Or, to quote the definition
13 Ethics i, Def. 2; CWS i, p. 408.
14 Ethics ii, Def. 5; CWS i, p. 447.
15 ‘The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite
time, but an indefinite time’ (Ethics iii, 8; CWS i, p. 499).
16 Ep. xii [Lodewijk Meyer]; CWS i, p. 205.
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given in Ethics iii, 4 Dem.: ‘For the definition of any thing affirms, and
does not deny, the thing’s essence, or it posits the thing’s essence, and
does not take it away’.17 Therefore the term from the Ethics, ‘indefin-
ite duration’, is derived from the absence of inner boundaries in the
conatus. Now, to assert the absence of an internal limit is precisely to
acknowledge and to affirm the internal positivity of the conatus and
to posit the absence of any inner negativity. In other words, to be
‘indefinite’ is our finite way of being infinite.
Duration is, so to speak, positively undefined. Its definition actu-
ally occurs through the unfolding of its power within the existential
field among many other finite modes. In the end, this dynamic defini-
tion results from the composition of experience as a mosaic of multiple
affects, affections, and desires. Duration (or ‘the indefinite continu-
ation of existing’), therefore, far from indicating a negation or a lack
of determination, points to its opposite, that is, an immeasurable field
of dynamic determinations, interwoven through the relations of one’s
internal power to exist and act with the external powers of many others.
In other words, existence is defined through one’s various relationships
with the world, with living beings, with people, etc. When seen in
this way, duration is inseparable from the conatus which guarantees its
dynamic breadth and exceptional ontological density.18
It is impossible for us to strive for a complete definition of that
dynamic force within such ontological density. Duration is not only
indivisible but should also be understood as inapprehensible. Defining
the continuation of existence is precisely not to understand it as a
process, that is, as the movement of the conatus in its various internal
determinations and external limitations. To seek to define duration is
not to conceive of it but to confuse it with time. Or, to put it clearly,
to seek to intellectually define duration is to imagine it, rather than to
conceive of it; and as per Letter xii’s warning, to imagine duration is to
separate it from the substance, that is, to imagine efficient and immanent
causality in the shape of transcendent and external causality.
17 CWS i, p. 498.
18 The argument about the positivity of duration and the negativity of time is a part of a
major section frommy doctoral dissertation: ErickaMarie Itokazu, ‘Tempo, duração e
eternidade na filosofia de Espinosa’ (Universidade de São Paulo (USP), 2008) <https:
//www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-18032009-110714/pt-br.php>
[accessed 02 July 2020].
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For this reason, Spinoza affirms that we are bound to have only an
extremely inadequate knowledge of our duration or of the duration of
the singular things outside us,19 since we are bound to imagine efficient
causality in the shape of transitive causality. The interesting thing is
that the same restriction that impedes adequate knowledge and any
satisfactory definition of duration now seems to open up a wide range
of determinations and movements of our power in the unfolding (sub
duratione) of existing and acting.
Sub duratione, the non-definition of duration, is the corollary of
our existence among other existences which is identical to the process
of singular things in the intertwining of simultaneous encounters of
composition or decomposition — a contrariety or complementarity of
images and relations — but also in the union or opposition of forces.
In other words, sub duratione is the very nature of the modal condition
of finite things in continuous and multiple sets of relations to other
existences, but above all it is a continuous process of power (potentia),
that is, the perseverance in one’s own being.
It should be noted that there are two distinct processes which
are not equivalent even though they may seem similar. As per Ethics
ii, we know that a body cannot be conceived of as an isolated unit
amongst other bodies, since to be a singular thing is to be an individual
composed of many others, each of which is also composed by many
other individuals, etc.20 From the concept of body, Spinoza charac-
terizes a continuous process of composition and decomposition with
other bodies, as though self-regeneration21 were occurring thanks to
the relations with other internal and external individuals within what
we can call a multiple and continuous process of singularization occurs.
However, in Ethics iii and iv, after the demonstrations concerning
the conatus, Spinoza highlights another process which is relevant here:
these singular things can then constitute, in their actual essence, a com-
positional or oppositional power in relationship with other external
19 Ethics ii, 30 and 31; CWS i, pp. 471–72.
20 ‘By singular things I understand things that are finite and have determinate existence.
And if a number of individuals so concur in an action that together they are all the
cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing’ (Ethics ii,
Def. 7; CWS i, p. 447).
21 Ethics ii, 13; CWS i, pp. 457–62.
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forces that have the possibility of not only diminishing this conatus but
also of destroying it.
In Spinoza’s political writings, our natural right is defined by our
power as a political expression of the conatus. Thus, a singular thing
is determined by the multiple relations of an individual conatus or
a collective one (as the multitudinis potentia) against external forces
(potestas) within which it strives to persevere in its own existence.
The duration of singular things is also inapprehensible in the political
process of this individual and collective conatus. Thus, they establish
relations with other forces that simultaneously determine their inner
ethical power to freedom or slavery, and their political power within
the various internal relations of a political body or against external
relations with a political potestas.
The central dynamics of composing or opposing ourselves (as in-
dividuals and as a collectivity) rests in both processes, in a continuous
definition of our existence: we are immersed in the world that we are
also comprised of, and we persist and endure as a singular and col-
lective conatus in and with this world as beings capable of producing
common affects and actions. One understands how, in this dual move-
ment of singularization and perseverance, which is also within the
continuously in-definition of ethical and political existence, duration
is as dense and thick from the ontological viewpoint as it is dynamic
and indomitable from the historical viewpoint.
THE POSITIVITY OF DURATION OR THE NEGATIVITY OF TIME?
From what we have just seen, it should be easy to understand why
Spinoza affirms that we may only have an extremely inadequate know-
ledge of duration. The in-apprehensibility of duration makes it im-
possible to conceive of it intellectually as a complete definition, which
forces us to (only) imagine it. This being said, the problem of time and
its relation to duration becomes harder and more complex at another
level. Indeed, imagination is not the source of error, as Spinoza demon-
strates; rather, the error consists precisely in taking imagination for
intellection, that is, taking a misconception for a concept.22 There are
22 Ethics ii, 17 Dem.; CWS i, pp. 465–66.
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things one can only conceive of and never imagine, such as eternity;
on the other hand, there are things one can only imagine and never
conceive of, such as one’s duration and the duration of external things.
The consequence is inexorable: seeking to understand duration
necessarily involves imagining it through time. And this is exactly what,
as Spinoza wrote in Letter xii, separates us from the substance. I would
like to summarize the triple mechanism operated by time as follows:
a) First mechanism: we are inclined, by a natural impulse, to con-
fuse time with duration.23 We begin to divide the total and
indivisible inner force of duration into parts. We are inclined
to imagine our immanent force (our conatus) by means of the
image of transitive causality introduced by the negativity of
time.
The continuity of our existence becomes the experience of its own
fragmentation, since time does not bind one moment to another. On
the contrary, time itself is the division that splits the indivisible inner
force of duration into a before and an after, transforming the continu-
ity of a life into a contiguity of isolated moments. As a result, we get
used to smudging the ground on which the power of our existence un-
folds, so that we feel deeply alienated (ab aliio), that is, separated from
ourselves. To confuse duration with time is to be forced to deal with
the argument presented in Letter xii: ‘For composing Duration of mo-
ments is the same as composing Number merely by adding noughts’.24
Transitive causality replaces desire’s immanent determination (our
conatus-cupiditas) for the emptiness of free will (its misconception).
The emergence of time reveals the eclipse of the conatus, transforming
the power of a life into a non-power to live.
b) Second mechanism: although neither number, nor measure, nor
time have any reality of their own, many ‘have confused these
three [aids of the imagination] with things themselves’.25 Thus,
to confuse time with duration produces a concrete effect, that
23 Ep. xii [Lodewijk Meyer]; CWS i, p. 202.
24 Ibid., 204.
25 Ibid.
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is, the imaginary construction of the reality of time outside of
us.
This argument has a mirroring relation to the preceding argument.
Given that duration is perceived as extremely fragmented, and living
is perceived as various split instants that do not support their own
continuity, we endeavour to imagine the consistency of our existence
maintained by an exterior and continuous support. As an imaginary
replica of Descartes’s continued creation, we will imagine an endless
and external time, an eternity which is the sole imaginary entity cap-
able of colligating the split instants within oneself. Time becomes an
external reality outside of us, and its mechanism and action are in-
dependent of all human actions. Since time is external, unrelated to
anything, and devoid of a beginning as well as of an end, it becomes
the symbol of the infinite beyond us. Our internal relation to the sub-
stance, established by immanent causality, will therefore be imagined
as the transcendent causality of the absolute above us.
However, because it is an imaginary construction, its very nature
is to present itself in various figures. It does not matter whether these
figures are linear or cyclical ones, eschatological or soteriological, for
they shall always be the metamorphic face of a Time edax rerum. One
cannot escape the order of nature. There, life is perceived as a strange
experience in which a single operator not only fragments the course of
life, but also merges the instants it has split, reversing the constitutive
power of the conatus from the inside out, and subsuming it under an
imaginary external power (potestas) of an infinite Time that devours
everything.
c) Third and final mechanism: of all aids of the imagination, only
time is able to fragment duration and to introduce, in a philo-
sophy of the necessary, the experience of contingency. As long
as one exists, one’s conatus, the striving inner force to per-
severe in existence, is also one’s actual essence. Even though
essence and existence are inalienable pairs, in this paradoxical
and imaginary experience, time (and time only) is capable of
clandestinely alienating the inalienable.
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This is why the operation of time introduces contingency and possibil-
ity, notions that Spinoza defines as the misconception of the necessary
bond between essence and existence.26 The ontological density of the
conatus’ inner process in singular things, necessarily determined by
their intertwined co-existence, is now dissolved by the fiction that all
things are individually isolated, for they are now separated from the
substance and turned into particular things whose existence is corrupt-
ible by the contingency of the world.
For each singular thing […] must be determined by another
singular thing to exist and produce effects in a certain and
determinate way, and this again by another, and so to infinity.
But since we have demonstrated from this common property of
singular things that we have only a very inadequate knowledge
of duration of our body,we shall have to draw the same conclusion
concerning duration of singular things. […] From this it follows
that all particular things are contingent and corruptible. For we
can have no adequate knowledge of their duration, and that
is what we must understand by contingency of things and
the possibility of their corruption. For beyond that there is no
contingency.27
These three mechanisms are the source of the multiple variations of
desire (conatus-cupiditas) that are related to Ethics iv and its demon-
strations of Human Bondage (De servitute humana). The Powers of
the Affects (Affectuum viribus), or their intensity, is connected with
temporal operations which determine hope, fear, despair, security,
and flutuatio animi, all of which are temporal affects and fundamental
political passions. The ‘future contingents’, the possible existence and
corruption of the world, Fors Fortunae, and servitude: all of these
images contribute to an internal superstition which is based on a pas-
sion forged by time, just like fear that simultaneously requires hope
about the image of an external entity upon which we are dependent
and which reinforces all theologico-political power. This could include
the image of the impossible union with the infinite of an eternal and
26 Cf. Ethics iv, Def. 3; CWS i, p. 546: ‘I call singular things contingent insofar as we find
nothing, while we attend only to their essence, which necessarily posits their existence or
which necessarily excludes it’. See also Ethics iv, Def. 4; CWS i, p. 546: ‘I call the same
singular thingspossible, insofar as, wedo not knowwhether those causes are determined
to produce them’; my emphasis.
27 Ethics iii, 31 Dem. and Corol.; CWS i, p. 472.
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transcendent God, or the secular image of the end of history, or the
image of a final emancipation of humanity in which we overcome our
endless and miserable present. The soteriological or the eschatological
expectations are both temporal projections of finalist thought that in-
stil fear and hope in the heart of one’s affective life.
Spinoza defines fear as an inconstant sadness and hope as an
inconstant joy, and writes that they are both ‘born from the idea of
a future or a past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt’.28
Fear and hope, however, are so inconstant that they take the shape of
existential doubt, and in this case we might understand that to doubt
is not to affirm the power of our existence. On the contrary, doubt
suspends our ability to act, that is to say, it suspends the action of our
conatus. That is why Spinoza explains that there is no fear without hope,
and there is no hope without fear. The inability to act is introduced by
the negativity of time; the soul’s vacillation of mind is the passion that
most makes us politically and existentially powerless. Vacillation is like
being a prisoner of permanent doubt floating between fear and hope.
It is an affective experience of impotence, of lacking power to act, as if
we were all merely possible existences in a contingent world.
Removing doubt about the ‘uncertainty of the future’ is the same
as requiring that the conatus gets rid of the impossible image of the
same future being simultaneously fearsome and hopeful, even though
this amounts to cultivating the fiction of an ‘uncertain present’ that
brings the promise of our ‘possibility to act’. Through such an inversion
of images, it is ‘the present’ that would become ‘uncertain’. It becomes
open to the imaginary possibility of human actions as a decision to-
wards a better future, that is, the false image of free will and the very
definition of finalist thought. To avoid the powerless effort of a suspen-
ded existence due to the vacillation of mind and in order not to expect
the impossible disclosure of future times in the present (the verge of
despair), some effort to build a resistance to doubt is required. The
introduction of an action is required, even if it is the image of free will
seeking the good: the closest affective image of some certainty, a fragile
and necessary pulse of the conatus from within passional life.
28 See Ethics iii, DA 12 and 13; CWS i, p. 534.
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How can we understand that same process outside of finalist
thought and within the operation of the efficient cause?
First, by paying attention to the fact that these teleological op-
erations reveal another important concept in Spinoza: utilitas. As he
defines it: ‘By good I shall understand what we certainly know to be
useful to us’,29 and ‘by the end for the sake of which we do some-
thing I understand appetite’.30 These definitions are clearly reinverting
what has already been inverted by our imaginary misconception. Thus,
Spinoza uses the lexicon of teleological thought, a corollary of servile
imagination, precisely to escape servitude. This is why, in Ethics iv, he
explains that one must differentiate the ‘contingent’ from the ‘possible’.
The distinction between these images determines the intensity of dis-
tinct passions which are more or less subservient to fortune.31 Further,
they determine different interrelations of human actions within the
political body that produce different dynamics inside of it — trans-
forming fear and hope into either security (certainty of a future joy),
or into despair (certainty of a future sadness) — and explain the social
dynamics of a political body, generating a higher or lesser propensity
to either freedom or servitude.
Our appetite (our efficient cause), based on its imagination as a fi-
nal causality and on its imagined quest for what is good (utilitas), in fact
proposes a determination in order to rid itself of the doubt and uncer-
tainty brought forth by our fears and hopes. For this, it is required that
the conatus push aside the fearsome image of contingent futures, even
though this amounts to fostering the imaginary construction of an uncer-
tain present. The confrontation of the conatus’ determinations with the
contingent future, even if it is through imagined free will and finalism,
thus produces an individual action, or a cooperation of individuals in
action, which, in turn, develops into a renewed effort (isolated or in
common) to transform the image of the contingent future into another
possible future. That is actually and precisely the appropriation of the
present time. The same mechanism can also simultaneously explain,
29 Ethics iv, Def. 1; CWS i, p. 546.
30 Ethics iv, Def. 7; CWS i, p. 547.
31 ‘An affect toward a thing which we know does not exist in the present, and which
we imagine as possible, is more intense, other things being equal, than one towards
a contingent thing’ (Ethics iv, 12; CWS i, p. 552).
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in terms of passional processes, the corporal imaginary constructions
that survive through the actions of time (be it an individual or political
body). The traces of memory (vestigia corporis) and social memories,32
as well as the corporal striving to maintain the image of its own ex-
istence, is what is expressed by the internal dynamic of resisting, or
renewing,33 the culture, language, customs, habits, rites, and ceremon-
ies.
CONCLUSION: SPINOZA AND HISTORY
We can now see how both the denial of time’s ontological status and
the positive density of the conatus is likely to change one’s views on
Spinozism. Tempus is not an essence, existence, res, idea, or epistemo-
logical value for knowledge or the sciences. This is perhaps so because
time is precisely this innate negativity, or the only instrument capable
of introducing the fissures of contradiction within the intense and plain
positivity of duration. This is precisely what we were looking for: the
connection between the positivity of duration and the negativity of
time seems, little by little, to reveal itself as the dynamic composition of
the existential human realm (be it individual or collective) of striving
in existence with all its consequences within the realms of imagination,
ethics, and, above all, politics.
To conclude, one might ask how to understand the historical pro-
cess implied by these remarks. The question about the relationship
between history and time can be renewed. To seek a theory of history
with the notion of time turns out to be an idealized abstraction that
surrenders to the temptations of finalist thought, and an error that con-
founds knowledge with imagination, a concept with a misconception,
and a science with an ideology.
In contrast, to understand history sub duratione amounts to re-
thinking the challenges of a materialist conception of history. Given
the in-apprehensibility of duration and its ontological positivity, the
32 See Laurent Bove, La Stratégie du conatus. Affirmation et résistance chez Spinoza (Paris:
Vrin, 1996) and Lorenzo Vinciguerra, Spinoza et le signe. La Genèse de l’imagination
(Paris: Vrin, 2005).
33 ‘An affect whose cause we imagine to bewith us in the presentmoment is stronger than
if we did not imagine it to be with us’ (Ethics iv, 9; CWS i, p. 551).
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historical process maintains in itself an overture to immeasurable
and indomitable determinations for multiple images and operations
of time, which contain passions and actions of reciprocal relations
between conatus. The affectuum viribus is now determined by the op-
position of affects: ‘By opposite affects I shall understand, in what
follows, those which pull a man differently, although they are of the
same genus — such as gluttony and greed, which are species of love,
and are opposite not by nature, but accidentally’.34 The accidental is
entirely different from the contingent and the possible, and not related
to time. Spinoza designates the accidental as that which constantly
modifies the inner force of our conatus through the relations between
things of the same genus in a multitude of affections and affects, which
are multiple interconnections of various and diverse durations con-
stantly composing and de-composing the complex thread of a dynamic
tissue of the maintenance of their own existence, in other words, their
own historicity.
If one thinks of the movement of history as a non-teleological
process, and if one thinks about the relation between materialism and
history in Spinoza’s philosophy, perhaps the answer can simply be
this: human actions do not occur according to a succeeding temporal
framework (characterized by transitive and final causality), whether
it is pursuing a linear, cyclic, progressive, or regressive time, since
human history does not move through time. On the contrary, it is
the imagination of time experiencing accidental causes (through the
multiple efficient and partial causalities intertwining and presenting in
our own power) that mobilizes us into history.
TRANSLATED BY BAPTISTE GRASSET
34 Ethics iv, Def. 5; CWS i, p. 546.




Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of Baruch Spinoza in the late 1960s
was of seminal importance in the creation of a political Spinozism.
His reading of Spinoza likewise had a great impact on debates ranging
across (post)structuralism, psychoanalysis, and Marxism. In fact, sub-
sequent currents of thought, with little direct connection to Deleuze’s
1968 bookExpressionism inPhilosophy: Spinoza, have discovered elem-
ents there that have proven fruitful for further elaboration.1 Deleuze’s
thought, it should be pointed out, is guided by a relation of strict
fidelity to Spinoza — an author that accompanied the inflections
1 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. by Martin Joughin (New
York: Zone Books, 1992). Interviewed by Pierre-François Moreau and Laurent Bove,
Alexandre Matheron claimed that Deleuze exerted more influence on Spinoza Studies
in France through his Difference and Repetition than through his Expressionism in
Philosophy (seeAlexandreMatheron, ‘À propos de Spinoza’,Multitudes, 1.3 (2000), pp.
169–200). It should be stressed that in Brazil,Marilena Chaui had already analysed the
political topics thatwould becomeof interest to Spinoza’s European readers in themid-
1980s (Antonio Negri, Étienne Balibar, André Tosel, Moreau, Bove, VittorioMorfino,
etc.). See herPolítica emEspinosa (SãoPaulo:Companhia das Letras, 2003), with texts
ranging from 1979 to 1995.
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in Deleuze’s trajectory and in his treatment, alongside Félix Guat-
tari, of numerous contemporary political issues.2 To name a few of
those topics: the relation between economic processes, structures of
social power and the state (all examined from a geo-economic and
geopolitical point of view), interpreted through a political-economy
perspective carefully attuned to the libidinal economy, and vice-versa.
Listing the available works about Spinoza in late 1960s France,
Pierre Macherey pointed to the near complete absence of any com-
mentary about the political dimension of Spinoza’s thought — a terra
incognita.3 Martial Gueroult’s and Deleuze’s 1968 publications were
thus all the more earth-shaking: both were decidedly undiplomatic,
breaking with established certainties and shedding new light on a
thinker that had himself defied established orthodoxies. Deleuze’s
book was part of a series of renewed interpretations of the Sephardic
philosopher that included works by Gueroult, Alexandre Matheron,
and Bernard Rousset.4 But it was through Deleuze’s reading that
Spinoza was transformed into the privileged figure in which philo-
sophy and social dynamics could be reunited.5 His study of Spinoza
was wholly original, involving the development of different philo-
sophical problems, such as ‘image of thought’,6 the ‘surface meaning’,
and the ‘logic of paradoxes’,7 as well as his recovery of the medieval
2 According toDeleuze’s secondary school students, in the 1950s, he often spentmonths
discussing the opening of Spinoza’s Ethics (cf. François Dosse, Gilles Deleuze and
Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, trans. by Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2010), p. 103). A survey of references to Spinoza in the work of
Deleuze can be found in Éric Alliez (see his ‘Appendix i: Deleuze’s Virtual Philosophy’,
in The Signature of the World, Or, What Is Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy?, trans. by
Eliot Ross Albert and Alberto Toscano (New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 85–103).
3 Among the works mentioned by Macherey, it’s worth recalling those from the early
twentieth century (Léon Brunschvicg, Victor Delbos, Albert Rivaud, Alain [Émile
Chartier]), the 1940s (André Darbon) and the early 1960s (Sylvain Zac), as well
as Ferdinand Alquié’s courses and the quasi confidential texts of Madeleine Francès
(1937), Marianne Schaub (1978), and the work of Paul Vernière (1954).
4 Martial Gueroult, Spinoza, 2 vols (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1968), i: Dieu (Éthique,
i); Bernard Rousset, La Perspective finale de l’Éthique (Paris: Vrin, 1968); Alexandre
Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Paris: Minuit, 1969).
5 PierreMacherey, ‘Spinoza 1968: Guéroult et/ouDeleuze’, in LeMoment philosophique
des années 1960 en France, ed. by Patrice Maniglier (Paris: PUF, 2011), pp. 293–313.
6 See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton (London: Athlone,
1994).
7 See Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. by Mark Lester and Charles Stivale
(London: Athlone, 1990).
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concern for the ‘univocity of being’ (present in all his three works
of that period). The result of their encounter was that both Spinoza
and Deleuze were refashioned. Their philosophical alliance produced
startling, unexpected mutations within Deleuze’s work.
For Deleuze, the history of philosophy is the determination of the
conditions and implications of a generative problem. That problem,
in turn, is what confers sense on philosophy’s concepts; this is what
Deleuze means when he writes of ‘milieu’ and its double connota-
tion in French: taking things ‘in the middle’ and seeking ‘to grasp the
(conceptual) milieu’. Milieu is then opposed to a doctrinal description
of an exhaustive and static content, following the speculative path of
that which has already been thought.8 It has been said that Deleuze’s
pedagogy consisted in insisting (methodologically and deontologic-
ally) on the role that ‘problems’ play. The problem-question relation
has nothing to do with ignorance or scepticism, be it learned or vulgar:
what allows one to connect and discriminate among propositions is a
problematic that allows those very propositions to have sense, opening
a horizon of meaning and conceptual production. Without the deter-
mination of the problematic, the enunciative act lacks any immediate
sense, since the argumentation in any case is subordinated to the act of
‘posing a problem’.9 A philosophy is thus the development of a prob-
lem that never depends on a voluntary choice of a philosopher: the
philosopher is affected by an external restraint, a regime of signs that
forces her or his thought — since thinking is not the voluntary exercise
of a faculty. This lends itself to a certain humorous misreading of one
of Deleuze’s most famous phrases: ‘it was on Spinoza that I worked the
most seriously according to the norms of the history of philosophy’.10
Rather than repeating what Spinoza said, it was as if Deleuze preceded
him: he intervened in Spinoza’s thought at the same time that he com-
mented it — all while opening himself up to the thought upon which
he was intervening.11
8 Cf. Manola Antonioli, Deleuze et l’histoire de la philosophie (Paris: Kimé, 1999).
9 François Zourabichvili, Le Vocabulaire de Deleuze (Paris: Ellipses, 2003), p. 66.
10 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara
Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 15.
11 Pierre Macherey, Avec Spinoza. Études sur la doctrine et l’histoire du spinozisme (Paris:
PUF, 1992), p. 237.
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We should regard with suspicion the chronology (or doxa)
that identifies Anti-Oedipus, published in 1972, as a turning point
in Deleuze’s work and as a point of departure from Expressionism in
Philosophy.12 In fact, his writings from the late 1970’s abandoned
the problematics of the Anti-Oedipus. Those later works, which fed
into his and Guattari’s Thousand Plateaus, actually saw the conceptual
influence of Spinoza grow more prominent:13 ‘plane of immanence’,
‘war machine’, ‘nomadism’, ‘apparatus of capture’, ‘assemblage’,
‘minority’, ‘lines’, etc. Several texts from the 1970s, contemporary
with Deleuze’s political engagements, serve to document that
mutation. This turn towards politics was for its part connected with
Deleuze’s startling and dramatic rejection of structuralism in the
late 1960s. It also marked his crowning achievement: to think the
simultaneity of sense and event in the interpretation of Spinoza’s
absolute immanence.14 Deleuze recognized that in phenomenology
and structuralism there was a transcendence of sense, an invariant that
neutralizes production and becoming.15 In opposition to it, Deleuze’s
treatment of Spinoza via the problem of expression led him to address
the question in terms of logic; that is, Deleuze’s approach thus
highlighted the critical force of a philosophy based on the reciprocity
between matter and thought.16
A constant in Deleuze’s texts from the 1960s is his critique of
representation. One way of understanding this stance was the philo-
sopher’s persistent unease with institutions. It was Spinoza, here, who
12 Rafael Becker, ‘Natureza e direito em Deleuze’ (doctoral thesis, Pontifícia Universi-
dade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, PUC-Rio, 2018), p. 188. See also François Zourabi-
chvili, Deleuze, une philosophie de l’événement (Paris: PUF, 1994).
13 Gilles Deleuze,Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure (Paris: Minuit, 1975), Deleuze and
Guattari, Rhizome: Introduction (Paris: Minuit, 1976), and Deleuze, ‘Spinoza and Us’
(1978), in his Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. by Robert Hurley (San Francisco:
City Lights Books, 1988), pp. 122–30. See also Zourabichvili, Deleuze.
14 François Zourabichvili, ‘Deleuze et Spinoza’, in Spinoza au xxe siècle, ed. by Olivier
Bloch (Paris: PUF, 1993), pp. 237–46 (p. 239).
15 In that respect, David Lapoujade wrote: ‘Logical doesn’t mean rational. We could
even say that for Deleuze a movement is all the more logical the more it escapes
rationality. The more irrational, the more aberrant, and yet the more logical’. See his
Aberrant Movements: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, trans. by Joshua David Jordan
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017), p. 27.
16 See Anne Sauvagnarques, Deleuze, l’empirisme transcendental (Paris: PUF, 2009), pp.
150–55.
MAURICIO ROCHA 77
allowed Deleuze to examine the issue from the perspective of pro-
duction, relating forms of institutional representation and the passiv-
ity of social formations to institutional norms and conduct.17 This
about-face suggests that Deleuze was no longer seeking to revert Pla-
tonism and its underlying ‘image of thought’, but rather to imbue
philosophy with immanence and ‘to install oneself on this [plane of
immanence]’.18 The concept of ‘plane of immanence’, which appears
for the first time in his Kafka, reappears in his article ‘Spinoza and Us’.
There, Deleuze could be found radicalizing the immanentist proced-
ure by subtracting the markers of power from within philosophy and
thought.19 Deleuze’s Spinozism grew even more political after joining
with Guattari: the concept of ‘expression’ is related to an affirmative
logic; that of ‘power’ to a reconceptualization of both politics and law;
that of ‘common notions’ to a renewed understanding of the composi-
tion of powers (potentiae).20
EXPRESSIONISM IN PHILOSOPHY
Marilena Chaui stresses that Deleuze’s Expressionism in Philosophy
was a revolutionary work for its discovery of expression as a central
concept in Spinoza’s philosophy. The concept of ‘expression’ was vital
for grasping Being as absolutely complex, internally differentiated, its
distinctions revealing the qualitative difference of expressive essences.
From there followed Deleuze’s refutation of an emanative and sub-
jectivist interpretation of attributes, in favour of a logic of expression:
substantial attributes are qualities (intrinsic divisions, by degree of
power) and infinite quantities (extrinsic division in extensive parts),
always univocally the same and differentiated or expressed in inten-
17 Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc introduced the first effort to connect philosophy, politics,
ethics (or critique and clinic) in Deleuze and Guatarri. Cf. his ‘Politique et clinique,
recherche sur la philosophie pratique de Deleuze’ (doctoral thesis, Charles de Gaulle
University – Lille iii, 2006).
18 Deleuze, ‘Spinoza and Us’, p. 122.
19 See Ovídio Abreu, ‘O procedimento da imanência em Deleuze’, Alceu, 5.9 (2004), pp.
87–104.
20 Vincent Jacques, ‘De Différence et répétition à Mille plateaux, métamorphose du
système à l’aune de deux lectures de Spinoza’, in Spinoza-Deleuze: Lectures croisés, ed.
by Pascal Sévérac andAnne Sauvagnargues (Lyon: ENSÉditions, 2016), pp. 29–44 (p.
30)
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sive degrees that do not break their unity — that is, in ‘modes’. It
was here that Deleuze forged a political Spinozism: by thinking the
relation between mind and body according to a logic of isonomy and
isomorphism; by concerning himself with the connections between
things and ideas; and by grasping the central place of the body and the
conatus conceived as intensity and power (or potentia).21
Deleuze approaches the medieval problem of the univocity of
Being in order to inject politics into metaphysics. In this debate, both
logical and ontological, God differs from his effects by the degree of
power in realizing a single and unitary being. Thus, forms, functions,
species, and genres are secondary — there can be more differences
between two individuals of a single species than between individuals
of supposedly difference species. Differences between beings do not
stem from generic forms and specific differences, as if Being were
enunciated differently in various senses, as in the peripatetic adagio.
In the univocal Being — which, according to Deleuze, ‘is said in one
and the same “sense” of everything about which it is said’22 — the
only conceivable difference concerns the degree of power. At issue
then is knowing what assemblages a being can form — each degree
of power corresponds to the power to affect and be affected. Power is
no longer distinguished from action; that is, the power to be affected
is necessarily fulfilled by virtue of the assemblages it can form, where a
certain, determinate degree of power is always necessarily carried out.
The power of the individual thus varies according to their encounters.
Hence the formula: ‘philosophy merges with ontology, but ontology
merges with the univocity of Being’.23 The One will thereafter be
thought of as the differentiator of differences, the internal difference or
immediate (disjunctive) synthesis of the multiple and its transversal,
hierarchy-less communication between beings that merely differ.
In AThousand Plateaus too we read: ‘pluralism = monism’.24 What
is at stake in that formulation is thinking internal difference and the ex-
21 Marilena Chaui, ‘Intensivo e extensivo na Ética de Espinosa: a interpretação dos
modos finitos por Deleuze’, in Deleuze Hoje, ed. by Sandro K. Fornazari (São Paulo:
Fap-Unifesp, 2014), pp. 21–40 (p. 22).
22 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 179.
23 Ibid.
24 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,AThousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,
trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 20.
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teriority of relations: ‘The univocity of Being does not mean that there
is one and the same Being; on the contrary, beings are multiple and
different, they are always produced by a disjunctive synthesis, and they
themselves are disjointed and divergent, membra disjuncta.’25 Chaui
identifies the effects of this mutation, and its logic, with Deleuze’s
encounter with Guattari:
What could be more Spinozist than conceiving of multiplicit-
ies, without referring to a subject, as haecceities? Or to conceive
of the individual as a component or element of the multiplicit-
ies under the form of singularities whose duration are mobile
or nomads, made and unmade according to their encounters
or relations? Or even to conceive of the mode of realizing
multiplicities not according to the model of the tree’s hier-
archical transcendence, but as the immanent horizontality of
the rhizome, with its plateau-like plane of composition, under-
stood as degrees of intensity?26
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA IS A LOGIC
Deleuze’s interpretation seeks to re-establish Spinoza’s logic of expres-
sion — of speculative affirmation and practical joy — on three levels.
Firstly, as a theory of substance, which explains how the substance is
expressed univocally in infinite forms of being. That is, substance is
conceived in infinite attributes, formally distinct and diverse, but not
opposed nor separate from each other; attributes do not bear a relation
of eminence, analogy, or equivocity with each other. This signals the
end of all privileges in ontology. Secondly, the logic of expression is
a theory of the idea, explaining how thought is adequately expressed
through its own determinations — signalling a via regia towards ma-
terialism, as per Louis Althusser.27 On this reading thought does not
have to be measured against an external reality. This in turn implies a
methodological programme — a theory of common notions. Thirdly,
25 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 179. See also Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 39.
26 Chaui, ‘Intensivo e extensivo’, p. 22; trans. by Nicolas Allen.The commentary refers to
the preface to the 1987 Italian edition of Thousand Plateaus.
27 Louis Althusser, ‘The Only Materialist Tradition, Part i: Spinoza’, in TheNew Spinoza,
ed. by Warren Montag and Ted Stolze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1997), pp. 3–19.
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the logic of expression would be a theory of finite modes, explaining
how the expression of the substance through its attributes gives way
to the expression of the latter in modes. Expression is real when the
relation between that which is expressed and that which expresses is
modal — when the things themselves are expressive. Furthermore, a
theory of finite modes institutes the conditions for a self-regulation
that communicates the organization of affects. This in turn implies the
question of individuation,28 wherein the notion of ‘problem’ acquires
an ethical-political content and leads to the question of prudence in
experimentation.29
Chapter viii from Expressionism in Philosophy describes how
Spinoza destabilized seventeenth-century rationalism: from within
rather than as a departure from Cartesian thought. The implications
of that subversion, writes Deleuze, is that thought is conceived as in-
dependent from the constitution of a subject — what Spinoza calls
the ‘spiritual automaton’.30 Concerning the intelligence of causes, the
same method leading to the knowledge of Nature also leads to the
knowledge of the forms produced by the mind: ideas have causes and
are themselves causes, in the same manner as things do. Rather than
being the function of a psychological consciousness, or a sovereign
subject of knowledge, ideas are what explains the things in thought and
the thoughts we have about them — which are adequate, when we are
the cause, and inadequate when we are only partial causes of them.
True ideas thus need to express their own causes, their own regime
of production. The Spinozist formula ‘verum index sui’31 means that
the criteria for validating a true idea are not extrinsic to it, and do not
require an external sign confirming it. On the contrary, it means that
its criteria are immanent to its own plane of expression. This way of
thinking breaks with the paradigms of ‘analogy’ or ‘eminence’, which
establish between thought and that which is thought an external rela-
tion of agreement or conformity.32 This is one way of understanding
28 Cf. Macherey, ‘Spinoza 1968: Guéroult et/ou Deleuze’.
29 Cf. Jacques, ‘De Différence et répétition à Mille Plateaux’.
30 TdIE 85; CWS [The Collected Works of Spinoza, see abbreviations] i, p. 37.
31 See Ethics ii, 43 Schol. 2; CWS i, p. 479; and Ep. lxxvi [to Albert Burgh]; CWS ii, p.
475.
32 In the seventeenth century, the form of representation of truth in terms of adequacy
establishes such an external relation.
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the Ethics’ ordine geometrico demonstrata: geometry is not a formalism
that assures access to the truth, but rather a form of expression that
allows for the unfolding of discursive figures where the very structure
of the real, in its constitution, is expressed. The logic of expression
is thus a logic of immanence — a logic whose vantage point allows
the thing to be thought as it is. After all, the act in which the thing
is thought is indistinguishable from the act through which the thing
is produced.33 Expression has nothing to do with a designation or a
representation: that which is expressed cannot be dissociated from
the act of expression; expression is not the act of deploying a set of
similar, silent images.34 To speak in terms of a logic means that this
way of thinking corresponds to a form of distributing and relating ideas
according to a ternary (or triadic) schema. This schema interposes,
between the expressed and that which expresses, the act of expressing
or the expression as such; it dynamically posits the conditions of what
they are in themselves, and simultaneously establishes the conditions
of their relation, which is not indicative or representative, as would be
the case in a relation of two terms.35
POWER OR RIGHT
In Expressionism in Philosophy, Deleuze examines rights from the point
of view of power relations as the immanent content of the political
field. He does so based on the description of a historic shift in the
very concept of natural right,36 wherein Spinoza’s concept of potentia
33 See the passage on the idea of the circle in Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the
Intellect (TdIE 33; CWS i, p. 17).
34 The allusion here is to ‘mute pictures on a panel’, with reference to Spinoza’s criticism
of René Descartes (Ethics ii, 49 Schol.; CWS i, p. 486).
35 ‘We everywhere confront the necessity of distinguishing three terms: substance which
expresses itself, the attribute which expresses, and the essence which is expressed. It is
through attributes that essence is distinguished from substance, but through essence
that substance is itself distinguished from attributes: a triad each of whose terms serves
as a middle term relating the two others, in three syllogisms. | Expression is inherent
in substance, insofar as substance is absolutely infinite; in its attributes, insofar as they
constitute an infinity; in essence, insofar as each essence in an attribute is infinite’
(Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, pp. 27–28).
36 This was a recurring problematic in Deleuze’s monographic works up until the late
1960s. See his book on Hume from 1953, which discusses the notion of the contract;
the text Instincts and Institutions from 1955, which offers a programme for the study
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is decisive. In his treatment, the idea of a ‘theoretical’ right, as a moral
faculty and voluntary disposition that could either receive recognition
or go unrecognized amounts to a form of mystification — as the effect
of an expected increase of power, or the sadness issued by the lack of
power. Spinoza struggles against the idea of rights as connected to a
prior legal order — be that of institutions, eminent or divine justice,
be it an objective law, authorizing or prohibiting certain actions, or
the idea of subjective rights. Instead, he proposes to understand the
equality of rights as a right itself (or power) that goes beyond a mere
formalism: institutions and collective practices depend on the com-
mon interest, as well as on inter-individual relations; they are not
derived from pre-existing duties, but rather from the constitution, in-
volving the ‘many’, of the right (or power) — hence Spinoza’s formula:
jus sive potentia.
As Étienne Balibar observes,
In theTTP, Spinoza had defined the notion of ‘right’ in the form
of a thesis — ‘the right of the individual is co-extensive with its
determinate power’ (TTP, 237). In the TP, he goes on to de-
velop all the consequences of this definition and, in the process,
to demonstrate his originality as a theorist. Taken literally, this
thesis means that the notion of ‘right’ has no priority, for that
priority belongs to the notion of ‘power’. One might say that the
word right (Jus) is used to express the originary reality of power
(potentia) in the language of politics. But by doing so we have
not introduced a separation between right and power, since
the word originary does not imply proceeding from or grounded
in (which is why, in particular, any interpretation of Spinoza’s
definition as a variant on the idea of ‘might is right’ is clearly
mistaken). Spinoza’s purpose here is not to justify the notion
of right, but to form an adequate idea of its determinations,
of the way in which it works. In this sense, his formula can be
glossed as meaning that the individual’s right includes all that he
is effectively able to do and to think in a given set of conditions.37
of sociality; and his course on Jean-Jacques Rousseau from 1959, which intervenes
in the debate on the state of nature by contrasting antiquity’s concept (from Plato to
Cicero) with that of Hobbes — the same strategy he would apply in Expressionism in
Philosophy, in the Vincennes courses on Spinoza, which are contemporary with the
publication of A Thousand Plateaus, and in the courses on Foucault from the mid-
1980s. The source Deleuze cites is Leo Strauss’ Natural Right and History from 1954
— Strauss reappears in Deleuze and Guattari’s 1991 meditation on tyranny in What is
Philosophy? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
37 Étienne Balibar, Spinoza and Politics (London: Verso, 1998), p. 59.
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Power is an object of admiration, less for its visible effects than for its
invisible operations, its effect-producing properties. This admiration
affects superstition, turning power into something unfathomable —
hence the relation between power and the passions, whereby psychic
life manifests itself in the image of an arbitrary and capricious will with
no cause (and as something to be dominated by reason). However, if
particular things are defined by their power, this means that none of
them possess efficacy all on their own.38 Spinoza scholars diverge on
the uses of the terms potentia and potestas in Spinoza — both translated
as ‘power’ in English —, and Latin classics tend to add confusion to
that vocabulary by using potentia to name an absolutely tyrannical
power, whereas potestas refers to a power authorized by law. Spinoza
combines their uses with particular variations, sometimes using the
term potestas to determine the potentia, and yet refusing to found
potentia in potestas. On the contrary, it is potentia that founds power
— to act and to understand, to affect and to be affected.
Beyond the etymological controversy, the problem is metaphys-
ical: for Spinoza, potentia is always actual; it is not potentiality, such as
the Aristotelian dunamis (δύναμις), of which potentia is the Latin trans-
lation. Dunamis and energeia (ενέργεια), actuality, are thus fused in the
term potentia. Galilean physics played a decisive role in this operation.
The (physical) phenomenon is the result of a temporal point of view,
the manifestation of a state, of the process leading to that result. That
process, leading to the event properly speaking, and to the relation —
called ‘eternal’ by Spinoza — is the same process through which all
differentiation becomes possible and which corresponds to the neces-
sary correlation between variables. What is therefore at stake is to grasp
the differences in themselves, as variations correlating with other vari-
ations. This serves as a corrective to the habit of fixating on an image
of difference.39 Deposing that transcendental principle, it becomes
necessary to recognize the universal dependence of things. Hence, the
concept of conatus, drawn from the vocabulary of seventeenth-century
38 See Ethics iii, Praef.; CWS i, p. 491: ‘Indeed they seem to conceive man in nature as a
dominion within a dominion’.
39 Cf. Françoise Barbaras, ‘Le Concept de puissance dans l’héritage de la science cartési-
enne’, Archives de Philosophie, 64.4 (2001), pp. 721–39; Mogens Lærke, ‘Immanence
et extériorité absolue. Sur la théorie de la causalité et l’ontologie de la puissance de
Spinoza’, Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, 134.2 (2009), pp. 169–90.
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physics, means the individuated expression of potentia, as the striving
each thing does to persevere without any finality. With the conatus,
Spinoza denies all hierarchy among natural beings.40 By rejecting fi-
nalism, he introduces a ‘near-plebeian democratic egalitarianism in the
ontology’,41 in keeping with the logic of univocity. This is what allows
one to think of right in terms of power: as a degree of physical intensity
that expresses itself in a relation of composition between an actually
existing body (an extensive part) and a mind (which is the idea of that
body). Different from Hobbes, who reduces conatus to a question of
kinetics,42 Spinoza thinks of conatus dynamically as a force and intens-
ity, a continuous clash and conflict, not just among external bodies (as
in Hobbes), but also, and especially, internal to each of them.43
The right of every being is always a part of the power of the whole
of Nature: that which allows one to act on all other parts. For that
reason, the measure of right is that of individuality, which in turn
undergoes variations according to encounters with higher and lower
powers, producing more or less effects. The extension of natural right
is, therefore, defined by the composition of the natural laws of the indi-
vidual with the laws of all Nature. This composition produces greater
or lesser variations in a being’s free power depending on whether that
power is impeded or aided by external causes. All power depends on
the relation that it produces according to the laws of its nature along
with the other laws of Nature that impede or aid that production. This
is a right that is immanent to the circumstances of an existing thing:
‘as much right as power’.44 The reality or unity of the right is nothing
more than the complex of relations into which individuals enter, sum-
marized in Spinoza’s phrase: what can a body do?45 Deleuze very often
repeated this question and he took it up as both a legal and an ethical
model:
40 See Ethics ii, Def. 6; CWS i, p. 447: ‘By reality and perfection I understand the same
thing’.
41 André Tosel, Du matérialisme, de Spinoza (Paris: Kimé, 1994), p. 140; trans by the
editors.
42 That is, of inertia and velocity, hence the continuous conflict of bodies external to one
another in the state of nature.
43 Cf. Chaui, Política em Espinosa, pp. 289–314.
44 See TP ii, 3; CWS ii, p. 507: ‘[…] each natural thing has as much right by nature as it
has power to exist and have effects’.
45 See Ethics iii, 2 Schol.; CWS i, pp. 494–97.
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All a body can do (its power) is also its ‘natural right.’ If we
manage to pose the problem of rights at the level of bodies, we
thereby transform the whole philosophy of rights in relation
to souls themselves. […] The theory of natural rights implies
a double identification of power with its exercise, and of such
an exercise of power with a right. ‘The rights of an individual
extend to the utmost limits of his power as it has been condi-
tioned.’ This is the very meaning of the word law: the law of
nature is never a rule of duty, but the norm of a power, the
unity of right, power and its exercise. There is in this respect
no difference between wise man and fool, reasonable and de-
mented men, strong man and weak. They do of course differ in
the kind of affections that determine their effort to persevere in
existence. But each tries equally to preserve himself, and has as
much right as he has power, given the affections that actually
exercise his capacity to be affected. The fool is himself a part of
Nature, and in no way disturbs its order.46
Power will always extend as far as it can — it lacks nothing and is always
actual — and operates between determinate thresholds — varying
by quantity/intensity — since for each existing thing there always
exists another more powerful thing in Nature.47 And because power
is no longer distinguished from action, the power to be affected is
necessarily related to its actual assemblages. Furthermore, a certain,
determinate degree of power is always necessarily performed, making
the power of the individual affected vary more (through joy) or less
(through sadness), according to their encounters.
This concept of power interconnects physics with ethics and polit-
ics. For Spinoza, men only become free when they take control of their
power to act and think, that is, when the conatus is determined by
adequate ideas from which active affects are derived, and which in turn
are explained by their own activity and by that which constitutes their
nature. The institution of the political body corresponds precisely to
the moment when the presumed solitude of individuals leads to the
formation of a higher individual. The constitution of life in common
under a form of political power (imperium) takes place in order to con-
cretize the natural right of each one and of all, since collective natural
right is conserved in that form of association.
46 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, pp. 257–58.
47 See Ethics iv, Ax. 1; CWS i, p. 547.
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Seventeenth century metaphysics cannot but be political. In a
context where absolute monarchy thrived, the image of a Creator en-
dowed with free will serves as a mirror for sovereignty — and vice
versa. The logical battles taking place in Part i of the Ethics, con-
cerning the doctrines and lexicons inherited from the Middle Ages,
capture the transposition of religious superstitions in the realm of civic
life as a process of mystification. Spinoza’s work thus reverts a long-
standing history of transcendentalism in history. In Deleuze’s review
of Gueroult’s book on Spinoza, he stresses the rigorous interrelation
of power and ‘necessary productivity’. He relates this interrelation to
Spinoza’s rejection of the providential figure of a Creator that acts
by free will, through an understanding that decides between possible
alternatives.48
From there follows the defence of Spinoza’s conception of the
‘materiality of the sign’: the sign is a perceived sign, independent of
the consciousness that perceives it and that remains passive. This ‘en-
counter’ is not of a signifier with a pre-existing and given meaning to be
interpreted. There is no recognition: the sense is physical, ethological,
a variation of power, not the reserve or principle of a pre-existing given
with an establishing meaning, origin or end. To give the sign an ir-
rational meaning presupposes the ignorance of divine activity; to think
of it as the vehicle for a different, hidden, eminent, allegorical meaning
would be theoretically mindless and a mystification, but also implies
political submission and a dependency on hermeneutical translators of
the ‘divine message’ expressed through compulsory commandments.
This materialist conception of the sign leads to a semiotics of the
passions of the social body, as developed in the TTP. There, Spinoza
shows how the constitution of the political body depends on a system
of imaginative signs whose function is to stabilize the affective dynamic
of the multitude. With this, one can read in Spinoza the materialist
philosophemes that are found throughout his philosophy: the rejec-
tion of divine transcendence and finalism; the equality of attributes
and the materialist vindication of the body, as a celebration of its pro-
ductive force that does not break with causal determination and with
48 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Gueroult’s General Method for Spinoza’, in Desert Islands and Other
Texts. 1953–1974, ed. by David Lapoujade, trans. by Michael Taormina (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 146–55 (p. 146).
MAURICIO ROCHA 87
the fact of belonging to Nature; the concept of power, the physical
world as natural order with no external principle; the identification of
reality with perfection and of the degree of reality with the degree of
perfection or power. In the last instance, this entails a rejection of any
hierarchy among natural beings according to spirituality and morality
— founded on sin, merit, and punishment.49
COMMON NOTIONS AND THE COMPOSITION OF POWERS
Deleuze considers common notions to be a theoretical driving oper-
ator that favours experimentation, furnishing the condition for that
process in the face of the constitutive conflicts of society (conceived
according the logic of power). These notions reflect the demand to
think the multiplicity of Nature from a rigorously immanent point of
view. This is also its most distinctively materialist feature in Spinoza:
reason not as transcendence, but as that which radicalizes cooperation
and communication.50 But while Spinoza’s Ethics rejects any norm-
ativity founded on transcendence, it does not abolish the normativity
proper to life — to psychic and collective individuation.51
The common notions form a mathematics of the real or the
concrete which rids the geometric method of the fictions and
abstractions that limited its exercise.
The common notions are generalities in the sense that
they are only concerned with the existing modes, without
constituting any part of the latter’s singular essence (ii, 37).
But they are not at all fictitious or abstract; they represent
the composition of real relations between existing modes or
individuals. Whereas geometry only captured relations in ab-
stracto, the common notions enable us to apprehend them as
49 Tosel, Du matérialisme, p. 136.
50 Ibid., p. 147.
51 The last three chapter of Expressionism in Philosophy deal with common notions:
the entire seventeenth century, part of the eighteenth century, and the twentieth
century all presuppose them. The emphasis falls on the distinction between an ‘order
of formation’ and an ‘order of application’, in the character of general, although not
abstract, ideas and in the aspects of the concept of reason that derives therein. This
is accompanied by a set of questions: how do we manage to experience a maximum
of joyful passions? How do we manage to experience active affections? How do we
manage to form adequate ideas? Chapter v of Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (pp. 110–
21), dealing with Spinoza’s unfinished Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, takes
up chapter xviii of Expressionism in Philosophy (pp. 289–301).
88 SPINOZIST MOMENTS IN DELEUZE
they are, that is, as they are necessarily embodied in living be-
ings, with the variable and concrete terms between which they
are established. In this sense, the common notions are more
biological than mathematical forming a natural geometry that
allows us to comprehend the unity of composition of all Nature
and the modes of variations of that unity.52
Deleuze claimed that Spinoza placed empiricism in the service of ra-
tionalism,53 and that the study of the relations of composition among
things would demand a programme of physical-chemical and bio-
logical experimentation, since we have no prior knowledge of those re-
lations of composition. In fact, common notions suggest a transition in
Spinoza’s philosophy that would impact the connections between the
imagination, rationality, and affective dynamism. Common notions
suppose a practice (a process of experimentation) and the conditions
of that process, since the process itself does not exist prior to the form-
ation of common notions. Through them, the ‘common’ articulates
the relation under which two modes, at least, come into agreement
and compose a new relation. Consequently, forming a common notion
is a function of the joyful passions, as the increase in the power to
act and to think; sadness, born from the encounter with a body that
does not agree with ours, does not lead to the formation of common
notions. The common notion is the first adequate idea, derived from a
long experimentation (hence its complexity, since it is simultaneously
practical and speculative).
For Spinoza, reason is realized by the action of bodies on
other bodies.54 Reason takes root in affections and the common
properties of bodies, starting with imaginative perceptions. This
explains Spinoza’s rejection of the antagonism between imagination
and reason, body and soul, desire and will. Given that human beings
are not born rational but rather experience rationality, reason is, in
the first instance, an effort to select and organize good encounters
that compose with us and inspire in us joyful passions. That is, it
consists in striving to select affections (states of the affected body)
that correspond to affects (variations) that agree with reason. The
52 Deleuze, Spinoza, pp. 56–57.
53 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, p. 149.
54 Gueroult, Spinoza, ii: L’âme (Éthique, ii), p. 341.
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guarantee of the constitution of knowledge and rationality, in its varied
forms, is nothing more than that assemblage and that composition of
bodies and minds.
Common notions are not fictions, they do not substitute a thing
for its image nor do they classify by species, genre, number, or by some
sort of transcendentality. They are ideas in general; they do not lead
us to know a singular essence, but rather are constitutive of relations.
Above all, they represent something in common among bodies (prop-
erties): be they common to all (motion and rest) or certain bodies
(two, at least, mine and that of another). When the corresponding re-
lations of two bodies are composed, they constitute a new relation — a
new form — of a higher power. The common notion is a representation
of that composition among two or more existing bodies.55 All bodies,
even where they do not agree, have something in common, like motion
and rest. At a certain point, the common notions make it possible to
understand at what level differences and oppositions are formed. But
since they do not allow us to know the essence of things,56 we can still
fall into abstractions, should we forget their inessential and relational
character. Only the third kind of knowledge has this character of grasp-
ing things in their singularity.
In the entry concerning the common notions in Spinoza: Practical
Philosophy,57 Deleuze seems to mimic the movement that he was pur-
suing throughout the 1970s. Then, he favoured a theory that would
establish a plane of immanence that is both theoretic-practical and vital
— an epistemology involving a determinate relation between life and
thought. Being that the composition of powers is based on multiplicity,
it became possible for Deleuze via Spinoza to formulate the problem
55 Pierre-François Moreau points out this experimental character in the formation of
common notions. See his Spinoza. L’expérience et l’éternité (Paris: PUF, 1994), p.
279. Pascal Sévérac notes the use of the noun convenientia in the ontological sense
in Spinoza’s Ethics (Ethics ii, 29 Schol.; CWS i, p. 476), just as in his Treatise on
the Emendation of the Intellect (TdIE 25; CWS i, p. 15). See his Le Devenir actif chez
Spinoza (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2005), p. 110. Both analyses deal with inadequate
perception, which isolates thatwhich is perceived from thatwithoutwhich it cannot be
understood.On theother hand, adequate perception is born from the contemplationof
various things at the same time, with those things being grasped in their real relations,
according to that which agrees, differs, or is opposed. Cf. chapter xvii of Deleuze’s
Expressionism in Philosophy, pp. 273–89.
56 See Ethics ii, 37, 38, 40 and 44; CWS i, pp. 475–78 and 480–81.
57 See Deleuze, Spinoza, pp. 54–58.
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of sociability and institutional creation as an activity of assessment and
experimentation. In the last instance, Spinoza’s ethics is now placed in
the service of a practical problem, which concerns the understanding
of groups: are they subjects or subjected (assujetis)? This reformula-
tion, in turn, was the clinical and political problem of analysis and
experimentation in the social field, which Deleuze explored alongside
Guattari.58 And it was along that line of inquiry that they sought to
understand the ways in which society is constituted and instituted,
according to the Spinozist perspective suggested by Deleuze. It was
also an invitation to follow the ‘lines of differentiation’59 in which
Spinoza appears to be offering a theory of productive desire (in Anti-
Oedipus) — in the ethological inspiration over and against morality;
in the concept of assemblage determined by the logic of powers, or
in the logic of coessential positivities and coexisting affirmations that
orchestrate the ‘Plateaus’ on the state, politics and law.60 Their project,
in the last instance, involved what one might call a ‘machinic histor-
ical materialism’, and whose properly philosophical thesis defines the
problem of thought not according to the subject/object relation, but
rather by scrutinizing (and tracing the cartography of) the relations
among land and the territories, in consideration of the true movement
of becoming and the production of the real.61
TRANSLATED BY NICOLAS ALLEN
58 Sibertin-Blanc, ‘Politique et clinique’, p. 48.
59 A formula created byLuizOrlandi, ‘Linhas de ação da diferença’, inGillesDeleuze:Uma
vida filosófica, ed. by Éric Alliez (São Paulo: Editora 34, 2000), pp. 49–63 (p. 58).
60 Deleuze, Spinoza, p. 95.
61 Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc, Politique et état chez Deleuze et Guattari. Essai sur le maté-
rialisme historico-machinique, Actuel Marx confrontation (Paris: PUF, 2013), pp. 39,
42, and 99.
Are there One or Two Aleatory
Materialisms?
VITTORIO MORFINO
A LITTLE EXCURSUS CONCERNING MY PREVIOUS
INTERPRETATION
To answer the question of whether there are one or two aleatory
materialisms I will introduce and then analyse a series of texts that I
have written over the last twenty years concerning Louis Althusser’s
writings from the eighties.
In primis, I will take into consideration the ‘Introduction’ that
I wrote with Luca Pinzolo for the Italian translation of some of
Althusser’s writings from the eighties, which was published under the
title Sulmaterialismo aleatorio (On aleatory materialism): the collected
texts included ‘On Marxist Thought’, ‘The Underground Current of
the Materialism of the Encounter’, the two texts that appeared in the
journal Lignes on Machiavelli and Spinoza, and the ‘Portrait of a Ma-
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terialist Philosopher’.1 The book was published in 2000.2 In the second
edition of 2006,3 we added the translation of the text ‘On Aleatory
Materialism’, which had meanwhile been published in the Journal Mul-
titudes.4
Our thesis as outlined in the introduction to this volume can be
briefly summarized as the continuity between the Althusser of the
sixties and the eighties. The implicit polemical objective, although
we did not quote him, was undoubtedly an article by Antonio Negri
published in a special issue of Futur antérieur (Sur Althusser, Passages)
entitled ‘Pour Althusser. Notes sur l’évolutions de la pensée du dernier
Althusser’ (For Althusser: Notes on the Evolution of the Thought of
the Last Althusser),5 in which he identified a Kehre, or turn, in the
thought of the ‘last’ Althusser.
By contrast, Luca Pinzolo and I argued that ‘in the writings of the
80s […] Althusser takes up some of the crucial themes […] of the
great works of the 60s, Reading Capital and ForMarx: those of tempor-
ality, contradiction, and complexity’.6 To illustrate this statement, we
quoted strategic passages from Althusser’s works, such as the ‘Outline
of the Concept of Historical Time’ (1965), ‘Contradiction and Over-
determination’ (1962), and ‘On the Materialist Dialectic’ (1963), and
again the distinction between whole and totality from ‘Is It Simple to
Be a Marxist in Philosophy?’(1976).
1 Louis Althusser, ‘Sur la pensée marxiste’, in Althusser and others, Sur Althusser. Pas-
sages (Paris : L’Harmattan,1993), pp. 11–29; ‘Le Courant souterrain du matérialisme
de la rencontre’, in Écrits philosophiques et politiques, ed. by François Matheron, 2 vols
(Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1994–95), i (1994), pp. 539–79, in English as ‘TheUnderground
Current of the Materialism of the Encounter’, in Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the
Encounter: Later Writings, 1978–87, ed. by François Matheron and Oliver Corpet,
trans. and intro. by Geoffrey M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 163–207;
‘L’unique tradition matérialiste’, ed. by Oliver Corpet, Lignes, 18 (1993), pp. 71–119;
‘Portrait d’un philosophe matérialiste’, in Écrits philosophiques et politiques, i, pp. 581–
82, in English as ‘Portrait of the Materialist Philosopher’, in Althusser, Philosophy of
the Encounter, pp. 290–91.
2 Louis Althusser, Sul materialism aleatorio, ed. by Vittorio Morfino and Luca Pinzolo
(Milan: Unicopli, 2000).
3 Althusser, Sul materialism aleatorio, ed. by Morfino and Pinzolo, 2nd edn (Milan:
Mimesis, 2006).
4 Louis Althusser, ‘Du matérialisme aléatoire’,Multitude, 21.2 (2005), pp. 179–94 (p.
189).
5 Antonio Negri, ‘Pour Althusser. Notes sur l’évolutions de la pensée du dernier
Althusser’, in Althusser and others, Sur Althusser, pp. 73–96 (p. 83).
6 Vittorio Morfino and Luca Pinzolo, ‘Introduzione’, in Althusser, Sul materialism
aleatorio, pp. 7–12 (p. 8; my translation).
VITTORIO MORFINO 93
In addition, we gave particular importance to a passage from
‘Contradiction and Overdetermination’ in which Althusser criticizes
the Marxist theory of revolution as the effect of a simple contradiction
between forces of production and relations of production. Concerning
the Russian Revolution (‘a result of the intense overdetermination of
the basic class contradiction’), Althusser writes: ‘we should perhaps
ask what is exceptional in this “exceptional situation”, and whether,
like all exceptions, this one does not also clarify its rule — is not,
unbeknownst to the rule, the rule itself. After all, are we not always in
exceptional situations?’.7
The conclusion of our introduction insisted precisely on this last
point: the writings of the eighties take into consideration the com-
plexity of the structure (which was at the centre of Althusser’s inves-
tigations in the sixties) from the point of view of the ‘beginnings and
genesis of such complexity’. Given this focus, the distinction between
conjuncture and conjunction emerges as important, as does (and es-
pecially so) the Epicurean model of the parallel fall of atoms and their
encounter made possible by the clinamen. It is important to emphasize
that this theme has nothing to do with the revival of a causality by
freedom in the Kantian sense, which moreover was always a privileged
object of Althusser’s criticism. Instead, it concerns the resumption
of the theme of complexity as always-already-given, not in the per-
spective of its revolutionary dissolution but rather of its own aleatory
constitution. In this sense, contingency is not opposed to necessity
but to teleology. The void and Epicurean atoms are not foundations
for freedom but instead the guarantee of the absence of a plan that
precedes their encounter. Nothing except the factual circumstances
of the encounter has prepared the encounter. This is the meaning of
the Althusserian insistence on void and on nothing: not a mystical
discourse that renders the void another name for God, but the nothing
of all which is not pure facticity.8
The second text that I take into consideration is ‘Il materialismo
della pioggia di Louis Althusser. Un Lessico’ (Louis Althusser’s Ma-
terialism of the Rain: A Lexicon), which I published in Quaderni
7 Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. by Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 2005), p. 104;
emphasis in the original.
8 Morfino and Pinzolo, ‘Introduzione’, pp. 10–11.
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materialisti,9 in the hope of revealing the systematic structure that
can be retraced within the fragmentary nature of the writings of the
eighties. As to the question of continuity / discontinuity, I suggested
that in these writings it was possible to identify some of the most
important themes and problems of the writings of the sixties, even if,
undoubtedly, they were contained within a totally different style:
The later texts are above all impressionistic, at times autobio-
graphical, at other times anecdotal. […] Moreover, all of the
texts cited in these essays are recalled from memory, resulting
in frequent distortions of the original sources, if not outright
inventions. These texts in no way demonstrate the systemati-
city characteristic of Althusser’s two masterpieces from the
1960s, Reading Capital and For Marx, where an entirely new
conceptuality was produced through an incisive, close reading
of Marx’s texts; here, Althusser often transforms his references
at will.10
Apart from this marked difference in style, I identified the most inter-
esting theoretical element by bringing to the fore ‘certain aspects of
the texts from the 1960s that have until now remained at the margins
(most importantly, the theme of the necessity of contingency)’:
This reclamation of earlier marginal moments in Althusser’s
text is possible due in large part to the insistent deployment






Insisting on the interpretative line of the ‘Introduction’ I have main-
tained a close correlation between the concept of void or nothing and
the concept of encounter ‘such that considering one in isolation will
result in altering the nature of both’.12
9 Vittorio Morfino, ‘Il materialismo della pioggia di Louis Althusser. Un Lessico’,
Quaderni materialisti, 1 (2002), pp. 85–108, in English as ‘An Althusserian Lexicon’,






It is precisely from this point that I reopened my reading of
the ‘last’ Althusser, in particular of ‘The Underground Current of
the Materialism of the Encounter’, in an intervention (‘Il primato
dell’incontro sulla forma’) I gave at a conference that took place in
Venice in 2004.
The two fundamental gestures I made in this intervention were
the affirmation of the rhetorical function of the void and the latent
centrality of Charles Darwin. On the void, I said:
I would like to maintain that the emphasis on the concepts
of ‘nothing,’ the ‘null’ and the ‘void’ has a purely rhetorical
function; that contingency and the aleatory are the effect of an
encounter and not of the nothing or the void. If this rhetorical
function is transformed into a theoretical proposition, it risks
transforming the theory of the encounter into a theory of the
event or of freedom.13
On Darwin:
What I would like to argue is that Althusser’s position is dia-
metrically opposed to Aristotle’s, and that the thesis that is
never written apertis verbis in ‘The Underground Current’ is
in fact its fundamental theoretical centre: the primacy of the
encounter over form. […] [This] can be read in a totally new
light when we juxtapose it with an author that Althusser refers
to only once: Charles Darwin.14
I have argued for the centrality of Darwin’s role based on the fact that
the only time his name was mentioned was in relation to a confer-
ence organized in Paris by Dominique Lecourt and Yvette Conry, in
which Lecourt presented an intervention entitled ‘Marx au crible de
Darwin’.15 In this lecture he placed the English naturalist at the highest
point of a philosophy of the encounter which would also include Epi-
curus and Machiavelli, an intervention that seemed to me at the very
least in dialogue with Althusser if not directly inspired by him.
After this little excursus, I am finally able to return to the question
posed by my title, namely whether there are ‘One or Two Aleatory
13 Vittorio Morfino, Plural Temporality: Transindividuality and the Aleatory between
Spinoza and Althusser (Leiden: Brill, 2014), p. 97.
14 Ibid., p. 104.
15 Dominique Lecourt, ‘Marx au crible de Darwin’, in De Darwin au darwinisme: science
et idéologie, ed. by Yvette Conry(Paris: Vrin, 1983), pp. 227–49.
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Materialisms’. Of course, this question resonates with —and polem-
ically opposes — an article published by François Matheron and
Yoshihiko Ichida entitled ‘Un, deux, trois, quatre, dix mille Althusser.
Considérations aléatoires sur le matérialisme aléatoire’.16 Through the
developments outlined in my introduction and the two essays I have
quoted, my answer to this question was that there was only one alea-
tory materialism in continuity with the Althusserian thought of the
sixties. And not only! When I found in some unpublished texts from
the sixties, that Althusser had used certain categories like ‘conjunction’,
‘encounter’, and ‘take hold’, I ended up backdating aleatory materialism
to the sixties. Now, however, I’m asking myself whether this was the
right way to think the problem, and whether it is not necessary to first
take into consideration the role of these categories in the theoretical
context of the sixties and then confront them with the thought of the
eighties.
INSTEAD OF GENESIS
Let us first take into consideration the context in which these categor-
ies emerge in the texts from the sixties. They seem to shed light on
the question of the disjunction established in Reading Capital between
genesis and structure: in other words, the disjunction between the
theory of the body, of the actual structure of society (to be even
more precise, of the mechanism that produces what Althusser calls
the ‘society-effect’), and the theory of bourgeois society as a historical
result.
It seems to me that Althusser introduced the concepts of en-
counter and conjunction to solve two problems in his theory that may
have a common origin. Firstly, his insistence on the Marxian term
Verbindung, which is translated as ‘combination’ but thought of as
‘combinatory’, did not allow him to think of the constitutive nature of
relations and, secondly and concurrently, did not allow him to clearly
conceptualize an alternative to the concept of ‘genesis’, which he, how-
16 François Matheron and Yoshihiko Ichida, ‘Un, deux, trois, quatre, dix mille Althusser.
Considérations aléatoires sur le matérialisme aléatoire’, Multitude, 21.2 (2005), pp.
167–78.
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ever, openly refused. I would like to address these two problems in turn
in the following paragraphs.
Firstly, in ‘The Object of Capital’, in particular in the chapter
dedicated to Marx’s critique of political economy, Althusser stresses
Marx’s use of the term Verbindung to think the relations of production
beyond any model of intersubjectivity.17 A Verbindung, or, to return
to the terms of the 1857 Introduction, a distribution, is ‘a certain
attribution of the means of production to the agents of production, in
a certain regular proportion fixed between, on one hand, the means
of production and, on the other, the agents of production’.18 Althusser
notes that there are even more distinctions to be found in Marx: on
the side of the means of production, there is a distinction between
the object and the instruments of production, and on the side of the
agents, there is one between the immediate agents of production and
the owners of the means of production. Althusser then concludes:
By combining or inter-relating these different elements —
labour-power, direct workers, masters who are not direct work-
ers, object of production, instruments of production, etc. —
we reach a definition of the different modes of production which
have existed and can exist in human history.19
Here Althusser adds an important remark: this Verbindung of the pre-
existing determinate elements ‘would sincerely and truly constitute a
combinatory’.20
In the second edition from 1968, Althusser fine-tunes his analysis,
affirming that this operation ‘might make us think of a combinatory’
but that the specific nature of the relations put into play from these
different combinations define and strictly limit the field:
To obtain the different modes of production these different
elements do have to be combined, but by using specific modes
17 Louis Althusser, ‘L’objet du Capital’, in Lire le Capital (Paris: PUF, 1996), pp. 245–
418 (p. 385), in English as ‘The Object of Capital’, trans by Ben Brewster, in Reading
Capital: The Complete Edition (London: Verso, 2015), pp. 215–355 (p. 329).
18 Ibid., p. 386, eng. tr., p. 329.
19 Ibid., p. 388, eng. tr., p. 330.
20 Althusser and others, ‘Variantes de la première édition’, in Lire le Capital (Paris: PUF,
1996), pp. 635–61 (p. 645).
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of combination or ‘Verbindungen’ which are only meaningful in
the peculiar nature of the result of the combinatory.21
Why did Althusser make this correction? We can suppose that the
translation of the term Verbindung with combination and Althusser’s
further reading of this in terms of a ‘combinatory of elements’ could
make one think of a pre-existence of the elements, which then enter
into different relations in different modes of production. The correc-
tion Althusser introduces in the second edition of Reading Capital
seems to aim at avoiding the risk of thinking of invariable elements
combined in different ways in different modes of production.
Regarding the second problem, we can list a series of texts, includ-
ing the little note ‘On Genesis’, the letters to René Diaktine, and the
‘The Humanist Controversy’. In these texts, the reason for the absence
of the concept of ‘genesis’ appears in full light. In a letter to Diaktine
dated 22 August 1966, Althusser insists at length on the question:
Whoever says genesis says the reconstitution of the process
through which a phenomenon A has actually been engendered.
That reconstitution is itself a process of knowledge: it has
meaning (as knowledge) only if it reproduces (reconstitutes)
the real process that engendered phenomenon A. You will see
immediately that whoever says genesis says from the outset
that the process of knowledge is identical in all its parts and in
their order of succession to the actual process of engendering.
[…] That means, to speak in less abstract terms, that who-
ever elaborates the genesis of a phenomenon A can follow the
tracks, in all its phases, from the origin of the actual process
of engendering without any interruption, that is, without any
discontinuity, lacuna, or break (the words hardly matter). This
immediate and total overlap […] implies the idea […] that the
subject of the real or actual process is a single and same subject,
identifiable from the origin of the process to the end.22
The ‘genesis’ paradigm therefore implies a kind of organic unity
between the concepts of ‘process of generation’, ‘origin of the process’,
‘goal or end of the process’, ‘identity of the subject of the process of
21 Althusser, ‘L’objet du Capital’, p. 388, eng. tr., p. 331.
22 Althusser to Diaktine, 22 August 1966, in Louis Althusser, Écrits sur la psychanalyse
(Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1993), pp. 83–110 (pp. 83–84), in English asWritings on Psycho-
analysis: Freud and Lacan, trans. by JeffreyMehlman (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996), p. 55.
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generation’, unity impregnated by the reference to an experience, the
experience of generation, ‘be it that of the child who becomes an adult
or that of the seed that becomes a vegetal or living being’. In the genetic
model, the individual we find at the end of the process, which we are
confronted with, is already present in the seed. According to Althusser,
this makes the structure of each ‘genesis’ teleological:
Every genetic thought is literally obsessed by the search for a
‘birth’, with all that is entailed by the ambiguity of that word,
which presupposes […] the […] idea that what is to be ob-
served in its very birth already bears its name, already possesses
its identity, […] already exists in some manner before its own
birth in order to be born!23
Althusser adds that the concept of ‘genesis’ — as with any ideological
concept — ‘recognizes misunderstanding, that is to say, designates a
reality by covering it with a false knowledge, an illusion’. The reality
that the concept of genesis misunderstands is ‘the emergence of the
phenomenon A, radically new compared to all that precedes its own
emergence’:
Whence the imperative of a logic different from that of genesis,
but precisely to think that reality and not to dispense with think-
ing that reality. I have for a long time now been insisting on
the necessity of constituting that new logic, which amounts to
the same thing as defining the specific forms of a materialist
dialectic.24
In a short note written exactly one month later on 22 September 1966,
entitled ‘On Genesis’, Althusser gave a name to this new logic which
he meant to replace the logic built around the ‘ideological (religious)
category of Genesis’. He called it the ‘theory of the encounter’ or
‘theory of the conjunction’. A privileged example, as in the letter to
Diaktine, is the logic of the constitution of the capitalist mode of
production:
23 Ibid., p. 86, eng. tr., p. 57.
24 Ibid., p. 89, eng. tr., p. 59.
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1. the elements defined by Marx ‘combine’. I prefer to say
(in order to translate the term Verbindung) that they
‘conjoin’ by ‘taking hold’ in a new structure. This struc-
ture cannot be thought, in its irruption, as the effect of a
filiation; it must be thought as the effect of a conjunction.
This new Logic has nothing to do with the linear caus-
ality of filiation or with Hegelian ‘dialectical’ causality
[…]
2. Yet each of the elements that come to be combined in the
conjunction of the new structure (in this case to hand,
accumulated money-capital; ‘free’ labour-power, that is,
labour-power divested of its work tools; and techno-
logical inventions) is itself, as such, a product, an effect.
What is important in Marx’s demonstration is that the three
elements are not contemporaneous products of one and the
same situation. In other words, it is not the feudal mode of
production which, by itself, thanks to a providential finality,
simultaneously engenders the three elements required for the
new structure to ‘take hold’. Each of these elements has its own
‘history’, or genealogy (to borrow a concept from Nietzsche’s
that Balibar has used felicitously in this connection): the three
genealogies are relatively independent. […]
Thus the genealogies of the three elements are independ-
ent of each other, and independent (in their co-existence, in
the co-existence of their respective results) of the existing
structure (the feudal mode of production). This excludes all
possibility of a resurgence of the myth of genesis.25
The plurality of genealogies in this passage indicates precisely the
opposite of genesis, that is, it indicates the emergence of a plurality of
elements that coexist but which are not contemporary effects of the
same situation.
We can find a similar critique of the concept of genesis in the
‘The Humanist Controversy’, picking up on the debate raised in the
Marxist field by what Althusser calls ‘the recent discoveries of human
palaeontology’.26 Here, the reference is to André Leroi-Gourhan and
25 Louis Althusser, ‘Sur la genèse’, in Écrits sur l’histoire (Paris: PUF, 2018), pp. 81–86
(pp. 81–82), in English as ‘On Genesis’, in History and Imperialism: Writings, 1963–
1986, trans. by Geoffrey M. Goshgarian (Cambridge: Polity, 2020), pp. 33–36 (pp.
33–34).
26 Louis Althusser, ‘La querelle de l’humanisme’, in Écrits philosophiques et politiques, ii
(1995), pp. 433–532 (p. 504), in English as ‘The Humanist Controversy’, in his The
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his theory that ‘the “ancestor” of the human line’27 is a being that, while
only having a modestly developed brain, has the distinctive particu-
larity of an upright position and free hands for making instruments
under conditions which are social and not individual. These discov-
eries would seem to fill in the gap separating current human societies
from the animal origins of the human species, because from its ori-
gins onwards the human species would be constituted by beings who
lived together and produced rudimentary instruments. In this regard,
Althusser cites Jean Suret-Canale who, on the basis of Leroi-Gourhan’s
theory, claimed that social labour is the original cause of humaniza-
tion.28 Criticizing this position on the question of anthropogenesis,
Althusser focused on the spontaneous persistence of a conception that
cannot resist associating materialism and genesis.29
Genesis signifies filiation — it signifies that we are dealing with
one individual whose transformations we can follow in the spontan-
eous form of an empiricism that weaves a continuous thread. Just as
it seems to break with a genetic scheme, the genesis of man from ape
introduces another genetic scheme within the human kingdom which
identifies the originary individual. Althusser writes:
The Originary Individual; he has been identified, he makes
‘tools’ of some unspecified sort, he lives in groups: he’s the one,
all right.30
Althusser opposes a theory of the encounter against this schema of the
‘originary’, the privileged example of which is the capitalist mode of
production as the result of a process that does not have the form of a
genesis. Remaining within the metaphor of filiation, Althusser writes:
We must go much further, and say that the Sons who count in
the historical process have no father, because they need several,
and these fathers are in their turn the sons not of a single father
[…], but of several.31
Humanist Controversy and Other Writings (1966–67), trans. by Geoffrey M. Goshgar-
ian (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 221–305 (p. 284).
27 Ibid., p. 505, eng. tr., p. 284.
28 Ibid., p. 508, eng. tr., p. 286.
29 Ibid., p. 515, tr. eng., pp. 292–93.
30 Ibid., p. 517, tr. eng., p. 294.
31 Ibid., p. 520, eng. tr., p. 296.
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As we have seen, the critique of the concept of genesis is constantly
accompanied by the historical example of primitive accumulation.32
The other example found in Althusser’s texts is that of the unconscious.
In the letter to Diaktine from 22 August 1966, Althusser writes:
When one wants to think through the ‘genesis’ of the un-
conscious, […] one starts with the result within knowledge,
namely, the existence of that identified ‘individual’ called the
unconscious, and elaborating the genesis of the unconscious
consists in moving back to its birth, to the point at which one
witnesses its birth, but one manages only with difficulty to rid
oneself of the idea that in a certain way, to elaborate the genesis
of the unconscious means to seek out, even before its birth, all
that already prefigures and announces it, already contains it in
person, even in the form of a draft, but that resembles it and that
is already it, that already bears its name, that is already identifi-
able […]. One has the greatest difficulty conceiving that prior
to the unconscious absolutely nothing exists that resembles the
unconscious; one always tends to recognize it in germ, as a
promise, draft, element, prefiguration, etc., before its own birth
precisely because one conceives its irruption in the form of a
birth.33
Althusser thus rejects the concepts of genesis and birth in favour of
concepts such as ‘encounter’, ‘taking hold’, ‘conjunction’. We can take
as an example this passage from the Three Notes on Discourse Theory:
We can […] set out the elements which are present and ‘preside’
over the conjunction that ‘takes hold’ in the form of the uncon-
scious. […] The elements involved exist in the characters of the
familial theatre, the familial situation: an ideological ‘situation’
in which are produced, as constitutive of this ‘situation’, the
effects of the articulation of the mother’s and father’s uncon-
scious with and in the structure of this ideological situation.
Unconsciouses articulated with the ideological, unconsciouses
articulated with each other by way of (in) their articulation
with the ideological: this is what constitutes the ‘situation’
that presides over the establishment of the unconscious in the
child.34
32 Cf. Althusser’s 22 August 1966 letter to René Diaktine, p. 61.
33 Althusser to Diaktine, 22 August 1966, p. 87, eng. tr. p. 58.
34 Louis Althusser, ‘Trois notes sur la théorie du discours’, inÉcrits sur la psychanalyse, pp.
111–70 (pp. 146–47), in English as ‘Three Notes on the Theory of Discourses’, in The
Humanist Controversy and OtherWritings, pp. 33–84 (p. 62; emphasis in the original).
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It is interesting to remark that the concept of the ‘void’ also has a
role between the set of concepts used to substitute the scheme of the
genesis, but in very precise way, as a ‘determinate absence’:
I believe you will agree with the very general principle that
absence possesses a certain efficacy on the condition, to be sure,
that it be not absence in general, nothingness or any other
Heideggerian ‘openness’ but a determinate absence playing a
role in the space of its absence.35
One might perhaps advance the hypothesis that this ‘theory of the
encounter’ intervenes in these texts of the sixties as a rectification of
a formalist theory of structural causality, or at least the potential risk
of such a theory. In other words, it seems to me that the functioning
of the theory of structural causality is secured by three theses: 1)
the thesis of the constitutiveness of relations; 2) the thesis of the
primacy of the encounter over the form; 3) and the thesis of plural or
differential temporality. Now, these three theses must be thought in an
intertwined fashion. In fact, T1 without T2 produces the reversibility
of genesis and structure or the impossibility of thinking the becoming
of the structure, T2 without T3 leads to think the encounter as a
discontinuous event in a unique time-line, and T3 without T1 ends
up thinking a multiplicity of unrelated times.
THE TEXTS OF THE EIGHTIES
Finally, we can address the content of the writings from the eighties,
where a series of concepts persists: the ‘encounter’, ‘taking hold’, ‘con-
stitutive relations’. This persistence may make us think that we are
dealing with the same materialism of the sixties, and the privileged
example of primitive accumulation also returns, even if the reference
to psychoanalysis and the unconscious disappear completely. I would
argue that this conceptual constellation constitutes one of the two
tendencies present in these writings, namely what I have called here the
materialist tendency; indeed, besides these concepts, we find others
whose history of appearance in Althusserian thought remains to be
written, for example the Deleuzian concept of ‘rhizome’, the Marxian
35 Althusser to Diaktine, 22 August 1966, p. 90, eng. tr., pp. 60–61.
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concept of interstice or the pair margin-centre. Allow me to quote a
passage on the Theses of June on the rhizome and interstice:
The world is now an unpredictable flow. If we want to give an
image, we must go back to Heraclitus (we do not bathe twice
in the same river), or Epicurus (primacy of void on the atomic
corpuscles). If we want to give a closer image, following in this
Deleuze […] we must not represent the world according to
Descartes as a hierarchical tree, but rather as a rhizome. For
me, I would prefer another image, that of Marx. Marx said:
the gods exist in the interstices of the world of Epicurus. He
added: in the same way, commercial relations existed in the
interstices of the slave world. I would say the same thing:
communist relations (communism is the end of the relations
of economic exploitation, the end of state domination and the
end of ideological mystifications) exist in the interstices of the
imperialist world.36
And here a passage on the pair margin-centre:
Marx said: the proletariat camps on the margins of bourgeois
society. And he put it in the centre, at the heart of the class
struggle of bourgeois society. What was Marx doing? He made
of the margin the centre. The problem today is formally the
same. You have to make the margin the centre.37
Of course, the use of these concepts, although rare and episodic,
sketches a different tendency than the one we have designated as the
materialist one — which is rooted in the sixties’ problematic — and
which we could define as eschatological to the extent that it, on the one
hand, rejects the hierarchical structure of the whole (which means, at
the same time, the temporal complexity of the conjuncture) and, on
the other, and as a consequence of this, affirms communism as simple
parousia to come.
In this sense, the illuminating concept of the conflicting presence
of these two tendencies in the texts of the eighties is precisely that
of void: it is an expression of the materialist tendency if thought in a
triangulation with the concepts of clinamen and atomic elements (we
could say that void, clinamen, and atoms are the conceptual tools that
36 Louis Althusser, Thèse de juin, IMEC, ALT2. A29.60.04, p. 9.
37 Ibid., p. 12.
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render a theory of encounter or of conjunction thinkable), and within
this conceptual relationship it expresses the simple rejection of the
anteriority of the logos, of the genesis; nevertheless, when it is thought
in connection with the concept of world it became an expression of the
eschatological tendency (of course there are some passages in which
the two tendencies intersect each other). Here is an example:
I simply want to say that this world, empty of any assured and
stable structure, empty of theory, depoliticized to the extreme
[…] I simply want to say that this world offers itself and that it
is to take. I studied the theme of ‘fortune’ (the good occasion)
in Machiavelli, and I came to the conclusion that fortune in its
higher form is the void: the absence of obstacles.38
If we try to lend systematicity to this set of concepts (forcing them,
perhaps) it seems to me that they shape the second tendency present in
the writings on aleatory materialism (a tendency which predominates
in the writings of 1985–86), an eschatological tendency in which the
void must become full, the margins centre, the interstices worlds,
where absence does not have a determinate character but is rather the
expectation of a full parousia, which the theory of structural causality
of the sixties had considered as both impossible and imaginary:
What reigns in silence is a big wait!39
CONCLUSION
To conclude, I propose the following interpretative schema. If we take
the writings of the eighties as a whole (something that Luca Pinzolo
and I did by publishing them with the title On Aleatory Materialism)
we can find the re-elaboration of the material deposits in two different
temporal streams, the first one which comes from the years 1966–67
(I would call it the materialist tendency), the second from the years
1976–7840 (the eschatological tendency). One can perhaps ascribe to
38 Ibid., p. 10.
39 Louis Althusser, ‘Sur le matérialisme aléatoire’, p. 189.
40 I am thinking particularly of some passages on communism in Louis Althusser, Les
Vaches noires. Interview imaginaire (Paris: PUF, 2016), pp. 251–67 or on the margins
in Être marxiste en philosophie (Paris: PUF, 2015), pp. 212–16.
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the first tendency the new elaboration of the materials leavened by a
second stream, coming from the beginning of the seventies with the
courses on Rousseau and Machiavelli and the text on Imperialism.41
Of course the two tendencies produce a tension which traverses the
writings and the concepts of these years, a tension that can perhaps
explain the different, if not opposing, interpretations the writings of
these years have produced.
However, perhaps it is possible to take a step further and risk
an hypothesis that could only be proven with precise and rigorous
work on these texts, a part of which has not yet been published:42
one could try a more precise periodization of these writings by saying
that in the writings of 1982 there is a dominance of the materialist
tendency, whereas in the writings of 1985–86 there is a dominance of
the eschatological tendency.
41 Louis Althusser, Machiavelli et nous, in Ecrits philosophiques et politiques, ii, pp. 39–
167; Louis Althusser, Cours sur Rousseau, ed. by Yves Vargas (Paris: Les temps de
Cerises, 2012); Louis Althusser, ‘Sur l’impérialisme’, in Écrits sur l’histoire, pp. 103–
260. In any case an important reconstruction of this stream of thought can be found in
Stefano Pippa, Althusser and Contingency (Milan: Mimesis International, 2018).
42 I’m referring to the group of text that are listed in the Althusser archive as ALT2.029
(Textes divers, 1982–1986).
II. THEMATERIALITYOFTHEMILIEU
AND THE MATERIALIST EDUCATION

Introduction to Part ii
MARLENE KIENBERGER AND BRUNO PACE
In a dialectical dance between the reproduction of an established order
and a counter-acting resistance, what survives over time? This part of
the volume has assembled what we could regard as ‘materialisms of
transmission’, that is to say, a milieu-mediated connection between
evolution and education. The texts in this part approach these ques-
tions from different angles and consider them in their diversity: three
(Pascal Sévérac, Marlon Miguel, Bernardo Bianchi) investigate what a
materialist approach to education could look like; the other two (Elena
Vogman, Catherine Perret) present a transdisciplinary perspective on
the evolution of languages, gestures, movements, and social norms in
relation to tools, labour, and economic organization. All of the authors
show an interest in unconventional paths in the history of philosophy,
pedagogy, linguistics, or anthropology.
Vogman dives into multiple aspects of Nikolai Marr’s theory of
language. Marr developed a paleontological and archaeological view
on history as a non-linear process, and Vogman shows that his views
were pretty much aligned with Walter Benjamin’s critique of his-
toricism as teleological and a-processual. Marr, whose theories were
banned by Stalin himself in the 1950s, sought the origin of languages in
a materialist foundation — namely, in the gesture, which he connected
to the use of tools and economic organization. He depicts different
gestures in different societies that survive throughout time as remnants
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of the past, and thereby proposes the anachronistic coexistence of ma-
terial traces from different historical stages and temporalities.
Against the backdrop of rising nationalisms, Marr insisted on a
materialist constitution of languages — perceiving them as a class
phenomenon and a fundamental element of class struggle — and his
theory negates any reconstruction of linguistic families that is based
on race. Vogman shows that Marr’s paleontological linguistics, which
in his time was condemned for being fictional and unscientific, can
nowadays be read as a political genealogy of languages as well as a
fruitful contribution to linguistics, which he accused of disregarding
the languages of oppressed people. Vogman depicts Marr as a multi-
disciplinary intellectual and the inventor of his own syncretic version
of historical materialism.
Perret analyses the multiple relationships between tools, hands,
the mouth, gestures, and speech, as well as their roles in human evolu-
tion. Tools are considered as extensions of our bodies, whereas hands
are seen as the intersection between gesture and speech. The human
technical milieu and its constitutive gestures survive over time and is
mediated by producing bodies. Perret, who draws upon Marcel Mauss
and André Leroi-Gourhan, emphasizes that a few collective human
characteristics, e.g. social norms, were able to become emancipated
from the biological and started undergoing an evolutionary process
in their own right. At the same time, they are inscribed into bio-
logical bodies and ultimately shape emotions, movements, and bodily
rhythms. Using the foundations of Leroi-Gourhan’s anthropology, she
re-evaluates the critique of contemporary capitalism, which continu-
ously forces us to reduce our understanding of social bonds to the
‘hallucinatory power of value’. By identifying the materialities of social
bonds which are not reducible to the logic of value, she resists the
‘gregarization’ — meaning the turning into a herd behaviour — of
society that is induced by the exploitation of the technical in favour
of economic interests.
Perret’s kinaesthetic materiality of social bonds — which can be
described as the sensitivity towards movements and gestures that are
needed for cooperative production — is not too far from the material-
ity of the ‘social glue’ needed to build a collective which is presented by
Miguel. Miguel discusses the situation of Anton Semyonovich Makar-
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enko, the well-known Soviet educator who formulated an anti-theory
of education based on one sole guiding principle: ‘the creation of a
real collectivity’. In the Gorky colony where he lived and collectively
organized a society with delinquent children in miserable conditions,
Makarenko focused on the formation of a sensibility that goes beyond
the individual perspective. He believed that the educator must im-
manently learn from the situation, take the unique circumstances into
account, and rearrange them so that the collective educates itself. In
theoretical terms, Miguel shows the connection between Makarenko’s
educational practice and Karl Marx’s ‘Theses on Feuerbach’: Humans
are, at the same time, products and producers of their own circum-
stances.
This recursive loop can also be found inBianchi’s text about eman-
cipation and the question of a materialist education. He argues that
education should not be conceived as an activity that seeks to explain
the human reality from the outside. In this way, Bianchi dissolves the
traditional subject-object dichotomy as well as stadialist and hierarch-
ical conceptions of the relationship between knowledge and politics.
His materialist gesture, therefore, consists in neutralizing the principle
of the ignorance of the masses by redefining the relationship between
politics, knowledge, and education. By drawing on Étienne Balibar’s
‘materialism without matter’ and his theory of transindividuality, Bi-
anchi proposes the idea of a recursive loop between individuation and
individualization, as well as between knowledge (and education) and
political agency.
While Bianchi’s analysis of a materialist education centres on Marx
and Balibar, Sévérac focuses on a Spinozist education based on reason
and knowledge that aims at a transformation of the affective sensibility
of the body. In his text, he delineates a Spinozist ‘physics of thought’ as
it is applied to a moral education. He emphasizes the transformation
that takes place in the child’s body that is being educated. Sévérac
sketches out an education which is opposed to the traditional, moral
education, and highlights how it must cultivate an ability to ‘speak out’,
a ‘moral force’ and ‘love for freedom’, which can enable the educated to
resist any tyrannical abuse of power.
The texts in this part raise and seek to answer important questions
at the intersection of materialism, education, evolution, and politics.
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How difficult is it to question what seems unquestionable because
of established traditions? How can a thinker resist a tradition and
thereby transform its body of knowledge? To what extent does the
scope of materialist thought undergo a transformation when an author
redefines what the questions and foundations could be and when
they elaborate new ways of considering different materialities? What
survives when the necessity of these questions and foundations are
challenged, and an author suggests that they are contingent on the
circumstances they are inscribed within?
May the following texts continue raising questions that transmit
and transform the materialist trends.
Language Follows Labour
Nikolai Marr’s Materialist Palaeontology of Speech
ELENA VOGMAN
Today the Soviet archaeologist, palaeontologist of speech, and in-
ventor of the theory of ‘linear’ or ‘gestural speech’, Nikolai Marr
(1864–1934), seems to be almost forgotten. The Georgian-born au-
thor is mostly known for his ‘New Theory of Language’, otherwise
called the Japhetic theory, yet Marr’s work on the disciplinary margins,
his incessant invention of new fields of knowledge, and his ‘archaeolo-
gical’ vision of history is comparable to such lateral thinkers as Aby
Warburg or Carl Einstein. In contrast to these authors, however, Marr
practiced archaeology, which led him to some crucial discoveries in the
Caucasus and a vast materialist theory of culture, which he understood
as evolving by ‘strata’1 and conditioned by historical and economic re-
lations. Regarding the impact of labour on the development of culture,
Marr’s ‘palaeontology of speech’ emphasized the role of the gesture
as genuine component of language and thought. At the same time,
Marr’s Marxist disposition did not prevent him from publishing the
first Russian translation of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s Méntalité Primitive,
accompanied with a special foreword by the author. Shortly after the
publication, Lévy-Bruhl was decried as one of the ‘bourgeois’ and
‘idealist’ philosophers along with Marcel Proust and Sigmund Freud.
1 A geological layer of rock, soil, or other material.
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Marr’s theory of language, which is also known as Japhetology
(iafetologia), implied the existence of a ‘Japhetic’ family, which the lan-
guages of the Caucasus, the Near East, and some non-Indo-European
languages of Eurasia and Africa were supposed to belong to. After
the Russian Revolution, Marr founded the Japhetic Institute in Saint
Petersburg, which was part of the State Academy of History of Ma-
terial Culture, where in the 1920s several poets and artists attended
lectures, including Sergei Eisenstein. Marr ventured to produce alter-
native models of temporality, which involved a new perspective on
the history of culture, and at the same time questioned the epistemic
ground on which such a history had been written and perceived until
that point. This epistemic shift went hand in hand with a critical open-
ing of the inherited disciplinary boundaries provoking Marr to create
new fields of knowledge, disquieting and sometimes disturbing other
fields, which became the reason why his critical attempts remained
underacknowledged or were even forgotten.
On the one hand, Marr’s materialism operated in close proximity
to the materiality of culture — its archaeological objects, its traces and
linguistic manifestations — and, on the other hand, it operated in a
more speculative anthropological dimension by addressing language’s
origins. This dimension challenged the orthodox model of histor-
ical materialism and introduced a series of ingenious and apocryphal
claims. In this non-linear, ‘fossilized’ time Marr discovered a crucial
form of life, a ‘survival’, which served as the basis for his materialist
palaeontology of speech. It was this model of time that transformed
Marr’s theory of language into a critical instrument aimed at both the
racist linguistic theories of his time and the dominant Indo-European
linguistics that was based on the arbitrariness of the sign.
In order to better seize the drifting trajectory that led Marr to a
paleontological model of history and language, my text will first draw
upon his archaeological expeditions to the Caucasus by examining a
number of photographic documents which are preserved at the Insti-
tute of History of Material Culture in Saint Petersburg. These materials
symptomatically reveal the impact that archaeological practice and
palaeontology had on Marr’s linguistic theory, or ‘Japhetology’, with
particular regard for its implied temporality. Secondly, I will briefly
trace Marr’s language theory, especially his late text ‘On the Origin of
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language’. Japhetology became the object of different waves of critique
formulated from both philological and linguistic perspectives follow-
ing the official ban of Marr’s theory, which was pronounced by Stalin
personally in the 1950s. An analysis of manifold parallels between
Marr’s approach and the poetico-theoretical methods of his contem-
poraries, in particular the poets Andrei Bely and Velimir Khlebnikov,
remains still to be written, insofar as they tempted to reconfigure teleo-
logical temporalities in order to lay bare the vertiginous complexity
of historical events. A different model of history would appear once
Marr’s linguistic approach is located in a constellation with these other
authors’ approaches. The rhythmical occurrences and re-occurrences
of historical events which Khlebnikov and Bely observed in their in-
vestigations reveal history’s entanglements with psychic and poetic
economy rather than with the irreversible course of history.
MARR’S ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXPEDITIONS
Marr studied every discipline offered at the faculty of Oriental Studies
in Saint Petersburg. He specialized in the Armenian, Georgian, and
Iranian languages, and swiftly became one of the leading orientalists
of his time. In 1892 — aged only 27 years old — Marr undertook his
first archaeological expedition to Ani, the ruined medieval Armenian
city situated on the territory of the Russian Empire, in today’s Turkey
alongside the closed border with Armenia. In the following decades
Marr undertook foundational archaeological work in Sinai, Palestine,
and the ancient sites of Armenia, such as Dvin, Garni, Ani, and the
lake Van. Marr’s research into the buried culture, architecture, and
language of the city of Ani (the first traces of which date back to the fifth
century) was pioneering in its approach and still remains an important
point of reference. His book Ani, a Written History of the City and the
Excavations, published many years later in 1934, included materials
from eleven expeditions between 1892 and 1917.2
Marr’s study of the excavated monuments of Ani opens with a
folded leaflet: a map of the ancient city. The author marks different sites
2 Nikolai Marr, Ani, knizhnaia istoria goroda i raskopki na meste [Ani, a Written History
of the City and the Excavations] (Moscow: OGIZ, 1934).
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and multiple discoveries are depicted in his text, such as the Church of
the Holy Redeemer, the wall of Ashot, King Gagik I’s church of Saint
Gregory or 131 fragments of an Armenian Inscription, etc. Already in
1905, Marr had critically qualified the title as the ‘written history of
Ani’, that is, ‘the history of the Armenian Bagratid Kingship based on
literary evidence, such as the traditional history of Armenia in general’,
as ‘limited and legendary’. Without an account of its silent material
traces, its surviving remnants, the past appears as ‘poor and dead’.3
Marr opposes such traditional literary history to the astonishing ‘life’
of Ani’s excavated ruins: archaeological landscapes that offer an insight
into history’s ‘concrete materiality’. The evidence of a vanished culture
that Marr obtained from his excavations reverses, in his view, the
certitude of a ‘nationally constituted Christian cultural history’, which
is anachronistically claimed as ‘Armenian’. Opposing such assertions
of literary history, Marr assembles a series of syncretic elements, of
Chalcedonian influences alongside Georgian ones, which he analyses
in his text.4
One quality of Marr’s text seems remarkable: while deciphering
fragments from Ani’s lost culture he emphasizes the destructive forces
of history, which attest, in each recovered monument, to an irreversible
loss. One can identify in this leitmotiv of destruction, which traverses
Marr’s archaeological gaze, a dialectical attention to the vanished layers
of culture and memory. This dialectics of residues returns in his future
research in the palaeontology of language: Marr will try to recover the
history of language— especially the history of oral languages — from
ephemeral contemporary vernaculars. In his work history appears not
as a homogeneous and teleological flow but rather as an archaeological
layering inhabited by survival and coexistence.
Another important element of Marr’s early archaeological work,
one that marks his entire oeuvre, is his attention to material culture.
‘Material culture’, which he sometimes writes as a compound noun,
appears at decisive junctures in Marr’s texts, expanding the semantic
field of this conceptual constellation. While in his early archaeological
investigations it describes the methodological focus he uses for the
3 Nikolai Marr,O raskopkah i rabotah v Ani leta 1906 [On the Excavations andWorks in





Figure 1. Nikolai Marr, The palace of Paron, Ani, ca. 1898. Archive of the
Institute of History of Material Culture, Saint Petersburg, inventory
number Q 756-76.
objects of the Institute of History of Material Culture — excavated
monuments and concrete material evidence from Ani, for example —
in his theory of language ‘material culture’ refers to the conditions
in which linguistic material is produced and studied in the field of
the palaeontology of language: It describes the method of reading
the history of thought in its relation to the origins of language and
Marxist theory. He writes, ‘the problem of thought is one of the most
relevant if not the most relevant theoretical issue in the world, precisely
because its roots lie not in itself and not in nature, but in the material
basis, described in the framework of dialectical materialism.’5 In this
passage written shortly before his death in 1934, Marr takes the stance
of historical materialism; but far from abandoning an anthropological
perspective on the history of culture, an archaeological vision of time,
5 Nikolai Marr, ‘Iazyk i myshlenie’ [Language and Thought], in Izbrannye raboty [Se-
lected Works], 5 vols (Leningrad: Gosudarstvennaia akademia istorii material’noi
kul’tury (GAIMK), 1933–37), iii (1936), pp. 90–121 (p. 104).
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and a highly syncretic and speculative method of research, Marr’s
‘materialism’ embraced different stages of his scientific investigations
beginning with his early archaeological work.
This early focus on ‘material culture’ — its concrete objects and
traces — is symptomatic of his early work with images. While prepar-
ing for his first archaeological expedition to Ani in 1891 Marr took
a three-month-course in photography, and insisted that the Imperial
Academy of Science provide him with expensive equipment and a
camera.6 Marr’s travel diaries bear witness to his emphasis on docu-
mentation and to the transmission of his archaeological experience. He
even refused to continue his trip without a camera, which should have
been sent to him a week after his departure for Ani’s archaeological
site. We read in his diary: ‘I am deeply concerned while waiting for the
camera, the site can be damaged by unforeseen events.’ Weeks later,
after the camera finally arrived, Marr’s entries became very laconic:
‘I’m exclusively occupied with taking images (documenting excavated
fragments of paintings) and developing them.’7
Photographs constitute a considerable part of Marr’s surviving
archive, which today numbers approximately 10,000 pieces from dif-
ferent archaeological expeditions and his later study of ‘gestural’ or ‘lin-
ear speech’.8 These materials helped Marr to establish a research instru-
ment for the Institute of History of Material Culture, which became
part of the Historical-Archaeological section of the St. Petersburg Uni-
versity. Marr also made use of these documents in his research and
lectures, an approach which was prescient for understanding images
as arguments in their own right. For several reasons, this visual archive
and its use value in Marr’s theoretical work have remained neglected.
Furthermore, a major part of his archive was destroyed during the 1917
revolution, as the train which Marr used to send his collection to the
Caucasian Historical Institute in order to establish the first museum of
Ani was destroyed during its journey. Surprisingly, this traumatic loss
6 Archive of the Institute of History of Material Culture, Saint Petersburg, fonds 1,
inventory 61/1893, pp. 94–95.
7 Nikolai Marr, Diary from 23 May and 9 June 1892, Archive of the Institute of History
of Material Culture, Saint Petersburg, fonds 1, inventory 33/1892, pp. 41 and 173.
8 See also T. M. Devel and T. B. Tomes, ‘Sobranie N. Ia. Marra v fotoarchive LOIA AN
SSR’ [N. Ia. Marr’s Collection in the Archive of the Institute for History of Material




Figure 2. Nikolai Marr, The side pylon of a church, Garni, 1909–10.
Archive of the Institute of History of Material Culture, Saint Petersburg,
inventory number Q 77-18.
of the archive coincides with Marr’s shift from archaeology to language
theory, leading him to more speculative, anthropological, and paleon-
tological perspectives.
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LANGUAGE’S ORIGINS
Marr’s groundwork for the ‘New Theory of Language’ dates back to his
talk at the Academy of Sciences on 21 November 1923, when he for-
mulated a double hypothesis. On the one hand, he refused a prevalent
racial genealogy of language by stating that there is no Indo-European
language family based on race. On the other hand, he claimed that
‘there is no primal unitary language, but a multitude of tribal lan-
guages’. In this way he disqualified the theory of the Ursprache as ‘an
instrumentalized ideological fiction’. In contrast to such a fiction, Marr
constructed a materialist perspective that regards language in Marx-
ist terms as a class phenomenon: ‘There is no language which is not
class language, hence there is no thought which is not class thought.’9
Yet, despite this radical claim, Marr was far from merely adapting any
dogmatic stance of historical materialism. In his theory of ‘material
culture’ he proposed that language is a tool that evolves in relation to
labour and, as a consequence, that it is a fundamental element of the
class struggle. At the same time, he considered labour as being part
of a complex cultural process which required a meticulous study of
its objects, traces, and ‘survivals’ — a crucial concept in Marr’s palae-
ontology of language. In this way, Marr’s highly productive period of
linguistic palaeontology, which dates from 1923 to 1934, was marked
not only by a remarkable transposition of his archaeological experience
to the level of language theory and culture, but also by an invention of
his own syncretic version of historical materialism evolving alongside
a constant reformulation of his own positions.10
The dialectical doubt present in Marr’s thought, which can be de-
scribed as ‘perpetually drifting’ because it is perpetually seduced by
new linguistic cases — which Marr conceived of as new ‘material’ bases
as well as a ‘formal and ideological’ frameworks for his analysis — was
inspiring for many contemporary artistic practices, especially those of
poets. At the same time, Marr’s critics, such as the linguist and founder
of Eurasianism Nikolai Trubetskoi, dismissed his linguistic approach
9 Marr, ‘Iazyk i myshlenie’, p. 91.
10 Nikolai Marr, ‘Novyi povorot v rabote iafeticheskoi teorii’ [New Turn in the Work of
Japhetic Theory], in Izbrannye raboty, i (1933), pp. 312–46; ‘Aktual’nye problemy i
ocherednye zadachi iafeticheskoi teorii’ [Current Problems and Imminent Tasks of the
Japhetic Theory], in Izbrannye raboty, iii, pp. 61–77.
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as well as his anti-colonial positions as those of a ‘half-mad graphoma-
niac’, and advised his works to be reviewed by a psychiatrist more than
a linguist.11 Such criticisms followed the formula, ‘First the conclusion
comes, and only afterwards the analysis of the material’,12 which was a
way of alluding to Marr’s seemingly biased method and consequently
of ignoring his archaeological and materialist investigations. Beginning
with Stalin’s personal ban of Marr’s theory in the 1950s, his Institute
was closed, and his theories regarded as an obscure perversion of sci-
ence and a linguistic aberration. To a large extent, Marr’s critics have
accused him of being non-systematic; at the same time, it must be said
that Marr’s genealogical approach, which takes places at the margins
of different disciplines, as well as his syncretic reading of the history of
culture cannot be understood from within a narrow historicist perspec-
tive. This is why critics considered Marr a pseudo-scientist who sought
to ‘prove the unknown by the unknown’,13 and principally referred to
Marr’s lack of a properly ‘linguistic education’ and ‘a concrete method
of comparative historical research in linguistics’ in order to discredit
him.14 Ultimately, his ‘new theory of language’ has been characterized
as ‘a highly attractive myth’, even in recent scholarship.15
In his text from 1925 entitled ‘On the Origin of Language’, which
was quickly also published in a German translation, Marr recalled the
central theses of Japhetic theory. In this text he claims that West-
ern Indo-European linguistics were merely oriented ‘to the data of
11 Trubetskoi to Jakobson, 6 November 1924, in N. S. Trubetzkoy’s Letters and Notes, ed.
by Roman Jakobson (TheHague: Mouton, 1975), p. 74. See also Stefanos Geroulanos
and Jamie Phillips, ‘Eurasianism versus IndoGermanism: Linguistics and Mythology
in the 1930s’ Controversies over European Prehistory’,History of Science, 56.3 (2018),
pp. 343–78 (p. 363).
12 Such was the formula against Marr’s theory articulated by V. V. Gornung in the
beginning of the 1950s, quoted after Vladimir Alpatov, Istoria odnogo mifa: Marr i
marrism [The History of One Myth: Marr and Marrism] (Moscow: Ed. URSS, 2004),
p. 15.
13 Ibid., p. 42.
14 Ibid., p. 11.
15 Ibid., p. 33. Alpatov questions the attractiveness of Marr’s theory of language far
beyond the ideological instrumentalization through the official Soviet dogma and the
pre-revolutionary tendencies of universal regard. ‘The popularity of Marr’s ideas […]
was already considerable in the beginning of the 1920s and grew further with the
formulation of “the new theory of language”’. Alpatov quotes a recent publication
of Olga Freydenberg, who is one of the most prominent scholars of Marr. Alpatov
characterizes the attraction of Marr’s theory as the ‘attraction of a [scientific] myth’.
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dead and traditional written languages’ and largely proceeded on a
philological basis. Similar to the example of Ani, where Marr opposed
the living materiality of the ruins to the dead literary historiography,
his palaeontology of speech critically discredits contemporary Indo-
European linguistics based on racial theory. In opposition to such
idealist tendencies in philology, as well as to the reconstruction of
ethnic identities, Marr sought to uncover a hidden link to social re-
lations surviving in homonymic affinities between different linguistic
clusters. In this regard he countered the Proto-Indo-European theories
— such as Otto Schrader’sSprachforschung undUrgeschichte—with his
own socio-biological approach and paleontological research method.
He states: ‘Indo-European linguistics cannot deny that it is a science
about language from historical epochs. However, regarding the issue
of its genesis leading to the prehistory of human speech, it is helpless,
it doesn’t say anything meaningful.’16 In this way Marr not only refused
an ethnic perspective on language but also introduced a historical tem-
porality into the very notion of ‘prehistory’, which up until that point
was regarded as a homogeneous space-time where nature prevailed
over culture and biological life prevailed over social processes.17
Our approach is socioeconomical. Even tribal society is
economico-tribal, not zoologico-tribal. And when a tribe is
constituted according to its active being and not its native
descent, this tribe is a class formation. As such, it is in struggle
with other equal class-tribal formations — in a struggle for
materials and the subject-matter of production, or for sale
of its production, and for this reason we can’t exclude the
prehistoric tribes from the class society.18
Following this argument Marr aimed to reconsider the relation
between language and thought: he saw language not merely as means
of communication but rather as an instrument (Russian: instrument)
16 Nikolai Marr, ‘Ob iafeticheskoi teorii’ [On Japhetic Theory], in Izbrannye raboty, iii,
pp. 1–34 (p. 33).
17 On the ‘invention of prehistory’ in the second half of the nineteenth century as well
as on the discovery of the deep time of the earth, see the excellent study by Maria
Stavrinaki, Saisis par la préhistoire. Enquête sur l’art et le temps des modernes (Dijon:
Les presses du réel, 2019).
18 Nikolai Marr, ‘Sredstva peredvizhenia, orudia samozazhity i proizvodstva v doistorii’
[Means of Transportation, Instruments of Self-protection and Production in Prehis-
tory], in Izbrannye raboty, iii, pp. 123–51 (p. 141).
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closely tied to the labour process. For this reason, he recognized
language in the first bodily tool: the gesture. Marr conceptualized
such communication, which he saw as conditioned by economic and
social relations, ‘kinetic’ or ‘linear speech’. In this way the theoretical
foundation for the genesis of language concerned the origin of
vocalization or auditory language from motoric language.
Marr’s methodological approach examined ‘the picture of the
transformation of language in the various eras of language creation by
way of comparison’, which he called ‘diachronic comparative gram-
mar’.19 By reconstructing, from contemporary linguistic forms, the
surviving archaic ‘residues’, this procedure was said to reveal the histor-
ical ‘stages’ of linguistic development. According to Marr, the primary
phonetic speech consisted of four phonetic elements: SAL, BER, ION,
and ROSH. He derived these from tribal names of people from the
Mediterranean area. According to the Japhetic theory, all human lan-
guages were formed from these four elements, which survived in them
and provided the ground for Marr’s linguistic palaeontology.
Conceiving of the hand as an evolutionary primal linguistic tool,
Marr wrote:
Primeval man, who did not possess any articulated language,
was happy if he pointed to or drew attention to an object, and
to do so, he had a particularly well-adapted tool (instrument),
the hand, which distinguishes man so sharply from the rest
of the animal kingdom […] The hand or hands were a per-
son’s tongue. Hand movements, facial expressions, and in some
cases body movements as well, were the only available means
(sredstva) of linguistic creation.20
From such an irreducible phenomenality of the hand, Marr derived the
primal language as being the ‘fundamental quality of japhetic language’.
This is how, following Lévy-Bruhl’s ‘loi de participation’ and Hamilton
Cushing’s ‘Manual Concepts’,21 he stated that concepts were not con-
nected by means of logical relations but instead by means of sensuous
and expressive elements. Cushing described how in Zuni language
19 Nikolai Marr, ‘O proischozhdenii iazyka’ [On the Origin of Language], in Izbrannye
raboty, iii (1936), pp. 180–215 (p. 182).
20 Ibid., p. 201.
21 Ibid., pp. 202–06.
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particular hand gestures and intonations, which accompanied speech,
could radically modify its signification. According to Cushing these
gestures or intonation nuances preserved aspects of the designated
object or acted as a trace pointing at its concrete meaning. On the one
hand, this anthropological foundation allowed Marr to formulate the
most speculative and provocative thesis in which he identified the hand
as the primal operator of language. On the other hand, Marr grounded
this anthropology of the hand within a new materialist framework:
he replaced the ‘mystical’ elements of Lévy-Bruhl’s concept of ‘par-
ticipation mystique’ with constructive ones, speculating on the social
and economic organization of life. Lévy-Bruhl conceived of ‘mystical
participation’ as a mode of perception in indigenous cultures where
‘objects, beings, and phenomena can be, though in some way incom-
prehensible to us, something other than themselves […] that they give
forth and receive mystical powers, virtues, qualities, and influences
which make themselves felt outside without ceasing to remain what
they are’.22 Although Lévy-Bruhl never intended to characterize the
‘mystical’ or ‘pre-logical’ mode of thinking as a failure of logic or an
inability to think rationally, he admitted that there was a nuance of
obscurity which accompanied his concept, leading to its inadequacy.
‘However’, he wrote, apparently confused by his own idea, ‘in default of
a wholly satisfactory formula, we can make an attempt to approximate
it.’23 For Marr, Lévy-Bruhl’s actual confusion could only have arisen
from an absence of a materialist standpoint, namely the obscuration
of the fundamental relation between thinking and labour, between
language and the conditions of cultural production. Marr, who agreed
with the radical alterity and singularity of the phenomenon of ‘mys-
tical participation’, also sought to demystify this concept by tracing its
historical dimension.
He argued that ‘it is entirely inconceivable that the hand could
have been replaced as the producer of a mental value-language, before
it was replaced by tools as the producer of material goods, or that
an articulated language of sounds could have taken the place of a
hand language at that time’. Rather, the foundation for the creation
22 Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, How Natives Think (1910), trans. by Lilian A. Clare (New York:
Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 61.
23 Ibid.
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of an auditory language must have been laid ‘by some process of
productive work’.24 The origin of an auditory language gained not
only a fundamental processual dimension, but it is also inseparably
linked to the economic and ergonomic organization of society. In
consequence, Marr argued that an articulated language ‘could not have
emerged before mankind’s transition to productive work with the aid
of artificially fashioned tools’.25
SURVIVING GESTURES
Marr’s attempt to introduce a materialist ground into the history of
language radically differs from the teleological framework of ortho-
dox historical materialism. Marr understood history not as a linear
progression of time but as a multi-layered and polydimensional pro-
cess closely related to matter, itself conceived as a concrete material
involved in the production of time. His notion of ‘survival’ paradig-
matically crystallizes this epistemic shift. However, survival would not
survive without a history in which its latency, its transformations,
and its possible reoccurrence is inscribed. Marr therefore carefully
distinguished historical phases or strata which mark the evolution of
language — understood in its complex historicity and not as a mere
evolution.
Language [yazyk] has nothing to do with a mere sound, but
with a phoneme, an articulated sound produced by mankind
and accompanied by the labour of the brain apparatus which
previously effected the hand with the same ends. Language
has to do with a sound directed by thought in the same way
as thought directs the hand, the gesture, and the facial expres-
sion of linear speech. Ant movements, for instance, do not
dispose of any particular technically adapted tool. The entire
body moves here. Animal sound language can be the origin of
the latest human artistic production in the sphere of sounds,
singing and music, while the vibration of the body can be the
24 In this article, ‘auditory language’ refers to a language composed of sounds, and it
differs from vocalizations or sounds which Marr saw as a complement to gestural
language. He regarded written language as a historically more advanced stage of these
forms of communication.
25 Marr, ‘O proischozhdenii iazyka’, pp. 202–08.
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foundation of the linear artistic creation, of dancing etc. But
neither the one nor the other led to the human language.26
For Marr the caesura which separates linear or gestural speech from ar-
ticulated language lies within the cultural and economic shift: literary
understood as the physical impact of the new conditions of production
emerging with the use of the tools. But what does it mean when Marr
speaks of surviving gestures as elements of linear speech?
It comes as no surprise that the archival materials show Marr’s
palaeontology of language documenting and interpreting cases of ‘sur-
viving’ linear speech. A series of images from Marr’s photographic
archive, captioned as ‘the Gestural language of a Georgian Woman’,
are preserved at the Institute for the History of Material Culture in St.
Petersburg. In a text from 1932 entitled ‘Language and Thought’, Marr
criticized Western linguistics which he saw as indifferent to genealo-
gical problems of thought and to marginal linguistic phenomena, such
as gestures, argot, and vernaculars. Paying great attention to women’s
gestures within patriarchal societies, Marr observed and interpreted
kinetic speech as a ‘survival’, in Russian: perezhitok. As a consequence
of Stalin’s progressive dictum of the first five-year plan, which postu-
lated to ‘overcome the survivals [perezhitki]’ of the past, the concept
of perezhitok could henceforth only be used in a pejorative sense.
Nonetheless, after Stalin’s ban, Marr’s texts shift from the discredited
concept of perezhitok to an intimately related one: perezhivanie, a neo-
logism in the framework of his language theory. This word, which is
based on the same root zhit’, ‘to live’, also denotes an emotionally
charged ‘experience’ in the Russian language. The use value of this
silent shift of meaning, in which Marr’s concept itself survives despite
negative political impositions and associations, in the context of Marr’s
Japhetic theory seems significant.
To return now to the images of Georgian women, what does
‘perezhivanie’ mean when manifested in their hand gestures? Accord-
ing to the author, the surviving element of ‘linear speech’ could only
survive because ‘its use’ relates ‘to the everyday life’ and to its ‘norm-
ative pressure’.27
26 Ibid., p. 200.
27 Marr, ‘Iazyk i myshlenie’, p. 108.
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Such bodily manifestations led Marr to reject Western anthropo-
logy’s perspective on the ‘primitive mentality’ as an evolutionary stage
of society in favour of a more complex political and social argument.
Marr gave examples of colonial countries, such as Australia or South
America, where the expression of women’s grief, especially that of
widows, traditionally manifested itself through a ban on speech. The
resulting silence was accompanied by gesticulation: for Marr, these
examples were of the ‘survival’ [perezhivanie] of linear speech par ex-
cellence.28 He observed similar gestures as a part of a different type of
patriarchal society: following their marriage, women in the Caucasus
were only allowed to speak silently, in gestures. In such a female ‘linear
speech’ he envisioned a survival of a conflict, a ‘women’s language’
which was used in the ‘struggle of women’s matriarchal organization’.29
Marr’s hypothesis also took into account the dissemination of hand
language in highly heterogeneous geographical and cultural regions
and formations. Through his analysis of the gestures which women
performed in two different photographs, one signifying the sun and
the other the full moon, Marr pointed to the structural similarity of
the two different expressions. In both cases hands were raised to form
a half-circle of the ‘orans posture’.30 However, while the expression of
the sun was emphasized through a light smile, this facial expression is
absent in the case of the moon. Marr’s archive also preserves studies of
collective expressions of manual speech, although they do not feature
references or further interpretation.
Such cases open up a double perspective within Marr’s thought:
on the one side, there is what he calls the ‘manifold semantic eman-
ations’ of the ‘hand’, meaning that one word unfolds a multitude of
potential meanings.31 Such a polysemic quality proves the hypothesis
of a phonetic speech that originated out of a handful of primal elements
or particular Urworte. Alongside words like ‘sky’, ‘cosmos’, and ‘man’,
Marr identified the word ‘hand’ as a significant part of these primary
linguistic elements. Regarding the question of the primacy of the sky
or the hand, Marr answered from the standpoint of Japhetic theory:
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 107.
30 Ibid., p. 108.
31 Marr, ‘O proishozhdenii iazyka’, p. 209.
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Figure 3. Nikolai Marr [image ordered in 1931], ‘Georgian women’s
gestures: the hands are brought together expressing “the sun”’, Tiflis ca.
1931. Archive of the Institute of History of Material Culture, Saint
Petersburg, inventory number Q 347-27.
‘Guided by the palaeontology of language, it points from the “sky” to
the “hand” as to the Urwort: the hand of the working man, the cre-
ator of the entire material culture, including language.’32 Hence, the
etymology of the word not only implies the gesture, but also provides
a knowledge of gestures, which operates by means of its expressive a-
mimetic potential (Marr further derives verbs like giving, taking, and
offering from the word hand). On the other side, Marr’s analysis of the
gesture genealogically locates language within the gesture, which then
becomes not only a proto-word but an operative prototype of linguistic
instruments.
32 Ibid. See also the excellent study by Susanne Strätling, Hand am Werk: Poetik der




Figure 4. Nikolai Marr [image ordered in 1931], ‘Georgian women’s
gestures: the hands are brought together expressing “the full moon”’,
Tiflis ca. 1931. Archive of the Institute of History of Material Culture,
Saint Petersburg, inventory number Q 347-28.
However, without providing any readymade answer to the prob-
lem of the origin of language, Marr dialectically claims: ‘Without an
interest in the origin of language, no linguistics is possible. Every the-
ory of language supposes a positive relation to this question.’33 For
Marr, language is a ‘belt in the sphere of the superstructure of society’;
it originated in different cultures simultaneously and independently
from one another. But the creative function of labour that effects the
transition between different cultural formations, ‘is unitary regarding
its origins, and all its manifold manifestations result from a unitary
creative process affecting the different stages of its development’.34
33 Marr, ‘O proishozhdenii iazyka’, p. 183.
34 Ibid., p. 189.
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WALTER BENJAMIN AND MARR
This paradoxical figure of thought, which both supposes a loss of
origin and the necessity of researching the origin’s ‘traces and “be-
comings”’ strongly echoes Walter Benjamin’s understanding of history.
Benjamin, who used a quote from Karl Kraus’s Words in Verse as an
epigraph for one of his theses on history, ‘Origin is the goal’, composed
a virulent critique of history regarded as a linear progression of time.
Instead, for Benjamin ‘[h]istory is the subject of a construction whose
site is not homogenous, empty time, but time filled full by now-time
[Jetztzeit]’.35
When the origin is conceived as an Urphänomen, one can under-
stand why Benjamin attentively read the German translation of Marr’s
text ‘Über die Entstehung der Sprache’ and discussed Marr’s theory
in his own text from 1935 entitled ‘Problems in the Sociology of Lan-
guage: An Overview’. Despite this interest, Benjamin’s reading of Marr
is marked by a particular reluctance provoked by the scope of Marr’s
thought: ‘Marr has attempted in his writings to introduce a number of
new and generally rather strange ideas into language studies’, Benjamin
states, helplessly characterizing Marr’s ideas as ‘too important to be
ignored yet too controversial to be adequately discussed here’.36 The
epistemic doubt contained within Benjamin’s assessment could derive
from the speculative character of Marr’s approach and not only from
the vast field of his work which was unknown to the German author.
But despite this critical hesitation, Benjamin referred to three major
points in Marr’s theory. The first — Marr’s materialist foundation of
language in gesture — echoes Benjamin’s own concept of ‘Stimmge-
bärde’, or voice gesture. The second, intimately related to the first, is
Marr’s derivation of language from labour: ‘This can be linked dir-
35 Walter Benjamin, ‘On theConcept ofHistory’, in SelectedWritings, 4 vols (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996–2003), iv: 1938–1940, ed. by Howard Eiland
and Michael W. Jennings, trans. by Edmund Jephcott, Howard Eiland, and others
(2003), pp. 389–400 (p. 395): ‘The concept ofmankind’s historical progress cannot be
sundered from the concept of its progression through a homogeneous, empty time. A
critique of the concept of such a progressionmust underlie any criticism of the concept
of progress itself.’
36 Walter Benjamin, ‘Problems in the Sociology of Language: An Overview’, in Selected
Writings, iii: 1935–1938, ed. by Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, trans. by
Edmund Jephcott, Howard Eiland, and others (2002), pp. 68–93 (p. 74).
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ectly to Marr’s theory, according to which the manipulation of tools
must have preceded that of language. But since the former activity is
impossible without thought, there must have been a kind of thought
which antedated speech.’37 The third point, which is highly important
for Benjamin’s political position at that time, is Marr’s critique of the ra-
cial foundations of language in the idea of a unitary national language.
Highlighting this argument, Benjamin quotes a passage from Marr’s
‘On the Origin of Language’:
In a word, it would be unscientific and lacking in any real
foundation to approach this or that language of a so-called
national culture as the native language of the whole population,
used by the mass of the people. For the present, the national
language as a phenomenon independent of social strata and
classes is a fiction.38
Marr even went so far as to oppose class affiliation to such national
unity of language. In this way Marr could even suppose that in cases of
similar social structures different national languages would show more
typological class affinities — as affinities between the same classes —
than relations between languages of different classes within the same
national language. Benjamin could not be indifferent to this idea in the
framework of his inquiry into the ‘sociology of language’, in particular
regarding his attention towards minor languages and slang, when he
claims:
Current linguistics, the author constantly reiterates, has little
inclination to seek out the sociological problems concealed in
the languages of oppressed strata of populations. Indeed, it is
remarkable how seldom linguistics, including the most recent
linguistics, has concerned itself with argot, except from a purely
philological point of view.39
The diachronic connection between hand language and auditory lan-
guage, which forms the methodological core of Marr’s palaeontology
of language, also provided a crucial aspiration for a materialist ap-
proach to the history of culture by politicizing it without reducing
37 Ibid., p. 81.
38 Ibid., p. 75.
39 Ibid.
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its speculative dimension. On the one hand, there was the possibil-
ity, in living Japhetic languages, of tracing the archaic structures —
anachronistic residues travelling through time — that live on in con-
temporary vernaculars and gestures. In this way, Marr’s palaeontology
of speech aimed at reconstructing the erstwhile whole from the ‘part’
represented by the ‘fossil remains’.40 On the other hand, the idea that
human culture and language developed in stages, changing step by
step in the context of political, social, and economic conditions, sug-
gests the image of a co-presence and co-existence of different societal
and socio-historical formations. In conclusion, Marr not only provides
evidence of the continued fossil existence of gestural, expressive and
sound-language remains in modern languages through analysing their
semantic and morphogenetic relationships, but he also reveals their
active influence in cultural and religious practices. Important schol-
ars of Marr’s work, such as the philologist Olga Freudenberg, have
devoted great attention to this last. Thus, Marr refers to the con-
tinuing ‘magic’ effect of the repetition of sound complexes, which he
saw in pagan and Christian prayers, in cuneiform inscriptions and in
architecture, in Abkhazian ‘songs without words’, and in Georgian re-
frains. This anthropological scope of Marr’s theoretical preoccupations
broadened, from the outset, the narrow perspective of linguistics as a
single discipline. Furthermore, it denied any dogmatic or rigid version
of historical materialism by privileging the analysis of material culture
in its most marginal and temporally remote dimensions (prehistory,
vernaculars etc.). This is how materialism paved the way for Marr’s
linguistic method, which emphasized the importance of gestures and
bodily expressions. Against the backdrop of rising nationalisms, Marr
insisted on a materialist constitution of language that originated be-
yond land and race in social relations between labour, culture, and
thought. In this way Marr’s materialist explorations of the origin of
language — an origin that is also forever lost — involves a processual
and a-teleological understanding of history and culture.
40 Marr, ‘O proishozhdenii iazyka’, p. 202.
Materialism and Capitalism Today
Zoo-aesthetics and a Critique of the Social Bond after
Marcel Mauss and André Leroi-Gourhan
CATHERINE PERRET
INTRODUCTION
The question posed by the editors of this collective volume is one of the
most pertinent questions of today: ‘What is the relevance of material-
ism for thinking the political?’ In spite of the scientific, philosophical,
and cultural corpus at our disposal today, which should be able to reori-
ent the catastrophic process set out by post-industrial capitalism (the
tragedy of migration, the ecological disaster, growing inequalities, the
rise of populisms, and the return to authoritarian politics), our efforts
to renew modern criticism seem destined to remain helpless. Mater-
ialism, which I define as the analysis of the determination of social
relations by the relations of production, has been largely incorporated
and exploited by the contemporary capitalist rationale.
This rationale has extended the reign of the commodity to know-
ledge on the one hand, and to psychè on the other. Today we witness
the production and commodification of new subjectivities stemming
from consumer practices: the design of identities, the marketing of new
forms of experience, and the development of what I call the genetic
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paradigm1 that has brought the reproduction of the species back into
the realm of the normative. These new forms of production transform
social bonds into goods, and goods into social bonds. Current capit-
alism has succeeded at what nineteenth-century determinism did not
dare to imagine.
Faced with this situation, it seems necessary to re-evaluate the
criticism addressed to the analysis of value, i.e. how this value is em-
bodied.2 This critical position argues, on the one hand, that social
subjects are defined both by their production and by their alienation
from this production, and, on the other hand, that the bonds between
subjects are realized through the exchange of values. Critical theories
of value, which begin with the concepts of fetishism and alienation,
are ultimately based on psychology, and have the goal of explaining the
paradoxical materiality of goods, i.e. their uncanny ‘spirituality’. These
theories are consistent with the presuppositions of so-called ‘neolib-
eralism’ whether they are based on behaviourism or psychoanalysis.3
By this I mean that, because critical theories of value think that social
bonds are found in the exchange that takes place between subjects,
they are easily subordinated to the neo-liberal, capitalistic idea that
subjects are qualified as such by what they produce. The main issue
with these theories comes from the fact that they function as mirrors
of the status quo, and hence they lack potency.
For this reason, I think it is useful to return to the attempts made
in the middle of the twentieth century to identify a materiality of
social bonds that is not reducible to the logic of value or to what has
been called ‘the symbolic exchange’.4 These alternative theories come
1 In French, I call this ‘le tout-génétique’.
2 See Jean Baudrillard, Le Système des objets (Paris: Gallimard, 1978); Simulacres et
Simulation (Paris: Gallimard, 1981); as well as Jean-Joseph Goux, Frivolité de la valeur
(Paris: Blusson, 2000).
3 The term ‘neoliberal’ has many flaws, including suggesting that capitalism has changed
in nature by changing its form. However, it has the advantage of making it clear that it
is becoming impossible to discern the implications of accumulation and those of the
individual’s subjection to the norms supposed to guarantee his or her autonomy.
4 We need to reassess the form of critique that has been dominant until now, which is
concerned with the analysis of value and the phenomena of its embodiment. Based
upon the analyses of the Frankfurt School since the 1930s as well as the theories of
libidinal economy and even most of today’s criticisms of neo-capitalism, this critique
builds upon the concepts of alienation of the subject and commodity fetishism which
are inherited from Marx and Freud. One should also note that in Marx and Freud
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from anthropology. They focus on the notion of ‘milieu’ in order to
disconnect this notion from the determinism that inspired it in the last
decades of the nineteenth century.5
By combining the definition of the human milieu as a technical
milieu with the distinction between individuation and subjectivation,
I would like to propose a reflection on the materialities of the social
bond. This bond is effectively embodied because it is symbolic, and be-
cause it indicates how alterity is a ‘part’ of everyone by dividing them. It
takes bodily shape. For example, it takes shape in regimes of perception
that condition the individual’s ability to sense the governing norms of
the society they belong to, and to bring them into play, for themselves
and towards others, as rhythmical and formal values, in other words, as
emotions and as living spaces. Then and only then does the individual
experience social reality, and not as a constituent of that reality who
is subjected to social order, but rather as an individual who feels, acts,
and thinks, and who thus contributes to the renewal of the norms and
codes that characterize the social bond.
I develop this argument alongside the work of Marcel Mauss
and Leroi-Gourhan. It is indeed impossible to think of this question
without one or the other, even if Leroi-Gourhan largely erased the
traces of his doctoral advisor in his writings.
MARCEL MAUSS’S ‘TECHNIQUES OF THE BODY ’:
BODY-AS-MEDIUM AND THE TECHNICAL MILIEU
I am less interested, for the purposes of this chapter, in Mauss’s famous
essay on the gift than in his later text on the techniques of the body.6
the concepts of ‘alienation’ and ‘fetishism’ were heuristic and critical. Parasitized
and disabled since that time by the dominant positivistic philosophies, they have
become explanatory tools used to ‘describe (a supposed) reality’, as if the subjects were
qualified as such, as subjects, by their identification with the objects they produce and
exchange, so that effectively the social bond is reduced to what Jean Baudrillard, under
the term ‘symbolic exchange’, likened to death (cf. Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange
and Death (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1993)).
5 The notion of ‘milieu’ thus appears in opposition to the notion of ‘environment’. This
distinction has its origin in the works of ethologist Jakob von Uexküll.
6 Marcel Mauss, ‘Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l’échange dans les sociétés
archaïques’, L’Année sociologique, nouvelle série, 1 (1923–24), pp. 30–186; in English
as ‘Essay on the Gift: The Form and Sense of Exchange in Archaic Societies’, in hisThe
Gift, expanded edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). Marcel Mauss,
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In this text, Mauss produces a theory of the close connection in the
human species between ‘doing’ (or ‘making something’) and ‘forging
bonds’ (or making social connections). He starts from the analysis of
the corporal practices involved in industrial production, which were
already dominant in 1936 through Taylorism. Mauss, who was a sup-
porter of cooperative socialism, uses his essay to highlight the relation-
ship between production and cooperation. He points out something
that is generally neglected by capitalist reasoning, namely, what ex-
ceeds the object produced during the process of technical production:
the creation and maintenance of a technical milieu which conditions
its production. Mauss develops the thesis of Alfred Espinas,7 who was
the founder of the biology of technology, and conceptualises that the
human milieu is a technical milieu.
However, Mauss extends the meaning of this proposition in two
directions. On the one hand, humans, unlike other animals, do not
adapt to their environment. They build it using techniques that ‘pros-
thetize’ their natural faculties and produce new bodies. In this sense,
the human milieu is the technical milieu which uses the body as an in-
strument. On the other hand, because modern production techniques
are divided and distributed between individuals, they require a differ-
ent mode of transmission for procedures that train the body in order
to be effective. This transmission both divides and assembles the bod-
ies into an experience and a common practice — modern production
techniques ‘assemble’ a common body from the various bodies at work
which passes directly through the sensations of the individual bodies.8
Beyond the cliché of automating bodies at work, Mauss shows that
modern technical production reveals another body than the body-as-
instrument or ‘object-body’, something he calls a ‘body-as-medium’
‘Les Techniques du corps’, Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique, 32 (1935),
pp. 271–93; in English as ‘Techniques of the Body’, Economy and Society, 2.1 (1973),
pp. 70–88.
7 Alfred Espinas, Les Origines de la technologie, Étude Sociologique (Paris: Alcan,
1897); English excerpts as ‘TheOrigins of Technology [excerpts]’, trans. by Catherine
Schnoor, inTheRoots of Praxiology: French ActionTheory fromBourdeau and Espinas to
Present Days, ed. by Victor Alexandre in coop. with Wojciech W. Gasparski (London:
Routledge, 1999), pp. 45–91.
8 Workers have to incorporate the entire process of the chain. They have to share the
same rhythms to be able to co-ordinate their movements, and, at the same time, to feel
each change in this shared rhythm. This co-operation between bodies, and between
bodies and machines, requires very specialized techniques of the body.
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— or body as ‘technical means’.9 This body-as-medium transforms the
material conditions of production into a living circuit of transmission,
or technical milieu. It develops an autonomous life of its own that takes
shape in bodies that ‘act together’ and communicate through shared
sensations. Mauss thus proposes that the producing body, in the act of
producing, is not only a quantifiable work force, but a living mediation
that contributes to the survival of this technical human milieu.
I have drawn two hypotheses from Mauss’s ‘Techniques of the
Body’. The first is that the social dimension of the production of value,
which is housed in the subject, and the milieu’s dimension, which is
found in the techniques of the body, are not identical. They coexist, yet
are embodied differently. The first dimension is embodied in norms,
and the second dimension is embodied in the forms of ‘affordances’10
or ‘agentivities’ constituted by rhythms, gestures, common practices,
or forms which enable cooperation. The body’s sensation at work —
which is an idea I will develop further in the next paragraph — con-
tributes to its productivity but it does not depend on this productivity.
The second hypothesis is that this sensation of the body at work
conditions the possibility of working ‘together’. Sensation, Mauss
writes, is a ‘cog-wheel’.11 It is a binding agent. The materiality of these
social bonds consists in the power of the sensation of constructing
action in time by recording it as a rhythm, and of distributing action
in space by inscribing it as a gesture. Sensation thus simultaneously
establishes the individuation of each body as well as their capacity to
cooperate.
As a result of these insights, it is possible to conceive of cooper-
ation which, just like commodification, is a verification of the social
bond, as not only dependent on the regulatory ideals shared by the
producing subjects, i.e. on the process of subjectivation, but as also
dependent on the individuation of this medium-body — this body-
as-means — which, through its activity, continuously recreates the
technical milieu.
9 Mauss, ‘Techniques of the Body’, p. 75.
10 For the use of the term in a practical sense, see the works of Hubert Godard, as well as
Carla Bottiglieri, ‘Soigner l’imaginaire du geste: pratiques somatiques du toucher et du
mouvement’, Chimères, 78 (2012/13), pp. 113–28 <https://doi.org/10.3917/chime.
078.0113>.
11 Mauss, ‘Techniques of the Body’, p. 85.
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The originality of Mauss’s thesis is to detach the body from its
subjective existence and to consider the body as a direct product of its
milieu. Thanks to this reversal of perspective, Mauss makes sensation
the a-subjective interface between the biological and social realms, or
between an individual’s belonging to her milieu and her belonging to
society. Mauss thus invites us to think about what remains — even
in symbolic exchange — of the order of a kinaesthetic materiality,
which is independent of the processes of subjectivation and the logic
of value.12
GESTURE AND SPEECH AFTER ANDRÉ LEROI-GOURHAN:
RETHINKING EVOLUTION
Following in Mauss’s footsteps, Leroi-Gourhan sought to think of so-
cial bonding in terms of the interplay between ‘milieu’ and ‘society’.
Leroi-Gourhan, who was a prehistoric anthropologist in contrast to
Mauss’s background in sociology, translated the problematic of the
‘milieu versus society’ in terms of the differences between a species and
an ethnic group. Like Mauss, he viewed the principle of individuation
in the framework of sensation and its relation to perception. In his
opinion, the power of human societies to continue to create their living
milieu depends on this process of individuation.
Let us very briefly recall some basic principles of Leroi-Gourhan’s
thought. In the first place, he posits the thesis that the human species,
contrary to what the vulgar evolutionist schema asserts, belongs to
a different evolutionary process than primates. The development of
humanity, Leroi-Gourhan explains, comes from the increase of their
technical genius, which depends on their upright position and the way
12 The editors of this volume have pointed out that Mauss’s redefinitions and objections
towards a more traditional Marxian conception of value are centrally important for
the notion of materialism. Though I agree, discussing Mauss’s complex relationship
to Marxism is beyond the scope of this chapter. One must note, however, that Mauss
was interested in the bodies of workers in action, and looked (thanks, in particular,
to cinema) at the ‘physio-socio-psychological assemblies’ that production lines are.
Indeed, Mauss does not, as most observers of his time did, see the effect of a giant
mechanism spreading throughout society, but rather points out the tiny cogs of indi-
vidual sensations that link the physiological, sociological, and psychological aspects of
such systems. What fascinates him is the way in which each body in its own plurality
matches the plurality of the others, each of which is a unique cog within the whole of
the mobilized bodies.
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in which this restructures the relation between the hand and the brain:
orthostasis frees the hand from the locomotive function and the mouth
from the feeding function. It hence releases the hand for gesture and
the mouth for word/speech.
Leroi-Gourhan’s second essential thesis is the distinction he
makes regarding the exteriorization of the species-specific individual
body through its techniques. On the one hand, the specific individual
body is externalized through its techniques, which includes techniques
of production and memorization. On the other hand, this specific
individual body is externalized into the ‘social body’ that groups
individuals together in ethnic groups, introduces the development
of these ethnic groups, and provides these individuals with the
memory they lack through education and learning. Leroi-Gourhan
calls this second plane of evolution and externalization ‘ethnic’, and
he notes that education ensures the reproduction of the social order
by institutionalizing this reproductive order and the power structures
that guarantee its legitimacy.
Therefore, there are distinct planes of evolution that have their
own logic instead of a single evolutionary process. This includes, firstly,
the species-specific evolution, which concerns the individual body
and which depends on the relation between hand and brain. This is
further concretized in the development of techniques; and secondly,
the ethnic evolution that concerns human societies. This evolution is
embodied in the modes which individuals, institutions, and norms are
grouped under.13 These planes of evolution are autonomous, which
means that they can diverge; this possible divergence of the species-
specific and the ethnic is one of the major questions discussed in Le
Geste et la Parole.14
13 The editors of this volume have asked if norms take on different planes for Mauss
and for Leroi-Gourhan and if the ethical plane of Leroi-Gourhan is approximately
the same as the social plane of Mauss. Though I find these questions interesting,
again, a thorough elaboration would necessitate a whole article. What I can say here is
that Leroi-Gourhan tried to eclipse the Maussian heritage in his work, even though
the connections between them cannot be adequately deduced from their texts. I
propose such a connection through a restitution of the link between their work, and
it, therefore, is my own hypothesis.
14 André Leroi-Gourhan, Le Geste et la Parole, 2 vols (Paris: Albin Michel, 1964–65), i:
Technique et Langage (1964); ii:Lamémoire et les Rythmes (1965); inEnglish asGesture
and Speech, trans. by Anna Bostock Berger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).
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In fact, the techno-economic evolution takes place between these
two planes.15 As capitalism develops, technical development is put at
the service of the economic development of societies, i.e. of the for-
profit economy. This third historical factor leads to the exploitation of
technologies in favour of a normative rationality that homogenizes so-
cieties, globalizes cultural issues, and creates a kind of undifferentiated
mega-ethnicity in which the need for individuation is forgotten.
For Leroi-Gourhan, the acceleration of techno-economic evolu-
tion in modern societies provokes the divergence between specific
evolution and ethnic evolution, or the individual body and the social
body. By producing new forms of experience and new identities, the
techno-economic evolution makes us forget that the technical genius
of humanity rests within the species-specific body of the individual.
This is the body of one who, for the last 40,000 years, has ‘thought’
with her hand and who has developed her cognitive and symbolic
faculties through the use of (1) her body, (2) her physical skills, and
(3) the lived relation of this body to space and time. Throughout this
time, the body has not changed: the hand, as the intersection between
gesture and speech, remains the organ upon which the individuation
of individuals depends. The hand is also the source of the capacity of
the social body to adapt to the transformations of its environment and
to create new milieus.
According to Leroi-Gourhan, the exploitation of the technical
apparatus developed by homo sapiens’ specific body in favour of the
interests of the economic organization of its social body runs the risk
of a gregarization — a turning into a ‘herd behaviour’ — of the human
species. With this risk there is not only the added risk of a technical
loss of creativity, but, more broadly, also a loss of social inventiveness,
as well as a decline in the power of humanity to emancipate itself by
producing its own forms of life.16
15 The term ‘techno-economy’ is an attempt to answer the question of the connection
between capitalism and these two planes.
16 ‘The great problem of the world as it already exists calls for a solution: How shall this
archaic mammal, with its archaic needs that have been the driving force of its ascent,
continue to push its rock up the hillside if one day it is left with only the image of its
reality? At no time in its development has this species yet had to break away from itself
since the days of the Australanthrope. Homo sapiens lived his interminable adventure
concretely; today the human is on the point of exhausting the resources of the planet,
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When seen from this perspective, the criticism of neo-capitalism
reaches another level, because it advances beyond a question of the
human in society and the subject that produces values and towards
the question of the human in its environment. Here it is not enough
to denounce the exploitation of the worker’s labour force, because it
is necessary to think of the nature of the body at work: the body-as-
medium of Mauss and the specific body of Leroi-Gourhan. The body
must be thought of as existing in a milieu, and as a body involved as
much in the production of material goods, raw materials, equipment,
and objects as in the production of intangible goods, knowledge, know-
how, and services. We need a new way of thinking about the body.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A ZOO-AESTHETICS
Yet, according to Leroi-Gourhan, a lock can maintain the development
of humanity on the horizon of its species-specific body. This lock is a
third plane of evolution that Leroi-Gourhan calls the aesthetic plane.
This third evolutionary plane re-inscribes ethnic evolution in the body
of specific humans. This plane is based on perception and on the power
of human perception to re-incorporate the norms and values of the
society of which the individual is a member. It is based on her power
to reshape or relive these norms and values as incarnated emotions
and as lived spaces, as rhythmic, sensitive, and formal values. This
power of perception, which, for Leroi-Gourhan, reinstates humanity
in its species condition, meaning its animal condition, ensures the
plasticity of social connections and their transformation through the
transformation of rhythms, gestures, and figures. Leroi-Gourhan thus
develops a ‘zoo-aesthetics’, which I will, to conclude, discuss in order
to show how we can critically enquire into alienation beyond the
traditional theory of value.
Leroi-Gourhan writes:
Can we see the perception and creation of rhythmic symbols
as something deeply rooted in the animal world which — on
and already themyth of human transplantation into space has sprung up. But there can
be no going back over the ground already covered. We can dream that when arriving
on a distant star, the humanwill encounter Pithecanthropus and the southern elephant
but will not revert to flint knapping’ (Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, p. 407).
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emergence at the human level — displays the same character-
istics as technics and language? To put it differently, since the
technical function in human beings exteriorizes itself in port-
able tools and since the perceived object too is exteriorized in
a verbal symbol, can we assume that movement in all its forms
— visual, auditive, and motor — was also ‘freed’ and entered
upon the same evolutionary cycle?17
This quotation lays the foundation of Leroi-Gourhan’s thesis: percep-
tion, far from anticipating the act of cognition as the philosophical
tradition suggests, comes from the same specific plane as ‘technique’
and ‘language’. Perception is not the elaboration of sensation in a
representation, but rather, for Leroi-Gourhan, it remains fundament-
ally animal. This is why perception can be said to ‘intervene’: It blocks
the natural, imposed rhythms, just as it blocks the phantasmata emer-
ging from sensation, and readdresses them to the body of the sender.
It reincorporates images springing from these imposed rhythms (the
external images coming from the world and the internal ones from
the organism itself) and interprets them (in the performative sense
of ‘acting’) in the form of new, individuated rhythms. It constructs
a ‘corporeity’ that, while not to be equated with the physical body,
animates that body and interprets it through figures and gestures by
attaching it to a dynamic that is literally emotional.18
Leroi-Gourhan did not formulate this ‘theory of perception’ any
further because he had different concerns. However, I have intro-
duced the baselines of this theory to gain an understanding of the
way in which artistic practices reiterate the question of the body in
its milieu today. Among the elements provided by Leroi-Gourhan’s
anthropology, the most surprising is the idea that perception, far from
anticipating the act of cognition as the philosophical tradition has pre-
sumed, belongs to the same specific plane as technique and language.
Accordingly, as I have pointed out, perception should not be conceived
as an elaboration, i.e. an overtaking of sensation into a higher form
of cognitive representation, but it remains visceral and fundamentally
animal. In other words, even in humans, perception is a kind of activ-
ity that cannot be detached from sensation; it functions as an engine
17 Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, p. 274.
18 On ‘corporeity’, see Michel Bernard, Le Corps, second 2nd and revised edition (Paris:
Editions Universitaires, 1976).
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brake that prevents sensation from losing its constructive power and
from dissolving into taste by being imagined and intellectualized. It is
a regressive faculty that anchors a sensation back into the specific body
and that assures the intimate connection between the mechanisms of
symbolization and the body. Thus, perception ensures the perennial
knot of speech and gesture.
Concurrently with the displacement of the energy of the motor
mechanisms towards the mechanisms of symbolization, the palae-
ontologist thus imbues an inverse power of investment of the vis-
ceral ‘depths’ of the sensation in the individual through the processes
of intellection. Through this bias, he further evokes the recharging
power of sensitivity through symbolic activity. For Leroi-Gourhan,
human perception is a question of the ‘spilling over’ or ‘transferring’
of the ideation mechanisms into technical operations. It guarantees
the autonomy of individuation processes in the face of processes of
subjectivation. This autonomy takes the a-subjective form of rhythms,
gestures, and figures that belong to no one and express nothing, but
which are the channel of the re-individuation of values and the basis of
their reinvention. It is through the materiality of these rhythms, ges-
tures, and forms that the social body remains connected to the specific
body and that the social bonds resist their ‘massification’.
The remarkable point here is how the individual creativity that
underlies the vitality of the social bonds is not anchored in a subject-
ive, autonomous, or ‘symbolic’ faculty of creation as tradition dictates,
but rather in a regressive movement. This brings the process of sym-
bolization back to the sensory apparatus, or, to use Leroi-Gourhan’s
terms, it brings the social back to the zoological. This is where we find
what already was present in Mauss, namely the inscription of the social
bonds in a logic of incorporation supported by sensation. Mauss and
Leroi-Gourhan thus provide a framework to understand social bonds
in different ways than through the hallucinatory power of value.
Both thinkers anchor the processes of subjection of the social
subject in the material logic of the body’s individuation in the envir-
onment. They are particularly interested in distinguishing the devel-
opment of techniques as a kind of activity in this logical framework.
Yet Leroi-Gourhan, in developing his thought in the field of aesthetics
and his conception of this material force of individuation and social
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bonding as an aesthetic capacity that is realized in rhythms, gestures,
and figures, grants it a greater power of actualization than Mauss, who
limited it to the sphere of work. Leroi-Gourhan’s materialism extends
the sphere of politics to aesthetics, which is not only understood as a
field of taste, but also as something beyond the sensory faculties of the
aesthetic subject, or ‘reflecting subject’, as one of the essential registers
of the specific individual’s life. He thus gives us the means to under-
stand why the splitting force of taste, or its power of ‘distinction’ to
borrow a term from Pierre Bourdieu, does not summarize the entirety
of aesthetic experience. He also helps us to understand why it remains
possible for social subjects to make a living experience of the body
in its milieu, through this body that bonds with other bodies using
sensation, as well as the work of singularization which we understand
as the process of individuation.
Both Mauss and Leroi-Gourhan understand the individuation of
the body in the milieu as a material power that is a part of the processes
of subjectivation through its ability to form strong connections. Their
materialism thus enlarges the sphere of politics beyond the sensitive
faculties of the aesthetic subject to all the manifestations of living-
speaking bodies. In this sense, it constitutes the basis of a formidable
criticism of a theory of value that is only based on the exchange
between alienated social subjects.
The Product of Circumstances
Towards a Materialist and Situated Pedagogy
MARLON MIGUEL
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I would like to address what could be called a materialist
education. In order to do that, I first need to briefly remind the reader
of some of the main principles of this form of education according
to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. While these two authors did not
write extensively on the question of education, they did open up in-
teresting new paths of thought concerning the relationship between
a materialist education and the notion of ‘milieu’, which were later
developed in more detail by other thinkers and practitioners. After this,
I will focus on the work of the Soviet educator Anton Semyonovich
Makarenko (1888–1939). The similarities between Marxist principles
— in particular those of the young Marx concerning the shaping of the
human through the transformation of its material conditions of exist-
ence — and Makarenko’s ideas and practice are too pronounced to be
accidental and indeed, as the reader will see, they formed an important
* I acknowledge the financial support of FCT, ‘Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnolo-
gia, I.P.’ (Stimulus of Scientific Employment, Individual Support CEECIND/02352/
2017/CP1387/CT0006).
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basis for the Soviet pedagogue’s writings. One can argue that these
Marxist principles constituted the atmosphere in which Makarenko’s
thought could emerge.
I am particularly interested in the connection between education
and the notions of ‘milieu’, ‘circumstance’, and ‘situation’ which are
employed by the materialist educator. Makarenko argued that edu-
cation should be conceived as a constructed and collective milieu
instead of a directive relationship between master and student. He
thought that the pedagogical process is mediated by this milieu and,
furthermore, that it also allows for a materialist critique of fatalism in
education, which should be understood as the idea that students are
fated to be a certain way and cannot change. In this way, he worked
towards an emancipation from the idea of pre-determined fates —
much in vogue at the time — attributable to subjects based on their
social background and conditions as well as their personal histories and
trajectories.
MARX AND ENGELS ON EDUCATION
Interestingly, Marx’s third thesis on Feuerbach connects education
or upbringing (Erziehung), revolutionary practice, and the notion of
‘circumstances’ (Umstände). This well-known fragment will work as
a kind of leitmotif for my argument in this chapter. Marx, along with
Engels, who revised and rewrote this text in 1888, claim that:
The materialist doctrine that men [humans, Menschen] are
products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore,
changed men are products of other circumstances and changed
upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances
and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence, this
doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which
is superior to society (in Robert Owen, for example).
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of
human activity can be conceived and rationally understood
only as revolutionising practice.1
1 Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, ed. by Friedrich Engels, in MECW [Marx & Engels
Collected Works, see abbreviations], v (1976), pp. 6–8 (p. 7).
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Even if Marx did not extensively discuss education, the term ap-
pears several times in his work, particularly in his collaboration with
Engels. According to them, education constitutes a central problem
concerning the overcoming of capitalism and of bourgeois values. In-
terestingly, education often appears as an indirect procedure or force
over individual subjects (those who are to be educated) instead of a
direct one. That is why it is frequently related to the question of the
environment and of the material conditions, in sum, of the circum-
stances as outlined by the third thesis: if humans are the product of
circumstances, then education must imply the transformation of cir-
cumstances and of the educators themselves. Marx and Engels present
in this thesis a conceptualization of materialism and address a crucial
problem: how the forces and relations of a society’s mode of produc-
tion constitute the material conditions that shape the human and that
need to be transformed?2
The question of education is evoked three times in the Manifesto of
the Communist Party, in particular to highlight the importance of a so-
cial and free education for all children. Furthermore, Marx and Engels
emphasize — and again this echoes the ThirdThesis, however this time
accentuating ‘economic relations’ — that human beings’ ideas, views,
and conceptions can only change if the conditions of their material
existence are also transformed.3 In spite of the well-known ‘epistemo-
logical breaks’ taking place in Marx’s work around 1845–46 where he
places a larger emphasis on economy, the question concerning the
transformation of the conditions of material existence can already be
traced back to The Holy Family. In this text the authors claim that
‘materialism is connected with communism and socialism’4 and that
2 In ‘Principles of Communism’, the draft for theManifesto, Engels claims that ‘the com-
monmanagement of production by thewhole of society and the resulting newdevelop-
ment of production require and also produce radically different humans [ganz andere
Menschen]’ (Friedrich Engels, ‘Principles of Communism’, in MECW, vi (1976), pp.
341–57 (p. 353); ‘Grundsätze des Kommunismus’, in MEW [Marx-Engels-Werke, see
abbreviations], iv (1977), pp. 361–80 (p. 376)).
3 ‘Does it require deep intuition to comprehend thatman’s ideas, views, and conceptions,
in one word, man’s consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of
his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?’ (Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels, ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party’, inMECW, vi (1976), pp. 477–
519 (p. 503)).
4 Karl Marx, The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism, in MECW, iv (1975), pp.
3–211 (p. 130).
148 PRODUCT OF CIRCUMSTANCES
only a re-arrangement of the empirical world (die empirische Welt ein-
zurichten) will bring about the humanization of human beings: ‘If man
is shaped by his environment [or surroundings, Umgebung], his envir-
onment must be made human’. Later on, Engels, in his book Socialism:
Utopian and Scientific (a part of his Anti-Dühring, published separ-
ately), pursues this problem of the relation between humanization and
environment, again returning to Robert Owen5 and connecting the
environment to education:
Robert Owen had adopted the teaching of the materialistic
philosophers: that man’s [Menschen] character is the product,
on the one hand, of heredity, on the other, of the environment
of the individual during his lifetime, and especially during his
period of development.6
All in all, the materialist approach to education stressed by Marx and
Engels must take into account the alteration of the milieu – in the
German version of the text quoted above, Engels introduces the in-
teresting term ‘umgebendenUmstände’,7 something as the ‘surrounding
5 Owen’s theory, based on his experiences managing cotton mills at New Lanark, em-
phasizes the notions of ‘environment’ and ‘circumstances’ connecting them to the
formation of an individual’s character. In his A New View of Society (1813), one can
read how social suffering is born out of ‘the inattention of mankind to the circum-
stances which incessantly surround them’ (Robert Owen, ‘Essay One: Any general
character may be given to any community by the application of proper means’, in A
New View of Society or, Essays on the Principle of the Formation of the Human Character,
and theApplication of the Principle to Practice (London:Cadell&Davies, 1813)<https:
//www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/owen/index.htm>) [accessed 12
September 2020]. The problem of the relation between circumstances and the form-
ation of character seems to have indeed been in vogue at that time. Stuart Mill, for
example, usingwhat he calls an ‘ethology’, also insists on the correlation of these terms,
but in order to redress the concept of ‘necessity’ and to emphasize how a free individual
can mould his character: ‘His character is formed by his circumstances […] but his
own desire to mould it in a particular way, is one of those circumstances, and by no
means one of the least influential’ ( John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative
and Inductive (New York: Harper, 1882), p. 1022 <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/
27942/27942-pdf.pdf> [accessed 12 September 2020]; see also Terence Ball, ‘The
Formation of Character: Mill’s “Ethology” Reconsidered’, Polity, 33.1 (2000), pp. 25–
48 <https://doi.org/10.2307/3235459>). However, the differences between both
thinkers are very important.Whereas StuartMill insists on the individual decision over
circumstances, Robert Owen emphasises the determinative power of circumstances,
the importance of education, and the notion of ‘co-operation’.
6 Friedrich Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, in MECW, xxiv (1989), pp. 281–
325 (p. 294); Anti-Dühring, in MECW, xxv (1987), pp. 1–309 (p. 249).
7 Friedrich Engels, ‘Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft’,
in MEW, ixx (1987), pp. 189–228 (p. 198).
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circumstances’ — in order to act upon the subjects and to aim at a
real transformation. If heredity — or more broadly, we could add,
genetic inheritance — constitutes an element of the composition of
character, it remains only one factor of the subject’s development. In
this sense, Engels anticipates and avoids a certain danger concerning
the naturalization of character.
The third thesis on Feuerbach underlines the transformation of
circumstances related to ‘rational understanding’, whereas other texts
emphasize how a rearrangement of the surroundings, empirical sens-
ibility, and habits are the real key to transformation. Indeed, a material-
ist education seems to me to indicate the necessity of transforming the
body and sensibility of the subject of education, and even their desires
and needs. This is precisely what Marx notes in the Grundrisse (the
chapter on Capital), in a section that addresses the ‘circuits’ of capital
— that is, he notes that the critique of capitalism must go through
the fact that this system shapes one’s needs and constantly produces
new needs that ensure new commodities are vital to one’s existence.8
Therefore, education must not only address this problem critically and
intellectually, but also sensibly, by learning how to re-shape desire (or
the ‘needs’) in order to modify capitalism’s functioning or ‘circuits’.
As a consequence of this focus, some of Marx and Engel’s texts
seem to open a stimulating space inside a very Germanic tradition
where education, emancipation, and formation always appear either as
a direct and formative action over subjects (Erziehung) or as the devel-
opment of an internal image (Bild) corresponding to their intellectual
and rational progress (Bildung). In the text for the First International in
1864, Marx claimed that he saw three aspects within the term ‘educa-
tion’: the ‘mental education’, the ‘bodily education’, and ‘technological
training’. He also introduced a theme that would establish a new and
8 ‘This necessity is itself subject to change, in that needs are produced just as much as
products and the various craft skills. […] The more the needs which are themselves
historically produced, the needs produced by production itself, the social needs which
are themselves the offspring of social production and intercourse — the
more these needs are posited as necessary, the higher the development of real wealth.
Considered as physicalmatter, wealth consistsmerely in themultiplicity of needs’ (Karl
Marx, Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy, in MECW, xxviii (1986), pp. 49–
537 (p. 451; emphasis in the original)). On this subject, see also Glenn Rikowski,
‘Marx and the Education of the Future’, Policy Futures in Education, 2.3–4 (2004)
<https://doi.org/10.2304/pfie.2004.2.3.10>.
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important tradition in pedagogical theories and would go on to have a
long history of its own: the theme of ‘polytechnic training.’9 Although
the first aspect listed by Marx is ‘mental education’, it is important to
emphasize the breach opened up by his work through the recognition
that to educate is more than only forming the mind (der Geist). His
ideas were to play a crucial role in the elaboration of theories and
practices concerning education, particularly in the Soviet Union.
MAKARENKO AND THE PEDAGOGICAL POEM
The role played by circumstances in education, which is explicitly
evoked in the third thesis, had strong repercussions in the history
of pedagogical practices and was taken over by important educators,
psychologists, and thinkers as a basis for their practices.
In this essay I will focus on one such pedagogue: Anton Semy-
onovich Makarenko.10 Because of his connection to Stalinism he was,
it should be said, quite a polemical author. Furthermore, his educa-
tional practice was often dismissed as being simply associated with
military and disciplinary methods. However, one should note that in
9 ‘By educationwe understand three things. Firstly:Mental education. Secondly: Bodily
education, such as is given in schools of gymnastics, and by military exercise. Thirdly:
Technological training, which imparts the general principles of all processes of pro-
duction, and, simultaneously initiates the child and young person in the practical use
and handling of the elementary instruments of all trades. A gradual and progressive
course of mental, gymnastic, and technological training ought to correspond to the
classification of the juvenile labourers. The costs of the technological schools ought to
be partly met by the sale of their products.The combination of paid productive labour,
mental education, bodily exercise and polytechnic training, will raise theworking class
far above the level of the higher and middle classes’ (Karl Marx, ‘Instructions for the
Delegates of the Provisional General Council’, in MECW, xx (1985), pp. 185–94 (p.
189)).
10 I used the following translations of The Pedagogical Poem to write this essay: The Road
to Life (An Epic of Education) inThree Parts, 3 vols (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub-
lishing House 1955); Poème Pédagogique. En Trois Parties, 3 vols (Moscou, Éditions
en Langues Étrangères, 1953); O Poema Pedagógico (São Paulo: Editora 34, 2012);
Poema Pedagógico (Spain: Omegalfa/Biblioteca Libre, n.d.) <https://www.omegalfa.
es/downloadfile.php?file=libros/poema-pedagogico.pdf> [accessed 12 September
2020]. Not reading Russian, my access to the original sources and to the Russian
critical literature on his work is very restricted. I would like to thank the help
of Elena Vogman with the comparison of passages of the original text, which can
be found here: <http://makarenko-museum.ru/Classics/Makarenko/Makarenko_
A_Pedagogic_Poem/Makarenko_Ped_poema_full_text.pdf> [accessed 12 Septem-
ber 2020].
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his work there is an interesting and ambiguous transition from a more
experimental moment to a more authoritarian one which takes places
between his two major works — The Pedagogical Poem (1935) and
Flags on the Battlements (1938).
With these observations in mind, I have turned my focus to the
consequences and possibilities derived from his ‘theory’, as well as the
ways it was renewed, in particular in the French post-war context, by
important figures surrounding the French Communist Party11 or in
the work of the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire and the Latin American
context.12 I would also like to mention that what I call his ‘theory’ is
in fact an anti-theory and it appears, at first, as a refusal of the available
pedagogical principles of his time.
Poem and (Anti)theory: Circumstances and Materialism
I would like to begin by outlining the context in which Makarenko
worked. At the end of 1920, he was invited to head a juvenile colony
11 I have in mind the reception of his work by, among others, authors such as Henri
Wallon, Louis Le Guillant, Irène Lézine, and Fernand Deligny. These names are part
of an important constellation around a social network with maladjusted young people
created in 1948 in France and called La Grande Cordée. Irène Lézine, psychologist,
translator, and activist of the French Communist Party (PCF), was responsible for
the introduction in France of authors such as Lev Vygotsky and Makarenko. At some
point, the PCFwanted to turn Deligny into a sort of ‘FrenchMakarenko’. Besides their
own books and articles, they all took part in Enfance, a journal created in 1947 which
was initially directed by Wallon. The journal synthesized the current debates around
childhood and once again actualized problems such as that of ‘character’. All of these
thinkers mobilize the notion of ‘circumstances’ in a particular way. For Deligny, the
educator is a ‘creator of circumstances’ (Fernand Deligny, ‘Les Vagabonds Efficaces’
(1947), in his Œuvres (Paris: L’Arachnéen, 2017), pp. 161–221 (p. 212), available
at the platformEncontroDeligny: <https://deligny.jur.puc-rio.br/index.php/livros-e-
publicacoes/> [accessed 12 September 2020]).Wallon developed amaterialist psych-
ology that emphasizes the influences of situation and of milieu on the development of
the subject (Henri Wallon, De l’Acte à la Pensée (Paris: Flammarion, 1942)). All of
them are interested in de-naturalizing the notion of ‘maladjustment’ (inadapdation),
showing that diagnoses should never isolate individuals from the social circumstances
where their cases evolve. For a development of these questions, I refer to Marlon
Miguel, À la marge et hors-champ: L’humain dans la pensée de Fernand Deligny (Uni-
versité Paris 8, 2016) <https://www.theses.fr/2016PA080020/document>; Marlon
Miguel, ‘Pour une pédagogie de la révolte: Fernand Deligny, de la solidarité avec
les marginaux au perspectivisme’, Cahiers du GRM, 14 (2019) <https://doi.org/10.
4000/grm.1696>.
12 See René Capriles, Makarenko: o Nascimento da Pedagogia Socialista (São Paulo:
Scipione, 1989).
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by the Public Education Department in Ukraine, which was called the
Gorky Colony.13 Situated six kilometres from Poltava, the colony was
to receive children and adolescents — many of them orphans — for
social re-education. The context was tough: the revolution had taken
place and the civil war had just finished in the region, leaving people
in very miserable conditions. The Public Education Department con-
ceived of Makarenko’s task not only as the re-education of these ‘young
offenders’ but also as an experiment to educate the ‘new man’ in new
ways. The young people sent to the colony were more or less danger-
ous, often very violent people who had committed infractions such as
theft, robbery, and organized crime. The first pages of The Pedagogical
Poem describe the complete distress of Makarenko before the student
body. They were resistant to any pedagogical process and, in addition,
the material conditions were hardly favourable: the colony simply pos-
sessed an unheated, abandoned hangar, which was falling apart. They
had neither clothes nor shoes for the kids, nor enough food to feed
everyone.
In this wretched state Makarenko was helpless, and he felt that the
‘pedagogical science’ he acquired reading books (Pestalozzi, Rousseau,
Natorp, Blonsky, etc.) offered ‘no method, no means, no logic — noth-
ing’14 to help him deal with the context. In this situation, he decided
not to follow any pre-conceived theory, dogma, or received ideas, and
13 The name was given only sometime after its creation and was inspired by the readings
of Maxim Gorky that took place in the Colony. When the kids discovered that the
life of Gorky had been similar to theirs, they took him as a sort of model for their
own lives: ‘They were stunned by the story, suddenly struck by the idea: “So Gorky
was like us! I say, that’s fine!” This idea moved them profoundly and joyfully. Maxim
Gorky’s life seemed to become part of our life. Various episodes in it provided us with
examples for comparison, a fund of nicknames, a background for debate, and a scale
for the measurement of human values’ (Makarenko, The Road to Life, I, pp. 135–56).
Here Makarenko is not so far from a principle that was fundamental for Paulo Freire’s
pedagogy: to associate the conquering of words with the conquering of the world — i.e.
the re-appropriation of one’s own history and the transformation of the world goes
through an acquisition of a certain language. In practical terms, for Freire, in order to
learn a word, one must learn its historical, cultural, and political dimensions. Freire
associated the educational process with the construction of a political consciousness
that would help the pupil to free themselves from oppression and become agents of
their own history: ‘There is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis. Thus,
to speak a true word is to transform the world […]. To exist, humanly, is to name the
world, to change it’ (Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum,
2005), pp. 87–88).
14 Makarenko, The Road to Life, i, p. 179.
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instead to take what I would call a materialist stance, that is, he learnt
from daily practices to build his store of hands-on experience, and in-
vented solutions according to what the circumstances gave, presented
to him, or demanded.
Indeed, the recurrence of the word ‘circumstance’ (Обстоятель-
ство) in The Pedagogical Poem is very striking. Makarenko claimed
that every important invention concerning the Colony came from the
observation of a certain set of circumstances. His usage of the word
— just like with Marx and Engels — certainly mirrored the historical,
economic, and social conditions; however, in contrast to their thought,
Makarenko referred to a far smaller scale, namely to the singular condi-
tions of the Colony or the kids’ trajectories, in sum, the actual situation
he found himself in. Hence, Makarenko’s use of the word referred to
a singular position in time and space; it was meant to be attentive,
present, and alert to what was happening — to reflect his stance right
there, right in the middle of the experience, at each moment. Interest-
ingly, the word employed by the author, Обстоятельство, is built in
exactly the same way as the German word used by Marx:Umstand. ‘Об’
is for ‘Um’, ‘Circum’ (accusative form of circus, ‘circle’, ‘ring’, ‘around’),
as стояте for ‘stand’/‘stehen’, ‘stance’, ‘standing’, coming undoubtedly
from the Latin stantia.15 And this etymology precisely reflects the
attitude that the educator, following Makarenko’s opinions, should
have: to stand in the middle of the situation and to learn, immanently,
what to do from it. Finally, if we remain on the grounds of etymology
and follow the sequence of metaphors emanating from this word, we
may remark upon the interesting way Makarenko found to work on
the transmission of his thought, that is, through the form of stanzas.
He prefers to write not a doctrine, a theory, a manual, or a kind of
reproducible knowledge, but rather a description of his experiences in
an immanent literary form — The Pedagogical Poem, written between
1925 and 1935, and describing his thirteen years of work at the Gorky
Colony, is precisely a literary work, a prose poetry.
The Pedagogical Poem can be read as a kind of anti-theory. How-
ever, Makarenko nevertheless presents a horizon or a guiding principle
15 It seems, indeed, that theRussianwordwas ‘fabricated’: it is a loan translation, a calque,
deriving from the German and French words.
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on top of which the whole experience can be built: the creation of
what he calls a ‘real collectivity’. This means that the educator must
be attentive to the ‘embryos’ or the ‘sprouts’ of the collectivity, which
are often unpredictable, but may appear all of a sudden and should
be saved, ‘cherished at all costs’ — these embryos constitute the most
‘important circumstances’ that have to be taken into consideration and
analysed during the pedagogical process.16
Collectivity and Social Glue
The collectivity is the target of a doubly circular movement. On the
one hand, it is the task of the educator to educate the children and
adolescents so that they learn to act collectively. This learning is not
so much that of reason, but rather the learning of a (new) model of
sensibility, of a certain sense of the collective. This sensibility refers
to the perception and observation of the surroundings, of the ‘milieu’
(среда, another important word in Makarenko’s work), and also relates
to the series of prefixes ‘um’/‘Об’/‘circum’.
This capacity to perceive what is around you, this capacity to
perceive what cannot be seen, what is made in the other rooms,
to perceive the tonality of life, this capacity of orientation. […]
The real Soviet citizen must be able to sense what happens
around him with all his nerves, almost unconsciously.17
In this extract one can also perceive an echo of Marx and Engel’s
insistence in The Holy Family, which I outlined earlier, on the ‘world
of senses’ and the necessity of rearranging the empirical world so that
humans’ become aware of themselves. Makarenko, however, gives an
even greater insistence on the development of the subject’s sensibility
and perception, and on their capacity to perceive beyond the limits of
their individual space.
On the other hand, and this is the second crucial point, it is not
so much the educator who is responsible for educating but rather the
juvenile collectivity itself that will (re)educate the children:
16 Cf. Makarenko, The Road to Life, i, Chap. 8, a chapter named precisely ‘Character and
Culture’.
17 Anton Semyonovich Makarenko apud Irène Lézine, A. S. Makarenko, Pédagogue So-
viétique (1888–1939) (Paris: PUF, 1954), p. 39, my translation.
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The task of the educator is not at all to educate. It is repug-
nant to good sense to think that a dozen cultivated individuals
gathered by chance at the Gorky colony would be able to edu-
cate one hundred and thirty delinquents. […] It is not the
educator who educates, but the milieu.18
The collectivity is thus the product of a long process which is based
on this double progressive movement: Firstly, the formation of a type
of sensibility (and thus of habits, customs, rituals, and traditions) that
goes beyond one’s individual perspective and that allows for the pro-
gressive production of the social glue tying these individuals together.
Secondly, thanks to the daily collective activities, there is an improve-
ment of this same sensibility and the capacity of the individuals to
relate to each other. To claim that it is the milieu that educates means
that the real process through which one is educated is correlated to the
tensions inside the collective activities and the way they are resolved.
That is why Makarenko was often accused of placing the collectivity
at the centre of his pedagogy and not the (individual) child, of not
following the ‘reign of psychology’ but rather that of work.
Makarenko’s main antagonist throughout The Pedagogical Poem is
the Public Education Department and its abstract pedagogical science.
What he wants to emphasize is that there should be no knowledge
or moral principle that precedes the solution of the problems emer-
ging from the pedagogical situation. That is why he strategically makes
use of different methods without transforming them into pedagogical
axioms. For example, sometimes Makarenko describes the use of mil-
itary strategies and even of disciplinary methods (such as the organ-
ization of the children in lines and ‘detachments’, or the practice of
gymnastics); at other times, to the reader’s surprise, he may even beat a
child and become very authoritarian. However, and this constitutes the
crucial point, he does not defend any of these attitudes as principles;
on the contrary, he even claims that violence should be avoided at all
costs, as it is, in the end, not really useful to create a collective culture.
If he describes these moments, it is to show that they may appear
as reactions to certain circumstances and show the incapacity of the
18 Anton SemyonovichMakarenko, ‘LaColonie de Poltava diteColonelGorki (1925)’, in
L’Éducation dans les Collectivités d’Enfants (Paris: CEMEA, Les Éditions du Scarabée,
1956), p. 57, my translation.
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educator — in this case, himself — to deal with the pupils. Indeed, the
absolute non-moralistic tone of The Pedagogical Poem is very striking,
as its narrative follows the flow of human affects and expresses the
perseverance to understand and try to deal with them.
To Sunder the Covenants of Fate: The Critique of Characterology
This non-moralistic tone is constantly present in Makarenko’s text,
which also demands, in turn, a non-moralistic reading. His tone is
deeply connected to his refusal of a psychological, behavioural, and
characterological approach to educating children. In the colony, com-
mon phrases such as ‘delinquent’ and ‘morally handicapped’ were, for
example, banned from the everyday vocabulary — instead, they used
the plural noun ‘colonists’. This does not mean, however, that these
terms disappeared in his text; on the contrary, he made use of them
to subvert or satirize them.
Furthermore, he applies the idea of an active forgetting of the
children’s past: ‘I considered that the principal method for the re-
education of delinquents should be based upon a complete ignoring
of the past, especially past crimes’.19 Makarenko, going against the
ideology of his time, de-naturalized delinquency and detached it from
a medical status that had the tendency to essentialize and classify
children according to an innate character or personality. He further
radicalized this position — fighting, as he claimed, against his ‘own
instincts’ — by choosing not to even read the children’s records as
they were sent to the Colony. To correlate an act (stealing, fighting,
drinking, betting) to a character fault would mean not taking into con-
sideration the hard and miserable circumstances in which these kids
and adolescents grew up. That is why Makarenko minimized these acts
so much and instead emphasized that the Colony would be precisely
the place to create another set of habits. In this same sense, Makar-
19 Makarenko, The Road to Life, i, p. 383. Some lines later, the text follows: ‘The usual
pedagogical logic at that time aped medicine, adopting the sage adage: “In order to
cure a disease, it must first be known.” This logic sometimes seduced even me, not to
mention my colleagues and the Department of Public Education […]. As far back as
1922 I had asked the Commission not to sendme anymore personal records.We quite
sincerely ceased to interest ourselves in the past offences of our charges, and with such
success that the latter soon began to forget them themselves’ (ibid., pp. 383–84).
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enko’s text rarely describes what the intimate and internal personality
of his pupils was supposed to be; he prefers to describe, their abilities,
techniques, physical aspects, tones of voice, style, the pace of their
walk and speech rhythms, etc. This does not mean that Makarenko
does not create descriptive categories in the Colony, but that they are
operational and mobile ones that are used to describe the situation in
which individuals find themselves and not to essentialize them.
This question of forgetting the past, which was so active in the
Colony, is reminiscent of an Althusserian phrase that could very well
be a definition of materialism: ne plus se raconter d’histoires.20 This
definition was inspired by Althusser’s readings of Lucretius and a new
pact of the nature capable of ‘sundering the covenants of fate’.21 With
it, Althusser pointed to the impossibility of giving a closed, definitive,
essential, and determined meaning to things, bodies, and individuals.
To put it even more strongly, he highlighted the impossibility of lock-
ing an individual into their past determinations. This does not entail a
total freedom of things or a refusal of necessity — quite the contrary,
in fact — but it does emphasize the ever-possible reconfiguration of
things through encounters.22
Whether one speaks of encounters or circumstances, what is at stake
in this excellent case study is the need to free the miserable kids from
the inevitable fate that was determined for them by tribunals, social
re-education centres, and prison, where they were repeatedly labelled
‘young offenders’, ‘delinquents’, ‘morally handicapped’, and ‘hereditary
bums’.23 Certainly, there is a rhetorical aspect to Makarenko ‘forgetting
of the past’ — for it is less a question of a denial of the past than an
attempt to fight against the prescribed fate assigned by the medical
20 ‘Never to tell myself stories, which is the only “definition” of materialism I have ever
subscribed to’ (Louis Althusser, The Future Lasts Forever: A memoire (New York: New
Press, 1993), p. 169).
21 Lucretius,On theNature ofThings, trans. byWilliamEllery Leonard (NewYork:Dover,
2008), i, p. 18.
22 Cf. Louis Althusser, ‘Le courant souterrain du matérialisme de la rencontre’, in
his Écrits Philosophiques et Politiques, ed. by François Matheron, 2 vols (Paris:
Stock/IMEC, 1994–95), i (1994), pp. 539–79.
23 Once again, Makarenko struggles with the pseudo-scientific literature that tried to
create a systematic characterological classification. ‘Several efforts have been made
in learned works to draw up a satisfactory system for the classification of human
characteristics [character], and the greatest pains taken to allot an “amoral” and
“defective” place for the waifs’ (Makarenko, The Road to Life, iii, p. 105).
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and socio-juridical apparatuses. Indeed, part of the pedagogical pro-
cess was to reconnect past memories and experiences with something
new. In this sense, it is interesting to see, for example, how Makar-
enko acknowledges the kids’ dexterity, what skills they learned in the
streets (theft, for example), which could then be translated and used
productively in the Colony. This translation became possible through
new circumstances, activities, and work.24 As we are going to see, the
theatre, which became an important activity of the Colony, was also a
place where the kids, playing with life and death both joyfully and with
hatred, reconnected to and re-translated their past memories.
The Organization of the Collectivity
This leads to the question of the organization of the Colony which I
will briefly present before moving on to my conclusion. First of all,
there was an emphatic steering away from the practices of other ju-
venile re-education centres of the time in which Makarenko insisted
on the importance of the Colony’s contact with the external world.
The colony was meant to be a more or less open space without enclos-
ures or violent surveillance. This led to two important consequences:
if they wanted to, the colonists could leave the colony, but in this
case they needed to assume responsibility for going back to their past
lives of thievery, street life, etc.; furthermore, instead of removing the
youths from society, the contact with the external world — such as
villages, cities, and farms in the vicinity as well as local commerce and
workshops — was a crucial, common dimension of the re-education
process. Not only did the colonists regularly deal with the external
world in matters concerning the Colony, but people from the outside
could also come to the public events taking place at the Colony such
as festivities and weekly theatre presentations.
24 Here the forgetting of the past meets another element, which is the praise of the
movement and of the constant change of circumstances seen as fundamental to the
collectivity: ‘I thought of the strength of the colonists’ collective, and suddenly I
realized what was wrong.Why, of course—how could I have taken so long to discover
it? It had all come about because we were at a standstill. A standstill can never be
allowed in the life of a collective. […] The universal law of general development was
only just beginning to show its true strength. The forms ruling the existence of a free
human collective implied progress [or movement forward]. The forms ruling death —
a standstill’ (ibid., ii, p. 278).
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Secondly, Makarenko, echoing Marx’s polytechnic education, pro-
posed a combination of work and education. This was not only a prin-
ciple per se but an essential need for survival. With almost no financial
support and miserable beginnings, the colony was forced to develop
its own economy. Its first main activity, therefore, was agriculture to
produce what to eat. Later on, however, they held many workshops
(engine workshops, for example), music and particularly theatre activ-
ities, etc. The Dzerzhinsky Commune, which Makarenko would also
run, and which is described in the third part of The Pedagogical Poem,
became famous for its massive production of FED cameras, which
were similar to the Leica ones.
Thirdly, the different activities were organized according to ‘de-
tachments’,25 that is, a certain number of kids (girls and boys mixed)
were allocated a certain function (planting beetroots, searching for
firewood in the forest, cleaning spaces, the staging of theatre plays,
etc.). Each detachment had a ‘commander’, who was someone without
privileges but who was very skilled in a specific function and therefore
responsible for the discipline of the group, the tools they used, and
for the quality of the service they provided. Besides these detachments
with a definitive role, there were also ‘mixed detachments’, which were
temporary and included people from other detachments for a provi-
sional and precise task. A detachment always had a commander even if
it only had two people in it. Finally, there was a ‘soviet of commanders’
that would take and discuss the decisions concerning important affairs
of the Colony, as well as the election and renewal of the commanders.
These elections were accompanied by long discussions and debates.
The soviet of commanders was guided by the aspiration that each col-
onist should be a commander of a mixed detachment at least once.
With this system of detachments, Makarenko aimed at creating an
‘extremely intricate chain of subordination in the colony, in which it
was impossible for individual members to become unduly conspicu-
ous, or to predominate in the collective’.26 The development of the
25 Theword is associated ratherwith self-management andguerrilla thanwith verticalized
and militarized principles. ‘The word “detachment” was an expression used in that
periodwhen thewaves of revolution had not as yet been diverted into the orderly ranks
of regiments and divisions. Guerrilla warfare, especially in the Ukraine, where it was
so long-drawn-out, was carried on exclusively by detachments’ (ibid., i, p. 348).
26 Ibid., p. 357.
160 PRODUCT OF CIRCUMSTANCES
detachment system points towards the structuring of the collectivity
according to organizational self-management and polytechnic prin-
ciples. Besides the system of detachments, a collective popular tribunal
was also created to judge problems in the Colony such as theft.
Among the many inventions described by Makarenko, I find the
theatre practice developed at the Colony especially interesting. After
around the third year of its existence, theatre became a central activity,
with the staging of around forty plays per winter in a hangar trans-
formed into a stage and an auditorium for six hundred people that
included the local population living near the Colony. There were sev-
eral mixed detachments that saw to different functions such as acting,
wardrobe requirements, heating, scenery, lighting-, sound-, and stage-
effects, cleaning, operating the stage curtains, etc. The kids performed
all these different activities and Makarenko played the role of the dir-
ector and prompter. Since they usually had one week to prepare a play
of sometimes four or five acts, it was impossible to learn all the text by
heart. Thus, the emphasis was on directing how to move oneself in the
space, which gestures to use, etc. Makarenko writes that he ‘attributed
great importance to the theatre, since through its agency the colonists’
way of speaking was greatly improved, and their horizons broadened’.27
Indeed, the theatre appears to have offered a perfect set of circum-
stances in which the juvenile collective had to find solutions to staging
complex plays in a very short time. The tensions that emerged and the
object of the debates inside the collective constituted a crucial part
of the pedagogical process. Moreover, it provided an opportunity of
practicing the different tasks of subordination, command, and the de-
velopment of techniques, without which the final result (i.e. the play)
would have been impossible. Finally, the theatre process also educated
the sensibility related to the perception of space, the movement of
bodies and the coordination of gestures — essential elements in the
creation of the collectivity.28
27 Ibid., ii, p. 82.
28 Here I should mention another experiment of this period concerning theatre, which
seems even more radical: Asja Lācis and the infantine proletarian theatre. In 1918,
Lācis started to work with war orphans in Orel and thought that theatre could be a
way to ‘awaken’ them. She divided the group of children into several sections (painting
and drawing,music, technical construction (of props, buildings, figures, animals, etc.),
rhythm and gymnastics, diction, and improvisation). According to Lācis, whereas
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CONCLUSION
Makarenko’s work is not straightforward, especially given the fact that
he wrote a literary rather than a theoretical account of it. At the same
time, it is precisely for this reason that his work is so interesting and
remains of importance today. Writing a poem and not a doctrine was
the way he found to describe the struggles of an exceptional situation
in an immanent and hence also materialist way. In the light of this
case study one can ponder if every pedagogical situation, dealing as
it does with singular and unique living creatures, will not inevitably
prove to be exceptional. In a way, a literary work is able to open up
paths of communication, to encourage others to experiment and to
invent, instead of confining experience to a set of rules that dictate how
to proceed as a manual would do.
Among the paths opened by Makarenko, one of the most import-
ant is how he struggles to de-naturalize and de-essentialize individuals,
and to emphasize how individuals are always the products of circum-
stances29 rather than the products of models prescribing what they
bourgeois education is geared toward individual development and the final product
(the play itself), communist education aims at a ‘collective aesthetic form’, it insists on
the process and the situation as the main pedagogical tools and on the development
of the collective rather than of each individual. Finally, the pedagogical process should
emphasize the observation and the learning both of the educator and the pupils. ‘Our
starting point for both educators and those who were to be educated was observation.
The children observed objects, the relations of objects and people to one another, and
their changeability.The educators watched the children to see what they accomplished
and how far they could productively apply their skills. Observation was not only prac-
ticed and developed through drawing, painting, and music inside the studio but also
outside of it. Early in the morning, and again in the evening, we went outside with
the children and made them aware of how colours changed through distance and time
of day, how different the sounds and noises were in the morning and evening, and
how silence can sing’ (Asja Lācis, ‘A Memoir’, South as State of Mind, 9 [Documenta
14#4] ([2017]) <https://www.documenta14.de/en/south/> [accessed 12 Septem-
ber 2020]).
29 In 1999, the French choreographer Xavier Leroy created a very striking performance-
lecture hybrid called Product of Circumstances, where he combined his double traject-
ory as researcher in bothmolecular biology and choreography. After his PhD, he finally
abandoned biology in favour of dance, precisely because of the naturalization of a
model body and theway academicwork seemed so sterile to him.However, in themore
traditional dance scene he also found a very crystallised notion of the body.Theexpres-
sion ‘product of circumstances’ puts into relation both the elements constituting his
biographical path that transformed him into a very particular dancer/choreographer
and the critique of a unified, biologized, modelled and essentialized conception of
body.
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should be or become. A characteristic of a materialist education, or
even of materialism tout court, is precisely to start from the actual and
singular situation, to refuse a ‘modelled’ conception of the human and
to take into account the circumstances, whether historical and macro
or individual and micro, before proceeding to analyse and judge.
Re-reading Makarenko also affords us an opportunity to rethink
how to build a collective, how to think about the materiality of what
he likes to call social glue, and how to fabricate it. It is a question of
building a common horizon at however small a scale — in Makarenko’s
case, that of the Colony —, one which should be able to help transform
society at large. Indeed, the misery of the traditional bourgeois edu-
cational system is to have forgotten the importance of the collective
construction.
Perhaps the main distinction between our educational system
and the bourgeois one lies precisely in the fact that with us a
children’s collective is bound to develop and prosper, to visu-
alize a better tomorrow, and to aspire to it in joyful, common
efforts, in gay, steadfast visions. Perhaps therein lies the true
pedagogical dialectics.30
30 Makarenko, The Road to Life, ii, p. 302.
In the Labyrinth of Emancipation
An Inquiry into the Relationship between Knowledge
and Politics
BERNARDO BIANCHI
Étrange parti pris cependant qui valorise aveuglément la profondeur
aux dépens de la superficie et qui veut que ‘superficiel’ signifie non
pas ‘de vaste dimension’, mais de ‘peu de profondeur’, tandis que
‘profond’ signifie au contraire ‘de grande profondeur’ et non pas ‘de
faible superficie’
Michel Tournier, Vendredi ou les limbes du Pacifique
INTRODUCTION
In the Marxist tradition, emancipation is often described as the oppos-
ite of either alienation1 or domination.2 However, during its politiciz-
* This chapter is based on three different strands ofmy research and aims to demonstrate
their interconnection. Firstly, it marks the closure of my research as a fellow at the Al-
exander von Humboldt Stiftung and the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher
Education Personnel of the Brazilian Government (CAPES). Secondly, it engages
with the research that has recently resulted in another co-edited volume published
by Routledge entitled Democracy and Brazil: Collapse and Regression. Thirdly, it aims
to bring together these two projects with the debates I have been engaged in with
Émilie Filion-Donato, Marlon Miguel, Ayşe Yuva, and many other dear friends from
the project ‘Materialism and Politics’.
1 See Gérard Bensussan, ‘Émancipation’, in Dictionnaire critique du marxisme, ed. by
Gérard Bensussan and Georges Labica (Paris: PUF, 1999), pp. 382–84.
2 See Ulrich Weiss, ‘Emanzipation’, ed. by Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Historisch-Kritisches
Wörterbuch des Marxismus, 15 vols (Hamburg: Argument, 1983–), iii (1997), pp.
272–89.
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ation in the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth
century in the Vormärz, it is not so much the alternative between both
dimensions, but rather their intertwinement, which becomes evident.
In this chapter, I analyse what I consider to be the classical form of the
concept of emancipation. This classical form is rooted in two funda-
mental features. On the one hand, it is based on a dichotomy between
passivity and activity, or heteronomy and autonomy. At the same time,
the concept is impregnated with the ideal of a process of maturation,
which takes the form of a process of intellectual development along the
lines of an organic growth.3
I analyse, on this basis, how the classical form of the concept
of emancipation developed according to a particular philosophical
anthropology of autonomy. This, in turn, gave rise to civil law as
the common reference for how to conceive political autonomy. My
purpose, as I develop in the section ‘Tutelage and the Labyrinth of
Emancipation’, is to demonstrate how this has been done and how this
conception has led, however well intended, to a hierarchical under-
standing of the relationship between knowledge and political action.
The latter trait is inseparable from what I define in a homonymous
section as ‘epistemocracy’.
According to the classical concept of emancipation, those who
lack judgment, since they are ‘incomplete’ individuals, are alieni juris,
and, consequently, cannot take part in the political life of their com-
munity — ‘before one can be a free citizen in the state, one must feel
free in the bosom of nature’.4 To emancipate oneself was the great task
of that time period as defined by Heinrich Heine,5 and it became a
requirement for the individual to engage in the political realm. Ac-
cordingly, emancipation forges an ideal of a fully-fledged individuality
in association with epistemic aptitude as the true basis for political
autonomy.
3 These two features have been partially identified by Ernesto Laclau in a provocative
text, which was originally published in 1992. In opposition to Laclau, however, I don’t
agree that these two dimensions lead to an undecidability between the ‘dichotomic
dimension’ and the ‘dimension of ground’. See his Emancipation(s) (London: Verso,
1996), p. 1.
4 Elme-Marie Caro, Problèmes de morale sociale (Paris: Hachette, 1887), p. 190.
5 Heinrich Heine, ‘Reise von München nach Genua’, in Heinrich-Heine-Säkularausgabe,
27 vols (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970–), vi: Reisebilder ii (1828–1831) (1986), pp. 7–72
(p. 61).
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The Latin emancipatio, derived from the verb emancipare, from the
expression ex manus capere, indeed literally means ‘to take off hands’.6
In Roman law, this referred to the figure of the slave, but, primarily, to
the infantunder the rule of the pater familias— the infantbeing the one
who does not speak (in + fāns). In the German language, the fact of be-
ing unable to speak for oneself is at the basis of the noun Unmündigkeit
and the adjective unmündig, which can be literally translated as ‘non-
mouthed’. Unmündigkeit is also a legal concept that corresponds to the
English word ‘minority’, and goes hand in hand with the notion of
legal incapacity.7 In the thought of Immanuel Kant, minority became
associated with a problem concerning the attainment of autonomy, a
problem directly linked to that of emancipation.8 Accordingly, it can
be said that to emancipate oneself, to become autonomous, means to
have a voice, to be able to speak — both in one’s private affairs in the
form of legal capacity, as well as in the political realm in the form of
political rights.
In the section ‘Materialism and Emancipation’, I outline a very
intriguing formula employed by Étienne Balibar: materialism without
matter.9 Following Balibar’s usage of the expression and its connection
to Karl Marx’s ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, this conception of materialism
6 ReinhardtKoselleck andKarlMartinGrass, ‘Emanzipation’, inGeschichtlicheGrundbe-
griffe: Historisches Lexikon, ed. by Reinhardt Koselleck, Otto Brunner, and Werner
Conze, 7 vols (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972–97), ii (1975), pp. 153–97.
7 I am referring to minority in reference to its meaning in terms of age. In English, as
in French and Spanish, the term minority (minorité in French and minoría in Spanish)
combines two differentmeanings: (i) the situation of a group that is smaller in number,
and (ii) the period before the attainment of majority. This is not the case in German
(nor in Italian and in Portuguese), which distinguishes between Minderheit, minority
in terms of number, andUnmündigkeit (orMinderjährigkeit), minority in terms of age.
8 See Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ [1784], in
Practical Philosophy, trans. by Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of
Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 15–22 (p. 17).
In the current chapter, I have chosen to translate Unmündigkeit in the work of Kant
as ‘minority’ and rejected other options such as ‘immaturity’, following the choice
made by Gregor in the Cambridge edition. I believe this choice is well justified for
two reasons. Firstly, it is the best option considering how Kant employs the concept
throughout his entire work, especially in the Doctrine of Right (first section of The
Metaphysics of Morals, which was also translated by Gregor in the Cambridge edition
of the works of Kant). Secondly, ‘minority’, differently from ‘immaturity’, is a legal
concept and, therefore, is more in line with Unmündigkeit.
9 ÉtienneBalibar,LaPhilosophie deMarx (Paris: LaDécouverte, 2014), p. 61. I also refer
the reader to Marianna Poyares’s contribution to this volume.
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posits the reciprocal constitution between activity (Tätigkeit) and sub-
jectivity, which means that the emergence and development of human
beings are inseparable from their practice. On this basis, I argue in
favour of what I consider to be a materialist concept of emancipation,
a topic further developed in this volume by Marlon Miguel and Pascal
Sévérac. This conception is fundamentally distinct from the classical
concept in so far as it rejects, from the outset, the premises of the philo-
sophical anthropology of autonomy, which are based on the concept of
minority (Unmündigkeit) and lead to epistemocracy. Therefore, I argue
that a materialist concept of emancipation is rooted in the dismissal
of the concept of minority. This means, ultimately, the rejection of
hierarchical ways of articulating the relationship between epistemic
competence and political agency, which opens up different approaches
to education. However, instead of reversing the ‘principle of the ignor-
ance of the people’10 into the ‘principle of the wisdom of the people’,
the question seems rather to lie in conceiving a form of education akin
to the democratic principle of self-organization, leading to a process of
reciprocal constitution of knowledge and political agency.11
TUTELAGE AND THE LABYRINTH OF EMANCIPATION
On the eve of the French revolution, the Marquis de Condorcet, in
his Essay on the Constitution and Functions of the Provincial Assemblies,
distinguished between those who are entitled to the right of citizenship
(droit de cité) and those who are naturally excluded from it: ‘the exclu-
sion of minors, monks, servants, men convicted of crimes, all those
who may be presumed not to have an enlightened will [volonté éclairée],
or a will of their own [volonté propre]; those who may legitimately be
suspected of a corrupt will’.12 A year later, Emmanuel-Joseph de Sieyès
laid the foundation of a fundamental distinction in constitutional the-
10 SeeCatherineColliot-Thélène, ‘L’Ignorance dupeuple’, inL’Ignorance du peuple: Essais
sur la démocratie, ed. by Gérard Duprat (Paris: PUF, 1998), pp. 17–40.
11 I argue, furthermore, that a materialist education should not be conceived as the activ-
ity of explaining human reality, as if this were composed of circumstances separated
from our own practice.
12 Marquis de Condorcet, Essai sur la constitution et les fonctions des assemblées provin-
ciales, inŒuvres deCondorcet, ed. byArthurCondorcetO’Connor andFrançois Arago,
12 vols (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 1847), viii, pp. 115–662 (p. 130; my translation).
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ory between active and passive citizenship which was enshrined in
the French law of 22 December 1789:13 ‘all can enjoy the advantages
afforded by society; but only those who contribute to the public es-
tablishment are […] true, active citizens, the true members of this
association’.14
The principle of autonomy, which is connected to the idea of an
independent and enlightened will, was a central trope of political rhet-
oric in the late eighteenth century. In fact, autonomy is what enabled
Condorcet to differentiate between natural and political individuals —
a distinction that could have no place in the ancien régime which, being
an organic society of corporate bodies, assigned political power not to
the individuals themselves but to status, that is, to the belonging of an
individual or group of individuals to specific sectors of the society. In
this sense, the ‘minors’ did not constitute a group like other groups
who were excluded from political life. After all, they were not a de-
terminate social category such as monks, servants, etc. In Condorcet,
as in the writings of Sieyès, autonomy is the only thing that can legitim-
ize legally binding obligations in either the political or private sphere.
Therefore, legal capacity and political autonomy go hand in hand.15
In the same way, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, autonomy is
forged along the lines of the legal capacity:
13 This distinction was enshrined in the third article, section i, of the above-mentioned
law.
14 Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, Reconnoissance et exposition raisonnée des droits de l’homme
et du citoyen (Paris: Chez Baudouin, 1789), p. 21; my translation.
15 For this reason, Pierre Rosanvallon states that the foundations of themodern tradition
of civil law and those of political theory overlap (Le Sacre du citoyen. Histoire du
suffrage universel en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), p. 100). In fact, in French civil
law, the usage of the word ‘emancipation’ was widely connected to the legal capacity
(capacité juridique). At the end of the seventeenth century, Antoine Furetière defined
emancipation in his dictionary and encyclopaedia as the freedom ‘to act in one’s affairs
and to govern one’s income without the assistance of a tutor’ (‘Émancipation’, in
Dictionnaire Universel, 3 vols (The Hague and Rotterdam: Arnoud et Reinier Leers,
1701), ii, pp. 33–34 (pp. 33; my translation). In the Napoleonic Civil Code of 1804, it
is stipulated that emancipation can be both tacit, as in the case of marriage (art. 476 et
seq.), or explicit, when a minor is prematurely released from parental authority. These
conceptions reverberate in Antoine-Gaspard Boucher d’Argis’s spirit when he writes,
in 1755, the article ‘emancipation’ for the Encyclopédie of Denis Diderot and Jean le
Rond d’Alembert: emancipation is ‘an act that places certain persons outside the power
of another’ (‘Émancipation’, in Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des Sciences, des
arts et des métiers, ed. by Jean Le Rond d’Alembert and Denis Diderot, 17 vols (Paris,
1755), v, pp. 546–49 (p. 546; my translation).
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The only qualification for being a citizen is being fit to vote. But
being fit to vote presupposes the independence of someone
who, as one of the people, wants to be not just a part of the
commonwealth but also a member of it, that is, a part of the
commonwealth acting from his own choice in community with
others. This quality of being independent, however, requires
a distinction between active and passive citizens, though the
concept of a passive citizen seems to contradict the concept
of a citizen as such. — The following examples can serve to
remove this difficulty: an apprentice in the service of a mer-
chant or artisan; a domestic servant (as distinguished from a
civil servant); a minor (naturaliter vel civiliter); all women and,
in general, anyone whose preservation in existence (his being
fed and protected) depends not on his management of his own
business but on arrangements made by another (except the
state). All these people lack civil personality and their existence
is, as it were, only inherence.16
By drawing on civil law, Kant takes ‘civil personality’ as the measure
of citizenship. Nevertheless, the reference to civil law as a repository
for reflecting on political theory is obviously not specific to Kant. In
Thomas Hobbes, this reference appears, for example, in Chapter xvi in
Leviathan, where he develops his theory of representation.17 Hobbes
was adamant that in the absence of purposive actions assignable to a
personal identity, only a tutor could give final consent for any trans-
action in which the minor had a part. That is, because ‘children, fools,
and madmen […] have no use of reason’, they lack authority, that is,
‘the right of doing any action’.18 Furthermore, because unrepresented
minors are not legal persons, their tutelage is nothing more than a form
of ‘representation by fiction’.19 Tutelage was different to the authority
of the parents over their offspring (patria potestas) which arose solely
16 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals [1797], in Practical Philosophy, trans. by
Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 353–603 (p. 458).
17 For the indebtedness of Hobbes’s theory to civil law, see Mónica Brito Vieira, The
Elements of Representation in Hobbes: Aesthetics, Theatre, Law, and Theology in the
Construction of Hobbes’s Theory of the State (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009), p. 156.
18 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Eccle-
siastical and Civil, ed. byWilliamMolesworth, inTheEnglishWorks ofThomas Hobbes,
11 vols (London: Bohn, 1839), iii, pp. 150 and 148.
19 Ibid., p. 149. See also David Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 21.
BERNARDO BIANCHI 169
from natural right.20 Instead, it was understood as the corollary of a de
facto situation concerning the lack of individuality of the minor. It had
no normative anchorage: tutelage did not aim at creating individuals
or producing autonomy.21
John Locke radically changed this position, as he connected the
authority of the parents to the duty of educating their offspring. The
power of parents over their children derived from their educative duty,
that is, their obligation to ‘inform the mind, and govern the actions
of their yet ignorant nonage […]’.22 Therefore, even though children
were to look upon their parents as ‘absolute governors’,23 their parents
were not to behave only as sovereigns but also as educators. This
meant that parental authority was not only conceived of in terms of
sovereignty, as in Hobbes, but also in connection to education.
We find this precise idea in Kant as well, not exactly in the text
of 1797, but in An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment
[Aufklärung]?’, which was published in 1784, where the idea of minor-
ity as preparation for autonomy is clearly posited.
Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-
incurred minority. Minority is inability to make use of one’s own
understanding without direction from another. This minority
is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding
but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction
from another. Sapere aude!24
Here, a second form of minority emerges, which is different from the
kind of minority that is mentioned in The Metaphysics of Morals. In
this text, Kant connects minority to the Enlightenment as its opposite
and, at the same time, its final objective, its raison d’être. Kant states
that this condition of being alieni juris occurs even in the condition
20 In Hobbes, tutelage is the form of patria potestas which is specific to civil society.
21 In this respect, tutors are analogous to sovereign.
22 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in Locke: Two Treatises of Government
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 265–428 (p. 306). It’s worth
recalling that the term ‘nonage’ was also used to translate Kant’s Unmündigkeit into
English, as it was done by Mary Campbell Smith <http://www.columbia.edu/acis/
ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html> [accessed 30 June 2020].
23 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, in The Educational Writings of John
Locke, ed. by JohnWilliamAdamson (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 2011),
pp. 21–180 (p. 33).
24 Kant, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, p. 17.
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of natural majority or maturity.25 At the same time, he is obviously
not simply dealing with a minority resulting from the law (civiliter), as
he refers to in The Metaphysics of Morals, which is related to all those
who, despite having reached the age of maturity, remain minors before
the law, as was the case for all those still under tutelage. According to
Kant, the minority in this case is not a mere product of nature, but
rather fundamentally a problem concerning the habit of dependence,
of letting others decide — a form of voluntary tutelage. Moreover,
Kant’s text from 1784 introduces the idea of minority as preparation for
autonomy and not simply its opposite. In contrast to his other writings,
Kant’s What is Enlightenment is more in line with the old problem
of voluntary servitude,26 which implicitly points in the direction of
Étienne de la Boétie.
The connection between Kant’s thought and La Boétie’s Discourse
on Voluntary Servitude, originally published in 1574, was definitively
consolidated by Johann Benjamin Erhard who, in 1793, translated it
into German and had it published in Der neue teutsche Merkur, which
was an important journal of dissemination for the Aufklärung at that
time. Unlike the Monarchomachs,27 La Boétie’s text sheds light on
how subjects voluntarily adhere to a despotic government — not
simply out of fear or sheer violence — so that they become accustomed
to tyranny. For Erhard, the minority cannot simply be described in
terms of a relation of domination by force or by law, since self-incurred
minority (which is an expression he borrowed from Kant) corresponds
to a ‘degree of formation of the spirit’.28 In Erhard’s eyes, Kant offered
25 On this specific occasion, one could write ‘natural maturity’, because in this case Kant
is referring to ripeness, or the biological condition of maturation.
26 Even though this formulation does not entirely match what could be described as
minority in light of Kant’sCritique of Judgement, since, in the latter text, Enlightenment
is identified as the ‘liberation from superstition’ (Befreiung vom Aberglauben), both
texts suggest an idea of minority as preparation for autonomy.
27 It is worth recalling, in this regard, the work Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, originally
published in 1579, and possiblywritten byPhilippe deMornay, considered to be one of
themost celebratedMonarchomach treatises of that time period.This book formulated,
for the first time, a theory of the sovereignty of the people as the origin of the king’s
power (Hubert Languet,VindiciaeContra tyrannos, or, Concerning the Legitimate Power
of a Prince over the People, and of the People over a Prince (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
28 Johann Benjamin Erhard, Über das Recht des Volks zu einer Revolution (Berlin: Syn-
dikat, 1970), p. 82; my translation.
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an answer to the problem of voluntary servitude posited by La Boétie,
in which he proposed that through the propagation of the lights, that
is, the diffusion of knowledge, it becomes conceivable to foresee an
exit from the state of minority. However, if kept against their will in a
state of minority, the people have the right to revolution: ‘as long as
the ruling class does not prevent the people from the Enlightenment
and as long as it maintains its primacy based on the predominance of
its own Enlightenment, there will be no revolution of the people’.29
It is only when minority becomes a dogma for the people that they
have the right to abolish the state that oppresses them. As a result,
revolution becomes an act of resistance and not an act of creation. In
Erhard’s view, it is the dogma of minority in terms of the repression of
human progress that causes revolutions, and although he does not use
the term emancipation (like Kant), he clearly addresses the concept
by tapping into the development of a self-incurred minority towards
a majority, or from voluntary servitude to becoming a people who
know their rights. Nevertheless, this progress takes the form of a pro-
cess of intellectual development along the lines of an organic growth.
However, as Hans Blumenberg has shown, the limits of the metaphor
of organic growth do not only concern the unjustifiable belief in ‘a
continuous progress of rationality’,30 but instead the fact that the hour
of ‘political majority’ only tolls after a process of intellectual develop-
ment. By considering Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Erhard together, one
can argue that the attainment of ‘the use of reason’ coalesces with the
‘propagation of the lights’, and gives way, paradoxically, to the idea of
benevolent forms of tutelage justified by the de facto minority of the
people. Under such a worldview the transition from minority towards
‘complete knowledge of human rights’ becomes ultimately impossible,
and tutelage becomes a labyrinth from which emancipation can never
emerge.
29 Erhard, Über das Recht, p. 95; my translation.
30 Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1999), p.
440.
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EPISTEMOCRACY
In the period of time known as the Vormärz, or ‘pre-March’, preceding
the 1848 Revolutions in the states of the German confederation, Heine
took up the argument concerning the connection between emancipa-
tion and minority. He wrote that a true transformation must assume
the form of a transformation of mentalities, which also justified, in
his view, the superiority of German philosophy vis-à-vis the French
political transformations of the time. While the transformative energy
in France was, in his opinion, directed against feudal privileges, in Ger-
many it was directed instead towards abolishing intellectual obstacles
and privileges.31 By drawing a comparison between Kant and Maximi-
lien Robespierre, Heine underscored the importance of the intellectual
transformations that had taken place in Germany, thus highlighting
how they were more radical and more mature than the French revolu-
tionary efforts.32 In Germany, the most important revolutionary task
was not seen as being directly political but rather ‘spiritual’ (geistig) or,
to put it in contemporary terms, as a matter of consciousness. Heine
explicitly praises the Germans, in contrast to the French, whom he
characterizes as infantilized, shallow, immature, and prone to unpre-
meditated action.
A similar argument is to be found in a text by Ludwig Feuerbach
from 1842 in which he identifies sensualism and materialism with
revolution (and France), while metaphysics and idealism are associ-
ated with reformism (and Germany):33 ‘The heart — the feminine
principle, the sense of the sensible, the seat of materialism — is French-
minded; the head — the masculine principle, the seat of idealism —
is German. The heart makes revolutions; the head, reforms. The head
brings things to a state; the heart, to motion’.34 When placed in connec-
tion with Heine’s thoughts, Feuerbach’s analysis reveals an argument
according to which the French mentality (and its materialism) entails
a sort of transformation that is inferior to German philosophy (and its
31 See Heinrich Heine, Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland, in
Heinrich-Heine-Säkularausgabe, inHeinrich-Heine-Säkularausgabe, viii:Über Deutsch-
land, 1833–1836. Aufsätze über Kunst und Philosophie, pp. 125–230 (p. 191).
32 Ibid., pp. 194–95.
33 Ludwig Feuerbach, ‘Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformation der Philosophie’, in Gesam-
melte Werke, 14 vols (Berlin: Akademie, 1970), ix, pp. 243–63 (pp. 254–55).
34 Ibid., p. 255; my translation.
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idealism) because the latter philosophical culture is not limited to the
surface of things. This perspective offers a view that displaces politics
by postulating the existence of a field of determination from which
politics emerges as a product, or secondary reality, of a core that is
located beyond it. This shows how Heine and Feuerbach prepared the
argument — which was later much associated with Marx — according
to which French materialism (and the politics that stem from it) is
ideological.35
These arguments implying the separation between depth and sur-
face, or essential and secondary phenomena, are inseparable from
stadialist arguments based on the hierarchization of the relationship
between intellectual development and political emancipation.36 Stadi-
alist arguments are also quite common in the discussions surrounding
the emancipation of subaltern groups, such as Jews, Blacks, women,
the working class, etc.37 Between 1842 and 1843, Bruno Bauer wrote
two interventions on the emancipation of the German Jews: The Jewish
Question and The Capacity of Present-day Jews and Christians to Become
Free.38 In these texts, which were starkly criticized by Marx, Bauer
argued that in order to achieve political emancipation Jews needed to
be freed from their prior prejudices.39 According to Bauer, they needed
to overcome their state of minority in order to become citizens. Here,
again, we can identify the philosophical idea, very prevalent in Ger-
many at the time, that a reform of consciousness must precede political
emancipation.
35 In this sense, one could rightfully identify Heine’s and Feuerbach’s writings with
Jacques Rancière’s category of meta-politics. See Jacques Rancière, Disagreement:
Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), pp. 81–
82.
36 I refer the reader to the definition of ‘stadialism’ in the Introduction (p. 11, n. 17).
Anti-stadialism here should not be misunderstood as rejection of the idea of stages. It
refers instead to the idea of a linear and hierarchical evolution that entails a separation,
in the form of a progression, between the moment of formation, on the one hand, and
that of political autonomy and activity, on the other.
37 In this case, we could say that the meaning of minority in terms of age (Unmündigkeit)
encounters its meaning in terms of number (Minderheit).
38 See Bruno Bauer, Die Judenfrage, first published in 1842 by the Deutsche Jahrbücher
für Wissenschaft und Kunst and Die Fähigkeit der heutigen Juden und Christen, frei zu
werden, first published in 1843 by the Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz.
39 The core of Bauer’s argument can be found in the opening pages of ‘The Jewish
Question’, in The Young Hegelians, an Anthology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983), pp. 187–97 (pp. 187–88).
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In 1850, Hermann Scheidler was confronted by the same ques-
tion and contrasted two fundamental forms of emancipation: inner
emancipation (innere) and outer emancipation (äußere). While the
first chiefly concerned superstition and the passions, the second con-
cerned political autonomy.40 Based on this idea, Scheidler defended
the importance of a public pedagogical project (Volks- and Staatspäd-
agogik) in order to bridge the two forms of emancipation — we are
once again faced with the problem of education, which, as we have
seen, justified parental authority in Locke’s work. This argument leads
us to the paradoxical, yet deeply ingrained, relation between domin-
ation and education. This concerns not only the fact that education
was often employed as a means to dominate, but also the idea that
domination prepares for self-rule (educates) those who were deemed
still unfit for it. For example, in the context of slavery in the Americas
the subjugation and domination of Blacks and Native Americans was
often justified ‘as a way to prepare them for eventual participation in
society as full citizens’.41
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Even though Sieyès’s invention of the distinction between passive and
active citizenship was mainly connected to pecuniary hindrances upon
the right to vote, entailing a system of censitary suffrage, it was also in-
serted, as we have seen, into a broader discussion about autonomy and
minority. After the revolution of 1848, the Second French Republic
abolished the last economic obstacles to exercising the right to vote,
and instituted universal adult male suffrage, a trend that later spread
throughout the continent. In the same time period, however, another
form of exclusion was consolidated: exclusion through illiteracy. How-
ever, in Europe, exclusions based on illiteracy have never had the same
importance as they had in the Americas.42 In the United States the
propagation of literacy tests, which were administered to voters, spread
40 Hermann Scheidler, ‘Judenemancipation’, in Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wis-
senschaften und Künste, ed. by Johann Samuel Ersch and Johann Gottfried Gruber, 167
vols (Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Gleditsch, 1850), xxvii, pp. 253–315 (p. 266).
41 YukoMiki,Frontiers of Citizenship:ABlack and IndigenousHistory of Postcolonial Brazil
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 55.
42 See Jairo Nicolau, História do Voto no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2002).
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in the mid-nineteenth century and lasted until the second half of the
twentieth century. In Brazil, the exclusion of the illiterate became a
constitutional norm with the first republican constitution of 1891,
which eliminated the censitary suffrage created by the imperial consti-
tution of 1824.43 As these examples show, in the context of profoundly
racialized societies, knowledge became a way of cloaking unequal ac-
cess to citizenship.
In view of these forms of political exclusion, I want to coin a term,
epistemocracy,44 which refers to all forms of discourse according to
which political action is dependent on the possession of knowledge
and competence by an individual or a group of individuals. Epistemo-
cracy allows for a modern form of tutelage, according to which those
individuals and groups of individuals that find themselves in a state
of minority (Unmündigkeit) should be completely governed as long as
their minority persists. In this paradigm even though the minors are
to be regarded as citizens, they are also denied a say in political life
so long as they are deemed minors. Therefore, epistemocracy allows
for forms of tutelage on the ground of ‘epistemic incompetence’. It
separates active (mündige) citizens from passive (unmündige) citizens,
or those whose voice should be heard from those whose voice should
be ignored. The legitimacy of epistemocracy is different from open
domination in that it is built upon the potential reversibility of the
situation affecting those deprived of their political rights based on the
proviso that, so long as they become epistemically competent, they
can leave their minority status and take part in political life. Regarding
this view, it must be said that minority is not something per se, it is
not a natural state resulting from ignorance and backwardness, and
nor does it arise from nature. Quite to the contrary: it is the result of
ideological constructions by means of which the individuals in a given
43 For a discussion about the introduction of the ‘literacy census’ in Brazil, see Sérgio
Buarque de Holanda, História Geral da Civilização Brasileira, 11 vols (São Paulo:
Bertrand Brasil, 2005), vii, p. 234. The exclusion of illiterate people from their right
to vote lasted until 1985 in Brazil, the final year of the military dictatorship.
44 My usage of the concept of epistemocracy must be distinguished fromDavid Estlund’s
concept of ‘epistocracy’. See his Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). In opposition to epistocracy, epis-
temocracy is not limited to the rule of experts, as it does not just concern political rule
or governance, but, more importantly, political agency and political participation.
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society are endowed with different functions. Consequently, instead
of the concept of minority, one should prefer the idea of minorization,
which underscores the fact that minority is not something that exists
by itself, but the result of practices and choices entailing the political
distinction between those whose voice is heard and taken into account
and those who are deemed to be incomplete individuals — and who,
therefore, need to be under tutelage.45 In this sense, minorization is
inseparable from epistemocracy, which ultimately re-enacts different
forms of domination, especially those connected to class, gender, and
race, under the appearance of differences in competence and know-
ledge.
MATERIALISM AND EMANCIPATION
As I have outlined in the previous sections, the classical concept
of emancipation is inseparable from a political anthropology of
autonomy. One of the clearest arguments against epistemocracy
corresponds to ‘the insurrectional moment of citizenship’46 as it was
theorized by Jacques Rancière in his book Disagreement. Furthermore,
the relationship of this conception of citizenship (or emancipation)
to the question of education was clearly articulated in Rancière’s The
Ignorant Schoolmaster. In this work, emancipation acquires special
contours insofar as it is associated with Jacques Jacotot’s revolutionary
pedagogy; an (anti-)pedagogy which, in the first decades of the
nineteenth century, rejected the hierarchy of intellectual capacity
and instead asserted that all people were equally competent.47 For
45 I am using the term of minorization in a sense that is not identical to Gilles Deleuze’s
and Félix Guattari’s ‘becoming-minor’— or the term ‘minoritization’ which is derived
from it. ‘Becoming-minor’ and ‘minoritization’ are built on the basis of the ‘minority’
as the smaller in number, a meaning that Deleuze extrapolates by saying that it cor-
responds to a ‘state of rule, that is to say, the situation of a group that, whatever its
size, is excluded from the majority, or even included, but as a subordinate fraction in
relation to the standard of measure that regulates the law and establishes the majority’
(Gilles Deleuze, ‘One Less Manifesto’, in Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime: The Politics
of Theatricality in Contemporary French Thought, ed. by Timothy Murray (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 239–58 (p. 255)).
46 Étienne Balibar, Equaliberty: Political Essays, trans. by James Ingram (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2013), p. 10.
47 This equality is explained by the following: ‘every common person might conceive
his human dignity, take the measure of his intellectual capacity, and decide how to
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this reason, Jacotot proposed that each person would be able to
become a master for the others and to support them in their own
intellectual development. Based on Jacotot’s perspective, Rancière
method ‘consists not merely in aiming for future equality, but in
directly producing its effects, precisely by positing it as an “axiom” in
the first place’.48 Without equality, the people would become stultified
by the superstition of their lack of intelligence.49
Through his complete rejection of minorization, Rancière’s axio-
matic presupposition of emancipation leads us to overlook the prob-
lem of education. The title of this section ‘materialism and emancipa-
tion’ points, however, in the direction of what could be regarded as
a contradiction; after all, emancipation and materialism are concepts
that stem from different traditions. This means that the operation of
reconciling both concepts will ultimately imply their transformation
into something else. I believe, however, that this reconciliation brings
about a form of emancipation that neutralizes epistemocracy, avoid-
ing, nevertheless, the form of an insurrectional moment it takes in
Rancière. It also brings about a form of materialist education which
is fundamentally anti-stadialist.
As Ayşe Yuva argues in her contribution to this volume, materi-
alism cannot be reduced to a debate regarding the primacy of matter
over spirit. Friedrich A. Lange, who was not willing to assign the origin
of materialism to a specific time period, stated in 1865 that this tradi-
tion was as old as philosophy itself and corresponded to the specific
struggle against religious thought, which is also why materialism has
so often been associated with impiety.50 However, Marx and Friedrich
Engels instituted a controversy by analysing the origin of the materi-
alist tradition in early modernity. Marx’s reception of materialism is
complex and even problematic, since his account of the modern his-
use it’ (Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 17).
48 Katia Genel, ‘Jacques Rancière and Axel Honneth: Two Critical Approaches to the
Political’, inRecognition orDisagreement: ACritical Encounter on the Politics of Freedom,
Equality and Identity, ed. by Katia Genel and Jean-Philippe Deranty (New York:
Columbia University Press), pp. 3–32 (p. 29).
49 Ibid, p. 39.
50 Friedrich Albert Lange, The History of Materialism and Criticism of its Present Import-
ance, 3 parts (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1925), i, p. 5.
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tory of materialism in TheHoly Family was fundamentally copied from
Charles Renouvier’s 1842 Handbook of Modern Philosophy — not the
best source to study the theme.51 Nevertheless, Marx still achieved a
theoretical breakthrough by proposing a new materialism, at the earli-
est in his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ in 1845.52
According to Marx’s ninth and tenth theses ad Feuerbach, mater-
ialism is characterized by the reciprocal constitution between activity
(Tätigkeit) and subjectivity, which leads to the concept of practice.53
This reciprocal constitution takes the form of a ‘recursive loop […]
where the products and the effects are at the same time causes and
producers of what produces them’.54 Even though Marx had already
proposed the reciprocal constitution between activity and subjectivity
in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, in 1844, it was only with
the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, from 1845, that he could start to theorize
this recursive loop concretely in terms of social relations, and not ab-
stractly in terms of human essence. This shift represents a radical break
with previous writings, such as his Contribution to theCritique ofHegel’s
Philosophy of Right.
In 1993, using an expression that he borrowed from Friedrich H.
Jacobi,55 Balibar proposed that this perspective be named ‘materialism
without matter’, claiming that ‘Marx’s materialism has nothing to do
with a reference to matter’.56 The concept of materialism without mat-
ter is inseparable from Balibar’s further research in terms of transindi-
viduality, which affirms the reciprocity between processes of individu-
51 Which has been meticulously demonstrated by Olivier Bloch, Matière à Histoires
(Paris: Vrin, 1997), pp. 384–441.
52 See the contribution by Frieder Otto Wolf and his discussion around the notion of
‘materialism of materialities’.
53 See Karl Marx, ‘Thesen über Feuerbach’, in MEW [Marx-Engels-Werke, see abbrevi-
ations], iii (1958), pp. 5–7 (p. 5). I follow Frank Fischbach’s preference for translating
the term with practice — avoiding, therefore, writing the word as Praxis/praxis. To
keep it in the German original represents an undue proliferation of concepts. See
Franck Fischbach, Philosophies de Marx (Paris: Vrin, 2015), p. 27.
54 See Edgar Morin, On Complexity (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2008), p. 49.
55 See Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, ‘Letter from Jacobi to Fichte’, inTheMain Philosophical
Writings and the Novel Allwill, ed. by George di Giovanni (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1994), pp. 497–536 (p. 502). However, Balibar’s usage of the expres-
sionmust be distinguished from Jacobi’s, since the latter has used it to describe Johann
G. Fichte’s Doctrine of Science as an inverted Spinozism.
56 Balibar, La Philosophie de Marx, p. 60; my translation. I also refer the reader to
Marianna Poyares’s contribution to this volume.
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ation (autonomization) and of individualization (singularization).57
In his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, Marx argues that old materialism is ideal-
ist like idealism itself because it assumes reality as a given fact based
on the exteriority between subject and object — and not in the form
of what I call, based on Edgar Morin, a recursive loop. Because philo-
sophers have neglected the reciprocal constitution between activity
and subjectivity underlying human practice, they have historically pre-
ferred education, even the ‘edification of the masses’, to the detriment
of revolution58 — the interpretation of the world, rather than its trans-
formation.59 Precisely for this reason, Marx says in the third thesis
on Feuerbach that ‘the educators must be educated themselves’60 —
a problem extensively analysed by Miguel in his contribution to this
volume.
I would like to propose a historical example that can address the
problems concerning the relationship between emancipation and edu-
cation that I have outlined in the previous two sections. After the
introduction of universal adult male suffrage in France, notably in view
of the election of Napoleon III, a preoccupation with educating the
people in order to adjust them to political participation led to the
fashion known as démopédie.61 This concept, which was analysed by
Rosanvallon, involved the art of educating or instructing the people
(demos + paideia). It is an idea that weds together the right to vote and
instruction, as if true political agency can only be attained through a
previous process of edification of the masses, or, as discussed through-
out this text, the kind of epistemocracy that is similar to the examples
concerning the exclusion from the right to vote in Brazil and in the
United States.
Rather than postulating the axiomatic neutralization of epistemo-
cracy, as Rancière does, I believe a solution against stadialist and
57 See Étienne Balibar, Spinoza politique. Le Transindividuel (Paris: PUF, 2018), p. 306.
See also Jason Read, The Politics of Transindividuality (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
58 Balibar, La Philosophie de Marx, p. 61.
59 Marx, ‘Thesen über Feuerbach’, p. 7.
60 Ibid., pp. 5–6. This question reappears much later, in 1875, in Marx’s Critique of the
Gotha Programme.
61 The term is used following Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s sentence ‘democracy is démopé-
dia’, quoted by Pierre Rosanvallon, Le peuple introuvable: histoire de la représentation
démocratique en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1998), p. 127.
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hierarchical conceptions regarding the relationship between know-
ledge and political action is to be found in the idea of a materialist
education. A materialist education cannot be regarded as the trans-
mission of knowledge; instead it must be conceived as intrinsically
political. However, this does not mean that it is political in the sense of
political philosophy. On the contrary, as Balibar recalls: political philo-
sophy has always taught that the multitude is intrinsically violent, and,
therefore, that it is in need of education — which means that it needs to
have knowledge transmitted to it, as if knowledge could be transmitted
from the outside. But autonomy is not the corollary of education. The
ideal of a fully-fledged individuality as the condition for autonomy
was, as we saw, the very basis of the philosophical anthropology of
autonomy, leading to the labyrinth of emancipation. As illustrated in
the case of démopédie, such a view leads to the vicious circle of elitism
and tutelage. In opposition to this perspective, materialism can play
a role in redefining the relationship between knowledge and political
action in an anti-stadialist fashion. Accordingly, education becomes
intrinsically political as long as it is regarded in the form of a recursive
loop between the process of learning and the process of acting and
transforming reality. Paraphrasing Marx, one could say: autonomy is
not the reward of education but is, instead, education itself.62
62 The original sentence is as follows: ‘Blessedness is not the reward of virtue but is virtue
itself ’ (Karl Marx, ‘Hefte zur epikureischen, stoischen und skeptischen Philosophie’,
in MEW, xl, pp. 13–258 (p. 155)). Marx quotes Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics v, 42; CWS




THREE MEANINGS OF MATERIALISM
I would like to lay the foundations for what can be called, from Spinoza
onwards, a ‘materialist education’. Let me clarify from the outset three
different meanings of ‘materialism’ which we can use to understand a
‘materialist education’:
First, in the empirical or immediate sense, that is, in the sense that
a person, a behaviour, or an ideology is said to be materialistic when
what is valued is material goods. Therefore, ‘to be materialistic’ is less a
label that is claimed than a label that is applied, often to depreciate what
is deemed to be materialistic. This definition of ‘materialistic’ implies
a way of living and thinking that values money, carnal pleasures, and
material comfort — in short, a way of life that is probably considered
too selfish or individualistic, and that would seem to detract from
higher values such as generosity or solidarity, or spiritual values that are
more concerned with the salvation of souls than with the enjoyment of
bodies. I do not wish to discard this meaning of ‘materialism’, because
being materialistic has something to do with being a materialist, i.e.
* Author affiliation: Univ Paris Est Creteil, LIS, F-94010 Creteil, France
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a follower of materialism (especially since in some languages, such as
French, there is only one word: ‘matérialiste’).
Secondly, ‘materialism’ can be understood ontologically, that is, in
the sense of a reduction of reality to matter alone: this ‘materialist’ con-
ception of the world considers consciousness as a function of the body,
the mind as an emanation of the brain, and thought as a production
of matter. As Félix Ravaisson said, when attributing this definition to
Auguste Comte, materialism is the ‘doctrine that explains the superior
by the inferior’:1 of course, this is a definition proposed by a spiritualist
who devalued materialist philosophies. But why should consciousness
be superior to the body or mind superior to the brain? Such an idea
presupposes a common measure between these two kinds of reality, a
presumption that Spinozism had already begun to challenge.
Thirdly and finally, it is possible to identify a ‘methodological’
materialism that does not itself pronounce on the nature of reality by
trying to answer questions such as whether there is a difference in
nature between thought and matter or a possible reduction of thought
to matter; instead, it studies psychic or mental phenomena in the same
way as it would study material or bodily phenomena, that is to say,
by taking them as the object of a causal, deterministic explanation,
or, as we say today, by ‘naturalizing’ them. In fact, methodological
materialism is based on the idea that the reality of thought or of the
psyche (ideas, affects) obeys natural necessity in the same way that the
reality of matter or of the organism (the movements of the body) does.
So, from what point of view should a materialist education be
understood? I will immediately exclude the second meaning of onto-
logical materialism: Spinoza does not conceive of thought as some-
thing reducible to matter. If we can derive a materialist education from
his philosophy, it is not in the sense that it adopts such a position on
the nature of reality, and therefore on the nature of the first object of
education — the child. The child, just like any human being, has a
mind, comprised of a psychological or cognitive system, which follows
its own laws, and which cannot be reduced to bodily, physiological,
1 Félix Ravaisson, La Philosophie en France au xixe siècle (1867) (Paris: Vrin Reprise,
1983), p. 189: ‘Selon l’excellente définition d’Auguste Comte […], le matérialisme est
la doctrine qui explique le supérieur par l’inférieur’.
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and especially cerebral or neural laws. Educating a child is therefore
not just about impacting a brain.
Spinoza can be described as ‘materialist’ in the third sense that
we have identified, that is, in the methodological sense: this is a non-
reductionist materialism, which considers the mind a natural thing
that can be studied as bodies are studied. At the end of the preface to
the third part of Ethics, Spinoza explicitly declares that he intends to
study psychic phenomena as if they were ‘lines, planes, and bodies’:2 he
intends to geometrize the psyche in the same way that science geomet-
rizes an organism, and to use this method to study the properties and
causal laws of bodies, in particular of human bodies. The foundations of
a physics of thought are laid on the same model as the physics of matter.
However, it should be noted in passing that this methodological mater-
ialism is itself based on a certain ontological conception of reality: it is
because both thought and matter are in fact the same reality conceived
under a different kind of being that it is methodologically necessary
to study psychic phenomena as we study material phenomena — or
to study material phenomena as we should study psychic phenomena,
that is, as phenomena of a single and unique Nature that is regulated
by precisely determined laws.3
From the point of view of education, this non-reductionist, meth-
odological materialism means two things:
First, that such education consists in impacting on both the psyche
and the organism; education in this sense is a way of guiding human
behaviour, a way of directing human conduct, the purpose of which
is not to allow the child’s ‘free will’ to be exercised. Indeed, from
the point of view of a materialist, that is, deterministic education,
such free will does not exist; on the contrary, belief in free will is an
illusion which the moral system of judgment is based upon. In other
words, a materialist education does not have as its ultimate purpose
the conferral of self-responsibility, but rather self-knowledge; it is not
meant to teach obedience to moral rules but knowledge of procedural
2 Ethics iii, Praef.; CWS [The Collected Works of Spinoza, see abbreviations], i, p. 492.
3 See Ethics, iii, Praef.: ‘nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are
everywhere one and the same, that is, the laws and rules of nature, according to which
all things happen, and change from one form to another, are always and everywhere
the same. So the way of understanding the nature of anything, of whatever kind, must
also be the same, namely, through the universal laws and rules of nature’ (ibid.).
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rules (knowledge of the procedures that regulate behaviour, self, and
other).
Secondly, another meaning of a non-reductionist, materialist edu-
cation is that the mind is considered an automaton that is regulated in a
determined way, just as the body is regulated as a physical automaton.
This does not mean that consciousness does not matter: the mind may
be a ‘spiritual automaton’ determined by laws, but it still feels what
it is thinking.4 The child’s materialist education is not a behavioural
education, or rather, it is a behavioural education insofar as it involves
an education of consciousness, which is experience as it is lived in the
first person. The way a child experiences things does, of course, have
an effect on his behaviour, and this is why an education of behaviour
must be an education of the way things are lived, felt, and understood.
Nevertheless, the education that can be derived from Spinoza’s
thought is perhaps also a materialist education in the first sense that
we have given to this term: namely, the empirical meaning of a very
particular care given to the body and also, in a sense, to the enjoyment
of its power. Let me explain. We have seen that Spinoza’s materialism
is not a reductionist materialism, which would lose interest in psycho-
logical interiority and focus only on external behaviour. Nevertheless,
it must also be seen that, from a Spinozist point of view, the mind is the
idea of a body existing in action: consciousness is consciousness of a
living, affected, and affecting body. The mind is all the more powerful
because it is the idea of a body that is itself more developed, more
active: ‘in proportion as a body is more capable than others of doing
many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so its
mind is more capable than others of perceiving many at once’, says the
Scholium of proposition 12 of Ethics iii.
It is the strength of the capacity to affect or to be affected — what
Spinoza calls the ‘capacity of doing things or of being acted on’ — that
makes up the cognitive strength of the mind: a highly sensitive body,
highly capable of being affected and of affecting, is a body whose mind
is capable of perceiving many things at once, and, by doing so, is also
4 See Treatise on Emendation of the Intellect (TdIE) 85; CWS i, p. 37: ‘This is the same
as what the ancients said, i.e., that true knowledge proceeds from cause to effect —
except that so far as I know they never conceived the soul (as we do here) as acting
according to certain laws, like a spiritual automaton’.
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capable of rationally understanding the relationships between things
(see the Scholium of Proposition 29 of Ethics ii).
MATERIALIST EDUCATION AND THE AFFECTIVE SENSIBILITY OF
THE BODY
Therefore, the challenge facing a materialist education — an education
that, as we have seen, is education in knowledge rather than obedience
— is to develop the affective sensibility of the body in order to increase
the cognitive sensitivity of the mind, which means to increase its power
to act in thought, that is, its power to understand. However, to do this
it is necessary to change the body, to transform it even, in the sense
that education gives the body another form, another higher nature.
The originality of a Spinozist, materialist education lies in exactly this
transformation.
In one of the last Scholiums of the Ethics, we read:
In this life, then, we strive especially that the infant’s body may
change (as much as its nature allows and assists) into another,
capable of a great many things and related to a mind very much
conscious of itself, of God, and of things. We strive, that is, that
whatever is related to its memory or imagination is of hardly
any moment in relation to the intellect.5
As François Zourabichvili noted in his masterly work on childhood,
the subject of the striving in question here is a ‘we’: conamur, we
strive.6 This is important because, as Spinoza explains several times,
the conatus is a striving to persevere in one’s being and not to change
into another: it therefore requires the action of another — the ‘we’ in
this case — so that the child’s body is changed into another. But who
is this ‘we’? It is, first and foremost, the collective striving of educators
of all kinds, parents, nurses, nannies, childcare workers, paediatricians,
teachers, etc. but it can also be the striving of institutions, starting with
schools, that contributes to the change in the child’s body. It is also
the striving of collective practices, care practices, sports education,
physical activities, and bodily awareness, all of which contribute to
5 Ethics v, 39 Schol.; CWS i, p. 614.
6 François Zourabichvili, Le Conservatisme paradoxal de Spinoza. Enfance et royauté
(Paris: PUF, 2002).
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increasing the abilities of the child’s body. This educational striving is
essential — we strive to it ‘apprime’, ‘first’, says the Scholium, and it is,
therefore, a major social striving, and it is (perhaps even more so in
Spinoza’s time than ours) a matter of life and death. Since death is a
threat to childhood, especially early childhood, we must help children
to quickly overcome this stage of fragility or physiological weakness;
we must help children to build another body, stronger, more resistant,
more ‘capable’.
At the same time, another important clarification is given in this
Scholium: the social body strives to change the body of childhood,
quantum ejus natura patitur eique conducit, or ‘as much as its nature
allows’ (patitur: as much as it is acted on), and as much as it assists
in it (ei conducit). This expression ‘quantum ejus natura patitur eique
conducit’ is decisive because it adroitly summarizes the terms in which
the problem of a materialist education of childhood are played out
— namely, the problem of the transformation of the child’s sensitive
body. This expression also includes a certain ambiguity, as it can be
interpreted as a restriction that prevents us from viewing the change
effected by education as a real transformation. In this interpretation,
the education would change the body as much as it preserves its nature,
or to put it another way, it would result in a change ‘in’ its nature and
not ‘of ’ its nature. This latter change is what Spinoza also refers to as a
‘death’. However, with reference to the Scholium of proposition 39 of
Ethics iv, we interpret this change not as a change that simply happens
‘to’ the body, but a change ‘of ’ its very nature and therefore as a real
transformation. Let us read the relevant Scholium:
[…] But here it should be noted that I understand the body
to die [mortem obire] when its parts are so disposed that they
acquire [obtineant] a different proportion of motion and rest
to one another. For I dare not deny that — even though the
circulation of the blood is maintained [retenta], as well as the
other [signs] on account of which the body is thought to be
alive — the human body can nevertheless be changed into an-
other nature entirely different from its own [in aliam naturam
a sua prorsus diversam mutari]. For no reason compels me to
maintain that the body does not die unless it is changed into a
corpse [mutetur in cadaver].
And, indeed, experience seems to urge a different conclu-
sion. Sometimes a man undergoes such changes [tales patiatur
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mutationes] that I should hardly have said he was the same
man. I have heard stories, for example, of a Spanish poet who
suffered an illness; though he recovered, he was left so oblivi-
ous to his past life that he did not believe the tales and tragedies
he had written were his own. He could surely have been taken
for a grown-up infant [pro infante adulto] if he had also forgot-
ten his native language.
If it seems incredible [incredibile videtur], what shall we
say of infants? A man of advanced years believes [credit] their
nature to be so different from its own [a sua tam diversam]
that he could not be persuaded that he was ever an infant, if he
did not make this conjecture concerning himself from (NS: the
example of) others. But rather than provide the superstitious
with material for raising new questions, I prefer to leave this
discussion unfinished.7
Beyond the rhetorical precautions given in this Scholium, Spinoza also
puts forward a very interesting idea, which despite not being fully
founded in reason is stated with sufficient clarity to be identified:
namely, that death is not the same as becoming a corpse. Spinozism
thus leaves room to think of other forms of death than mere organic
death. To illustrate this idea of a non-organic death, Spinoza relies on
two examples: firstly, the Spanish poet’s amnesia, and secondly the
development of the baby, as if the passage from infantia to provecta
aetas, from infancy to adulthood, were a form of death.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BODY
Spinoza certainly advances cautiously on this delicate subject and does
not claim that amnesia and adulthood are equivalent to the final death.
As so often occurs in Spinoza’s discourse, experience is summoned
to disturb a habitual conviction: in this example, he means to uproot
the identification between death and becoming a corpse. The first
experience concerns the amnesia of a certain Spanish poet, who has
become forgetful of his own literary creations and is no longer able to
recognize what should be most intimate to him or see himself in his
works — here amnesia is treated as a certain type of transformation
of the body, namely a body defined by its ability to remember. The
7 Ethics iv, 39 Schol.; CWS i, pp. 569–70.
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second experience concerns becoming an adult and is called upon to
reinforce this idea of a possible non-cadaveric transformation of the
body. Of course, Spinoza does not state in an affirmative way that the
baby’s body, which has become an adult body, is a body that has met
death (mortem obire), but he strongly suggests it, notably by using
the expression ‘naturam diversam’. In the first half of the Scholium,
death is defined as the transformation into a nature totally different
from one’s own (a sua prorsus diversam); it is then said, at the end of
Scholium, that the man of advanced age believes the nature of the baby
to be so different from his own (a sua tam diversam) that he needs the
mediation of others in order to persuade himself that he was a baby.
It should be pointed out, however, that this is only a ‘belief ’ (credit)
and that the adult may be mistaken. The rebuttal could be that the
man’s nature is not so different from that of the baby and that the baby
he was is not necessarily dead. But if we look at the structure of the
argumentation of this part of the Scholium, we note that the case of the
baby who has become an adult generalizes the case of the poet who has
become an amnesiac: Spinoza is telling us that if we consider the rather
exceptional case of the Spanish poet incredible (incredibile), then we
ought to take the far less exceptional, and therefore much more cred-
ible, case of the baby — here ’credit’ is the counterpart of ‘incredibile’,
and shows us that the case of the baby has a stronger experiential value
than that of the amnesiac poet. Here again, however, we are dealing
with a problem of self-recognition: the man of advanced years finds it
very difficult to recognize himself in a past which is, in a sense, his own,
and because he is also forgetful of this past, he needs others to persuade
him that he was once a baby. The man of advanced age is neither in
error nor in rational certainty when he ‘believes’ the nature of babies
very different from his own, nor is he in error or certainty when he
allows himself to be persuaded by others that he was once a baby. On
the one hand, he can see that there is a form of continuity from baby
to adult (in others, and therefore in himself), and that is why it is not
irrational for him to form the conjecture that he was once a baby —
but it is only a conjecture (de se conjecturam faceret). On the other
hand, he has great difficulty in believing in this continuity of nature,
and this difficulty is the indication that he feels that he is no longer
the same, that he has experienced an upheaval and that something of
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him has died. It may even be the case — but the text does not make
it possible to decide this — that what he feels within himself (the
absence of community with the baby) may have more truth than what
he convinces himself of via others (the continuity between the baby
and himself).
This example shows the ways in which Spinoza provides a defin-
ition of death that goes beyond the simple framework of becoming a
corpse. He suggests that life cannot be reduced to organic life alone
or to the mere preservation of physiological functions. We can call
this the life of the body, which is not strictly organic, affective life,
but also includes how life is constituted by the connection of images,
defined by the remembrance in and by the body, and by the body’s
ability to affect and be affected. The life of the organic body is certainly
necessary for the development of its affective life; moreover, there is no
affective life that is not inscribed in a life of organs, tissues, skin, and
physiological functions; however, if this life of the affective body is not
reducible to the life of the organic body, it is because, according to this
Scholium, the organic body can conserve itself while, at the same time,
the affective or sensitive body can be transformed. To put it another
way: the organic body can live while the affective body can die and
become another. This seems to be the case with the example of the
baby, which lives on as an organic body but ‘dies’ when it becomes
another affective body. It is important to insist on this becoming other
of the affective body because, as long as the organic body endures, the
death of the affective body is not a simple disappearance but rather the
advent of a new life of the affective body.
If the transformation is indeed what necessarily happens to the
body of childhood (infantile amnesia, which concerns the first three
or four years, and which occurs around the age of seven or eight, is one
of the signs of it), then a materialist education must take note of this
transformation, and accompany it as well as possible: it must aim at
making the transformation take place in such a way that the infant’s
body, or more generally speaking the child’s body, becomes a body
with very great sensory and sensitive aptitudes that are connected to
a very intelligent and consciously aware mind.8 If one wanted to say
8 See Ethics v, 39 Schol.; CWS i, p. 614: ‘And really, he who, like an infant or a child,
has a body capable of very few things, and very heavily dependent on external causes,
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things in a provocative way, one could say that materialist education
aims at a form of death for the child related to memory and affect and
not biology. This form of death induced by the materialist education
of the child’s body is a way of replacing it with another, stronger body.
However, it should be pointed out here that the aim is to transfer
the body of childhood from its first nature to another nature that is suit-
able for it, one that is really different from the first but not contrary to it.
The opposite transformation of the body into a different and contrary
nature would be a brutal cadaveric transformation, for example the one
produced by suicide. In such a case, as Spinoza points out, the idea of
the new nature is not reproduced in the mind, and the transformation
amounts to a pure destruction of the one who is transformed.9 The
whole point of the transformation that accompanies education is to
give birth to a new nature which can be affirmed and desired by the
one who is educated. This new nature preserves traces of the previous
nature as not all memory or all feeling is abolished by it;10 it necessarily
has properties in common with the previous nature, and there is there-
fore a degree of continuity, which is why the child can contribute to
this transformation (‘as much as its nature allows and assists’). But he
can do so only under the educational impulse, only through collective
striving, since one thing, by itself, strives to persevere in its being, and
not to transform itself into another.
The expression ‘as much as its nature allows and assists’ indicates
both the dimension of passivity and the dimension of activity that are
specific to the child in changing their body. The nature of the child’s
body is acted on through such a change, in the sense that effects will
be produced in its corporeal nature that are only partially explicable
has a mind which considered solely in itself is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or
of God, or of things. On the other hand, he who has a body capable of a great many
things, has a mind which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself, and
of God, and of things’.
9 SeeEthics iv, 20 Schol.;CWS i, p. 557: ‘Someonemay kill himself […]because hidden
external causes so dispose his imagination, and so affect his body, that it takes on
another nature, contrary to the former [aliam naturam priori contrariam], a nature of
which there cannot be an idea in the mind (by iiiP10). But that a man should, from
the necessity of his own nature, strive not to exist, or to be changed into another form,
is as impossible as that something should come from nothing’.
10 See Ethics iii, Post. 2; CWS i, p. 493: ‘The human body can undergo many changes
[multas pati potest mutationes], and nevertheless retain impressions, or traces, of the
objects (on this see ii Post. 5), and consequently, the same images of things’.
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through it, for although they can indeed be explained in large part by
the desires of the educators, by the (more or less conscious) striving
of the social body which determines (at least in part) the change in
the child’s body, Spinoza does not understand the child’s body as a
passive, receptive object. He also evokes its activity, or rather, to be
more rigorous, something like its activity (because ‘ei conducit’ is not
‘ad eum conducit’, a syntactic form that would more completely suggest
the idea of full participation of the body in this transformation). We see
that the child’s body does not only undergo this fundamental change,
but rather, if the education is successful in terms of not being pure
compulsion effecting obedience, then the body in question directly
participates in its own transformation. With the expression ‘as much
as its nature allows and assists’ Spinoza suggests that the child stands
somehow in-between, that is, between passivity and activity, between
a joyful passivity that is not refractory to this useful change, and an
inchoate activity that participates in its own transformation, however
incompletely. This means that in the ‘we’ of the conamur, in the collect-
ive nature of the educational striving, we can also hear the very striving
of the child as they gradually become their own educator.
FROM MORAL EDUCATION TO ETHICAL EDUCATION
Rather than being called ‘education’, it seems to me that material-
ist education should be characterized as ‘re-education’ or ‘counter-
education’. This is because usually education is geared towards obedi-
ence, and perhaps it is not even possible to escape this moral education
when we are dealing with a relationship between beings who are dom-
inated by the imagination — certainly this is true of children, but it can
also be said for most adults. For their own sake, should children not
be taught to obey the rules set by parents?11 This moral or moralistic
education is even useful, since it teaches individuals to conform to the
11 See TTP xvi, 35; CWS ii, p. 289:‘even though children are bound to obey all the
commands of their parents, they are still not slaves. For their parents’ commands
are primarily concerned with the advantage of the children. We recognize a great
difference, then, between a slave, a son, and a subject. We define these as follows: a
slave is someonewho is bound to obey the commands of amaster, which are concerned
onlywith the advantage of the person issuing the command; a son is someonewhodoes
what is advantageous for himself, in accordancewith a parent’s command; and a subject,
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values of the group to which they belong, and teaches them the prin-
ciple that recognition from the group is offered to those who recognize
the group. It thus teaches them a form of autonomy which consists of
self-restraint and emotional self-control: in short, ordinary education
constitutes the child as a moral subject who is responsible for his or
her actions; it produces in him or her an ‘ingenium’ (a temperament)
of self-discipline so that, thanks to this emotional and reflexive in-
teriority, ‘it works on its own’. In this respect, we can say of moral
education what Michel Foucault says of disciplinary power, the object-
ive of which is not a discontinuous grasp on individuals but a perpetual
hold over them, which means that ‘one is perpetually in the situation
of being watched’ — and we could add, in the case of moral education,
‘watched by oneself ’. Thus, moral education, like disciplinary power,
‘looks to the future, to the moment when it will work on its own and
when surveillance may no longer be anything more than virtual, when
discipline, therefore, will have become a habit’.12
Spinozist materialist education consists of the work of self-
transformation, that is, the transformation of a self that is always first
educated for the purposes of obedience: such education is ‘counter-
education’ or ‘re-education’ in the sense of medical re-education,
which involves recovering a lost, damaged, or calcified capacity,
regaining flexibility, awakening frozen organs, reviving tetanized
muscles, undoing (in short) mechanisms which have become
hardened in order to produce connections that increase the power of
acting. To unbind and to bind again, forming new connection, disturbs
what is fixed or frozen and thus produces a liberating disconnection:
such is the task of a materialist education that can be deduced from
certain passages of the Ethics and which makes it possible to lay the
foundations of an education understood as an ethics rather than a
moral one.
finally, is someonewhodoeswhat is advantageous for the collective body—andhence,
also for himself — in accordance with the command of the supreme “power”’.
12 Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France 1973–1974, trans.
by Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 47. In the original, ‘[le
pouvoir disciplinaire] regarde vers l’avenir, vers le moment où ça marchera tout seul
et où la surveillance pourra ne plus être que virtuelle, où la discipline, par conséquent,
sera devenue habitude’ (Michel Foucault, Le Pouvoir psychiatrique. Cours au Collège de
France. 1973–1974 (Paris: Gallimard Seuil, 2003), p. 49).
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The first text to be considered from the Ethics is one of the few
where education is explicitly mentioned.
[…] it is no wonder Sadness follows absolutely all those acts
which from custom are called wrong, and Joy, those which are
called right [omnes omnino actus, qui ex consuetudine pravi
vocantur, sequatur tristitia, et illos, qui recti dicuntur, lætitia].
For from what has been said above we easily understand that
this depends chiefly on education [nam hoc ab educatione
potissimum pendere]. Parents — by blaming the former acts,
and often scolding their children on account of them, and on
the other hand, by recommending and praising the latter acts
— have brought it about that emotions of Sadness were joined
to the one kind of act, and those of Joy to the other [parentes
nimirum, illos exprobanbo, liberosque propter eosdem sæpe
objurgando, hos contra suadendo, et laudando, effecerunt, ut
tristitiæ commotiones illis, lætitiæ vero his jungerentur].
Experience itself confirms this. For not everyone has the
same custom and Religion. On the contrary, what among some
is holy, among others is unholy; and what among some is
honourable, among others is dishonourable. Hence, according
as each one has been educated, so the either repents of a deed
or exults at being esteemed for it.13
What is ordinary education? It is about valuing some actions and
devaluing others. For educators, first and foremost parents, it is a
question of associating affects with certain acts (performed by chil-
dren) so that these acts are perceived — or better said, felt — as
positive or negative. Education, in terms of cognitive development
and the direction of conduct, is above all an undertaking that pro-
duces cognitive-affective connections in the child in order to solicit
or prevent certain behaviours: it consists in combining (jungere) the
representation of certain acts with emotions (commotions) of joy or
sadness.
How is this junction between representations and emotions
achieved? First, through an operation of nomination (vocantur,
dicuntur) that depends on customs (ex consuetudine): based on
traditional ways of speaking about the group to which they belong,
parents interpret certain acts and use terms charged with positive or
negative affects (‘wrong’, ‘right’, ‘good/bad’, ‘kind/bad’). At the same
13 Ethics iii, DA xxvii Exp.; CWS, i, p. 537.
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time, parents repeatedly formulate reproaches or encouragement by
blaming, reproving, and reprimanding (exprobrando, objurgando),
or congratulating, exhorting, and praising (suadendo, laudando). In
short, it is a question of the parent attaching (sequatur) an emotion
to the representation of the act the child has committed, which in
turn either increases or diminishes the child’s power to act. On the
basis of this production of an association between representation and
emotion more complex affects are then formed, which can be sorted
into the two types of love or hatred (love being a ‘joy accompanied by
the idea of an external cause’ and hate a ‘sadness accompanied by the
idea of an external cause’).14
The educational operation therefore shows that the very act per-
formed by the child, in itself, can be perfectly ‘innocent’: it only
becomes a moral act through the habit of appointment, and of valu-
ation or devaluation, which is performed by the parents.
Through this activity of cognitive-emotional conjunction, ordin-
ary education — which we would gladly call ‘moral education’ —
consists in producing in the child aspirations towards or repudiations
of certain acts, and not only concerning behaviours but also thoughts
or feelings. But whether or not these acts have an external expression,
or remain within the interiority of the child, the essential thing is that
they do not refer to ‘external causes’ but to ‘internal causes’ — that is,
to the ‘interiority’ of the child. This psychological interiority is even
constituted by the moralistic education of the child, which produces
in him what we can call ‘self-love’ or ‘self-loathing’, and which Spinoza
more readily calls ‘self-esteem’ or ‘repentance’, or ‘love of esteem’ and
‘shame’, these two affects being the socialized forms of satisfaction and
repentance.15 All education contributes to the activation of this law in
the child:
If someone has done something which he imagines affects
others with Joy, he will be affected with Joy accompanied by
the idea of himself as cause, or he will regard himself with
Joy. If, on the other hand, he has done something which he
imagines affects others with Sadness, he will regard himself
with Sadness.16
14 See Ethics iii, DA vi and vii; CWS i, p. 533.
15 See Ethics iii, 30 Schol.; CWS i, pp. 511–12, and iv, 52 Schol.; CWS i, p. 523.
16 Ethics iii, 30; CWS i, p. 510.
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Education therefore produces in the child a self-awareness which is
above all a moral awareness: by producing in the child affects of joy
and sadness ‘which are accompanied by the idea of an internal thing
as cause’,17 ordinary education makes for the child a cause, a moral
cause of affects that reward or sanction which is produced through the
judgment of others and the good or evil that has been done. The moral
educator’s challenge is to produce cognitive-emotional sequences in
order for the child to form judgements about themself, to rejoice or
to feel sad about themself: the child learns to make value judgments
not first of all about things or other people but about themself and
their own actions — whether of the body, of language, thought, or of
desire. In order to behave well, they learn a kind of reflexivity which
is first of all an emotional reflexivity: they learn to glorify themself or
to repent. They are trained to train themselves, since there is no better
government of the other than a government of the affects by which the
other governs themselves
Such an education gives rise to an indefinite multiplicity of con-
crete educational practices, customary forms of moral education,
which are often based on religion. However, I would like to distin-
guish an education that the Theological-Political Treatise characterizes
as ‘good’18 and that from the Ethics we could qualify, precisely, as ‘eth-
ical’ from these other forms of moral, social, and religious education.
Its most significant quality is that it does not submit to a power as
soon as it becomes tyrannical.19 Therefore, good education is char-
acterized by a political virtue, namely resistance to abuse of power;
and this resistance itself is characterized by two remarkable properties:
its form (speaking out) and its radicality (resistance to the peril of
one’s life). According to Chapter xx of the Theological-Political Treatise,
these two characteristics have emotional prerequisites: in a negative
way, they imply not being carried away by certain affects, those that
lead to submission (greed or sycophancy), but also and especially
the fear of death; and, in a positive way, possessing and cultivating a
‘moral force’ and a love of freedom, above all the ‘freedom to speak’.
17 See Ethics iii, DA xxiv Exp.; CWS i, p. 536.
18 TTP vii [90]; CWS ii, p. 206, and xx [28]; CWS ii, p. 349: ‘good education [bona
educatio]’.
19 See TTP xx (the end).
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However, the production of such affects, which run counter to the
affects of subjection, requires the defeat of ordinary loves and hatreds
and the development of new sequences of affections — those which
proposition 10 of Ethics v tells us are made ‘according to an order for
the intellect’. Good education is above all an education in reason: an
education in the affected reason, which is at the same time an educa-
tion in rational affectivity.
Who is such an education for? For children, undoubtedly, since a
good education doubles ordinary education and develops in the child
(alongside moral affectivity and self-discipline) a desire for rational-
ity and freedom: if such an education does not produce rationality
in them, it at least can cultivate the beginnings of adequate thought,
which is above all thought aimed at continuous reform. This makes
possible, if only at a later time, a re-education of passionate self-
satisfaction. This good, rational education is also aimed at adults if they
are eager for a new, firmer, and more serene existence. For Spinoza
places this task of re-education is very high on the agenda.20
While Spinoza did not write the ‘science of education’ mentioned
in the prologue to the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, he at
least showed in the Ethics a real concern for education, so much so that
one might wonder whether this treatise on the science of education
would not have ended up resembling the Ethics or have been somehow
a derivative of it. And in more general terms, we should understand
Spinoza’s ethics as a practical philosophy that consists of a materialist
education — of children and of oneself — aimed at transforming the
affective sensibility of body and mind.
20 See Ethics iv, App. ix;CSW i, 589: ‘because, among singular things, we know nothing
more excellent than a man who is guided by reason, we can show best how much our
skill and understanding are worth by educating men so that at last they live according
to the command of their own reason’.
III. CRITICAL MATERIALITIES IN
FEMINISM AND NEW MATERIALISM

Introduction to Part iii
ALISON SPERLING
The contributions of this part elucidate the complicated relationship
between feminism and New Materialism. The contributors in what
follows both highlight the affinities between feminism and New Ma-
terialism as well as challenge the multiple intellectual histories out of
which ‘feminist New Materialism’ can be said to have emerged. They
also question the ways in which political thought has operated (or has
not done so) in various strands of New Materialism.
Cornelia Möser’s essay opens the third part of this volume and
provides a helpful overview of the ways in which New Materialism
has been received and developed, specifically in the French context.
She situates New Materialism as originating in STS and in linguistic
and structuralist philosophy, and suggests that Stacy Alaimo and Susan
Hekman’s collection Material Feminisms from 2008 might serve as a
starting point, as it is certainly a touchstone text, across the essays in the
field. Möser describes New Materialism as an intellectual project that
interrogates the relation between the linguistic and the material and
which addresses things and thing-ness, the nonhuman, the boundaries
between subject and object, and questions of agency beyond the hu-
man and beyond human perception: a kind of posthumanist ontology.
According to Möser (citing Jana Tschurenev), an early critique of New
Materialism lies in the fact that much of the scholarship did not pay
attention to social structures and institutions. Importantly for Möser,
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New Materialism is not substantially connected to socialist feminist
traditions, French materialist feminism, or to Marxist feminism. This
critique of the lack of certain feminist and political traditions in the
various collections Möser analyses is echoed in other essays in the part.
Chiara Bottici’s contribution reclaims intersectional feminism
through anarchist thought; it re-imagines, via anarchic feminism, polit-
ical embodiment in the world. Bottici argues that anarchist feminism
has not received its due as a foremother of intersectional and in-
clusive politics, which are as important as ever in the contemporary
moment, in part because anarchist thought is not often embraced in
academia or in public debates (largely, according to Bottici, because
it has been wrongly and universally associated with violent tactics).
Anarchafeminism has long argued that the liberation of women must
include all women, particularly those whose resistance does not ac-
cord to the same subjection of power present in electoral politics or
in capitalist, or corporate power. If women do not want to be ruled by
men, it does not follow that they want to be ruled by women: in other
words, Anarchafeminism does not aim to seize or claim state power,
but to dissolve that power altogether. The paper develops an idea of the
transindividual (following Spinoza) as an anarchist feminist process
of becoming as opposed to individuation-as-event or as becoming-
singular. Bottici argues that all bodies are processes, a longstanding
notion of Anarchafeminism that has been wrongfully ignored in ge-
nealogies of New Materialism.
The third chapter in this part by Émilie Filion-Donato has the
lofty goal of intervening into one of the most complicated challenges
of ‘standpoint theory’ or situated knowledges — that is, in Filion-
Donato’s words, ‘if everything we do, down to how we perceive, has
an impact on the things we measure or want to talk about, how can
we ever be sure we are getting the “right” measurements? How can
we act collectively without this shared account of the world?’.1 Filion-
Donato responds to this set of questions by mobilizing Evelyn Fox
Keller’s use of the ‘psychodynamism of individuation’, which allows
for a dynamic autonomy or dynamic objectivity that is crucial for her
project because it demands attention for shared emotions and experi-
1 Filion-Donato, in this volume, p. 242.
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ences. Through this allocentric perception, the individual oscillates
between self and other, or between individuation and a connectivity
with the world. Filion-Donato’s exploration of these issues is com-
plexly wedged amongst key figures of the discipline: following Fox
Keller, then Ernest Schachtel, and decidedly against Helen Longino’s
critique of Keller, Filion-Donato attempts to confront the challenge to-
wards New Materialism which was raised in response to Karen Barad’s
diffractive method. What Filion-Donato termed ‘killing the subject’ in
the conference that inspired this collective volume, and ‘decentering
of the subject’ in her contribution to the volume, is not, for Keller or, I
think, for Filion-Donato, the same as imagining, even if momentarily,
an erasure of the frontiers between subject and object. In other words,
Keller only dissolves the subject temporarily, and importantly (as well
as somewhat counter-intuitively), she does so through an expansion
of the subject to include the object; in short, she creates a relational
ontology.
We stay with Karen Barad’s work in Christoph Holzhey’s contri-
bution to the section. Holzhey poses crucial challenges to Barad while
also introducing the nuances that may be required to think physics and
ontology together at dramatically different scales. Holzhey approaches
the question of ontology by denying the importance of physics for
ontological questions at human scales, a kind of ‘cut between politics
and ontology’2 that partly follows from foundational work in gender
studies, which distinguished between biological sex and the social
construction of gender. He details his suspicion of the allure of the per-
formativity of matter, especially at the scale of particle physics because
recent philosophies of physics have claimed matter as fundamentally
creative and agential. Holzhey attempts to ‘deactivate the performative
normativity of ontology by re-doubling reduction’, that is, if the atomic
level is only demonstrable or ‘pragmatic’ at higher scales, ‘then the
same properties can emerge in the same pragmatic sense also from a
radically different ontology of continuous matter’.3 Physics does not
offer a foundational understanding of matter but rather the tools which
we can use to think the performative — and thus the political — power
2 Holzhey, in this volume, p. 256.
3 Ibid, p. 265.
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of an ontology of matter that is formulated as what Holzhey calls an
‘indeterminacy of ontology’.
Together these four essays provide a thorough sense of some of the
key contributions of feminist New Materialism, while also boldly chal-
lenging certain assumptions that have undergirded its development.
These essays are important to our continued understanding of the
relation between feminism and New Materialism as they provide a crit-
ical eye toward what has thus far been over-determined, presumed, or
omitted from what became a quickly accepted and employed mode of
feminist thought operating against the linguistic turn that preceded it.
These essays convincingly demonstrate that debates about what New
Materialisms are and what they can do are still very much unsettled,
and still warrant sustained and critical attention.
Materialism, Matter, Matrix, and Mater
Contesting Notions in Feminist and Gender Studies
CORNELIA MÖSER
INTRODUCTION
Under the label of new materialism (NM), a number of scholars, who
mostly come from the United States — specifically, from the Uni-
versity of Chicago — as well as from several Northern and Central
European countries, have published and defended a scientific ap-
proach that they characterize as new and materialist. This approach is
among other fields mostly rooted in science and technology studies
(STS) and in philosophy. It grapples with the idea of the existence
and potential agency of a material world beyond human perception.
This approach reached its peak in the early 2010s and then gradually
lost influence, although it should be said that it was a rather mar-
ginal phenomenon from the start. Surprisingly, in France, where the
strongest scientific branch of feminism is a materialist one, NM is al-
most unknown. Considering the numerous French references of NM,
this absence and non-translation recalls the feminist gender debates
in France and Germany. Whereas Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble was
translated into German one year after the publication of the original, it
took fifteen years before it was translated into French.1 Although NM
1 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York:
Routledge, 1990); Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter (Frankfurt a.M.:
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claims to be an alternative to post-structuralism, its reception (or lack
thereof) in France shows that it cannot be understood as the returning
spectre of Marxism or of materialist feminism.
WHAT’S NEW IN NEW MATERIALISM?
A series of publications, books, articles, and conferences introduced
and discussed NM around 2008. In a recent publication in France,
I presented NM to a French speaking audience and compared it to
materialist feminism in France.2 The books I analysed for that pur-
pose showed that nuances in notions of materialism exist theoretically,
politically, and in disciplinary projects, and each of these aspects
needs to be considered in order to gain an understanding of the non-
reception of NM in France. The first collection I analysed, Material
Feminisms, which was edited by Susan Hekman and Stacy Alaimo and
published in 2008,3 focuses on ecofeminism and calls for a transvalu-
ation of nature. Criticizing postmodern feminism for having gone too
far in rejecting nature in its attempt to also reject biological explan-
ations of male domination, the editors of this volume argued that
(feminist) research should concentrate on the natural world and the
human body. In their view, postmodernism wrongfully privileged cul-
ture over nature, and so they argued for the deconstruction of the
opposition between nature and culture and for investigation into what
they call, for example, transcorporeality. That term signifies the con-
nection of bodies with each another and with other creatures, types
of matter, and landscapes.4 In her review of the book, the materialist,
feminist historian Jana Tschurenev observed a discrepancy between
the book’s project and the actual research represented in the collection.
Suhrkamp, 1991); Judith Butler, Trouble dans le genre. Pour un féminisme de la sub-
version (Paris: La Découverte, 2005); Cornelia Möser, Féminismes en traductions.
Théories voyageuses et traductions culturelles (Paris: Éditions des archives contempo-
raines, 2013).
2 CorneliaMöser, ‘Néo-Matérialisme. Un nouveau courant féministe?’, inMatérialismes,
cultures et communication, ed. by Maxime Cervulle, Nelly Quemener, and Florian
Vörös (Paris: Presses des Mines, 2016), pp. 227–44.
3 Material Feminisms, ed. by Stacy Alaimo and Susan J. Hekman (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2008).
4 Stacy Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self (Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press, 2010).
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Most of the research, she noted, came from literature studies and not
from a greater variety of disciplines. As a result, she thought that the
contributions failed to consider social structures, the state, and other
social and political institutions, as well as social movements.5
The second collective volume I analysed was edited by Diana
Coole and Samantha Frost in 2010 under the title New Materialisms
and shared some concerns with the ethics of science and ecofeminist
perspectives.6 However, the collection reduced feminist perspectives
to just one approach among many others. The notion of materialism
present in this volume was not linked to historical materialism and
instead expressed a strong belief in the ethics of science and, most
of all, in the impact the natural sciences should have on social and
material change. The authors did not analyse science as a sociopolitical
formation, and instead of questioning the division of research into the
natural sciences and the humanities, they tried to apply the knowledge
of the natural sciences to the humanities. They focused on the agency
of matter and affirmed a ‘new posthumanist ontology’ that should
break with neo-Marxist and critical theory. The latter tradition is, in
their view, too negative and critical, and so for their more positive
project they turned to the writings of Baruch Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze,
and Michel Foucault.
The third collection I analysed was edited by Iris van der Tuin
and Rick Dolphijn and published in 2012 under the title New Ma-
terialism.7 The use of the singular noun as opposed to the plural of
New Materialisms used in the previous collection marks this project
as a conceptual and philosophical one. It gathered texts and interviews
with the professed aim of inquiring into the ideal and material con-
stitution of the world. What the authors aimed to understand was
the reciprocal production of what is in the world and the things we
know about the things in the world. Their epistemological project was
presented as a philosophy of difference, which might recall postmod-
5 Jana Tschurenev, ‘Review of “Material Feminisms” by Susan Hekman and Stacy
Alaimo’, Das Argument, 52.287 (2010), pp. 414–16.
6 New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, ed. by Diana Coole and Samantha
Frost (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).
7 Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, New Materialism: Interviews & Cartograph-
ies (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press, 2012) <https://doi.org/10.3998/ohp.
11515701.0001.001>.
206 MATTER, MATRIX, MATER
ernism. However, instead of focusing on the construction of difference
on a symbolic level, they, too, focused on the agency of matter.
Contrary to the Frost/Coole collection, van der Tuin and
Dolphijn very much emphasize their inscription in a feminist project
of knowledge, but their feminism concentrates on the works of Rosi
Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz, Luce Irigaray, and Simone de Beauvoir.
They, too, do not discuss socialist, materialist, or Marxist feminism.
Their ‘close reading’ of Beauvoir presents her as a French feminist
and inscribes Beauvoir into their own project of the philosophy of
difference. In doing so, they radically erase Beauvoir’s own claim to
existentialist philosophy as well as, ironically, her strong opposition
to the philosophies of difference in French feminism in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.8 Their motivation for this specific reading lies in
Beauvoir’s notion of the flesh, which, according to the authors, allows
for an ontogenesis which serves as an alternative to the opposition
of two competing views on gender: naturalism and constructivism.
While in naturalism sex would determine gender, in constructivism
it is the other way around: gender would determine sex. Dissatisfied
with both, the NM of van der Tuin and Dolphijn refutes feminist
oppositions to sexual difference and calls for affirming sexual
difference and showing sexual differing. Feminism understood in
terms of differing would push sexual differences to the extreme and
help transcend the nature/culture binary by opting for a monism.
Furthermore, this monism is filled with the hopes of transcending
anthropocentrism, which, according to the authors, limits human
perception. It remains unclear, though, how exactly they wish to
access the non-human world and its agency without relying on their
own human point of view.
In spite of their more or less close relationships to feminist science,
and in spite of their differing perspectives (STS and epistemological),
all of these projects have several points in common:
– their attempt to go beyond postmodernism, which is sometimes
almost an attack on postmodernist approaches.
8 Simone de Beauvoir was one of the founders of the journal Questions Féministes, later
Nouvelles Questions Féministes, which was the declared counter-part to the Antoinette
Fouque style of feminism in the group Psychanalyse et Politique.
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– their understanding of materialism as the study of the material
world, that is, of the relationship between words and things.
– their interest in finding out more about the agency of matter that
lies beyond human perception.
– their disregard of earlier feminist engagements with material-
ism, such as socialist, materialist, or Marxist feminism.
This quite schematic presentation nonetheless gives us some elements
that are helpful in understanding why there has been no exchange
between French materialist feminism and NM(s). If we look back at
the history of feminist theory, at least in France, Germany, and the US,
which are the contexts I am most familiar with, we need to clarify a
number of terms and explain their historical meaning in order to grasp
feminist engagements with materialism in the past.
Most of the first attempts to theorize women’s oppression in
the 1970s started from a historical materialist background and bor-
rowed from Marxist vocabulary and concepts. Among these, one finds
Marxist feminism, socialist feminism, materialist feminism, and radical
feminism. Marxist feminism is interested in the gendered patterns of
capitalism but views gender oppression and capitalism as one social
system. In other words, according to Marxist feminism there cannot
be any women’s emancipation within capitalism. In order to liber-
ate themselves, women not only have to get rid of the patriarchy but
capitalism as well. Socialist feminists like Silvia Federici, Josette Trat,
or Frigga Haug9 also view patriarchy and capitalism as interwoven,
but through their focus on how the accumulation process relies on
reproductive work, they have also shown capitalisms’ dependency on
patriarchy. Still, for the socialist feminists as well, there can be no par-
tial liberation because both systems are linked.
In her introduction to feminist theory, Linda Nicholson proposes
to differentiate between one-system and two-system models. Marxist
9 Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist
Struggle (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012); Josette Trat, Les Cahiers du féminisme
(1977–1988): Vingt ans dans le tourbillon du féminisme et de la lutte des classes (Paris:
Syllepse, 2011); Frigga Haug and Kornelia Hauser, ‘Marxistische Theorien und femi-
nistischer Standpunkt’, inTraditionen Brüche. Entwicklungen feministischerTheorie, ed.
by Gudrun-Axeli Knapp and Angelika Wetterer (Freiburg: Kore, 1992), pp. 115–49.
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and socialist feminisms are examples of one-system models.10 Radical
feminism and materialist feminism, on the contrary, are two-system
models, because they consider that there can be important change
in the patriarchal order without overcoming capitalism. It is not so
much that they do not want to overcome capitalism, but rather that
they refuse to wait on the revolution for significant change to happen
in women’s lives. Not only have these two-system models criticized
persistent male domination in socialist countries, which relativizes the
promise that the patriarchy would disappear with the end of capitalism,
but they also claim that ending the oppression of women is an aim in
itself; it does not need to be ennobled by inscribing it into the struggle
against capitalism.
Radical feminism is also clearly inspired by the US Civil Rights
Movement, from which it borrowed both terminology (sexism de-
veloped as an analogy to racism) and praxis (consciousness-raising
groups). Materialist feminism in France is closer to the two-system
model of radical feminism than it is to socialist or Marxist feminism.
Sociologist Christine Delphy, a key figure of materialist feminism in
France, has been strongly criticized for her concept of sex classes11
that comes from Friedrich Engels12 and was taken up by Virginia
Woolf,13 Simone de Beauvoir,14 and, later, by Kate Millett,15 Ti-Grace
Atkinson,16 Shulamith Firestone,17 and the Radicalesbians. Engels
conceived of women as the proletariat and men as the bourgeois, which
proved to be an inspiring formula for early feminist theory. Delphy’s
and other materialist feminist’s notion of materialism insists on the
material grounds and effects of women’s oppression. They do so in
10 The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory, ed. by Linda Nicholson (New York:
Routledge, 1997).
11 Geschlechterverhältnisse und Frauenpolitik, ed. by Projekt sozialistischer Feminismus
(Berlin: Argument, 1984).
12 Friedrich Engels, Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats: im
Anschluß an Lewis H. Morgans Forschungen (Zürich: Hottingen, 1884).
13 Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas (London: Hogarth Press, 1938).
14 Simone de Beauvoir, Le Deuxième Sexe (Paris: Gallimard, 1949).
15 Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1970).
16 Ti Grace Atkinson, Amazon Odyssey: The First Collection of Writings by the Political
Pioneer of the Women’s Movement Ti-Grace Atkinson (New York: Links Books, 1974).
17 Shulamith Firestone, TheDialectic of Sex:The Case for Feminist Revolution (New York:
Morrow, 1970).
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order to oppose feminist approaches that conceive of women’s oppres-
sion as belonging to only the symbolic order or as only a question of
behaviour and traditional roles. For such thinkers it was crucial to show
the economic exploitation of women by men.
Socialist feminists like Mary McIntosh and Frigga Haug have poin-
ted out the limits of the sex class concept already in the early 1980s.
Elsewhere I argued that the notion of sex classes replaces social classes
and that, therefore, materialist feminists see no difference between
a working woman and a bourgeois woman. Yet for Delphy, women
are always defined by their male partners: women do not belong to
social classes, they form a class of their own. For Delphy, bourgeois
women are mere luxury prostitutes that stand and fall at the will of
their husbands and rarely own anything themselves.18 Maira Abreu has
shown that materialist feminists like Delphy and other authors from
the Questions féministes journal collective actually called themselves
radical feminists up to the late 1970s.19 This re-labelling has caused a
deal of confusion today as some now wrongfully suspect there is a prox-
imity between materialist feminism and socialist or Marxist feminism.
While it is true that materialist feminism is interested in exploitation
and the material ground of women’s oppression, it is also true that
this type of feminism marks a point of rupture with the socialist and
Marxist left in France, as — contrary to the former group’s position
—socialist and Marxist feminists have always remained close to an
anticapitalistic politics. In like manner, NM creates some confusion
because it resembles neither of the two models, as it is neither a one-
nor a two-system model. It does not resemble radical nor socialist
feminism. In order to understand what is new in NM, we need to take
a closer look at their notion of materialism.
18 Christine Delphy, ‘Nos amis et nous. Les Fondements cachés de quelques discours
pseudo-féministes’, Questions féministes, 1 (1977), pp. 20–49 (p. 41). She is not the
only one to observe that heterosexual women’s status often depends on their husband’s
status. Recent sociological studies show that for bourgeois women, this is still very
often the case, cf. Le Collectif Onze, Au tribunal des couples: Enquête sur des affaires
familiales (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2013), p. 312.
19 Maira Abreu, ‘De quelle histoire le “féminisme matérialiste” (français) est-il le nom?’,
inMatérialismes féministes, ed. byMaximeCervulle and Isabelle Clair (=Comment s’en
sortir?, 4 (2017)), pp. 55–79.
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NOTIONS, THEIR MEANINGS, AND THEIR MATERIALITY
The political project of historical Marxism was compelling for many
feminists. The materialist, feminist translation of the historical Marxist
project was to name the exploitation of women by men and criticize the
ideology of bourgeois love that made women consent to their exploit-
ation. Yet, Marxism had its own analysis of women’s oppression20 that
converged with feminism in the critique of the bourgeois family. The
Frankfurt school took up Wilhelm Reich’s Freudian-Marxism and pro-
duced a number of theories on women’s oppression (Leo Löwenthal
on Henrik Ibsen, Max Horkheimer on motherhood, Herbert Marcuse
and Erich Fromm on sexuality, and even Theodor Adorno was tempted
by an analysis of women as merchandise).21 While part of feminist
research in Germany took up these works and tried to use their less
sexist parts for their own theories,22 large parts of radical feminism
in the 1970s struggled to break with the Freudian-Marxist framework,
which they found barely sufficient to explain women’s oppression, and
ended up forming new alliances with post-structuralism. This story
has been told by Cornelia Klinger in terms of a ‘marriage’,23 but ob-
20 August Bebel, Die Frau und der Sozialismus (Zürich: Hottingen, 1879); Wilhelm
Reich, Die Sexualität im Kulturkampf (Copenhagen: Sexpol, 1936).
21 Leo Löwenthal, ‘Das Individuum in der individualistischen Gesellschaft. Bemerkun-
gen über Ibsen’, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, 5.3 (1936), pp. 321–63; Eva-Maria
Ziege, ‘The Fetish-Character of “Woman”: On a Letter from Theodor W. Adorno
to Erich Fromm Written in 1937’, Logos, 2.4 (2003) <http://www.logosjournal.
com/issue2.4.pdf>; Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry
into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955); and Max Horkheimer, ‘Egoismus und
Freiheitsbewegung: Zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters’, Zeitschrift für
Sozialforschung, 5.2 (1936), pp. 161–234.
22 See, for example, Ursula Beer, Klasse. Geschlecht. Feministische Gesellschaftsanalyse
und Wissenschaftskritik (Bielefeld: AJZ Verlag, 1987); or Regina Becker-Schmidt,
‘Die doppelte Vergesellschaftung—die doppelte Unterdrückung: Besonderheiten der
Frauenforschung in den Sozialwissenschaften’, in Die andere Hälfte der Gesellschaft.
Österreichischer Soziologentag 1985. Soziologische Befunde zu geschlechtsspezifischen
Formen der Lebensbewältigung, ed. by Lilo Unterkirchner and Ina Wagner (Vienna:
ÖGB Verlag, 1987), pp. 10–25. Much later there was a similar attempt by feminists
in France: Adorno critique de la domination. Une lecture féministe, ed. by Eleni Varikas,
Nicole Gabriel, and Sonia Dayan-Herzbrun (= Tumultes, 23 (2004)).
23 See Cornelia Klinger, ‘Liberalismus — Marxismus — Postmoderne. Der Feminismus
und seine glücklichen oder unglücklichen “Ehen” mit verschiedenenTheorieströmun-
gen im 20. Jahrhundert’, inKritischeDifferenzen— geteilte Perspektiven. ZumVerhältnis
von Feminismus und Postmoderne, ed. by Antje Hornscheidt, Gabriele Jähnert, and
Annette Schlichter (Wiesbaden:Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), pp. 18–41. Klinger dis-
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viously the marriage metaphor obscures the important ways in which
feminists have actually contributed to building what was later called
post-structuralism. Nevertheless, feminist postmodern theory had its
day from the late 1980s to the early 2000s and the new materialist
project is a declared attempt to end what they view as the dominance
of postmodern theory in academia.24 However, as we can understand
through the analysis of the different forms of feminism and of mater-
ialism, NM is probably closest to the theoretical strand it criticizes:
postmodernism.
If you try to understand what this school of ‘postmodernism’ these
thinkers oppose actually is, the only reference you will find is to Butler’s
work. Had their notions of materialism not been so different, new
materialists could have joined materialist feminist’s critique of Butler
and gender theory. NM criticizes postmodern theory for not reflecting
on its own implications in modernism. However, NM does not seem
to reflect upon its own postmodernist implications and clearly lacks
basic engagement with other forms of feminist materialism. Had NM
not been so opposed to Butler, they would have actually noticed that
she, too, has been working on the notion of agency in her exchanges
with Saba Mahmood and Talal Asad.25 Nevertheless, these exchanges
do not really match those of inquiring into whether fossils can be seen
as a proof of the agency of matter.26
In her work on NM, Pia Garske has undertaken a comparison
between NM and historical materialism. For her, these two schools
are similar in their efforts against essentialism, and yet she high-
lights important differences in their perspectives on social human-
ity. Garske shows how historical materialism distinguishes between
cusses the various unhappy marriages of feminism and concludes that feminism is
not an appropriate bride for postmodernism. While this argument certainly hinges
on the definition of feminism one employs, Klinger is right that Butler’s alliance with
postmodern theory was devastating for a certain type of radical feminism.
24 See Material Feminisms, ed. by Hekman and Alaimo, pp. 1–5; Coole and Frost, New
Materialisms, pp. 2 and 6; or Dolphijn and van der Tuin, New Materialism, p. 91.
25 See Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood, Is Critique Secular?
Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013); and
Saba Mahmood, The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
26 Dolphijn and van der Tuin, ‘Interview with QuentinMeillassoux’, inNewMaterialism,
pp. 71–84.
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agency (Handlungsfähigkeit) and efficiency (Wirkmächtigkeit), which
clearly seem to be one and the same thing for NM.27 While Hand-
lungsfähigkeit asks whether someone has the capacity to act, Wirk-
mächtigkeit asks, on the one hand, whether someone or something has
an impact, which introduces the question of power once we discuss
this quality in relation with humans (there is Mächtigkeit in Wirk-
mächtigkeit, that is the question of Macht, of power). The term also
includes the impact a thing or a substance can have on its environment.
This distinction between Handlungsfähigkeit and Wirkmächtigkeit also
brings up the question of intentionality. A substance does not choose
to impact its environment the way a human can choose to go on strike.
But these differentiations might explain why new materialists could
not take part in ongoing feminist debates on agency, because these
debates almost exclusively focus on the Handlungsfähigkeit-side of the
issue while the interest of the NW(s) is clearly limited to the Wirk-
mächtigkeits-side of agency. Or, to put it more clearly, so far feminist
theory has mostly been interested in women’s capacity to act in a world
that is organized to deny their subjective existence.
CONCLUSION
The new materialist project is mostly interesting for its attempt to re-
new and challenge feminist understandings of nature. It is true that
the necessary rejection of nature in feminism, which arose from the
misogynistic practices of relegating women to the nature part of the
nature/culture binary, as well as the modernist grounding of women’s
oppression in their supposedly ‘naturally’ inferior disposition, has cre-
ated quite a rift between feminism and nature. A renewed interest in the
material world had already been attempted by ecofeminists who were
almost exclusively socialist feminists (Maria Mies, Vandana Shiva,28
Françoise d’Eaubonne.29 Sadly, the NM(s) have not embraced this
legacy. The same is true for the rich and strong tradition of femin-
ist theory of embodiment (Iris Marion Young, Sandra Lee Bartky,
Susan Bordo, Ann Cahill). It seems that in the same way that many
27 Garske, What’s the Matter.
28 Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Ecoféminisme (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998).
29 Françoise d’Eaubonne, Le Féminisme ou la mort (Paris: Pierre Horay, 1974).
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feminists needed to break with nature and the body, new materialists
somehow needed to break with most feminist materialist theories. Par-
ticularly in the 1970s and 1980s those that were later labelled French
feminists undertook an inquiry into feminist ways of perceiving the
body. In Germany, Barbara Duden, Gerburg Treusch-Dieter, and Gesa
Lindemann30 have pursued an analysis of the body from their own
perspectives.31 Bodily materiality was one of the central questions in
the German ‘Butler Debates’ of the early 1990s.32
New materialist’s call to take on ecological and bodily issues might
also have contributed to their difficulty in being received by feminist
research in France, because the majority of that research is working
to counter naturalist sexism. And yet, NM’s proposition to practically
undertake the project of rethinking nature is quite deceptive because
they also systematically refuse to see the sociopolitical implications of
nature. Frieder Otto Wolf has criticized the nature-culture binary and
called for a realistic view of our existence as natural beings33 which
would involve understanding humanity’s ‘natural’ side, our depend-
ence on nature’s agency, but also the unintended effects of our own
actions. NM’s exclusion of all of humanity from ‘nature’ as well as its re-
fusal to see humans as sociopolitical beings that are involved in creating
institutions, ideologies, concepts, and tools has led to new materialists
falling back upon the exact same dualism of nature-culture that they
claim to transcend. This is also valid for their uncritical reproduction
of the division of science into natural science and the humanities. This
division is itself the product of sociopolitical struggles and expresses
a power relation as much as the criticized humanities’ divided world
view does. The new materialist’s project of understanding the reflex-
ive foundations of the naturalization of social relations is extremely
30 Gesa Lindemann, ‘Die leiblich-affektive Konstruktion des Geschlechts. Für eine Mi-
krosoziologie des Geschlechts unter der Haut’,Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 21 (1992), pp.
330–46.
31 Barbara Duden, Geschichte unter der Haut. Ein Eisenacher Arzt und seine Patientinnen
um 1730 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987); Gerburg Treusch-Dieter, ‘Von der Antinorm
zur Norm. Neuere Perspektiven weiblicher Sexualität’, in her Von der sexuellen Rebel-
lion zur Gen- und Reproduktionstechnologie (Tübingen: Gehrke, 1990), pp. 140–67.
32 Möser, Féminismes en traduction, pp. 176–85.
33 Frieder OttoWolf, ‘Wider die Kategorie der gesellschaftlichen Naturverhältnisse’,Das
Argument, 50.279 (2008), pp. 867–72.
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important, but, in order to have this project succeed, the social and
political relations cannot be ignored.
NM might also be viewed as a clever survival strategy connecting
the humanities to the natural sciences, which could save the human-
ities from being abolished. While this strategy, if it is one, would be
understandable, it does bear the risk of reaffirming the problematic
division of science into these two parts. One can glean a fetishization
of the natural sciences from many new materialist writings in exactly
their presentation of the natural sciences as the ‘actual’ science, with
humanities playing the supporting role of commentary.
Feminist research began in the early 1980s as a project to rad-
ically change not only the universities and science but society as a
whole.34 The different epistemological attempts to reach that goal in-
cluded standpoint theory and the notion of strong objectivity from
thinkers such as Evelyn Fox Keller, Sandra Harding, and Donna Har-
away, among others. Haraway is actually the only socialist feminist
to be claimed by the new materialists, but all of the socialist feminist
impulses in her work are stripped away in order to make her another
humanist observant of science. Confronting NM with a feminist and
socialist critique of science would allow for a better understanding of
science as a sociopolitical process, which is organized by institutions,
and which mediates the knowledge it produces.35
34 Gisela Bock, ‘Frauenbewegung und Frauenuniversität — Zur politischen Bedeutung
der Sommeruniversität’, in Frauen und Wissenschaft. Beiträge zur Berliner Sommeruni-
versität für Frauen, Juli 1976, ed. by Gruppe Berliner Dozentinnen (Berlin: Courage,
1977), pp. 15–22 (p. 22).
35 Émilie Filion-Donato’s contribution to this volume undertook such a promising con-
frontation.




It has become something of a commonplace to argue that in order to
fight the oppression of women, it is necessary to unpack the ways in
which different forms of oppression intersect with one another. No
single factor, be it nature or nurture, economic exploitation or cultural
domination, can be said to be the single cause sufficient to explain the
multifaceted sources of patriarchy and sexism. Consequently, intersec-
tionality has become the guiding principle for an increasing number
of left-wing feminists from both the global north and south. As a re-
sult, most publications in gender theory today have engaged with the
concept of intersectionality in one way or another — whether to pro-
mote it, to criticize it, or simply to position oneself with regards to it.
Yet, strikingly enough, in all the literature engaging with intersec-
tionality there is barely any mention of the feminist tradition of the
past that has argued for exactly the same point for a very long time: an-
archist feminism or, as I prefer to call it, ‘anarchAfeminism.’ This specific
term was introduced by social movements who wanted to feminize the
concept and, in so doing, provide more visibility to a specifically fem-
inist strand within anarchist theory and practice. This anarchafeminist
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tradition, which has largely been neglected both in academia and in
public debate generally, has a particularly vital contribution to offer
today.
To begin, together with queer theory’s ground-breaking work
aimed at dismantling the gender binary of ‘men’ and ‘women’, it is
important to vindicate once again the need for a form of feminism
that opposes the oppression of people who are perceived as women
and who are discriminated precisely on that basis. Notice here that I
am using the term ‘woman’ in a way that includes all types of women:
AFAB women,1 AMAB women, feminine women, masculine women,
lesbian women, trans women, queer women, and so on and so forth.
Despite the alleged equality of formal rights, women are still the object
of constant discrimination, and the advancement of queer rights can
be accompanied by a retrogression in regard to women’s battles. The
emergence of right-wing figures such as Milo Yiannopoulos showed
that one can support gay and queer rights and still be a misogynist. But
the most infamous data about the continued oppression of women,
even in a context such as the US where we have come to expect im-
provements in queer rights, are the data about violence against women
and bodies that are perceived as feminine: there are currently between
126 and 160 million ‘missing girls’ from the global population.2 Trans
women are more likely to be raped and suffer violence than trans men,
so much so that the term ‘transmisogyny’ has been created in order
to point to situations in which transphobia and misogyny meet and
mutually reinforce each other.
Therefore, far from viewing feminism as an issue of the past, it has
become more imperative than ever to connect this standpoint with
1 I am using the terms ‘Assigned Female at Birth’ (AFAB) and ‘Assigned Male at Birth’
(AMAB) to signal the fact that by speaking about ‘male’ and ‘female’ we implicitly
accept the state sanctioned view according to which our gender corresponds to the
sex assigned to us at birth. Notice here how the (almost always binary) gender system
and the state apparatus are tightly interwoven, since it is through our state IDs and
passports that a gender identity is attached to our lives.
2 The ‘missing girls’ are not counted in the hundreds, or thousands, but in the millions.
As of today, there are somewhere between 126 to 160 million girls missing from
the global population as a consequence of sex-selective abortion, infanticide, and





the oppression of all bodies perceived as ‘femina’. However, such a
standpoint must be supported by an articulation of women’s liberation
that does not create further hierarchies, and this is precisely where
anarchafeminism is useful. While other feminists from the left have
been tempted to explain the oppression of women on the basis of a
single factor, anarchists have always been clear in arguing that, in order
to overcome the patriarchal order, we have to fight the multifaceted
ways in which diverse factors — economic, cultural, racial, political,
etc. — converge to uphold it.
The neglect, if not outright historical amnesia, that the important
leftist tradition of anarchism has been faced with is certainly the result
of this viewpoint being banned in academia and public debates in
general, where it has most often been misleadingly portrayed as little
more than a call for violence and disorder. This ban has been enacted to
the detriment of historical accuracy, global inclusiveness, and political
efficacy.
My proposal is to remedy such a gap by formulating a specific
anarchafeminist approach adapted to the challenges of our time.3 My
aim is not only to make the anarchafeminist tradition more visible as
an important component of past women’s struggles, and therefore re-
establish a kind of historical continuity which has been missing to date,
even though this would certainly be a worthwhile endeavour. Besides
historical accuracy, recovering anarchafeminist insights has the crucial
function of enlarging feminist strategies precisely in a moment when,
as intersectional feminists have argued, different factors increasingly
converge to intensify the oppression of women by creating further
class, cultural, and racial divisions among them.
3 A first version of this essay was presented at the Night of Philosophy in New
York City on 26 January 2018 and then at the UNESCO Night of Philosophy
on 15 November 2018. An extract of the talk was published in Liberation on 15
November 2018 <https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2018/11/15/nuit-de-la-philo-
pour-un-anarcha-feminisme_1692047> [accessed 12 April 2020], whereas a full
version appeared on Public Seminar 7 March 2018 <http://www.publicseminar.
org/2018/03/anarchafeminism/> [accessed 13 April 2020]. A Spanish translation
of the latter by Miguel Ibáñez Aristondo appeared on 12 September 2018 in Re-
porteSextoPiso <http://reportesp.mx/anarcafeminismo-chiara-bottici> [accessed 13
April 2020], a French translation by Jeanne Etelain et Anaïs Nony in the journal
La Deleuziana, 8 (2018) <http://www.ladeleuziana.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/
02/Bottici-1.pdf> [accessed 13 April 2020], and an Italian translation in Per cosa
lottare. Le frontier del progressismo, edited by Enrico Biale and Corrado Fumagalli
(Milano: Fondazione Giacomo Feltrinelli, 2019).
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In a time in which feminism is often accused of being mere white
privilege, this task is more crucial than ever. The emancipation of
women from the global north can indeed happen at the expense of
women from the global south, whose reproductive labour within the
household is often used to replace the labour previously performed by
the now ‘emancipated’ women. It is precisely through the adoption
of such a global perspective, which is all the more necessary today
because of the increased mobility of capital and labour forces, that
the chain connecting gendered labour across the globe becomes more
apparent, and the timeliness of anarchafeminism as an intersectional
approach along with it. To put it concisely, we need a more multifa-
ceted approach to domination. In particular, we need an approach that
is able to incorporate different factors as well as the different voices
coming from all over the globe. As Chinese anarchafeminist He Zhen
wrote at the dawn of the twentieth century in her Problems of Women’s
Liberation:
The majority of women are already oppressed by both the gov-
ernment and by men. The electoral system simply increases
their oppression by introducing a third ruling group: elite
women. Even if the oppression remains the same, the ma-
jority of women are still taken advantage of by the minority
of women. […] When a few women in power dominate the
majority of powerless women, unequal class differentiation
is brought into existence among women. If the majority of
women do not want to be controlled by men, why would they
want to be controlled by women? Therefore, instead of compet-
ing with men for power, women should strive for overthrowing
men’s rule. Once men are stripped of their privilege, they will
become the equal of women. There will be no submissive
women nor submissive men. This is the liberation of women.4
These words from 1907 show how prophetic and relevant anarcha-
feminism is, and they present the answer to our question: why anarcha-
feminism? They show that anarchafeminism is the best antidote against
the possibility of feminism becoming white privilege and thus a tool in
the hands of a few women who dominate the vast majority of them.
4 He Zhen, ‘Women’s Liberation’, in Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian
Ideas, ed. by Robert Graham, 3 vols (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2005), i, pp. 336–
41 (p. 341).
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In an epoch when the election of a woman president is presented as a
liberation for all women, or when women such as Ivanka Trump can
lay claim to feminist battles of the past by transforming the hashtag
#womenwhowork into a tool to sell a fashion brand, the fundamental
message of the anarchafeminists of the past is more urgent than ever:
‘Feminism doesn’t mean female corporate power or a woman Presid-
ent; it means no corporate power and no Presidents.’5
THE ONTOLOGY OF THE TRANSINDIVIDUAL
At this point, one may object: why insist on the concept of feminism
and not just call this anarchism? Why focus on women? If the purpose
is to dismantle all types of oppressive hierarchies, should we not also
get rid of the gender binary which, by opposing ‘women’ to ‘men,’
imprisons us in a heteronormative matrix?
I should make it clear immediately that when I write ‘women’ I do
not mean some supposed object, or eternal essence, or, even less so, a
pre-given object. Indeed, to articulate a specifically feminist position
while maintaining a multifaceted understanding of domination, we, as
feminists, require a more nuanced understanding of ‘womanhood’. By
drawing upon insights from an ontology of the transindividual, I will
argue that bodies in general, and women’s bodies in particular, must
be considered as processes rather than as objects that are given once
and for all. We are not things, we are relations. Women’s bodies, like all
bodies, are bodies in plural because they are processes, processes that
are constituted by mechanisms of affects and associations that occur
at the inter-, intra-, and the supra-individual level. To give just a brief
example of what I mean here, think of how our bodies come into being
through an inter-individual encounter, how they are shaped by supra-
individual forces, such as their geographical location, and how they are
made up of intra-individual bodies such as the air we breathe, the food
we eat, or the hormones we swallow.
There can be different roads to articulate an ontology of the
transindividual. In Europe, the term has been at the centre of dis-
cussions arising from Étienne Balibar’s reading of Baruch Spinoza’s
5 Peggy Kornegger, ‘Anarchism: The Feminist Connection’, in Quiet Rumors: An
Anarcha-Feminist Reader, ed. by Dark Star (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2012), pp. 25–
35 (p. 31).
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ontology as well as the result of a resurgence of interest in the philo-
sophy of Gilbert Simondon.6 These two strands of the debate on the
transindividual have at times unfolded separately, and at times con-
verged, as with Balibar’s philosophy, since it is from Simondon that
Balibar derived the notion of transindividuality which he uses to in-
terpret Spinoza’s Ethics.7 In this article, I mainly draw inspiration from
Balibar’s insight that Spinoza’s concept of individuality is best under-
stood as transindividuality (1997), and from Moira Gatens’s feminist
readings of such an ontology, according to which the most monist of
all ontologies — Spinoza’s — is also the most pluralist.8
The starting point for Spinoza’s philosophy is that there is being
rather than nothing.9 Indeed, he writes that not to exist is to lack
power, and to be able to exist is to have power. Thus, if what necessarily
exists are only finite beings, then finite beings are more powerful than
an absolutely infinite being, which is absurd. Therefore, he concludes
that either nothing exists or an absolutely infinite being exists. But we
exist, either in ourselves or in something else, which necessarily exists.
Therefore, an absolutely infinite being necessarily exists.10 This is, in
my view, the most beautiful lesson of Spinozism: if there are twenty
people in a room, then an absolutely infinite being necessarily exists.11
6 Besides Étienne Balibar, Spinoza: From Individuality to Transindividuality (Delft:
Eburon, 1997), explored below, more recent influential views include: Balibar and
Vittorio Morfino, Il transindividuale: soggetti, relazioni, mutazioni (Milano: Mimesis,
2014); Balibar, ‘Philosophies of the Transindividual: Spinoza, Marx, Freud’, trans.
by Mark G. E. Kelly, Australasian Philosophical Review, 2.1 (2018), pp. 5–25; Jason
Read, The Politics of Transindividuality (Leiden: Brill, 2015); Daniela Voss, ‘Disparate
Politics: Balibar and Simondon’,Australasian Philosophical Review, 2.1 (2018), pp. 47–
53—who expands onGilbert Simondon’s concept of transindividuality, by comparing
itwithBalibar’s view—andMurielCombes,Gilbert Simondon and thePhilosophy of the
Transindividual, trans. by Thomas LaMarre (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), the
first monograph fully devoted to Simondon and the philosophy of the transindividual.
7 Spinoza does not explicitly use the term transindividual or transindividuality, so
for those who like to trace the origins of this ontology of the transindividual, one
should follow Balibar, Spinoza: From Individuality to Transindividuality, which expli-
citly draws inspiration from Simondon, L’Individuation psychique et collective (Paris:
Aubier, 1989), which, in turn, coined the expression ‘transindividuality’.
8 Moira Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power, and Corporeality (London: Routledge,
1996), pp. 56–57.
9 Ethics i, Def. 1; CWS [The Collected Works of Spinoza, see abbreviations], i, p. 408.
10 Ethics i, 11 Dem.; CWS i, pp. 417–18.
11 The argument of the twenty persons is used inEthics i, 8, Schol. 2,CWS i, p. 415, where
Spinoza starts adding some a posteriori elements to the a priori proof for the existence
of an infinite substance developed in Propositions 1 to 7 of Part i.
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But this also implies that there is an infinite unique substance that
expresses itself through an infinity of ‘attributes’, where the latter term
stands for what the intellect perceives of the substance as constituting
its essence.12 Among the infinity of such attributes, those that are ac-
cessible to humans (at least under current conditions) are thought and
extension. A single thought is therefore just a mode of the attribute of
thought, whereas a single body is a mode of the attribute of extension.
But, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, I should
clarify that this does not mean that thought and extension, or ideas
and things, are separate or even parallel to one another. Spinoza clearly
states that ‘[t]he order and connection of ideas is the same [idem]
as the order and connection of things’;13 thought and extension are
the same (idem), not parallel to one another, and it is even less true
that they are two different substances. It is important to emphasize
this because whenever we speak about mind and body, or ideas and
things, our long-inherited dualistic metaphysical framework tends to
surreptitiously creep in. The first step in order to get to a truly plural-
istic conception of the body is to get rid of this framework, and thus
of the idea that a body is something different, parallel, or opposite to
a mind. When we say ‘a body’ we do not mean something separate or
even opposed to ‘a mind’ or ‘a soul’. ‘Body’ and ‘mind’ are just modes
expressing two different attributes of the same substance.
This also leads us to the specific understanding of individuality as
transindividuality which one can develop by drawing inspiration from
Spinoza, particularly from the sort of compendium of his physics that
he put forward in Part ii of the Ethics, where his eccentric materialism
fully emerges.14 If thought and extension are just two of the infinite
attributes of the unique substance, then we cannot speak of a mater-
ialist ontology without immediately adding that it is not the brute,
inanimate, static matter that is at stake here. Spinoza’s materialism is an
eccentric form of what we might call a ‘spiritual materialism’, precisely
because extension and thought are just two of the infinite attributes of
the same substance.
12 Ethics i, Def. 4; CWS i, p. 408.
13 Ethics ii, 7; CWS i, p. 451.
14 Ethics ii, 13–15; CWS i, pp. 457–63.
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Within such an ontology, individual things (res singulares) exist
only as a consequence of the existence of other individual things15
with which they participate in an infinite network of connections.16
Notice here that this view also implies that causality must not be
understood in the sense of a linear succession of events, but rather
as a multiplicity of connections linking individuals, which are them-
selves made up of more simple and more complex individuals that are
all causally related. As a consequence, every individual is constantly
composed and decomposed by other individuals with whom it enters
into contact through a process of individuation, which involves infra-
individual, inter-individual, and supra-individual levels.17 In order to
render this complexity, Balibar argued, individuality must be under-
stood as transindividuality.
In this understanding, individuals are therefore never atoms,
events, let alone subjects that are given once and for all. They are pro-
cesses, the result of constant movements of association and repulsion
that connect more simple individuals with other simple individuals,
but also with more complex ones that constantly make and unmake
bodies. To get a crude but efficient sense of what I mean here, think of
how animal bodies are composed and decomposed by the liquids that
traverse them; we drink, but we perspire, we urinate, we are constantly
processing liquids by which in turn we are being processed. Similarly,
human individuals are constantly composed by the molecules that
we breath in and out of our bodies through a transindividual pro-
cess of association and attraction linking different forms of human,
animal, and vegetative life into the same network. Notice that within
this monist ontology the same holds true for thoughts; as individuals,
bodies are the result of all the modes with the attribute of thought
that we constantly encounter, be they the reflections you are reading
or the phone conversation you had this morning. To put it even more
strongly, the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order
and connection of things, because ideas are nothing but affirmations
of the body. Again, observe here how easily one escapes the trap of
metaphysical dualism. Since the body and the mind are nothing but
15 Ethics i, 28; CWS i, pp. 432–33.
16 Balibar, Spinoza, p. 27.
17 Ibid.
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modes within different attributes of the unique substance, no radical
separation between a subject of knowledge and its object can subsist. In
fact, the very notion of a self-enclosed individual, let alone of a subject,
of a Cartesian ego, does not make any sense in this ontology. Human
beings do not occupy a privileged position within this ontology, being
themselves nothing but more complex individuals than, say, a stone
or a chair, because they result from more complex movements of at-
traction and repulsion between more or less complex individuals. In
other words, they are not given entities, but rather processes, webs of
affective and imaginal relations that are never given once and for all.
As Gatens has emphasized, this also means that in the process of
individuation that generates individuals in general, and human beings
in particular, complex dynamics of imaginary identification become
particularly crucial.18 We constantly meet and recognize or misrecog-
nize ourselves in certain images of the body, which include images that
we have of our bodies and of other bodies, as well as images that others
have of them and which become constitutive of our own being. For
Gatens, the key term for keeping together the mental and the material
side of this process is ‘the imaginary’ and for Spinoza it is ‘imagination’.
The latter term, in his theory of knowledge, denotes a set of ideas
produced on the basis of present or past bodily affections.19 Following
Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, we can summarize Spinoza’s view of im-
agination by saying that it is a form of bodily awareness, which means
awareness of the perceiving body as well as of the perceived bodies
encountered and that, as a consequence, it is always, properly speaking,
a form of collective imagining.20 In order to avoid misunderstandings,
18 One of the first commentators to point to this constitutive role of imagination in
Spinoza was Antonio Negri. See, in particular, his The Savage Anomaly: The Power of
Spinoza’s Metaphysic and Politics (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1991),
pp. 86–97. According toCarolineWilliams, what is new in this book byNegri, Balibar’s
Spinoza and Politics (London: Verso, 1998), and Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd,
Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past andPresent (London:Routledge, 1999) is that they
draw attention to Spinoza’s novel, materialist rendering of imagination, without simply
dismissing it as a source of errors. See Williams, ‘Thinking the Political in the Wake of
Spinoza: Power, Affect and Imagination in the Ethics’, Contemporary Political Theory,
6 (2006), pp. 349–69 (p. 350). What I am trying to do here is to combine the merit of
Spinoza’s ontology with a theory of the imaginal that more clearly distances itself from
the modern philosophy of the subject.
19 Ethics ii, 26 Dem.; CWS i, p. 469 and Ethics ii, 40 Schol. 2; CWS i, pp. 477–78.
20 Gatens and Lloyd, Collective Imaginings, p. 12.
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we should recall that an idea does not only consist of mental content.
Imagination has a bodily grounding, because the mind is just the body
that is felt and thought. Furthermore, according to Spinoza, an idea is
‘a conception of the mind’.21
Notice here that while Gatens’s feminist interpretation of Spinoza
focuses on the specifically human usage of this capacity to imagine,
there is nothing within this conception that prevents us from extending
Spinoza’s understanding of imagination to all other forms of extension,
or, in more contemporary terms, of materiality. Despite the different
forms that this idea could take, there is no a priori reason in this ontol-
ogy to assume that thinking and imagining would be a prerogative of
the human. I also want to point out that while Spinoza uses the typic-
ally modern concept of imagination, which, in the history of western
philosophy, is imbued with humanism, we can certainly reformulate
his insights in terms of a theory of the imaginal. In particular, it is with
regards to what Gatens called ‘imaginary bodies’, and what I would
like to call ‘imaginal bodies’, that we can understand the psychological
side of the process of individuation described above. Whenever a body
encounters another body, which can be a simple body, like a glass of
water, or a more complex one, like another animal, a change in its own
constitution will occur. It is in this sense, and in order to keep together
what happens at the infra, inter-, and supra-individual level, that the
notion of transindividuality becomes particular helpful. In sum, bod-
ies are always necessarily bodies in plural, both social and individual
at the same time, because their individuality is always and inevitably
a form of transindividuality. But if bodies are always transindividual
processes, then we also need a theory that is able to conceptualize our
capacity to imagine without falling into the false alternative between
theories of imagination as an individual faculty and theories of the
imaginary as a social context. And it is precisely at this point that, as
I hope I have shown, the concept of the imaginal becomes particularly
useful.22
21 Ethics ii, Def. 3; CWS i, p. 447.
22 I have developed the concept of the imaginal as an alternative to theories of imagin-
ation understood as an individual faculty and theories of the imaginary understood as
a social context, in Chiara Bottici, Imaginal Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2014).
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I would like to list the benefits of such an ontological shift towards
transindividuality as the prism through which individuality must be
understood. Firstly, instead of elaborating a form of feminism and then
having to add ecology as something different from feminism itself,
here the two positions are unified from the beginning because, in an
ontology of the transindividual, the environment is not something
separated from us but, rather, the environment is us — literally some-
thing constitutive of our individuality. Secondly, imaginal collective
formations such as sex, race, and class are from the beginning con-
ceptualized as constitutive of our individuality, and thus as intimately
intertwined. Thirdly, when women’s bodies are theorized as processes,
as sites of a process of becoming that takes place at different levels, we
can speak about ‘women’ without incurring the charge of essentialism
or culturalism. There is no place here for the opposition between sex
(nature) and gender (culture) because there is no place for body-mind
dualism. Lastly, by adopting this transindividual ontology, we can also
use the concept of woman outside of any heteronormative framework,
and thus use the term such that it includes all types of women: femin-
ine women, masculine women, AFAB women, AMAB women, lesbian
women, bisexual women, trans women, cis women, asexual women,
queer women, and so on and so forth. In sum, ‘women’ encompasses all
bodies that identify themselves and are identified through the always
changing narrative of ‘womanhood’.
To conclude this point, a transindividual framework allows us to
answer the question ‘what is a woman?’ in pluralistic terms while also
defending a specifically feminist form of anarchism. Developing the
concept of women as a series of open processes also means going
beyond the dichotomy of the individual versus the collective: if it is
true that all bodies are transindividual processes, then the assumption
that there could be such a thing as a pure individual, separate, or even
opposed, to a given collective, is at best a useless abstraction and at
worst a deceitful phantasy.
WHICH WOMEN? AND WHICH ANARCHAFEMINISM?
Adopting an anarchafeminist lens entails taking the entire globe as
the framework for thinking about the liberation of women. This im-
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plies going beyond any form of methodological nationalism, that is,
privileging certain women and thus certain national or regional con-
texts. If fighting the oppression of women means we have to fight all
forms of oppression, then statism and nationalism are no exceptions.
If one begins by looking at the dynamics of exploitation by taking
state boundaries as an unquestionable fact, one ends up reinforcing
the very oppression one meant to question in the first place. A slogan
for this proposal might look something like: ‘the globe first.’ Adopting
anything less than the entire globe as our framework is at best naive
provincialism and at worst obnoxious ethnocentrism.
Whereas several feminist theories produced in the global north
have failed to understand the extent to which the emancipation of
white, middle-class women happened at the expense of a renewed
oppression of working-class racialized bodies, anarchafeminists have
traditionally adopted a more inclusive perspective. It is no coincidence
that many anarchist theorists, from Pjotr Alexejewitsch Kropotkin to
Paul Reclus, have been geographers and/or anthropologists. By explor-
ing the processes of production and reproduction of life independent
of state boundaries and on a planetary scale, these authors not only
were able to avoid the pitfalls of any form of methodological national-
ism, but could also perceive the global interconnectedness of forms of
domination, beginning with the intertwinement of capitalist exploit-
ation and colonial domination.
A tangential remark I would like to offer here is that while one can
use labels such as Latin American or Chinese anarchafeminism, I be-
lieve that those labels must be used as ladders to be abandoned as soon
as we have reached the top. The vitality of the anarchafeminist tradition
consists precisely in its capacity to transcend state boundaries, meth-
odological nationalism, and even the Eurocentric biases that persist
throughout most of the radical theory produced in the global north. It
is very revealing, for instance, that most of the feminist tools, whether
rooted in Marxist feminism, post-structuralist feminism, or radical
feminism, derive from theories produced in a very small number of
countries. We can actually name and count them on one hand: France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and perhaps Italy.
To combat this Eurocentric trend, and the subsequent privileging of
Western Europe in building frameworks of emancipation, it is pivotal
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to bring texts produced by anarchists worldwide to the centre of the
discussion. This global inclusion is the only way to insure a form of
feminism beyond Eurocentrism and beyond ethnocentrism.
THE COLONIALITY OF GENDER : ANOTHER WOMAN IS POSSIBLE
If we take the globe as our framework, the first striking datum to
emerge is that people across the globe have not always been doing
gender, and, moreover, even if they did do it, they have done it on very
different terms depending on where they lived. It is only with the emer-
gence of a worldwide capitalist system that the gender binary of ‘men’
versus ‘women’ gained worldwide hegemony. This does not mean that
sexual difference did not exist before capitalism, nor does it imply that
we should indulge in the nostalgia of a gender fluid past. It simply
means taking note of the historically situated nature of the current
gender regime, and, in particular, of the fact that binary gender roles
were not as universally accepted as the primary criteria through which
bodies were classified, as they are today. Modern capitalism made the
mononuclear bourgeois family — with its binary gender roles — hege-
monic, and the modern sovereign state with its bureaucratic apparatus
sealed that gender binary on us through state IDs and passports.
Marxist feminists have long emphasized that capitalism needs a
gendered division of labour because, as it is predicated on the endless
expansion of profit, it needs both the extraction of surplus value from
waged productive labour as well as unpaid reproductive labour, which
is still largely performed by gendered bodies. To put it bluntly, capital-
ism needs ‘women’. It relies on the assumption that when women are
washing their husband’s and children’s socks, they are not ‘working’
but merely performing a function ordained for them by nature.
As Maria Mies, among others, has emphasized, perceiving
women’s care work as the consequence of their nature, instead of as
the actual work it is, is pivotal to maintaining the division between
‘waged labour’, which is subject to exploitation, and ‘unwaged labour’,
which is subject to what she, along with others, has termed ‘super-
exploitation’.23 This form of gendered exploitation is ‘super’ because,
23 Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on aWorld Scale: Women in the International
Division of Labour (London: Zed Books, 1986).
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whereas the exploitation of waged labour takes place through the
extraction of surplus value, the exploitation of women’s domestic
labour takes place via denying their work the very status of work.
By building on these types of insights, Maria Lugones put for-
ward the very useful concept of the ‘coloniality of gender.’24 She
uses this concept to emphasize how the ‘male/female’ binary and the
racial classification of bodies were both systems that Europeans expor-
ted through the colonial expansion that accompanied the worldwide
spread of capitalism. Within the American context, Lugones shows
how gender roles were much more flexible and variegated among
Native Americans before the arrival of European settlers. Different
indigenous nations possess, for instance, a third gender category to
positively recognize intersex and queer subjectivities, whereas others,
such as the Yuma, attribute gender roles on the basis of dreams, so that
a AFAB woman who dreams of weapons is considered and treated,
for all practical purposes, as a man. This shows that there has been
a systematic intertwinement between the expansion of the capitalist
economy, the racial classification of bodies, and gender oppression.
It is manifestly true, and yet all too often forgotten, that to classify
people on the basis of their skin colour or their genitalia is not an a
priori of the human mind. Classifying bodies on the basis of their sex,
as well as classifying them on the basis of their race, implies, among
other things, a primacy of the visual register. According to Oyèrónkẹ́
Oyěwùmí, such a primacy is typical of the West, particularly when
looked at from the perspective of the Yoruba pre-colonial cultures. As
she points out in her seminal work The Invention ofWomen, the Yoruba
cultures, for instance, relied much more on the oral transmission of
information than on its visualization, and they valued age over all
other criteria for social hegemony.25 They did not even have a name
to oppose men and women before colonialism: to put it bluntly, they
simply did not ‘do’ gender.
24 Maria Lugones, ‘The Coloniality of Gender’, in The Palgrave Handbook of Gender
and Development: Critical Engagements in Feminist Theory and Practice, ed. by Wendy
Harcourt (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 13–33.
25 Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí, The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western
Gender Discourses (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
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Therefore, questioning the coloniality of gender also means ques-
tioning the primacy of the visual: it is by seeing bodies that we say ‘here
is a woman!’ or ‘that is a man!’ But it is also within such a visual register
that we have to operate in order to question hegemonic and hetero-
normative views of womanhood and thereby open new paths toward
subverting them. To propose another slogan, we could say: ‘Another
woman is possible; another woman has always already begun.’
AN ONGOING MANIFESTO
These words, ‘another woman is possible; another woman has always
already begun’ could indeed be the starting point of a new anarchafem-
inist manifesto. In contrast to other manifestos, an anarchafeminist one
would inevitably need to be open and as ongoing as the transindividual
ontology upon which it rests.26 Starting with Errico Malatesta’s insight
that anarchism is a method, and thus not a programme27 that can be
given once for all, the writing of such a manifesto could begin with the
following points:
FIRST: At the beginning was movement: Anarchism does not mean
an absence of order but rather searching for a social order without an
‘orderer’. The main ‘orderer’ of our established ways of thinking about
politics is the state. Because we are so accustomed to living in sovereign
states we tend to perceive the migration of bodies across the globe as a
problem. On the contrary, we should remember that sovereign states
are a relatively recent historical phenomenon (for most of humanity,
peoples have lived under other types of political formations) and that
human beings have been migrating across the Earth since the very ap-
pearance of the so-called Homo sapiens. Homo sapiens is therefore also
a Femina migrans, or even better, an Esse migrans, hence the need for
an anarchafeminism beyond boundaries and beyond ethnocentrism.
SECOND: Just do it:28 Do not aim to seize state power or wait
for the state to give you power, just start exercising your power right
26 InMay 2019, a collective writing project called ‘Anarchafeminist Manifesto 1.0’ began
on Public Seminar. The readers who are interested are invited to follow at <https:
//publicseminar.org/2020/05/anarchafeminist-manifesto-1-0/>.
27 Errico Malatesta, L’Anarchia [1891] (Rome: Datanews, 2001), p. 39.
28 ‘Just do it’ can also mean to subversively re-appropriate a corporate power logo, and
thus re-appropriate what capitalism has stolen from us.
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now. Aiming to seize state power, or asking for recognition from the
state, means reproducing that very same power structure that needs to
be questioned in the first place. This means not only ‘think globally,
and act locally’; it also means that a little bit of freedom is within
everybody’s reach and can be exercised in a number of ways that are
not mutually exclusive. This could include general strikes, grassroots
organizing, civil disobedience, and boycotts, but also resisting gender
norms, subverting or playing with them, refusing to comply, and so on
and so forth. The latter actions are not simply ‘individualist strategies,’
as some have labelled them; instead, they are political acts as such,
which can go hand in hand with larger projects, as can be seen in the
increasing number of women’s strikes, communal living spaces, and
queered families proliferating around the globe. To think about bodies
as transindividual processes also means that we should escape the false
alternative between individual versus collective strategies, and work at
all different levels simultaneously. The oppression is global, and so the
fight has to be global as well.
THIRD: The end is the means; the means is the end: There cannot
and there should not be any fully-fledged political programme for
an anarchafeminist manifesto. This does not mean that there cannot
and there should not be any site-specific and time-limited political
programme: it simply means that there cannot be a unique one fit for
all different possible intersections of axes of oppression. If freedom is
the end, freedom must also be the means to reach it. Anarchism is a
method for thinking as well as for acting, because acting is thinking
and thinking is acting. In the same way in which bodies are plural,
their oppression is plural as well, and so the strategies of fighting it
must be plural as well. As anarchists have been saying for a long time:
‘multiply your associations and be free.’ In other words, search for
freedom in all of your social relations, not simply in electoral and
institutional politics, though the latter may also be one of the levels
you operate at. But if freedom is both the means and the end, then one
can also envisage a world free from the very notion of gender as well
as the oppressive structures it generates. Because gendered bodies are
still the worldwide objects of exploitation and domination, we need
an anarchafeminist manifesto right here and right now. But such a
manifesto should be conceived as a ladder that we may well abandon
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once we have reached the top. Indeed, it is implicit in the very process
of embarking upon such an anarchafeminist project, that we should
strive for a world beyond the opposition between men and women and
thus, also, in a way, beyond feminism itself.





Organizing life according to differences, be they sexual
(male/female)1 or otherwise,2 is a social praxis. Indeed, feminists
have long argued that though it may be possible to group humans into
two groups based on differences which we call sexual, the meaning
we ascribe to these differences and the impact we allow them to
have is unequivocally social. In other words, what we make of these
differences and the psychological and material consequences they
1 It has been suggested that I may mean ‘gendered’ here. Though I personally believe,
with Anne Fausto-Sterling (Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of
Sexuality, rev. edn (New York: Basic Books, 2000)), Thomas Laqueur (Making Sex:
Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,
2003)), and others, that sex is a scientific construct, using ‘gender’ here would be
misleading becausewhat I am referring to are the perceived physical differences not the
social roles extrapolated from the same. Whether these differences are really relevant
for deducing any personality or group traits or whether they have been exacerbated (or
even constructed) by the superimposed (cultural) bicategorization are a different set
of questions (to which I answer: no and yes.)
2 Though other differences, such as ‘racial’ differences, those pertaining to neuronal
or bodily ability, sexual orientation, or those of socio-economic circumstances, have
been of equal importance in this social organization of difference, I focus on gender
difference here because the epistemologists I study base their theoretical framework
on the construction of this specific difference.
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result in arise from socio-cultural interactions, alliances — whether
explicit or not — and more or less fixed arrangements. Second,
feminists have argued that such practices enable the emergence of
two different cultures (men/women)(gender),3 which, through some
combination of feedback loops and confirmation biases, reinforce the
significance and importance given to the alleged sexual differences.
That is, by rewarding members of an in-group for a certain set of
behaviours and punishing or discouraging other behaviours, as well
as ascribing the converse undesirable behaviours to the out-group,
each culture participates in exacerbating and amplifying intergroup
differences.
This dynamic reinforcement of differences has important con-
sequences for epistemology. Indeed, many epistemologists argue that
knowledge production is a specifically human endeavour which is
inextricable from its historical, local, and social context. As a result, ac-
cording to this viewpoint, knowledge is permeable to cultural or group
biases. Feminist epistemologists combined these two insights — the
existence of gendered cultures and the permeability of knowledge to
culture — and began to ask in the 1970s whether, and if so, how,
male cultural (androcentric) biases have impacted the production of
scientific knowledge. In other words, if we accept that the way gender
3 When I use men or women, I mean the cultural extrapolations from the bodily
characteristics (when I mean those, I use male/female). Nicole Claude Mathieu has
suggested that there are three paradigms to think of the relationship between sex and
gender. In the first, social sex (gender) is undissociated from biological sex (sex).
Under this paradigm, all that we associate with the feminine (gender) is a direct and
faithful translation of the (female) biological condition and can only be explained
by it (Nicole-Claude Mathieu, L’Anatomie politique: catégorisations et idéologies du
sexe (Paris: Côté-femmes: 1991)). The second paradigm proposes that the social sex
symbolizes the biological sex.That is to say, that the first (gender) refers to the second
(sex) and is related to it in some way, without being absolutely determined by it.
In this paradigm, if biology is not the only determinant of (gendered) behaviour, it
is because there is, according to these theories, a number of codes and norms that
are learned by individuals, voluntarily or not. The third conceptualization proposes
that the obstinacy to confine the heterogeneity of the biological condition to two
categories actually comes from the social systemwhich frames or orients the reading of
biological data. This conceptualization proposes that the network of norms and codes
that governs bodies and pushes them to conform to one of the two groups has the
purpose of simplifying social interactions. Because of this simplification, the social
model of bicategorization is preferred tomore complexmodels, such as those in which
heterogeneity of sexwould be accepted. As a result, the data invalidating the dimorphic
model are either ignored or reinterpreted in favour of the coherence of the system.
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and gender roles are expressed at any given time is a social praxis,
and we also accept that knowledge emerges out of a specific cultural
context, then the praxis of gender has to be taken into account as part
of the general social context from which this knowledge emerges.
This chapter relies upon my own typology of the strategies put
forward by U.S. feminists in response to the problem of androcentrism
in the production of knowledge. Briefly put, this typology groups the
various feminist strategies into three categories: ‘changing the subject’,
‘multiplying the subject’, and ‘decentring the subject’.4
This chapter has two goals. The first is to challenge the category
of strategies Helen Longino, in ‘Subjects, Power, and Knowledge’,
ascribes to biologist and epistemologist Evelyn Fox Keller and her
strategy: psychodynamism of individuation.5 The second goal of this
chapter is to underline how psychodynamism of individuation and
New Materialism can benefit one another, emphasizing the interrela-
tions between them and discussing their relationship to Spinozist
materialism.
In her 1993 essay, Longino places Keller in the category she calls
— and which I use with some adjustments — ‘changing the subject’.
According to Longino, this category contains two different strategies:
Keller’s psychodynamism of individuation and standpoint theory.6
Longino groups these two strategies together because she believes that
they have similar consequences for rethinking how science should be
done. That is, in her opinion they both attempt to change who is doing
science (what we could call the epistemic subject). Contra Longino,
4 The first two categories are inspired by Helen E. Longino, ‘Subjects, Power, and
Knowledge: Description and Prescription in Feminist Philosophies of Science’, in
Feminist Epistemologies, ed. and intro. by LindaAlcoff andElizabeth Potter (NewYork:
Routledge, 1993), pp. 101–20. The last category is my own.
5 Ibid.
6 Very briefly, ‘standpoint theory’, the genealogy of which can be traced back toMarxism
andBlack feminism, argues that the subject of knowledge’s position (be it their gender,
‘race’, socio-economic background, sexual orientation, mental and physical ability,
etc.) has an influenceon the type andquality of knowledgeproduced.Hence, epistemic
authority is given to certain people on specific topics. For example, it will be assumed
a black woman has access to specific knowledge about the condition of black women
in general, something that cannot be spontaneously known to someone who is not
part of this group (see Patricia Hill Collins, ‘Learning from the Outsider Within: The
Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought’, Social Problems, 33.6 (1986),
pp. 14–32). This is not strictly speaking an epistemology based on identity since this
position can change during one’s lifetime.
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I argue that Keller’s use of object-relation theory allows ontological
insights and consequences that are irreducible to a change of the epi-
stemic subject of the sort proposed by standpoint theory. Instead, I
propose that Keller forgoes substantial ontology in favour of relational
ontology. To help make this point, I place Keller’s psychodynamism
of individuation in relation with New Materialism, a strategy found in
my third category (decentring the subject) where I also place Keller’s
psychodynamism of individuation.
This discussion sets the stage for the second goal of this chapter
which is to underline how both strategies (New Materialism and psy-
chodynamism of individuation) can benefit one another. Particularly,
I endeavour to show how Keller’s psychodynamism of individuation
can help address some of the most devastating criticisms directed at
New Materialism. These criticisms are twofold. First, some have con-
tended that the ontology in New Materialism revives the threat of
idealism (understood as anti-realism) because the subject of know-
ledge is also part of the apparatus and hence can impact the phenom-
ena solely through its presence.7 Second, others have reproached the
ontology of New Materialism for making collective action difficult,
and even impossible, given the éclatement of the (human) subject.8
Indeed, in this multiverse of forces, ascribing responsibility can seem
difficult. I shall address these criticisms at the end of this paper.
In brief, this paper aims to encourage reflection on an epistemo-
logical project that takes both psychic structures and matter seriously
by achieving a cross-pollination of New Materialism and the psychody-
namism of individuation. My hope is that this cohabitation can lead to
more democratic epistemologies. Before going into the details of this
cross-pollination, however, I will first situate myself in the materialist
tradition, for it would be remiss of me not to mention the impact
of Baruch Spinoza on this project. I have borrowed many ideas from
Spinoza but principally his monism and immanent causality. Both
7 Andreas Malm, The Progress of This Storm: Nature and Society in a Warming World
(London: Verso, 2018); Andreas Malm, ‘Against Hybridism: Why We Need to Dis-
tinguish between Nature and Society, Now More than Ever’, Historical Materialism,
27.2 (2019), pp. 156–87.
8 Malm, ‘Against Hybridism’; Eva Bendix Petersen, ‘“Data Found Us”: A Critique of
Some New Materialist Tropes in Educational Research’, Research in Education, 101.1
(2018), pp. 5–16.
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concepts, in my opinion, are remedies to the impasses of teleological
thinking, which is the source of most biases or ‘ideologies’ in Louis
Althusser’s sense.
MATERIALISM
I understand being a materialist in the sense of being a dedicated
monist. This monism is inspired by Spinoza’s monism in that it is com-
mitted to using the same methodology when considering the causal
relationships of the attribute of Thought as much as that of Extension.
Indeed, in the Ethics, Spinoza writes:
I shall treat the nature and powers of the Affects, and the
power of the Mind over them, by the same Method by which,
in the preceding parts, I treated God and the Mind, and I
shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a
Question of lines, planes, and bodies.9
As such, this methodology means committing to monism even when
it seems not to correspond to traditional notions of materialism: i.e.,
when thinking about social relations as well as psychological forces
and states. Arguing for the contrary — that social relations or psycho-
logical states have no impact on a phenomenon — is, in my view, to
take a dualist stance and claim that psychic and social formations are
somehow supra material.
This monism is also, in my opinion, what connects onto-
epistemological materialism, or scientific materialism,10 and historical
materialism, both of which are encountered in this volume. The first is
a materialism which can be traced back to Democritus and Epicurus
and which we associate with a scientific kind of understanding.
According to this type of materialism (and monism), matter is
the only thing that exists. This school of thought is also known as
9 Spinoza, Ethics iii, Praef.;CWS [TheCollectedWorks of Spinoza, see abbreviations], i,
p. 492.
10 The use of ‘scientific’ here may lead to some confusion as Marx has been known to use
the term ‘scientific socialism’ or ‘communism’ to refer to his ideas in opposition to the
‘utopian socialism’ of the kind proposed by Fourier and Saint-Simon (see Raymond
Aron, Le Marxisme de Marx (Paris: Editions de Fallois, 2002), p. 579.). I shall use
scientific here only to refer to the contemporary sense of ‘natural sciences’.
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physicalism. Hence, there is no god-like or soul-like force11 that
can make matter bend the rules of its nature. The second, historical
materialism, is a materialism which can be traced back to Marx and
has more to do with a socio-history which encourages us to learn more
about social determinations in order to enact socio-political change.
In this sense, I understand Marx’s methodology as monist since social
relations are analysed on the same plane as natural phenomena.12
It is a more complex monism than physicalism, but a monism in its
methodology nonetheless.13
This ‘taking into account’ of social relations and psychological
states as elements that constitute a phenomenon, however, has often
been reduced to radical constructivism or dismissed as such by the
first kind of materialism (onto-epistemological).14 Such a dismissal
seems to suggest that taking more ‘data’ into account when considering
a phenomenon is alien to science or the scientific method when, in
fact, the contrary should be true. In my opinion, this suggestion is
the result of some confusion around the ideas of contingency and
necessity. Indeed, to say that psychic and social formations may impact
matter and vice versa is understood as suggesting that ‘things’, meaning
matter, could have been different (say, if we hadn’t interfered). That
is, it is understood as saying that ‘things’ (or even laws of nature)
are contingent because it seems that if social and psychic formations
11 Though someNewMaterialists use the terms ‘vitality’ and ‘material vitalism’ (e.g. Jane
Bennett), they make a point of distancing themselves from older forms of vitalism
(which are closer to the idea of a soul). Bennett writes ‘Mine is not a vitalism in the
traditional sense; I equate affect with materiality, rather than posit a separate force
that can enter and animate a physical body’ ( Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political
Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), p. xiii). So my point
here is that the traditional form of vitalism is an error that leads to a dualist and
teleologistic mode of thinking (though this is might not be the case with the new uses
of ‘vitality’ and ‘vitalism’).
12 Marlon Miguel has correctly pointed out that not all scholars of Marx would agree
with the presentation of his philosophy as monist. While it is true that the question
of monism in Marx is complex, I believe his methodology is more straightforwardly
monist. Žižek has argued, for example, that it is a dialectical monism (see citation
below).
13 Slavoj Žižek, Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism
(London: Verso: 2014), pp. 5–15.
14 Donna J. Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and




have anything to do with matter, then the latter might be changed
at will. As a consequence, this supposed contingency of matter is
understood as a kind of anti-realism, in the sense that it seems to
suggest that some external (human or god-like) will has more bearing
on the way matter behaves than any intrinsic laws of its nature. This is a
misunderstanding. Spinoza, through his rejection of the very notions
of Beginning and End,15 shows that social and psychic formations are
no more free than gravity is. He writes in a Letter 58:
[C]onceive now, if you will, that while the stone continues to
move, it thinks, and knows that as far as it can, it strives to
continue moving. Of course, since the stone is conscious only
of its striving, and not at all indifferent, it will believe that it is
very free, and that it perseveres in motion for no other cause
than because it wills to. This is that famous human freedom
everyone brags of having, which consists only in this: that men
are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the causes by
which they are determined.16
Indeed, Spinoza’s ontology alerts us to this misconception and pro-
poses ways out of it.17 First, his notion of a unique and immanent
substance throws off the finalist-bias. Second, he shows that the Scho-
lastic notions of necessity and contingency are errors of the same kind:
the result of finite modes investing a teleological quality into Nature.18
It is this teleological investment, which Spinoza understands as ima-
ginary, that makes us both conceive of a will (ours or God’s) that
15 Louis Althusser saw this in Spinoza as well as a long tradition of materialist thinkers.
He writes in ‘The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter’, in
Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978–87, ed. by François Matheron and
Oliver Corpet, trans. by Geoffrey M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 163–
207: ‘from Epicurus to Marx [via Spinoza], there had always subsisted — even if it
was covered over (by its very discovery, by forgetfulness, and, especially, by denial
and repression, when it was not condemnations that cost some their lives) — the
“discovery” of a profound tradition that sought itsmaterialist anchorage in a philosophy
of the encounter (and therefore in a more or less atomistic philosophy, the atom, in
its “fall”, being the simplest figure of individuality). Whence this tradition’s radical
rejection of all philosophies of essence (Ousia, Essentia, Wesen), that is, of Reason
(Logos, Ratio, Vernunft), and therefore of Origin and End’ (p. 188; emphasis in the
original).
16 Ep. lviii [G. H. Schuller]; CWS ii, p. 428.
17 For more on his ontology and the consequences on the notions of Freedom and
Necessity, see Stefano Visentin in this volume.
18 See Ericka Itozaku’s paper in this volume for a more in-depth discussion of this issue.
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shapes things into what it wants and also imagines things as contingent.
However, Spinoza shows that the laws underlying the nature of finite
things depend upon other finite modes that constitute and limit it.
Once we get rid of this teleological illusion, the epistemological
and ethical tasks before us become, in Spinozist terms, to sit with and
consider our power in its finitude, i.e., in how it is limited by other fi-
nite modes. Consequently, my argument is that what has been missing
from the materialist projects (both onto-epistemological materialism
and scientific materialism) is this understanding of our finitude, and
consequently Spinoza’s ethical project. This finitude, however, is not to
be understood as a kind of fatalism, as pointed out in the introduction
to this volume. Instead, understanding what has determined our lives
is the very thing that sets us free from depleting affects (shame, guilt,
anger, etc.), allowing us to persevere in our being more joyously, i.e.,
powerfully, and, in so doing, change how we relate to other finite beings
and our environment. Freedom is, as Engels would later write, the ap-
preciation of necessity.19 Hence, this change should not be conceived
as a freely made decision that can direct the will here or there; instead,
it is more like a fine tuning of our response to the finite beings that
constitute us and which we constitute in return, and this results in a
better agreement with ourselves and those around us (be they human
or otherwise). This co-constitution of finite things and the fine tuning
to what surrounds us is something we also find in the strategy of New
Materialism, which I will now discuss.
19 Friedrich Engels,Anti-Dühring, inMECW [Marx & Engels CollectedWorks, see abbre-




Though many scholars have written on this topic,20 I will focus here
on Karen Barad’s account of New Materialism. Barad’s method, which
she calls the Diffractive Method, is also a metaphor that was inspired
by Haraway and quantum physics. It is used as a critical response
to representationalist metaphors of reflection. Haraway writes about
such metaphors, saying that ‘both are optical phenomena, but whereas
reflection evokes themes of mirroring and sameness, diffraction is
marked by patterns of difference’.21 She adds that ‘a diffraction pattern
does not map where differences appear, but rather maps where the
effects of differences appear’.22 This method, therefore, allegedly helps
us to better attend to the relational nature of difference.
Using diffraction as a metaphor can help change the way that we
perceive and interpret objects in two important ways. First, it helps
shift the focus away from the intrinsic characteristics of ‘objects’. That
is, we can see that what is expressed and hence measured, i.e. that which
emerges as the ‘characteristics of the waves’, actually emerges from the
meetings of a ‘prior’ set of waves. Because any measured ‘crest’ does not
actually exist before its meeting with the other crest, and/or the meet-
ing with the diffracting apparatus — e.g. an island or a rock — Barad
calls this meeting an intra-action in contrast to an inter-action. The
20 Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies
(AnnArbor,MI:OpenHumanities Press, 2012); Birgit Van Puymbroeck andN.Kath-
erineHayles, ‘“EnwebbedComplexities”:ThePosthumanities, DigitalMedia andNew
Feminist Materialism’, DiGeSt: Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies, 2.1–2 (2015),
pp. 21–29; Bennett,VibrantMatter;DianaCoole and SamanthaFrost, ‘Introducing the
New Materialisms’, in New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, ed. by Diana
Coole and Samantha Frost (Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 1–43; Rosi Braidotti,
Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming (Oxford : Blackwell, 2002);
Elizabeth A. Grosz, The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2004); Elizabeth A. Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Cor-
poreal Feminism (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1994);MariamFraser, Sarah
Kember, and Celia Lury, ‘Inventive Life: Approaches to the New Vitalism’, Theory,
Culture & Society, 22.1 (2005), pp. 1–14.
21 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter
and Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 71.
22 Donna Haraway, ‘The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropri-
ate/d Others’, in Cultural Studies, ed. by Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula
A. Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 295–337 (p. 300), emphasis removed.
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nuance is important because inter-action presupposes the existence of
some fully formed ‘actants’ present ‘before the meeting’, whereas intra-
action stresses the co-constitution of those ‘actants’. This move from
inter-action to intra-action therefore requires one to shift ‘the primary
epistemological unit’ from ‘things’ to phenomena, i.e. from an inter-
action between pre-existing relata to boundary forming intra-action
in phenomena. Shifting our analysis from ‘things’ to ‘phenomena’ also
underlines the inseparability of ‘intra-acting’ ‘components’. 23
Second, diffraction is a helpful metaphor because it is, especially
in the case of light, hard to observe without some special apparatus.
Indeed, without the use of a certain set of tools, it may have always been
assumed that light only behaved in a particle-like way, i.e. as matter and
not as waves. Two things happen with this metaphor. First, it emphas-
izes humans’ (in)capacity to detect, observe, or fully grasp something
without a special set of tools and techniques. Second, it emphasizes
the active dynamic role humans take, with or without apparatuses, in
‘(re)configurings of the world’.24 Therefore, the metaphor is not only
helpful to transition from an ontology of ‘objects’ towards one of ‘phe-
nomena’, but it is also useful to understand how specific practices shape
‘where the effects of differences appear’.25 The method/metaphor thus
helps us understand how our very measuring practices are neither in-
nocent nor inconsequential.
However, this insight confronts us — perhaps ironically — with
some problems reminiscent of those faced by an ‘anti-realist’ or even
radical relativist perspective. Indeed, if everything we do, down to how
we perceive, has an impact on the things we measure or want to talk
about, how can we ever be sure we are getting the ‘right’ measure-
ments? Further, without an agreed upon measurement, i.e. a shared
account of the world, how can we understand one another, let alone,
and more importantly, act collectively? Another problem, which is not
an anti-realist one per se but is still relevant to the discussion at hand,
is how to make sense of responsibility given this fragmented, or even
23 Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward anUnderstanding of HowMatter
Comes to Matter’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28.3 (2003), pp.
801–31 (p. 815).
24 Ibid., pp. 816, 818, 819, 821, 822, and 828.
25 Haraway, ‘The Promises of Monsters’, p. 300.
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erased, subject. I suggest that part of the answer to this can be found in
Evelyn Fox Keller’s use of the psychodynamism of individuation.
Psychodynamism of Individuation
Keller points out that, as is illustrated by the biblical use of ‘know-
ing’, and contrary to Bacon’s infamous proposition that ‘knowledge is
power’, knowledge needs not only be about power but can instead also
have to do with connection. Keller argues that this second possibility
has been largely ignored.26 Furthermore, she argues that knowledge’s
relationship to power has been overblown to such an extent that dom-
ination metaphors permeate scientific writing and thinking.27 She
stresses that the relationship to nature is all too often expressed in
terms of scientists ‘attacking’ or ‘solving’ nature, or of ‘conquering’
her/it — implying that something about nature will, through the at-
tack, conquest, or discovery of a solution, disappear and make way for
the scientist’s vision and will.
In Keller’s opinion, this conception of knowledge resembles a
conception of objectivity in which the knowing subject, in order
to be objective, has to be detached from her object of study. This
(mis)conceptualization of objectivity is due, she argues, to a specific
(mis)conception of autonomy wherein there is a ‘tacit implication
[…] that autonomy can be bought only at the price of unrelatedness’.28
The shared ideal of un-relatedness in both autonomy and objectivity
has persuaded her to explore the interaction between emotional and
cognitive experiences and development. Not only does this shared
ideal suggest that the two are related, but Keller’s hypothesis is that her
study could help uncover the idea that they are, in fact, co-constitutive.
In order to explore this relation between objectivity and autonomy,
Keller turns to the object-relation theory of German psychoanalyst
Ernst Schachtel and his take on the ‘psychodynamism of individu-
ation’.
26 Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1995), pp. 115–16.
27 Ibid., p. 123.
28 Ibid., p. 72.
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In traditional Freudian psychoanalysis, the process of individu-
ation, i.e. ego formation, is thought of as the more or less tragic
consequence of a self-awareness, or the delineation between inner
and outer stimuli, that develops as a result of unfulfilled needs. Freud
writes:
An infant at the breast does not as yet distinguish his ego from
the external world as the source of the sensations flowing in
upon him. He gradually learns to do so, in response to various
promptings. He must be very strongly impressed by the fact
that some sources of excitation, which he will later recognize as
his own bodily organs, can provide him with sensations at any
moment, whereas other sources evade him from time to time
— among them what he desires most of all, his mother’s breast
— and only reappear as a result of his screaming for help.29
That is, by realizing that her mother cannot and is not fulling her needs,
the child understands that she is not, in fact — and this is contrary to
what she may have initially thought/felt — one with her mother or the
world. This is a traumatic experience for the child who then realizes
that she must turn outward to satisfy unmet needs, and this towards
an external world over which she has little control. This initiation into
self-consciousness is condemned, for Freud, to a separation from the
mother/world because it destroys the symbiotic illusion. This makes
the child’s relationship to the world conflictual, but also de facto ori-
ented towards instrumentalization. Though Freud acknowledges that
this feeling of connectedness with the world (or symbiosis) may sub-
side in some adults, something he calls in this context the oceanic
feeling, he claims not to recognize it in himself and proceeds to link it
to some primitive pre-individuated ego.30 Because of this, the oceanic
feeling speaks to, for him, some (regressive) longing to (re)unite with
the world/mother.
Schachtel has a different understanding of that dynamic of indi-
viduation. For the latter, fulfilling unmet needs is one of two types
of interest the child can have for the world. According to Schachtel,
29 SigmundFreud,Civilization and itsDiscontents, inTheStandardEdition of theComplete
PsychologicalWorks of SigmundFreud, ed. by James Strachey, trans. byAngelaRichards,
24 vols (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953–74), xxi
(1961), pp. 57–145 (p. 67).
30 Ibid., pp. 64–65.
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the child is first and foremost turned towards the world by a curiosity
and pleasure that exceeds biological necessities, i.e. there is an intrinsic
and independent joy brought about by merely discovering the world.
This joy is explained, in Schachtel’s view, by the satisfaction the child
experiences when she is connected to others and the world. Further,
since Schachtel doesn’t think of the dynamic of individuation as trau-
matic, the kind of uniting effort such as that sought out through Freud’s
‘oceanic’ feeling can be positive and desirable.31 This is the case so
long as the transition from the symbiotic moment to the moment of
individuation is dynamic. For this dynamism to be possible at all the
child must have a secure sense of self, which Schachtel describes as
one that can tolerate both difference and continuity between self and
world. This in turn enables an attention for the world and its objects
that is not only vested with or contingent upon one’s needs and de-
sires.32 Schachtel calls this attention allocentric perception. He calls
the instrumentalizing perception which opposes allocentric percep-
tion ‘autocentric perception’.
Keller uses Schachtel’s developments on perception to discuss
what I alluded to earlier: a particular conception of autonomy and its
relationship with objectivity. Keller terms the traditional conception
of autonomy, i.e. one in which one sees oneself as separated from
and impermeable to the world, static autonomy. Keller adds, how-
ever, that the allocentric perception that I just mentioned allows for
another conception of autonomy, which she calls dynamic autonomy.
This autonomy requires that one trust her capacities and abandon the
delusion that she is fully self-sufficient, can act independently of the
world and others, or can avoid being acted upon. This will allow ‘for
that vital element of ambiguity at the interface between subject and
object’.33
The notions of objectivity corresponding to dynamic and static
autonomy are dynamic and static objectivity. ‘Dynamic objectivity
aims at a form of knowledge that grants to the world around us its
independent integrity but does so in a way that remains cognizant
31 Ernst Schachtel,Metamorphosis: On the Conflict of Human Development and the Psych-
ology of Creativity (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 182.
32 Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 119.
33 Ibid., p. 84, my emphasis.
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of, indeed relies on, our connectivity with that world’.34 Keller com-
pares this sort of objectivity to empathy. Like empathy, then, dynamic
objectivity is an objectivity that mobilizes shared experiences and
emotions between the subject and object of knowledge.35 In static
objectivity, on the contrary, the understanding of the other can only
be attained by separating and fracturing the subject from her object of
knowledge, which involves dissociating the object from the subject so
that the latter can instrumentalize it. This leads to a type of knowledge
where difference is thought of in terms of frontiers and sharp edges. In
this paradigm of objectivity, perception becomes an ‘act of aggressive
violence in which the perceiver, like Procrustes with his hapless vic-
tims, cuts off those aspects of the object which he cannot use for his
purposes’.36
In sum, Keller’s vision of the subject is not, strictly speaking, a ‘de-
centring’ of the subject in the sense that it makes the subject disappear.
In fact, as we have just seen, Keller spends a significant amount of en-
ergy describing how a subject is formed, or individuated, and how that
impacts her relationship to the world and therefore also to knowledge.
My point is, however, that this dynamism of individuation — which at
one point accepts a certain degree of separation and at another unites
subject and object — forces us to think of the frontiers between subject
and object as at least momentarily absent. This ‘decentring of the sub-
ject’ is the key, in my opinion, to answering the criticisms addressed to
New Materialism which I have mentioned above.
Longino’s Critique of the Psychodynamism of Individuation
Before addressing how the psychodynamism of individuation can help
to answer the criticism addressed to New Materialism, let us turn
to Longino’s own criticism of the psychodynamism of individuation.
Longino’s characterization of the psychodynamism of individuation
focuses on the aspect of the theory that attempts to show that ‘cog-
34 Ibid., p. 117.
35 Ibid., p. 116.
36 Schachtel, Metamorphosis, p. 171, quoted by Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science,
p. 120.
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nitive efforts have an ineluctably affective dimension’.37 From that
reading, therefore, she places Keller’s psychodynamism of individu-
ation alongside standpoint theory38 for both theories, in her opinion,
aim to highlight the subjective conditionality of descriptive claims by
emphasizing their ‘social and historical location’. Her criticism of both
theories is, therefore, that they ‘fail to explain how we are to decide or
to justify decisions between what seem to be conflicting claims’.39 In
other words, if subject X describes ‘Phenomenon A’ as ‘a’ and subject
Y describes ‘Phenomenon A’ as ‘b’, how are we to determine who is
right?
Though Longino writes that both theories fail at answering this
question, she also proposes that standpoint theory attempts to solve
it by ascribing more epistemic authority to one subject based on their
social and historical location. It is less clear how she thinks the psy-
chodynamism of individuation ascribes epistemic authority, but she
nevertheless criticizes it on the same grounds. For Longino, the ‘ana-
lytical task is not to determine which is epistemically most adequate.
Rather, the task is to understand how these complexly conditioned
subjectivities are expressed in action and belief.’40
This criticism resembles what we have seen earlier about the
‘threat of anti-realism’ directed at New Materialism. That is to say, that
standpoint theory, the psychodynamism of individuation, and New
Materialism all, to use Longino’s wording again, ‘fail to explain how we
are to decide or to justify decisions between what seem to be conflict-
ing claims’. It is indeed conceivable that the accounts of a phenomenon
given by New Materialism would lead to different descriptive claims
about that phenomenon. These accounts may change according to the
apparatus involved. So how can Keller’s psychodynamism of individu-
ation help at all with the ‘anti-realist’ problems New Materialism seems
to reiterate?
37 Longino, ‘Subjects, Power and Knowledge’, p. 108.
38 As a reminder, ‘standpoint theory’ argues that the subject of knowledge’s position
(be it their gender, ‘race’, socio-economic background, sexual orientation, mental and
physical ability, etc.) has an influence on the type and quality of knowledge produced.
39 Longino, ‘Subjects, Power and Knowledge’, p. 109.
40 Ibid.
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Relational Ontology
My hope is to have shown above that the psychodynamism of indi-
viduation, contrary to what Longino suggests, is not about lending
epistemic superiority to one subject, but instead about redefining the
epistemic subject altogether by redefining what could be called his or
her epistemic virtues — a topic I will discuss in a moment — and by
extending who/what counts as subject. This expansion of the subject
is something this theory shares with New Materialism and what I have
called here relational ontology. As for the redefinition of the subject’s
epistemic virtues, New Materialism already hints at the connection
between ontology, epistemology, and ethics, but does not really ex-
pand upon the topic of epistemic virtues.
I have already claimed that New Materialism and the psychody-
namism of individuation share a common shift in ontological terms.
Indeed, what New Materialism and, I argue, Keller, ask us to do is
to try to think of object and subject in terms of the relationship they
have with one another, and how these relationships are shaped by and
shape these entities, critters, or relata. In Keller, this shift in ontology
is captured by her discussion of the ‘vital element of ambiguity’41 and
of the continuity between the subject and object, which questions the
impermeability of both and highlights their inter/intra-dependence.
Whereas in Haraway and Barad, the subject is ‘heterogenous’, ‘noni-
somorphic’, and ‘partial’,42 these descriptors all point to an ontology
in which subject-object formation is not only co-constitutive, but in
which the relation and cosmological organization bears more weight
than its ‘individual’ components. Therefore, the subject is redefined as
an emerging pattern of difference, which ‘highlight[s], exhibit[s], and
make[s] evident the entangled structure of the changing and contin-
gent ontology of the world, including the ontology of knowing’.43
Furthermore, both, beyond offering a different ontology, propose
in and by this ontology, an ethical framework. The suggestion that the
self cannot be defined or thought of outside of its relationships has two
major ethical consequences. First, it allows for a much more dynamic
41 Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 84.
42 Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’, p. 586.
43 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 73.
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(and emancipating?) self-understanding. That is, one that is not con-
fined to only one or to a cumulative list of identity. This ‘departure from
identity’ is not, however, reducible to a non-identity, or a point of view
from nowhere, i.e. a detached conception of objectivity which aims to
paradoxically embody the universal. The positionality of every element
in the pattern of diffraction is and has to be taken into account! But that
account, or census of positions, does not determine future outcomes,
nor does it sanction the attribution of blame. The causal chain of the
elements taken into account is neither linear nor monocausal, and it is
therefore neither reproducible nor predictable. Thus, identity is both
constrained by some parameters and, at the same time, understood as
contingent: it is processual.
Processualism and Allocentric Perception
I would now like to discuss processuality and return to the question
of how a reading of the psychodynamism of individuation may an-
swer some criticism addressed to New Materialism. Processuality is
precisely what helps reveal how the ‘complexly conditioned subjectiv-
ities’ Longino worries about ‘are expressed in action and belief ’. Keller’s
understanding of processuality involves ‘the growing interest among
physicists in a process description of reality’, whereby ‘object reality ac-
quires a dynamic character, akin to the more fluid concept of autonomy
emerging from psychoanalysis’.44 Indeed, where the psychodynamism
of individuation can benefit New Materialism, I argue, is precisely
through these processual, dynamic descriptions of the world that a
‘more fluid concept of autonomy’ allows for.
Therefore, and as a first response to this anxiety about the spectre
of anti-realism, the psychodynamism of individuation helps us to
understand how the agential cuts into phenomena are made at the hu-
man level. That is to say, according to which interests, motivations, and
to what end those cuts are made. It emphasizes that knowledge claims
are not innocent and devoid of emotional or libidinous investments (in
the terms of New Materialism, these emotional-libidinous investments
may be considered part of the apparatus). It does not contend, how-
44 Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 94.
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ever, that these emotional investments are any ground to reject one
claim in favour of another (allegedly less invested) or to hierarchize
them into better or lesser claims. Instead, the psychodynamism of in-
dividuation calls for an investigation into these emotional-libidinous
investments — as real material objects — so that we can share fuller
accounts of phenomena.
Second, and while recognizing that this objective may not be
achievable (immediately or forever), the psychodynamism of indi-
viduation provides us with an insight into the problem of a shared
account of the world. Indeed, with allocentric perception and dynamic
objectivity, a sketch of what Mirenda Fricker has called epistemic
virtues emerges.45 Though Fricker’s theory of epistemic virtues is of
inestimable help in the realm of judiciary testimonies as a transitional
or intermediate tool in this specific context, my point of departure or
premise is that, ultimately, for most knowledge projects, the sort of
unbiased judgement she is after is impossible, and may not even be
desirable. Therefore, in this quest for epistemic virtues, the orientation
would be towards those that result in the questioning of one’s own
authority and the room that is opened up as a consequence for different
and possibly conflicting accounts. These virtues, in common language,
might be called generosity, benevolence, patience, and curiosity —
though I am hesitant to propose anything that is definitive here, and
by giving these examples I only wish to make my meaning as clear as
possible. What I can say about these virtues at this point, however, is
that in practice they would be of the sort that maximize the possibility
for a common ground — even when the language we use seems to lead
to deadlocks and contradictions regarding any phenomenon’s descrip-
tion.
The examples I have given may seem to put the onus of the epis-
temological enterprise on the ‘listener’ rather than the ‘speaker’ of
some information. I want to suggest, however, that the onus is in fact
shared between the parties. This is because one finds oneself in either
position at different times and also because these virtues, if we come
back to the examples of generosity, benevolence, patience, and curi-
45 Miranda Fricker, ‘The Virtue of Testimonial Justice’, in Epistemic Injustice: Power and
the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 86–108.
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osity, do not make a demand upon the ‘listener’ alone. Indeed, in the
way she conveys information a speaker can prove to be more or less
generous, benevolent, patient, and curious towards her interlocutor.
Keller alludes to this when she points to the empathy that dynamic
objectivity requires and which consists in finding a common language
in shared experiences and emotions.46 The psychodynamism of indi-
viduation therefore suggests that if non-instrumentalized perception is
possible, there is finally no such thing as a fully disinvested perception.
That is, this non-instrumentalized perception will have to find a com-
mon language in shared experiences and emotions which implies an
emotional investment. If we accept that perception is always-already
oriented and invested, what we need for finding a common ground
is a way of accessing multiple grids of analysis. I contend that this is
precisely what allocentric perception and dynamic objectivity offer.
Third, this encounter between New Materialism and the psycho-
dynamism of individuation has the advantage of addressing the threat
of idealism (understood as anti-realism) by encouraging doubt about
the ego’s separation from the world and also encouraging processual
reflexivity, which forces us to face the ways in which the ego affects
objects and how objects, in turn, affect the subject. Indeed, when the
subject enters this ambiguous space in which the object affects her
completely, there is as little doubt about the object’s presence as there
is about her own. Keller’s psychodynamism of individuation therefore
gives us the means to face and negotiate the ambiguity between the
inside and the outside without negating our sense of self.
Fourth, and regarding the question of accountability in the face
of a dislocated subject, I contend that agenthood, and hence account-
ability, in this ontological paradigm is not a matter of tracing back
intention and therefore responsibility to the original misbehaviour in
order to ‘punish the mistake’ of a ‘unified’, ‘coherent’, ‘free-acting’ sub-
ject. Rather, this accountability is one which encourages doubt about
one’s own presence as a coherent unit,47 and, by extension, encourages
doubt about one’s own (epistemological and ethical) omnipotence.
This accountability is one which demands that the subject locate her-
46 Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 116.
47 Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’, pp. 585–86.
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self in the maelstrom of forces pushing her around and thus that she
identify where her power lies. Further, this accountability is one that
demands ‘reponsibility for difference’, for where one places the fateful
line between self and everything else.48 This doubt results in what
Haraway calls the ‘possibility of webs of connections’, which are ‘called
solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology’.49 This
alliance between New Materialism and the psychodynamism of in-
dividuation hence shifts the focus from a cartography of matter that
demands exhaustive models aimed at predicting future outcomes or
at attributing blame to one that dynamically demands responses (per-
sonal and collective) to depleting circumstances. In sum, how we arrive
where we are does matter (to get out of immobilizing blame and
shame), but it matters less than how we can fix/change the depleting
circumstances and move forward collectively, whether that be through
reparations, mediation, or separation.
48 Ibid., p. 585.
49 Ibid., p. 584.
Emergence that Matters and Emergent
Irrelevance
On the Political Use of Fundamental Physics
CHRISTOPH F. E. HOLZHEY
Physics was long considered as the model science. It arguably lost
this role to the life sciences towards the end of the twentieth century,
but some strands of new materialism have helped to give it a second
wind. How physics theorizes matter seems to matter again, and not
only intellectually but politically as well. As an ex-physicist who is
semi-converted to the humanities, I am quite interested in the idea
of mobilizing the critical potential of physics, but for this very reason
I find it important to problematize some of the ways in which this
potential tends to be all too quickly either embraced or rejected.
In this chapter, I will need to be quite quick and schematic myself
and will only give some indications and elaborations on three points.
They are, firstly, my claim that the fundamental ontology of matter
has no political relevance; secondly, my position that what is politic-
ally relevant is, instead, to devise effective strategies to deactivate the
normative power of fundamental ontologies; and thirdly, the prop-
osition that physics can be helpful to address these first two points,
that is, to understand its own irrelevance and at the same time inspire
strategies to deactivate the normativity of ontologies of matter.
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1. THE FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY OF MATTER IS (POLITICALLY)
IRRELEVANT
Let me begin with some clarifications of my claim. I speak of the ‘fun-
damental ontology of matter’ and take it primarily in the sense that one
might associate with physics, that is, in terms of defining elementary
material constituents and establishing their laws of interaction, or what
is often referred to as the ‘theory of everything’.1 This is what I will
primarily mean by the term ‘ontology’ even when I do not qualify it
further; I do not thereby intend to subsume or exclude other dimen-
sions or meanings of ontology, in particular not a ‘materialist ontology’,
which I would consider to have a far broader meaning.
By claiming that the ontology of matter has no relevance, I mean
that no difference could be detected on our human scale — or indeed
any finite length scale — if the fundamental ontology were quite rad-
ically different. I am thinking of alternatives such as discrete particles
moving in a vacuum vs a continuum conception of matter; or processes
fully determined by laws of motion (which is associated with mechan-
ics) vs allowing for random deviations or something like free will.
My claim, then, is that any of these ontological options are com-
patible with all that could possibly matter on any specified scale. When
it is understood in this way my claim could seem unsurprising. Who
would have thought that the ontologies of matter proposed by physics
are politically relevant? Wouldn’t that imply, among other things, an
archaic appeal to nature, falling prey to the naturalistic fallacy of de-
1 See, e.g., the glossary of Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden
Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory (New York: Vintage Books, 2000):
‘T.O.E. (Theory of Everything). A quantum-mechanical theory that encompasses all
forces and all matter’ (p. 423). The term became popular in the 1980s in the context
of string theory as a promising candidate to address the fundamental incompatibility
of highly successful fundamental theories such as quantummechanics and gravitation.
While it seems uncontroversial within physics that a ‘theory of everything’ in this sense
of describing all matter and interactions should be possible, even Greene remarks that
there is no agreement on further associations with this ‘grandiose descriptive term’
(p. 16): for a ‘staunch reductionist’, such a theory would truly describe everything and
effectively represent the endof physics, while others, himself included,would highlight
that reduction in principle does not imply reduction in practice; they would consider
a T.O.E. as but the beginning, namely as ‘the firmest foundation on which to build
our understanding’ (p. 17). Others, still, some of whom I will cite in section three,
insist that ‘unexpected phenomena’ and ‘new physical principles’ and ‘independent
laws’ would emerge at larger scales (p. 17).
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riving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’? Isn’t it uncontroversial that physics only
describes but cannot establish political or ethical norms?
Yet, much of what is written under the label of new materialism
argues for the political importance of ontology in the sense I outlined
earlier. Their proponents tend to agree on insisting that matter is fun-
damentally active, agential, vibrant, even vital. In this way, they seek to
correct what they interpret as the still-dominant ontology of Descartes
and its solidification through Newton’s mechanics, which through its
success established the paradigm for all modern scientific knowledge.
This ontology is dualistic, conceiving matter as passive and inert, and as
animated and activated by human subjects — be it directly or in a more
complex cultural and linguistic way.2 In like manner, the tradition of
historical materialism also gets targeted as presupposing the passivity
of matter.3
Why is it so important for new materialism to overcome this
ontology by insisting on the activity of matter? In what sense is it
political? To put it very briefly and roughly, the argument is that the
dualism of active subject vs passive matter lies at the heart of a host
of hierarchical binaries in which one side masters and dominates the
other, which has led to the violence of sexism, classism, racism, and
the exploitation of nature.
This understanding of the political and its criteria are certainly not
new: there is a long tradition of tracing fundamental, political issues
to the persistence of hierarchical binaries, and of adopting different
positions and strategies in response that seek to overcome the violent
consequences of these binaries. Most feminist traditions could be men-
tioned here, especially ecofeminism, as well as queer theory with its
2 See, e.g., StacyAlaimo and SusanHekman, ‘Introduction: EmergingModels ofMateri-
ality in FeministTheory’, in their co-editedMaterial Feminisms (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2008), pp. 1–19; Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, ‘Introducing
the New Materialisms’, in New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, ed. by
Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), pp.
1–43; Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2010).
3 See, e.g., SamanthaFrost, ‘The Implications of theNewMaterialisms for Feminist Epis-
temology’, in Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, ed. by Heidi E. Grass-
wick (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011), pp. 69–83 and Simon Choat, ‘Science,
Agency and Ontology: A Historical-Materialist Response to New Materialism’, Polit-
ical Studies, 66.4 (2018), 1027–42 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717731926>.
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critique of heteronormativity. To use an intellectual shortcut, one can
say that what unites otherwise quite diverse positions and problem-
atizes the naturalistic-fallacy argument is the notion of performativity,
which undermines the systematic separation of registers: no descrip-
tion or representation of what is is ever neutral. Instead, it is always also
performative, productive, and normative.
2. THE RELEVANCE OF DEACTIVATING THE NORMATIVE POWER
OF FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGIES
While I agree that it is important to acknowledge the performative
power of ontology, I also think it is important to distinguish different
political strategies relating to it. I am thinking, in particular, of different
feminist and queer strategies that oppose gender essentialism, that
is to say, the dispositive that turns nature into destiny. One primary
and influential strategy in these traditions is to distinguish between
biological sex and socially constructed gender, and to insist that the
norms and categories of gender are contingent and do not result from
biology. This strategy could also be described as insisting on a break or
cut between ontology and politics, or between what is and what could
be — and arguably ought to be — otherwise, and it seems very similar
to what I am proposing.
However, there is also the important counter-argument that such a
division only serves to veil the social construction of sexual difference
and its function of founding and stabilizing a hierarchical gender bin-
ary. According to this view — and I am thinking especially of Judith
Butler’s Gender Trouble and her theory of gender performativity —
all reference to a pre-discursive ontology is politically suspect. This
position abolishes the distinctions between sex and gender, ontology
and politics, and the descriptive and the normative,4 and replaces them
with a continuity. As Butler writes in reference to Monique Wittig: ‘sex
proves to have been gender from the start’.5 In other words, ontology
is always already politics; ‘Ontology is, thus, not a foundation, but a
4 Cf. Butler’s reflection on the temptation to distinguish between a descriptive and a
normative account of gender in her 1999 preface to Gender Trouble: Feminism and the
Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. xxi.
5 Ibid., p. 189.
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normative injunction that operates insidiously by installing itself into
political discourse as its necessary ground’.6
In many circles, this kind of argument has made it quasi-taboo to
invoke ontology, ‘nature’, ‘being’, etc., at least without using inverted
commas. And this development is precisely what new materialisms
have reacted to. In my reading, these various thinkers share the in-
tuition that refraining from ontological references may only disavow
an ontology of inert, passive matter and unwittingly re-enforce it.7
They insist on taking matter more seriously and engaging in onto-
logical speculations, asking such questions as, for example, ‘What if
Culture Was Really Nature All Along?’.8 Of course, with this reversal
of Butler’s ‘sex has been gender from the start’, the question becomes
how anything can be said or thought about matter without employing
discourse. The new materialist move could perhaps be described as
follows: Firstly, to highlight the importance of implicit ontological as-
sumptions — in particular, of the opposition between active discourse
and passive matter — and the difficulty of avoiding them.9 Secondly,
to engage with and rework ontology, rather than disavowing it, and
thereby seek to improve its politics.
It should be noted that a great deal of the work produced under the
banner of the ontological turn — initiated through related but different
traditions, especially in science studies and anthropology — is not
interested in asserting an ontology that would lie beyond cultural or
linguistic construction. Instead, the aim in such work generally seems
to be a radicalization of the constructivist impulse and a deflation of
6 Ibid.
7 The mechanism of disavowal that I am invoking here is modelled upon Sigmund
Freud’s account of fetishism as a disavowal of sexual difference, which involves both
a denial of the ‘reality’ of castration and its acknowledgment through anxiety and
the defensive creation of fetishes. Disavowal here produces precisely what it was
supposed to avert, namely a split (and in that sense castrated) subject. See the entry
‘Disavowal’ in Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-
Analysis (London: Hogarth Press, 1973), pp. 118–21. From a feminist perspective, a
fetishization of women is just as problematic as their identification with an essential
lack.
8 Vicki Kirby, ‘Natural Convers(at)ions: Or, What If Culture Was Really Nature All
Along?’, in Material Feminisms, ed. by Alaimo and Hekman, pp. 214–36.
9 Indeed, one might consider it impossible to avoid ontological assumptions, though
I wonder whether such a claim would have to be based in pragmatics, anthropology,
psychology, or aesthetics rather than logic.
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the normative effect of ontology. This is to be achieved through the
identification of a multiplicity of different — that is to say, incompat-
ible but individually equally viable — ontologies, and not merely in
philosophical or spiritual belief systems but also in social practices.10
I find this strategy promising, and while what I will propose re-
sembles it, I also want to note that it is highly ambiguous. Indeed,
proliferating ontological discourses rather than renouncing them in-
creases the risk of unwittingly re-enforcing ontological assumptions
through disavowal:11 In particular, the view that all ontologies are con-
structed and mediated by discourse seems to fit well with an ontology
of passive matter and active discourse. This is not to say that a pluraliza-
tion of ‘ontologies’ — and what has been called ‘ontological politics’12
— necessarily implies such an underlying ontology of matter and dis-
course, but its redefinition of ontology forecloses the possibility of
critically addressing the effect of underlying ontologies — something
that was still possible within the strategy of refraining from positive
ontological references.13
10 Cf. Steve Woolgar and Javier Lezaun, ‘The Wrong Bin Bag: A Turn to Ontology in
Science and Technology Studies?’, Social Studies of Science, 43.3 (2013), pp. 321–
40 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312713488820>; Martin Holbraad, Morten Axel
Pedersen, and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, ‘The Politics of Ontology: Anthropo-
logical Positions’, 2014 <https://culanth.org/fieldsights/the-politics-of-ontology-
anthropological-positions> [accessed 26 March 2019]; Christopher Gad, Casper
Bruun Jensen, and Brit Ross Winthereik, ‘Practical Ontology: Worlds in STS and
Anthropology’, NatureCulture, 3 (2015), pp. 67–86.
11 Cf. Woolgar and Lezaun’s worry that the notion of ‘ontological politics’ may ‘entail
commitments that take us beyond the long established deflationary stances of sceptical
STS’ (p. 336).
12 Cf. Annemarie Mol, ‘Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions’, The Socio-
logical Review, 47.1_suppl (1999), pp. 74–89 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
954X.1999.tb03483.x>, referring to John Law.
13 See, e.g., Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky, ‘Das ontologische Debakel oder was heißt: Es
gibt Medien?’, ZMK Zeitschrift Medien- und Kulturforschung, 8.2 (2017), pp. 157–68,
who observes critically that computer-science discourses of ‘operational ontologies’
avoid and disavow the philosophical question of ontology—what is being?—with the
effect that everything, including human beings, is objectified and treated as given data
and ‘stock’ (Bestand). Giorgio Agamben’s bookWhat Is Real? (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2018) is animated by a similar worry, namely that abandoning the
properly philosophical question of being means forsaking valuable resources for res-
isting (neo‐)liberal, biopolitical modes of governmentality. But these two thinkers do
not employ similar strategies to counter a pluralization of ontologies. While Agamben
pushes towards amore properly ontological inquiry, I interpret Deuber-Mankowsky as
following the strategy of ‘refraining from ontological references’ in order to keep the
question of ontology open.
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By contrast, the new materialist positions that I focus upon target
the ontological level underlying discursive practices. Instead of being
interested in deflating ontologies by multiplying them, they propose
an alternative ontology: one that conceives of matter as active, vibrant,
and even alive, rather than as passive, inert, and dualistically opposed
to the activity and agency of human discourse and culture. I am es-
pecially interested in the influential argument by Karen Barad, who
mobilizes theoretical physics to develop what she calls an ‘agential
realist ontology’.14
Although Barad criticizes the excessive power granted to language,
she takes no issue with the notion of performativity that, according
to Butler, accounts for that power. On the contrary, she extends per-
formativity from language to matter itself. Her neologism ‘intra-action’
encapsulates much of her argument: this term goes beyond the ‘usual
“interaction,” which presumes the prior existence of independent en-
tities/relata’,15 and instead allows for the emergence of separate entities.
According to Butler, the fact ‘[t]hat the gendered body is performative
suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various acts
which constitute its reality’.16 While one might limit this argument
to manifestly social categories such as gender, Barad emphasizes than
in quantum mechanics the ontological status of elementary entities,
such as light or electrons, depends on how their reality is constituted
in experimental acts: for instance, depending on the apparatus with
which they are observed, they materialize as particles or waves.
The parallels Barad draws between discursive and quantum per-
formativity are striking, compelling, and suggestive. However, they
also run the risk of short-circuiting different levels, registers, and
scales, thereby creating profound ambiguities and losing a sense of
what, in her own account, emerges and comes to matter in between.
On the one hand, expanding performativity extends what I would
characterize as top-down constructions, from social discourse all the
way down to the sub-atomic scale, while, on the other, it also ends
14 Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward anUnderstanding of HowMatter
Comes to Matter’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28.3 (2003), pp.
801–31 (p. 811).
15 Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity’, p. 815, emphasis added.
16 Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 173.
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up flipping to its reverse: Rather than refraining from ontological dis-
course Barad often affirms a particular ontology. Asserting a ‘relational
ontology’, insisting on ‘nature’s queerness’, and affirming an ontol-
ogy of ‘indeterminacy’, as she does, certainly avoids many problem
associated with essentialism and helps to counteract them.17 Still, I
would maintain that any ontology, however indeterminate, relational,
or processual, becomes problematically normative when one forgets
its speculative, constructed, and strategic character and instead just
embraces its performativity, which is seen as operating across all scales
from the bottom-up, as it were. Among other things that I cannot
unfold here,18 there is the risk that such an ontology would become
unduly extrapolated to suggest that everything is indeterminate and
queer, and should and can be recognized and destabilized as such.19
Indeed, Barad insists quite emphatically that her account holds for
all scales, from the microscopic to the macroscopic and in a precise
and literal — rather than merely analogical way — for discourses as
much as for matter.20 According to my reading, this claim ends up
17 Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity’, pp. 812, 816 and Karen Barad, ‘Nature’s Queer
Performativity’,Qui Parle: Literature, Philosophy, Visual Arts, History, 19.2 (2011), pp.
121–58 (pp. 125, 147).
18 See e.g. the contributions by Cornelia Möser and Marianna Poyares in this volume.
19 Such questions of (post)foundationalism in new feminist materialisms are addressed
by Katharina Hoppe, ‘Eine neue Ontologie des Materiellen? Probleme und Perspekt-
iven neomaterialistischer Feminismen’, inMaterial turn: Feministische Perspektiven auf
Materialität und Materialismus, ed. by Christine Löw and others (Leverkusen: Bar-
bara Budrich, 2017). While Hoppe suggests that a ‘relational ontology’ like Barad’s
can escape the problem of a normative essentialism, Timothy Morton and Graham
Harman warn against over-investing in the political benefits of relational ontologies.
See Timothy Morton, ‘Treating Objects Like Women: Feminist Ontology and the
Question of Essence’, in International Perspectives in Feminist Ecocriticism, ed. by Greta
Gaard, Simon C. Estok, and Serpil Oppermann (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp.
56–69. Heeding this warning does not imply endorsing Harman’s ‘speculative realist’
alternative, his ‘Object Oriented Ontology’ (OOO). Rather, I find its critique by
Thomas Lemke not only compelling, but — for very similar reasons — also applicable
to Barad’s Agential Realism, including his argument that ‘OOO’s promise to break
once and for all with subject–object dualism results in a revived form of subjectivism’.
See Thomas Lemke, ‘Materialism without Matter: The Recurrence of Subjectivism in
Object-OrientedOntology’,Distinktion: Journal of SocialTheory, 18.2 (2017), pp. 133–
52 (p. 134) <https://doi.org/10.1080/1600910X.2017.1373686>. In other words,
while I argue for the strategic value of speculative ontologies, I also see a need for a
critical corrective to their proclaimed realism.
20 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of
Matter and Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 24, 86, 110;
‘Nature’s Queer Performativity’, p. 147. See also Elizabeth Stephens, ‘Feminism and
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undermining her own sense of ‘how matter comes to matter’, which
requires emergent discontinuities or what she calls ‘agential cuts’ en-
acted through intra-action.21
I agree that the notion of emergence is key for understanding
how matter comes to matter, and also that a cut or discontinuity is
important. However, the crucial question is how to relate discontinuity
to the notion of emergence, which has gained much currency in recent
years but still remains thoroughly ambiguous.22 Indeed, the notion of a
continuously emerging discontinuity seems inherently contradictory,
and requiring it as a condition for something coming to matter risks
implying that nothing can actually come to matter and everything is
already determined ‘from the start’ and ‘all along’, whether through
discourse or nature.
Instead, what I would like to suggest is that matter properly comes
to matter at any relevant scale to the extent that other scales cease
to matter. There is no need to claim any discontinuity here, only a
New Materialism: The Matter of Fluidity’, Interalia: A Journal of Queer Studies, 9
(2014), pp. 186–202. I should highlight that Barad’s point that quantum phenomena
are not necessarily restricted to microscopic scales is well taken if one takes ‘scale’
only in terms of length scales. Nevertheless, in most interpretations of quantum
mechanics (in particular Bohr’s), the possibility of describing experiment and its
results as classical (rather than quantum) objects is crucial and this requires a large
number of accessible degrees of freedom (as can usually be found in macroscopic
objects).
21 Cf. Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, esp. pp. 175–79. For a critique of Barad’s
denial of ‘scale variance’, see DerekWoods, ‘Scale Variance and the Concept ofMatter’,
inTheNew Politics of Materialism: History, Philosophy, Science, ed. by Sarah Ellenzweig
and John H. Zammito (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), pp. 200–24. While I largely
agree with his critique, I am sceptical about his insistence of linking ‘scale variance’
to the emergence of ‘jumps and discontinuities’ (p. 201) across scales and maintain
that physics can only account for a pragmatic sense of emergence. For a helpful and
nuanced assessment of Barad’s agential realism, stressing the importance of emergent
discontinuities as well as exclusions, see Gregory Hollin and others, ‘(Dis)Entangling
Barad: Materialisms and Ethics’, Social Studies of Science, 47.6 (2017), pp. 918–41
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312717728344>.
22 For entry points into the vast literature on emergence as notion that appeared in late-
nineteenth biological and evolutionary theories and ‘re-emerged’ in the last quarter
of the twentieth century as a ‘legitimate’ and widely popularized scientific concept
in theories of complexity, self-organization, and chaos, see, for example, Peter A.
Corning, ‘The Re-Emergence of “Emergence”: A Venerable Concept in Search of a
Theory’, Complexity, 7.6 (2002), pp. 18–30 <https://doi.org/10.1002/cplx.10043>
and the very helpful reader Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and
Science, ed. by Mark A. Bedau and Paul Humphreys (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2008).
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coming to matter and ceasing to matter, which in turn relies on the
possibility of material properties changing with scale. One could speak
here of a scale-dependent ontology, as some indeed do,23 but as long
as the multiple ontologies at different scales remain reducible to an
underlying ontology, the normative power of that ontology is bound
to remain irresistible.
While breaking with physics in favour of another, more properly
philosophical understanding of ontology is always an option, I argue
that the desired discontinuity can also be addressed more immanently
within physics by considering the limit of infinitely small or infinitely
large scales and seeing how incompatible, discontinuously related fun-
damental ontologies can account for the same finite-scale properties.
In the next section, I will give some indications on how thinking with
physics in this manner may be helpful in devising strategies to de-
activate the normativity of fundamental ontologies, including those of
physics itself.
3. PROPOSITION: A PHYSICS OF EMERGENCE CAN HELP IN
DEACTIVATING ONTOLOGICAL NORMATIVITY
There is something to be learned, I suggest, from the ways in which
physics routinely combines and mixes incompatible, discontinuously
related ontologies when modelling phenomena emerging at some par-
ticular scale, such as the crystallization of liquids, the condensation
of vapour into droplets, or other so-called phase transitions. With the
phrase ‘mixing ontologies’ I mean describing matter both in terms of
discrete particles moving in a vacuum and in terms of continua of
energy, temperature, or some other fluid or field that can flow and
propagate waves.
In the late nineteenth century these ontological alternatives were
hotly debated and ultimately decided upon in favour of atomism.24
23 In addition to Woods, see, for instance, Robert W. Batterman, ‘Autonomy and Scales’,
inWhyMore Is Different: Philosophical Issues in CondensedMatter Physics and Complex
Systems, ed. by Brigitte Falkenburg and Margaret Morrison (Heidelberg: Springer,
2015), pp. 115–35 (p. 133).
24 Debates on atomism, which entangle metaphysics and physics, seem to keep recurring
on different time scales even after Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy posits irresolv-
able antinomies of pure reason. See, for example, Alan Chalmers, ‘Atomism from the
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Nonetheless, continuum models, which imply an ontology of continu-
ous, indefinitely divisible fluids rather than discrete atoms, are still
in use today and indeed continue to be omnipresent when physics
models emergent phenomena such as phase transitions. Of course, the
common view is that continuum descriptions are only pragmatic ap-
proximations and that continuum properties of matter emerge only in
a pragmatic sense at large scales, and are, in principle, reducible to the
properties of atoms and their interactions. However, it turns out that
simple everyday experiences such as the qualitative difference between
phases, the transitions between them, and other thermodynamic phe-
nomena are remarkably hard to grasp or even define without relying
on continuum descriptions.
In the late nineteenth century, statistical mechanics was developed
to make the reduction of everyday phenomena to an atomistic ontol-
ogy plausible and to understand how the thermodynamic properties of
matter can emerge from mechanics. Perhaps the most important and
basic issue at stake here is the so-called second law of thermodynamics,
the law of irreversibly increasing entropy, which has been interpreted
as defining an arrow of time. The challenge is that the laws of mech-
anics are reversible — any process going in one direction can also go
in the opposite direction — and it would seem logically impossible
to derive a directed process, such as a tendency towards equilibrium,
from reversible laws. Yet, statistical mechanics shows that if you have
enough particles there is an overwhelming probability that the com-
plicated and therefore effectively random movement of microscopic
particles will behave as described by thermodynamics and approach
equilibrium.
Most physicists are quite satisfied with such an account, which
considers all material processes to be reducible in principle but allows
for the emergence of new properties — such as irreversibility — in
17th to the 20th Century’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N.
Zalta (Spring 2019 Edition) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/
atomism-modern/> [accessed 5 May 2020] and Torsten Wilholt, ‘When Realism
Made a Difference: The Constitution of Matter and Its Conceptual Enigmas in Late
19th Century Physics’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 39.1 (2008), pp. 1–16 <https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.shpsb.2007.04.003>. While physicists may no longer question the reality of
atoms, they have also ceased to consider them as elementary and tend rather towards
ontologies of continuous fields, strings, or membranes.
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practice. Such a pragmatic sense of emergence is sufficient to justify
the use of thermodynamics, and more generally, the relative autonomy
of phenomena at higher levels and the respective disciplines studying
them, such as chemistry and biology.
However, others observe that this view of ‘reducible in principle,
but emergent in practice’ privileges fundamental physics and under-
mines other sciences and their objects. In other words, critics have
highlighted how a pragmatic sense of emergence introduces no discon-
tinuity or cut, and they worry that the fundamental ontology and its
laws continue to dominate everything across all scales.
I take this worry seriously. It corresponds, in effect, to what I
have called the normative performativity of ontology, which here takes
the form of extending reversibility from the fundamental level to all
scales and disregarding a pragmatic emergence of irreversibility. When
viewed from a certain perspective, such normativity is irresistible as
it seems logically impossible to shift continuously between opposite
properties.
In the final quarter of the last century, Ilya Prigogine and Isa-
belle Stengers were particularly vocal in insisting that thermodynamics
should be taken more seriously than a pragmatic approximation of
particle mechanics. They argued that change is fundamentally im-
possible in an ontology of particles obeying deterministic, reversible
laws, and time is just an illusion, insofar as the past and future are, in
principle, fully determined by the present state.25 Within the paradigm
25 To be a little more precise, Prigogine and Stengers highlight in Order Out of Chaos:
Man’sNewDialogue withNature (London:Heinemann, 1984) that classicalmechanics
expresses a ‘static view of nature’ (p. 11). Seeing that mechanics is all about particles
moving in space and time, this claim is counter-intuitive, but their point is that with
laws of motion that are both deterministic and reversible, a system’s state at any given
moment fully determines all states in the future and the past. As Alvin Toffler writes in
his foreword, ‘there is no evolution, neither to order nor to disorder, the “information”
[…] remains constant in time’ (p. xxix). The problem with classical physics is, for
Prigogine and Stengers, therefore not that it implies or may inspire fatalism — though
it certainly does — but rather that it does not allow for any real sense of process,
transformation, or becoming. It means ultimately, as they say in reference to Einstein,
to ‘deny the reality of time as irreversibility, as evolution’ (p. 293). Such a sense of time
is enabled through irreversible laws of transformation, even if they remain determin-
istic and involve, for instance, a constant loss of information. In any case, Prigogine
and Stengers’s insistence on irreversibility through the second law of thermodynamics
seems only to further fatalism, which implies neither determinism nor reversibility,
but is consistent with the presence of randomness (on which Prigogine and Stengers
insist) and even free will. Indeed, the second law is usually associated with entropic
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of particle mechanics, everyday experiences of change, evolution, de-
cay, or anything else that could matter would only be due to our
subjective perception, our ignorance of the fundamental details, and
to the way we construct the world at our scale. Prigogine and Stengers
therefore stress the importance of finding an alternative ontology in
which irreversibility and randomness are fundamental. Even if their
context is different and their project more thorough, their insistence
on acknowledging the fundamental activity and creativity of mat-
ter, and their arguments about the far-reaching political and cultural
implications of a post-Newtonian ontology, are strikingly similar to
new-materialist arguments of this century.
Again, I am suspicious of the foundationalist gesture that insists
on the relevance of matter’s fundamental ontology and embraces its
performative normativity. As an alternative to either refraining from
ontology or developing a less damaging one, I propose to deactivate
the performative normativity of ontology by redoubling reduction,
that is, by showing how the same properties can, as a matter of prin-
ciple, be reduced to, and therefore also be considered to emerge
pragmatically from, radically different ontologies with conflicting per-
formative normativities. In other words, I propose, on the one hand, to
accept physics’ weak, merely pragmatic sense of emergence, embracing
it as the only thing mattering at any given scale; and, on the other
hand, I propose to deactivate the normativity conveyed by the claim
that emergent properties remain, in principle, reducible through a
strategic redoubling: if atoms could only become plausible by demon-
strating how observed properties can pragmatically emerge from them
at higher scales, then I maintain that, as a matter of principle, the same
properties can also emerge in the same pragmatic sense from a radically
different ontology of continuous matter.
processes inevitably leading to death, disorder, and decay, and ultimately with the so-
called ‘heat death of the universe’. However, if fatalism tends to focus on some future
event and its imperviousness to whatever happens before, and if standard thermo-
dynamics focuses on describing equilibrium states no matter how they are produced
by irreversible processes, the interim is all that matters to Prigogine. In The End of
Certainty: Time, Chaos and the New Laws of Nature (New York, NY: Free P, 1996),
he recalls the anecdote of a 1946 meeting, in which his interest in nonequilibrium
physics was received by a hostile comment that highlighted the transient character of
irreversible processes and for which he now would have the repartee: ‘But we are all
transient. Is it not natural to be interested in our common human condition?’ (p. 62).
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Without going into details, let me just highlight that this is not
to deny the reality of atoms, but to insist that one can always go to
smaller scales and establish well-defined procedures for re-describing
atoms as pragmatically emerging from continuum fields. Here discon-
tinuity is neither in emergence or scale but rather between the contrary
ontologies that one can posit speculatively, and the point is that this
discontinuity becomes increasingly irrelevant as the scale of the fun-
damental ontology decreases with respect to ours.
Of course, the very notion of a fundamental ontology becomes
problematic in this infinite regress to smaller scales, but whereas rela-
tional ontologies tend to invoke such a regress — often through the
image of ‘turtles all the way down’26 — in order to stress a lack of
foundation that renders everything unstable, my emphasis lies on the
emergence of a remarkable stability and consistency at higher scales.
Indeed, the higher scales — which is where matter comes to matter
— can be considered autonomous or ‘protected’ from lower scales.27
Conversely, the fundamental ontology becomes increasingly uncer-
tain because nothing can possibly be experienced that would allow
for a decision between different ontological options, and therefore
the fundamental ontology becomes utterly irrelevant. Rather than an
ontology of indeterminacy, I would prefer to speak of an utter inde-
terminacy of ontology; of an undecidability of ontology rather than an
ontology of undecidability.
Fundamental, so-called high-energy physics seems close to the
point of showing its own irrelevance, even if it is no doubt premature
to speculate over whether the Higgs Boson is the last evidence that
can be of some guidance or whether astronomical observations can
give some clues. More interesting and certainly more relevant for most
of us is what emerges on intermediate scales, from condensed matter
physics to chemistry, biology, and geology (to speak only of the natural
sciences).
26 See Isabelle Stengers, ‘Turtles All the Way Down’, in Power and Invention: Situating
Science (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1997); Donna J. Haraway,When
Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), pp. 32–33 and 287.
27 Important references within physics for the kind of argument to which I am alluding
here are Philip W. Anderson, ‘More Is Different: Broken Symmetry and the Nature of
the Hierarchical Structure of Science’, Science, 177 (1972), pp. 393–96 and Robert B.
Laughlin and David Pines, ‘The Theory of Everything’, PNAS, 97.1 (2000), pp 28–31.
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If, as I am insisting, the ontologies envisaged by fundamental phys-
ics are irrelevant at this scale, my argument that a particle ontology
can, in principle, always be re-described in terms of continua (and vice
versa) could seem equally irrelevant. My claim is certainly not one in
which those working in statistical mechanics, for instance, would be in-
terested, as it would only make the dynamics much more complicated
and unmanageable without having any practical advantages.28
Conceptually, however, the possibility of such a re-description
is significant insofar as large-scale properties, such as the irreversible
tendency towards equilibrium, can then be seen as a strict rather than
an approximate consequence of the fundamental ontology (which is,
as always, only ever posited speculatively). As a consequence, phys-
ics’ practice of combining descriptions corresponding to incompatible
ontologies appears in a different light. Indeed, I would like to point
out that the very theory that convinced physicists of the ‘reality of
atoms’ — Einstein’s theory of Brownian motion — crucially depends
just as much on an atomic description as on a continuum descrip-
tion.29 While there is an ingrained habit in physics of considering the
continuum as but a large-scale approximation of a more fundamental
atomic description, my argument on the double reducibility of all phe-
nomena makes it possible to take the continuum just as seriously and
consider atoms as but a way of approximating continuous matter.
I suggest that methodically oscillating between such contrary on-
tologies and combining them on an equal footing helps to deactivate
their normative power and to recognize scale-specific phenomena like
Brownian motion as mattering in their own right, that is, not just as
proof of atomism but equally as proof of the reality of a continuum, and
ultimately also as something ‘more’ — namely, as something coming
28 Such pragmatic considerations — rather than an obstinate adherence to classical
physics— are themain reason that Prigogine’s ambitious project of establishing a ‘new
physics’ with an alternative fundamental description (appropriate for phenomena in
far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics) remains popular only outside of physics and
must be considered a failure within physics, as Stengers also ended up conceding.
See Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics, 2 vols (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2010–11), ii (2011), ‘Book v. In the Name of the Arrow of Time: Prigogine’s
Challenge’, pp. 103–204 (pp. 121–22).
29 Cf. Sergio Chibbaro, Lamberto Rondoni, and Angelo Vulpiani, Reductionism, Emer-
gence and Levels of Reality:The Importance of Being Borderline (Cham: Springer, 2014),
especially section ‘3.3 The Paradigmatic Brownian Motion’ (pp. 57–62).
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to matter at a specific scale, requiring physics to work through specific
combinations of mutually incompatible ontologies.30
CONCLUSION
To conclude, I have argued that the fundamental ontology of matter as
theorized by physics is irrelevant at human scales, but that it is polit-
ically relevant to address its performative power. I have suggested that
this power is due to a seemingly irresistible reductionist attitude that
sees in pragmatically emergent properties only the properties of the
underlying ontology and not their novel character. In order to deacti-
vate the misleading normativity of ontology, it seems insufficient to
highlight that the whole point of physics’ reductionist theorizing is to
understand how novel properties can emerge from a simple ontology;
nor is it effective to refrain from all ontological references or posit an
ontology of indeterminacy. Instead, the best political strategy may be
to insist on an indeterminacy of ontology, that is, to posit method-
ically and speculatively mutually incompatible ontologies and work
through their consequences in alternation or even conjunction. I sug-
gest that understanding and probing such a methodology in physics
may provide helpful models to think with in other domains, even if
the relevant ontological questions are quite different, involving not
particles and continua, but oppositions such as activity and passivity,
matter and language, nature and culture.
According to this view, physics can offer to critical thought not
a solid foundation of matter and the world, but rather tools for cri-
tique that seem to defy logic and challenge deeply ingrained habits
of thought. The political relevance of physics lies in not only showing
the irrelevance of its fundamental ontologies, but also in indicating
strategies to deactivate their normative ontologies and thereby open
spaces for political negotiations.
30 Alluding here to Harman’s critique of ‘duomining’, I suggest to take objects seriously
precisely insofar as their modelling within physics requires a double undermining
(which is effectively an undermining and an ‘overmining’). Cf. Graham Harman,
‘Stengers on Emergence’, BioSocieties, 9.1 (2014), pp. 99–104 <https://doi.org/10.
1057/biosoc.2013.43> and Graham Harman, ‘Agential and Speculative Realism: Re-
marks on Barad’s Ontology’, Rhizomes: Cultural Studies in Emerging Knowledge, 30,
2016 <https://doi.org/10.20415/rhiz/030.e10>.
IV. TOWARDS A RENEWED
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

Introduction to Part iv
DANIEL LIU
The following five chapters are varying attempts to reassemble the
‘historical’ and the ‘materialist’ constituents of the history of materi-
alism on terms which are not those of the ‘historical materialism’ that
was mandated by Marxist and Leninist orthodoxy for much of the
twentieth century.1 This part begins with Frieder Otto Wolf’s call to
pay closer attention to what Karl Marx (1818–1883) was trying to
articulate under the heading ‘the materialist conception of history’,
in order to dissolve a calcified version of historical materialism from
the twentieth century. Wolf emphasizes that Marx’s project was one
of theory building, and calls attention to Raúl Rojas’ argument that
Marx’s so called ‘historical materialism’ was an ‘unfinished project’ and
should not, therefore, be read as scripture or commandment.2 In place
of an overarching theory of a law-like succession of social orders of
production, Wolf argues that a methodological ‘finite Marxism’ should
focus on the specific details of how contemporary capitalism actually
operates, and how it produces its unique patterns of power and dom-
ination.
The part then moves on to the contributions by Ayşe Yuva and
Alex Demirović, which provide distinctly opposing claims about the
1 Tony Judt, ‘Goodbye to All That?’, New York Review of Books, 1111.14 (21 September
2006).
2 Raúl Rojas, Das unvollendete Projekt: Zur Entstehungsgeschichte von Marx’ Kapital,
Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften, 14 (Berlin: Argument, 1989).
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relationship between materialist philosophy and political philosophy.
Yuva’s chapter returns to the eighteenth century to provide broader
historical and geographical contexts for the history of materialist philo-
sophy, paying particular attention to the ways in which materialism
has been attacked for being ‘reductionist’, ‘vulgar’, or too ‘mechanical’.
Yuva argues that this blanket critique needs to be counterbalanced
with the actual historical contexts in which materialism was adopted
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: namely, that materialism
was explicitly articulated as alternatives to philosophies based on in-
corporeal ideals or ‘spirit’, and in opposition to the theologies and
theocracies that used to dominate the world’s major political orders.
In particular, Yuva explores Germaine de Staël’s (1766–1817) influen-
tial argument about the opposing tendencies of English materialism
vs German idealism, and largely maps this binary opposition to the
Ottoman political reformer Beşir Fuad (1852–1887), who adopted
the mantle of scientific materialism in order carve out a philosophical
space independent of conservative Islamic orthodoxy. On the other
hand, Demirović marshals two of the dominant French philosophers
of the twentieth century, Michel Foucault (1926–1984) and Louis
Althusser (1918–1990), to augment Marx and to argue that ‘politics is
really a kind of spiritualism and it is illusory’.3 In this way, Demirović
can argue that his own so-called ‘critical materialism’ is ‘concerned
with the reality of ghosts and the undead precisely because the polit-
ical mind is spiritual, and because the economy is theological and
metaphysical’.4 It is unclear if there is any middle ground between
Demirović’s conclusion and Yuva’s appeal that we ‘not fall back into a
dogmatic materialism, unconscious of the ideological parts it inherited
from its history’.
The last two chapters in the section elaborate some of the essential
ground for Demirović’s claims. The contribution by Facundo Vega is
a close reading and critique of the oeuvre of the leftist political philo-
sopher Ernesto Laclau (1935–2014), in particular Laclau’s attempt to
juggle the political importance of Marxist historical materialism in the
mid-twentieth century with a Heidegger-inflected, post-structuralist
3 Demirović, in this volume, p. 323.
4 Ibid., p. 325.
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anti-foundationalism. Vega tracks the development of Laclau’s thought
from the late-1970s to his death in 2014, showing how Laclau’s earlier,
Marxist arguments about class conflict and modes of production in
the 1980s gave way to meditations on the ontological foundation of
‘the political’ in the 1990s. The end result of Laclau’s recourse to ‘the
political’ in the metaphysical sense is, according to Vega, a totalizing
conception of political difference, one that elides into populism and
proto-fascism.
Vega’s critique of Laclau’s attempt to cast politics in purely meta-
physical terms is complemented byMariannaPoyares’s chapter on the
salutary uses of ethnography in critical social theory. Poyares argues
that the ethnographic method itself calls attention to positionality,
difference, and plurality, starting with the explicit need to clarify the
relationship between actors’ and analysts’ categories. For Poyares this
self-reflection itself constitutes ‘bringing the theorist closer to “matter
itself ”’,5 primarily by forcing the theorist to question and re-examine
the hegemony of her prior theoretical categories.
To round out this introduction, I would like to call attention to a
dual use of ‘materialism’ in these five contributions.
1. The first is the problem of which philosophers or what kinds of
philosophy are considered to be ‘materialist’, either by their con-
temporaries at the time or by later philosophers in retrospect.
This is essentially a problem of distinguishing materialist philo-
sophy from other, presumably non-materialist philosophies.
For the moment, let us call this ‘materialism1’.
2. The second is the problem of what kinds of materials or things
such materialist philosophers hold as central or prototypical
to their understanding of why materialism, as a general set of
philosophical positions, ought to be taken more seriously than
other, non-materialist philosophies. Let’s call this ‘materialism2’.
We might initially construe materialism2 (‘What materials are ma-
terialists concerned with?’) to be a subset of materialism1 (‘What is
materialism?’), therefore making materialism1 the bigger and more im-
portant problem area to address. However,Yuva’s chapter in particular
5 Poyares, in this volume, p. 346.
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calls attention to the fact that the moniker ‘materialism’ in its various
guises was also a way to harness growing natural and social ‘scientific’
knowledge of materials and material relations in order to challenge the
theologies and theocracies that used to dominate the world’s major
political orders. Materialism, so its protagonists claimed, insisted upon
the primary importance of the material, the substantive, and ultimately
secular world, over and against the ideal and the spiritual.6 Another
way to put it: a key hallmark of materialist philosophy is that it in-
sists that materialism2 is more important than materialism1, because
materialists argue that the totality and variety of material relations
supersedes idealist or metaphysical presumptions.
Notice the repeated invocations of the particular and the specific
against the general and the abstract in these five chapters on historical
materialism. In Wolf’s chapter, we see (emphases mine):
According to this analysis, finite Marxism combines a specific
analysis and reconstruction of the domination of the capitalist
mode of production […]7
The project of laying bare the inner workings, structures,
mechanisms, and tendencies of the domination of the capitalist
mode of production in modern bourgeois societies, and at least
to begin to understand how they present themselves in actual
lived experience, has not been entirely lost, in spite of many
simplifications and reductionist tendencies […]8 this field of
scientific research […] insights into the actual workings of the
historical domination of the capitalist mode of production.9
Finite Marxism […] is uniquely capable of understanding
the ‘specific materiality and the characteristic conditions’ of
other fields of domination.10
not […] by offering ‘Marxism’ as an overarching theory,
but by emphasizing its own specific contribution […]11
[…] without attempting to subsume them to Marxist gen-
eralities […]12
6 Margaret C. Jacob, The Secular Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2019).
7 Wolf, in this volume, p. 280.
8 Ibid., p. 285.
9 Ibid., p. 286.
10 Ibid., p. 289.
11 Ibid., p. 290.
12 Ibid.
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In Poyares’s argument for the uses of ethnography (again, emphases
mine) via Robin Celikates:
Critique has to be based on the analysis of social reality and
its contradictions, and […] can only find its criteria in the
social practices, struggles, experiences, and self-understandings
to which critique is connected.13
[…] empirical research without the reduction of the ob-
ject of analysis to the mere instantiation of theory […]14
And in his critique of Ernesto Laclau’s latter-day populism,Vega argues
that Laclau’s ‘operation of de-substantializing and re-substantializing
“the people” leads to a disdain for the autonomy of “the many”’ (again,
emphasis mine).15 Notice that, time and again in all but one of these
chapters, the philosophers being studied and the authors of the essays
themselves align ‘materialism’ with specificities, and hold ‘reality’, ‘ob-
jects’, ‘inner workings’, ‘the many’, and the manifold lived experiences
against theory and generalities. If Platonism and Heideggerian ontol-
ogy progressively abstract their way towards the Good, or the One, or
to God, or Being itself,16 then materialism moves in the opposite dir-
ection.17 It should therefore not be a surprise that, since the eighteenth
century, the natural sciences provided the empirical foundation of and
inspiration for modern materialist philosophy against both theology
and metaphysical speculation. Additionally, it must be observed that
13 Poyares, in this volume, p. 347.
14 Ibid., p. 350.
15 Vega, in this volume, p. 339.
16 That is to say, the operation Heidegger is engaged in is not so dissimilar to Plato
and Plotinus. See Benjamin Crowe, Heidegger’s Religious Origins: Destruction and
Authenticity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Hans Jonas, ‘Gnosticism
and Modern Nihilism’, Social Research, 19.4 (December 1952), pp. 430–52; Benjamin
Lazier, God Interrupted: Heresy and the European Imagination Between the World Wars
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Karl Löwith, ‘Knowledge and
Faith: From the Pre-Socratics to Heidegger’, in Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor
of Paul Tillich, ed. by Walter Liebrecht (New York: Harper, 1959), pp. 196–210. In
George Steiner’s introductory text Martin Heidegger (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991), Steiner objects that, although one could interpret Heidegger as a crypto-
Platonist, Heidegger himself rejects this (pp. 60–61). However, one should actually
examine how Heidegger does this, rather than simply accept his own interpretation as
doctrine.
17 Hans Blumenberg makes a parallel argument about the history of creativity in ‘“Imita-
tion of Nature”: Toward a Prehistory of the Idea of the Creative Being’, trans. by Anna
Wertz, Qui Parle, 12.1 (2000), pp. 17–54.
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debates about the relationship between the general and the particular
were most robustly practiced in the natural and social sciences.18
This vast diversity in our material environments is precisely why so
many of the ‘New Materialists’ from the early-2000s found references
to the natural sciences so valuable, if fraught. But, as Poyares argues
quite forcefully, one need not go all the way to the natural sciences
to find challenging materials in their particularities: the social and
political sciences, which are the home of the ethnographic method,
give plenty of examples.
18 Lynn K. Nyhart, ‘Wissenschaft and Kunde: The General and the Special in Modern
Science’, Osiris, 27.1 (2012), pp. 250–75 <https://doi.org/10.1086/667830>; Lynn
K. Nyhart, ‘The Political Organism: Carl Vogt on Animals and States in the 1840s and
’50s’, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 47.5 (November 2017), pp. 602–28
<https://doi.org/10.1525/hsns.2017.47.5.602>; Sander Gliboff, H. G. Bronn, Ernst
Haeckel, and the Origins of German Darwinism: A Study in Translation and Transform-
ation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008); Sabina Leonelli, Data-Centric Biology: A
Philosophical Study (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016); Horst W. J. Rittel
and Melvin M. Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning’, Policy Sciences,
4.2 ( June 1973), pp. 155–69; Charles H. Pence, ‘“Describing Our Whole Experi-
ence”: The Statistical Philosophies of W. F. R. Weldon and Karl Pearson’, Studies in
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 42.4 (2011), pp. 475–
85 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2011.07.011>; Theodore M. Porter, Genetics in
the Madhouse: The Unknown History of Human Heredity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2018). See alsoWilhelmWindelband, ‘Rectoral Address, Strasbourg,
1894’, History and Theory, 19.2 (February 1980), pp. 169–85 <https://doi.org/10.
2307/2504798>.
Materialism against Materialism
Taking up Marx’s Break with Reductionism
FRIEDER OTTO WOLF
INTRODUCTION
There is a problem in the air. On the one hand, after many post-modern
criticisms, nobody (or very few people) want to rehabilitate tradi-
tional modern materialism in the vein of Julien Offray de La Mettrie
or Georgi Plekhanov, to provide just two examples. Its strong ten-
dencies towards simplification and reductionism seem to forbid any
further engagement with the theory.1 On the other hand, the post-
modern variant of pluralism seems to have stifled the will to explore,
know, or explain what is really going on, in contrast to mere ‘outward
appearances’, as a necessary starting point for a perspective of active
political intervention. In particular, any political practice committed
to at least creating possibilities of liberating initiatives, which will be
or will become capable of overcoming the very material structures of
domination in place, will have to lift the veil of superficial ‘illusion’.
1 Maurice Godelier has classically summarized the underlying criticism of ‘false mater-
ialisms’ in his debate with Lucien Sève. See Maurice Godelier, ‘Dialectical Logic and
the Analysis of Structures: A Reply to Lucien Sevè’, International Journal of Sociology,
2.2–3 (1972), pp. 241–80 (p. 253).
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The perspective of ‘finite Marxism’, as I defend it,2 opens the way to
simultaneously address the plurality of the structures of domination in
place while also maintaining the need to analyse their underlying struc-
tural dynamics, particularly including an analysis of the domination of
modern bourgeois societies by the capitalist mode of production.3
In my opinion, the structures of domination in place today have
been (more or less) adequately described by the ‘triple oppression’
formulated by activists of the 1990s. However, I would argue for re-
placing the triplet of ‘Class, Sex, and Race’ with the somewhat more
refined and extended quadruplet of structural forms of domination —
class, gender, (especially international) dependency, and ‘ecological
overexploitation’ —,4 and not leaving out the elementary ideological
dimensions of, for example, racism, antisemitism, homophobia, and
comparable forms of discrimination.5 And yet I propose to accept
the broader underlying claim of aiming at and hitting something real,
namely a level of historical reality, as it has been (and still is) defended
by the respective historical social and political movements. By so do-
ing, I would claim that it is both possible and feasible to overcome the
traditional notions of an essentialist and reductionist materialism. This
reductionist approach to reality — which does not accept the complex
reality of the given and considers the most immediate realities to be
mere appearances (at the very least) — tends to be incapable of provid-
ing a realistic orientation for political practice, which has to deal with
given socio-historical realities as they effectively present themselves.
2 See my attempt in ‘Die unabschließbare Aufgabe des endlichen Marxismus: Eine
materiell verankerte Arbeit des Begriffs ohne Essentialismus oder Reduktionismus’,
Con-Textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy, 2018.5 (2018), pp. 200–17.
3 My thinking in this respect has certainly been influenced in important ways by Félix
Guattari’s work since the 1970s, with whom I have had occasion to discuss problems
of eco-socialist strategy building. A central role has certainly been played by his essay
in Three Ecologies (London: Athlone, 2000) — but I am unable to reconstruct how it
has impacted my own contributions to eco-socialist strategies.
4 Because they have been relatively focused upon by Marxist, feminist, ecological, and
dependency theories. I do not see any possibility of integrating these disparate theories
into one overarching theory, as some exponents of these theories have attempted.
5 By concentrating explicitly on this ideological dimension of intersectionality, Karin
Stögner makes it salient that critics must also bring out the plurality of the structures
of domination overdetermining this ideological dimension. See her article ‘Inter-
sektionalität von Ideologien — Antisemitismus, Sexismus und das Verhältnis von
Gesellschaft und Natur’, Psychologie & Gesellschaftskritik, 41.162 (2017), pp. 25–45.
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Instead, I want to propose a ‘materialism of materialities’6 —
which would include a ‘materialism of emergence’, as has been pro-
grammatically formulated by Roy Bhaskar and Mario Bunge.7 In this
chapter, I shall try to argue that re-reading Karl Marx may help us to
overcome and change the traditional fixation of left-wing debates on
the still-pervasive idea of a need for a materialist reductionism.8 This
begins with Marx’s own breaking away from traditional ‘materialism’,
which he found so decisively wanting that some have misinterpreted
his rejection of ‘all hitherto existing materialism’ as a farewell to ‘ma-
terialism’ as such.
MATERIALISM OF MATERIALITIES, OR A NON-REDUCTIONIST
MATERIALISM
One of the points Marx forcefully made in his private notes on
Feuerbach9 concerned taking his distance from this ‘hitherto exist-
ing materialism (the one of Ludwig Feuerbach included)’.10 I want
to argue for a re-reading of Marx which sees him (accompanied by
Friedrich Engels) philosophically on the way towards a new, non-
reductionist kind of materialism, i.e. a ‘materialism of materialities’.11
Such a ‘materialism of materialities’ should be understood as fully ex-
6 See my ‘Ein Materialismus für das 21. Jahrhundert’, in Kritik und Materialität: im
Auftrag der Assoziation für kritische Gesellschaftsforschung, ed. by Alex Demirović
(Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2008), pp. 41–59.
7 See Roy Bhaskar’sARealistTheory of Science (London: Verso, 2007), as well as hisThe
Possibility of Naturalism (London: Routledge, 1979), and Mario Bunge’s Emergence
and Convergence: Qualitative Novelty and the Unity of Knowledge (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2003). See also Tuukka Kaidesoja, ‘Bhaskar and Bunge on Social
Emergence’, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 39.3 (2009), pp. 300–22.
8 Which has taken a new (and regrettable) form in the more or less openly ‘vitalist’ turn
taken by many defenders of ‘new materialisms’. See the critique formulated by Paul
Rekret, ‘ACritique ofNewMaterialism: Ethics andOntology’, Subjectivity, 9.3 (2016),
pp. 225–45.
9 The obvious question of what may have been in his mind as ‘2)’ seems to remain
unanswerable, and is, therefore, ordinarily avoided.
10 Karl Marx, ‘Thesen über Feuerbach’, inMEW [Marx-Engels-Werke, see abbreviations],
iii (1958), pp. 5–7 (p. 5; my translation).
11 As Louis Althusser has formulated it, influenced by Sigmund Freud’s discovery of the
irreducible unconscious in modern subjectivity in parallel with Marx’s discovery of
class-struggle as thematerial process underlying the reproduction ofmodern societies.
See especially Althusser, ‘On Marx and Freud’, trans. by Warren Montag, Rethinking
Marxism, 4.1 (1991), pp. 17–30.
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tending to the worlds of feelings, practices, organizations, institutions,
and even ideas.
This new materialist perspective of Marx was explicitly articulated
(and partially worked out) by Louis Althusser in his struggle to over-
come the historical crisis of Marxism as it had been constituted by
Engels in its ‘classical’ form. I think it is time, after a long traversée du
désert (crossing the desert), to reopen the question of Marxism, i.e. of a
conscious development of Marx’s theoretical critiques,12 as well as the
question regarding the corresponding, but clearly distinct, practical
perspective of radical Marxist politics, as well as the articulation of
both of these problematics in a philosophical materialism of mater-
ialities which can situate finite Marxism. According to this analysis,
finite Marxism combines a specific scientific analysis and reconstruc-
tion of the domination of the capitalist mode of production over
modern bourgeois societies, and of the ways in which modern states
reproduce capitalist class domination, with the openness to learning
from the theoretical breakthroughs arising from the other struggles
of liberation which necessarily arise in modern bourgeois societies.
Using this foundation, finite Marxism is aware of its own specificity
as a limitation — and it rejects any temptations to ‘overarch’ or ‘hege-
monize’ feminist theories, de-colonialism, or ecological critical theory.
Instead, it recognizes and learns from the ways in which these theories
understand specific structures and the internal ‘contradictions’ that are
constitutive for these structures of domination in the historical reality
of modern societies. On the other hand, finite Marxism also strives to
deserve an equal treatment from these ‘other sides’.
While it is true that Marx left his theoretical work to us as an ‘un-
finished project’ (Raúl Rojas),13 he also opened up a field of real and
effective scientific research which has found important continuation
in the work of Marxists since the 1890s. This scientific work has been
continued with considerable success — in spite of the relative block-
ade of the philosophical and political reflection of its presuppositions
12 In order to justify this plural I shall elaborate on the distinction between his critique
of political economy and his critique of politics (cf. below, next paragraph).
13 See his pioneering study of Marx: Raúl Rojas, Das unvollendete Projekt. Zur
Entstehungsgeschichte von Marx’ Kapital (Berlin: Argument, 1989), which has not had
the reception it still deserves.
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and implications which seems to have started with Engels’s redaction
of the notes on Feuerbach where he eliminated some reflexive turns as
being ‘too difficult’, and then has been finalized by Plekhanov’s attempt
to reinsert Marxism into the tradition of modern ‘materialism’. Indeed,
this historical blocking, very probably, has been the unavoidable side
effect of academic exclusion of Marxist theory building and historico-
empirical analysis, while, in the political sphere, Stalinism distorted
the forms of Marxism within institutionalized science regarding ‘real
socialism’. The historical development of the political practices which
have effectively emerged in Marxist politics have been decisively blun-
ted and perverted by reformist or Stalinist practices. Accordingly, the
second breakthrough realized by the late Marx has had a still more
complicated fate. His radical and innovative ‘critique of politics’14 has
remained in the draft stages of his own analytical sketches, and has
been generally misread as a mere application of the insights of the
critique of political economy.15 Therefore, Marx’s original critique of
politics has found little direct continuation — although its problems
have unavoidably imposed themselves upon Marxist political leaders
— from Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein, via Lenin, Leon Trotsky,
and Rosa Luxemburg, to José Carlos Mariátegui, Antonio Gramsci,
and Mao Zedong.
In this regard, one of the decisive blockades which have remained
dominant in mainstream Marxism has been due to a notion of mater-
ialism that has ignored the insights of Marx on the need to overcome
the reductionism characteristic of the radical French enlightenment.
Engels did not follow Marx on this issue,16 as he repeatedly flirted
with the French materialist tradition. Meanwhile, Plekhanov later con-
ceived of Marxism as essentially building upon that French tradition,
14 As reconstructed in Étienne Balibar, Cesare Luporini, and André Tosel, Marx et sa
critique de la politique (Paris: Maspéro, 1979), which is still in need of a proper sequel,
and requires only some revision in view of the accessibility of further writings of Marx
due to the progress of the MEGA.
15 Which has been doublymisleading, as it seems to imply the very idea of ‘economicism’
and class reductionism.
16 Although Engels first followedMarx in this, he then contributed to obscuring the issue
of Marx’s new materialism in his redaction of the first publication of Marx’s notes ad
Feuerbach as ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, or by his masking of the decisive breaks which
separated their manuscripts for the German Ideology from their earlier publication of
the Holy Family.
282 MATERIALISM AGAINST MATERIALISM
thereby obscuring Marx’s explicit distance from what he called the ‘old
materialism’. Marx, instead, took up a non-reductionist perspective
on the materiality of history, as it had been sketched out by Montes-
quieu17 and elaborated by Adam Ferguson.18
In order to make it possible to overcome this blockade upon
scientific analysis and philosophical reflection, as well as political de-
liberation, we need to understand the decisive difference between
the traditional, reductionist materialism of emerging bourgeois pro-
gressivism19 (which had the historical function of getting rid of pre-
modern political and religious ideas) and the non-reductionist mater-
ialism of materialities Marx followed in his research practices (as well
as in his organized political work). In this way, we should overcome
and account for the ‘real illusions’ of modern bourgeois practice.
THE ‘MATERIALIST ILLUSION’ OF THE EARLY MARX
Even in his last-minute contributions to the Holy Family Marx still
imagined a continuity between his own position and French materi-
alism as it had been continued and radicalized by Jeremy Bentham.20
Therefore, Marx still participated in the exercise of a reductionist
materialism which, notably, provided the foundations for modern
utilitarianism.21 This simplifying and strongly reductionist current of
radical thought corresponded to the perspective of the radically indi-
17 And rediscovered byAlthusser in hisMontesquieu. La Politique et l’histoire (Paris: PUF,
1959).
18 See the analyses presented by Danga Vileisis in her ‘Der unbekannte Beitrag Adam
Fergusons zum Geschichtsverständnis von Karl Marx’, in Quellen- und Kapital-
Interpretation. Manifest-Rezeption. Erinnerungen (Marx-Engels-Jahrbuch. Neue Folge,
2009), ed. by Carl-Erich Vollgraf, Richard Sperl, and Rolf Hecker (Hamburg: Argu-
ment, 2010), pp. 7–60.
19 Of which La Mettrie presented an advanced form. See the still classical reading by
Friedrich Albert Lange, in the chapter on La Mettrie in his The History of Materialism
and Criticism of its Present Importance, 3 parts (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner,
1925), ii, pp. 49–91.
20 The new turn taken by Marx in these texts has been convincingly analysed in Danga
Vileisis, ‘Marx’ frühe, utilitaristische Auffassung des Kommunismus’, in Marx, Engels
und utopische Sozialisten (Marx-Engels-Jahrbuch. Neue Folge, 2016/17), ed. by Carl-
ErichVollgraf, Richard Sperl, andRolfHecker (Hamburg: Argument, 2010), pp. 9–38.
21 In spite of his earlier sympathy towards Bentham, Marx later attacked him as the
philosopher giving voice to the ‘appearing surface’ of modern bourgeois societies, and
thereby blocking scientific inquiry: ‘It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality,
FRIEDER OTTO WOLF 283
vidualized private subjectivity of the owner of commodities.22 Due to
having to consider his or her own labour power as a commodity to
offer on the market, the perspective of the private individual reduced
everything to its market price. This, evidently, implied an attitude and
a practice of more or less violently ‘abstracting’ from all specific ‘use
values’, while in actual practice referring exclusively to the acquisition
of exchange value and the embodiment of the same in the form of
money.
Later on, in the German Ideology manuscripts, Marx explicitly
articulated his break from this kind of ‘old’ materialist reduction-
ism, which is evident in the original version of Marx’s theses on
Feuerbach.23 As becomes clear in the manuscripts produced for a pro-
jected journal under the title of ‘German Ideology’, Marx was quite
firm — especially in his critique of Stirner — that his project was not
to anchor modern society in a reductionist view of ‘human nature’.24
In this critique, Marx, later followed by Engels, began to address the
underlying logic of domination of the capitalist mode of production in
modern bourgeois societies. He still had a long way to go in articulating
this critique as a scientific alternative to Hegel’s philosophical repro-
duction of the structures of domination in place in modern bourgeois
societies. Initially, Marx formed his critique on the basis of an alterna-
tive Feuerbachian philosophy that attempted to replace Hegel’s central
category of ‘spirit’ with Feuerbach’s idea of the ‘human’ (Mensch).
Property, and Bentham’ (KarlMarx,Capital, 3 vols (London: Penguin, 1976), i, trans.
by Ben Fowkes, p. 280).
22 For a critique, see my Radikale Philosophie. Aufklärung und Befreiung in der neuen Zeit
(Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2002), p. 17.
23 Much less so in the Theses on Feuerbach after Engels’s editorial revamp, see George
Labica, Karl Marx. Les thèses sur Feuerbach (Paris: PUF, 1987).
24 Marx has fallen into other kinds of reductionism in his manuscripts for the so-called
‘Feuerbach-chapter’ in theGerman Ideologymanuscripts, as Danga Vileisis and myself
will show in our forthcoming book Deconstructing Historical Materialism. To disen-
tangle his search with its advances and setbacks is a main task of contemporary Marx
research, which clearly goes beyond mere philology.
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MARX’S CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AS AN EMERGING
SCIENCE ON ‘PROPER FOUNDATIONS’
Marx used a number of steps to continuously work out his critical
struggle concerning the illusions shaping the ‘surface’ of the dom-
ination of the capitalist mode of production in modern bourgeois
societies. He pursued this project in his critique of Proudhon, the
CommunistManifesto, the immediate pre-history of Capital (especially
in the Grundrisse), and in the elaboration of the manuscripts for Cap-
ital itself. By so doing, he achieved a decisive breakthrough towards
real scientific analysis by unveiling the secret of how capital achieved
the production (and realization) of surplus value within a framework
of an exchange of equivalent values. Although, in the final analysis,
he still had to leave the production of a definitive text of his mag-
num opus to his friend. Indeed, Engels was the only one capable of
presenting Marx’s scientific breakthrough in its entirety and full im-
portance.25 Even volume i of Capital, when read from a perspective
of the enlarged reproduction of the domination of the capitalist mode
of production, succeeds in conveying this radically new scientific per-
spective. However, Engels had to admit that it remained impossible
for him to reconstitute the ‘aesthetic unity’ of this work as Marx had
planned to realize it. Or, in other words, we can say that the closing of
the dialectical circle from the wealth of nations constituted by many
commodities at the beginning of Capital, and the different ‘forms of
revenue’ of the different categories of commodity owners outlined at
the end of Capital volume iii, turned out to be far less significant than
Marx himself had anticipated.
This situation leads to interesting questions regarding the reasons
for this impossibility. Was it a contingent failing due to Marx’s early
death and Engels’s admitted lack of theoretical capability? Or was it
somehow implied by some elements of philosophico-political preju-
dice that were still inherent to Marx’s argument? Asking such explicit
questions opens up the perspective of looking at the traditional issue
of the ‘Abschluss’ (closure/finalization) of ‘Marx’s system’, as it was
25 See Michael R. Krätke, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie heute. Zeitgenosse Marx (Ham-
burg: VSA, 2017), pp. 211–43.
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introduced by Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk in 1898, in a different light.26
Accordingly, in this perspective, the non-closure of Marx’s systematic
presentation follows necessarily from its very structure as a materialist
dialectic which consciously and methodically respects the ‘limitations
of the dialectical mode of presentation’, as Marx himself underlined.
This not only opens up the possibility of looking at Marx’s apparent
unwillingness to return to his previous elaborations for volume ii and
iii of Capital, but, much more importantly, it also makes it possible for
us to understand the limitations of any possible closure of his theoret-
ical reconstruction of the system of capitalism domination — which is
not a way of producing another blockade, but rather encouraging fur-
ther systematic elaboration concerning the specific field of the ongoing
reproduction of the domination of the capitalist mode of production
in modern bourgeois societies — as the relation of Marx’s ‘general
theory’ to the historical plurality of modern bourgeois societies should
be understood.
It is true to say that Marx actually intended for considerable fu-
ture research to be carried out in the field of the critique of political
economy, as he had opened it by his epistemic breakthroughs. In the
new MEGA the real state of his work in this field was made access-
ible as such,27 which also made it possible to fully appreciate Engels’s
disparate work to finish and complete this unfinished work.28 More
importantly, Marx’s and Engels’s selective publications have been his-
torically sufficient to open up a field of effective scientific inquiry that
has been taken up and continued by others. The project of laying bare
the inner workings, structures, mechanisms, and tendencies of the
domination of the capitalist mode of production in modern bourgeois
societies, and at least to begin to understand how they present them-
selves in actual lived experience, has not been entirely lost, in spite of
26 See classically, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Karl Marx and the Close of his System: A
Criticism (London:T. FisherUnwin, 1898), as well as the retrospective presentation of
the ensuing debate in Hans G. Nutzinger and Elmar Wolfstetter, Die Marxsche Theorie
und ihre Kritik: Eine Textsammlung zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Marburg:
Metropolis, 2008).
27 I am referring to the latest complete edition of the works by Marx and Engels in
German: ‘Marx Engels Gesamtausgabe’ (MEGA²). This new edition has replaced the
first MEGA, which had been discontinued under Stalinism.
28 See Michael R. Krätke, Friedrich Engels oder: Wie ein Cotton-Lord den Marxismus
erfand (Berlin: Dietz, 2020).
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many simplifications and strong reductionist tendencies as they have
dominated large parts of the history of ‘official Marxism’.
In this way, Marx also decisively contributed to the opening up
of a field for further research concerning major politico-economic de-
velopments, such as credit, monopolization tendencies, or the role of
politics and the state within the capitalist mode of production. Despite
many impediments and obstructions, this field of scientific research
has developed and produced an important body of relevant insights
into the actual workings of the historical domination of the capitalist
mode of production in modern bourgeois societies. However, neither
a first wave of popular rebellions like the Paris Commune, which Marx
analysed, nor the socialist revolutions and radical reform initiatives
of the twentieth century, which were discussed in ‘classical Marxism’,
were capable of permanently overcoming the ‘really existing’ domin-
ation of the capitalist mode of production.29 On the other hand, the
merely scientific concretization of Marxist theory in terms of the ‘con-
crete analysis of the concrete situation’ (Lenin) has turned out to be
unfeasible if not downright impossible — and had to be reformulated
as the central task of political deliberation.30
The resulting deep ‘crisis of Marxism’, which broke out in the
sixties and seventies,31 finally produced the insight into the finite char-
acter of the Marxist theorization of the domination of the capitalist
mode of production in modern bourgeois societies. It was only in the
1960s, against the background of a world-wide movement of reading
29 This does not justify the retreat from this historical task as pursued by leading ex-
ponents of ‘neomarxism’ in the 1950s and 1960s, as e.g., in a reflective perspective,
in Lucien Goldmann, Recherches dialectiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1959) or in a new,
activist vein in Paul Mason, Clear Bright Future: A Radical Defence of the Human Being
(London: Allen Lane, 2019).
30 See Georg Lukács’s ‘Postscript 1967’ [1967], in his Lenin: A Study on the Unity of his
Thought, trans. by Nicholas Jacobs (London: Verso, 2009), pp. 86–97, where Lukács
argues that the position taken by Lenin in referring to ‘the concrete analysis of the
concrete situation’ is not an opposite of ‘pure’ theory, but — on the contrary — it
is the culmination of genuine theory, its consummation, the point where ‘it breaks
into practice’, which I take as an implicit recognition that it is logically impossible for
scientific analysis ever to fully arrive at this starting point of any meaningful political
deliberation.
31 In 1978 a German collection of Althusser’s essays from the 1970s was published under
the title Die Krise des Marxismus (Hamburg: VSA, 1978).
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Capital,32 that new attempts at understanding the epistemological per-
spectives opened by Marx’s scientific breakthrough were made.33 In
this period, the philological reconstruction of Marx’s scientific devel-
opment from the available manuscripts finally began to be employed
for a better understanding of key scientific and political problems.
REDUCTIONIST TEMPTATIONS WITHIN HISTORICAL MARXISM
Generally speaking, Marx’s break with reductionism in history — and,
accordingly, with reductionist illusions in political practice — was not
followed in the dominant ‘Marxist’ line of thought as it emerged with
Kautsky, Bernstein, and their followers. Their attempts at ‘popular-
izing’ Marxism in the labour movement avoided or even concealed
Marx’s philosophical and political insistence on a materialism of ma-
terialities, with its implicit break with materialist reductionism, and,
instead, these thinkers created a line of continuity between Marx and
reductionism.
Early creative contributions to advancing scientific knowledge in
the fields of inquiry opened up by Marx’s two major breakthroughs
(in his critique of political economy and his critique of politics) range
from applications to historical (or contemporary) analysis of real so-
cietal processes and struggles. Examples include Kautsky’s discussion
of the ‘agrarian question’ (1988),34 Lenin’s analysis of the impact of
the capitalist mode of production on contemporary Russian society
(1964),35 and theoretical constructions addressing central aspects of
32 Which I know frompersonal experience tohave reachedParis in at least the endof 1963
— and to which Althusser formulated a first philosophical response by means of his
famous seminar of 1964, resulting in Louis Althusser, Étienne Balibar, Roger Establet,
Pierre Macherey, and Jacques Rancière, Lire le Capital (Paris: Maspéro, 1965).
33 The breakthrough was articulated as an ‘epistemological cut’ by Althusser or as ‘recon-
structed’ as a ‘systematic science’ in the Frankfurt variant of a ‘new reading of Capital’.
See Ingo Elbe, Marx im Westen. Die neue Marx-Lektüre in der Bundesrepublik seit 1965
(Berlin: Akademie, 2008), pp. 30–87.
34 For a careful and (exceptionally) non-dismissive recent discussion of this question, see
Jairus Banaji, ‘Illusions about the Peasantry: Karl Kautsky and the Agrarian Question’,
The Journal of Peasant Studies, 17.2 (1990), pp. 288–307.
35 For an exhaustive reconstruction and critical analysis of this question, see Projekt
Klassenanalyse, Neue Stufe des Wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus? Zum Verhältnis von
Marxscher Theorie, Klassenanalyse und revolutionärer Taktik bei W. I. Lenin (Berlin:
Verlag für das Studium der Arbeiterbewegung, 1972).
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the full development of the capitalist mode of production Marx had
not yet been able to fully work out (like credit, state intervention,
and international exchange). These aspects were specifically addressed
in pioneering research by, for example, Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferd-
ing, and Eugen Varga — even if these texts were often in need of
broader clarification regarding their actual presuppositions and impli-
cations. In contrast to these developments, and, in parallel, addressing
a problematic debate on ‘revisionism’ vs ‘orthodoxy’, an effectively
‘conservative’ philosophical operation has attempted to stop these dy-
namic developments of Marxist theory: Kautskyanism — and, in a
hidden and much more decisive, later parallel, Stalinism — have not
only worked upon ‘philosophically’ reintegrating Marx’s science into
the ‘old materialism’, with the central effect of replacing a rationally
grounded practice of open political philosophical debate by traditional
forms of a linear historical and dogmatic determinism. Much more
importantly, both vulgarized Marx’s theory of the domination of the
capitalist mode of production in modern bourgeois societies by re-
ducing it to a schematic theory of historical ‘capitalism’ which was
neither clearly systematic nor specifically historical, thereby missing
the specific reality of the capitalist mode of production as an ‘ideal
average’ (idealer Durchschnitt).36
Taking Marx’s explicit reference to the ‘ideal average’ as the decis-
ive indication for a materialist theoretical reconstruction — which, in
his opinion, should take place in the ‘real sciences’37 — has important
implications. Firstly, it assists to overcome the illusions of ‘theoreti-
cism’ which view concrete, practical reality as a mere ‘emanation’ of
the level discussed in theory building. Secondly, it reveals the assump-
tions behind ‘empiricism’38 and ‘practicism’ (Praktizismus)39 that put
aside the requirements of theory building and only address practical
36 In German, this has been exposed in an exemplary fashion by Michael Heinrich in
‘Geld und Kredit in der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie’, Das Argument— Zeitschrift
für Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften, 45.251 (2003), pp. 397–409.
37 Marx’s changing ways of referring to ‘wirkliche Wissenschaft’ — which understandably
havemademanyMarx scholars diffident about his claims to scientificity—finally seem
to come down to this.
38 Which has been one of the main tendencies of the dominant bourgeois thinking about
science.
39 As it has been philosophically elaborated by pragmatism.
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singularities. The level of reality which is reconstructed by the theor-
etical operations of constructing concepts and statistically describing
averages is neither to be confused with the concrete historical realities
of particular modern societies (and their states) nor relegated to the
status of a mere theoretical fiction. It is a decisive level of historical
reality that constitutes a specific characteristic of all modern societies.
Sometimes this has led to the illusion of distinguishing and opposing
this level of theory (e.g., under the name of a ‘theory of value’) from or
to a real understanding of class struggle, whereas, in actual fact, this
level of theory only implies the search for a clear understanding of
how class struggle lies under and structures the whole process of the
reproduction of the very forms of capitalist domination.
A renewal of Marx’s radically innovative perspective on a non-
reductionist kind of materialism can make use of two contemporary
sets of information. Firstly, a more complete understanding of the
complex reality of the domination of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion in the plurality of modern bourgeois societies, as they are over-
determined by other structures of domination (especially gendered,
transnational, ecological). Secondly, a renewal of the philosophical
debate about the meaning of materialism today.
Accordingly, ‘finite Marxism’ does not have to relinquish the sci-
entific or political claims characteristic of the ‘critique of political
economy’ as Marx initiated it — and yet, it is also uniquely capable
of understanding the ‘specific materiality and the characteristic con-
tradictions’ of other fields of domination. In particular, finite Marxism
will be able to make a significant contribution to concretizing a new
kind of radical politics by combining alliance building and mutual re-
spect for the different kinds of liberation struggles with an effective
deepening of class struggle. It will do this by seriously taking up Marx’s
work that has hitherto remained in the form of initial exemplary ana-
lyses and general argumentative sketches, especially in his later critique
of politics. In doing so, it will decisively advance Marx’s ‘originary’
project of a politics of liberation by not restricting its perspective solely
to the politics of class struggle, but fully taking on board the political
implications and objects of ‘gender trouble’, anti-racism (and its correl-
ates), ecological conservation needs, and international co-ordination
requirements as they are elaborated by feminist, anti-racist, and ecolo-
290 MATERIALISM AGAINST MATERIALISM
gical theory and research. Again, this will not be achieved by offering
‘Marxism’ as an overarching theory, but by emphasizing its own spe-
cific contribution to understanding the domination of the capitalist
mode of production and the structure of the modern state as an agency
of domination.
Thereby, finite Marxism will show itself capable of taking up the
relative findings of the other fields of scientific research pertinent for
modern bourgeois societies in its own research, as well as to con-
clude non-instrumentalist alliances with other struggles for effective
liberation, based on their potential for a mutual understanding of the
structures of domination each one is struggling against and for a broad
solidarity against all attempts to curtail their liberty. Opening Marxist
debates to the findings of feminist, anti-racist, ecological, and ‘de-
pendency’ theory — without attempting to subsume them to Marxist
generalities — will help to revitalize finite Marxism in its ‘own field’ of
class struggle. And a new philosophy, a non-reductionist ‘materialism
of materialities’ will, accordingly, become capable of making decisive
contributions to the bringing under way of a process of constituting a
real historical alternative — scientifically, as well as politically.
RETURNING TO MARX AND DEFENDING ‘FINITE MARXISM’
When he sketched his notes on Feuerbach, Marx still had a long way
to go towards his definitive scientific break-through in Capital. Step by
step, in a journey that was certainly not linear, he discovered the road
towards a non-reductionist kind of materialist analysis of the capitalist
mode of production, as it is, indeed, dominating modern bourgeois
societies. In so doing, he learned to respect the specific kinds of ma-
terial reality of the many different dimensions of historical and present
societies. This is what made it possible for him to actually think of class
struggle in its effective historical reality: not as a confrontation of pre-
existing subjectivities, but as the emergence of distinct and, eventually,
antagonistic subjectivities within the very processes of societal repro-
duction and historical change.40
40 In the mainstream of Marxist theory, however, as exemplified by Kautsky and Stalin,
this was schematized into assuming the pre-existence of ‘class subjectivities’.
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In Capital, Marx succeeded in radically freeing himself (almost
completely) from his previous reductionist illusions in order to com-
pletely focus his research on the historical structure of the domination
of the capitalist mode of production in modern bourgeois societies.
Therefore, he constructed a ‘missile’ and threw it against the dominat-
ing global bourgeoisie(s) and their allies, which led them to discredit
his scientific insights and politically obstruct his theoretical insights
from spreading into the established institutions of the economic, so-
cial, and political sciences.
However, and in spite of an impressive record of struggles aiming
at overcoming the domination of the capitalist mode of production
in modern bourgeois societies, there still is a tendency in the Marxist
tradition to overlook an important caveat that Marx already clearly ar-
ticulated. This involves the need to observe the difference between the
general theory reconstructing the general structures and mechanisms
of the capitalist mode of production and an analysis of its specific func-
tioning within a given socio-historical situation, for which the general
theory may only serve as a ‘guiding thread’.41 This caveat should be
sufficient to overcome a tendency, still frequent among Marxists, of
simplifying socio-historical analysis itself down to a deductive applic-
ation of a general theory of ‘capitalism’.42 What is more — and this
is a graver political consequence — is the tendency towards ‘class re-
ductionism’, as it has spread in historical Marxism, whereas, in practical
terms,43 Marx, at the first Workers’ International, clearly addressed the
issues of women’s liberation or of colonialism in their specificity and
on an equal footing.
The renewal of Marxist analysis, needed today, will be capable
of combining a critical defence of the actual achievements of Marxist
41 This is because critical theory can only establish the general laws ofmotion of the ‘ideal
average’ (cf. above), and not be prolonged into the ‘concrete analysis of the concrete
case’ without further empirical (or historical) research.
42 See my critique of this simplifying notion in Frieder Otto Wolf, ‘Karl Marx und die
Globalisierung. Die Problematik des “Kommunistischen Manifests” und ihre Per-
spektiven‘, SoWi—das Journal fürGeschichte, Politik,Wirtschaft undKultur, 28 (1999),
pp. 190–98.
43 Marx’s correspondence with Vera Zasulich (especially in his unsent drafts) also makes
it clear that in his analysis there is no space for a class-reductionist and teleological or
stage-based perspective on the transformation of societies.
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science44 with a renewed radical philosophy. A new openness to the
contributions of feminism, dependency theory, and political ecology
will help us to find new perspectives for a radical practice of Marxism
and a renewal of liberation struggles today. In this way, it will over-
come the historical ‘crisis of Marxism’: not by returning to the kind
of Marxism constituted by Engels for the rising workers movement,45
nor by retreating to a mere ‘Marxianism’ within scientific research,46
but by beginning to define an adequate, and of course, unmistakably
non-idealist, unequivocally dialectical, ‘unity of theory and practice’
for the twenty-first century.
In this way, finite Marxism will be capable of contributing to the
elaboration of new comprehensive perspectives, developed conjointly
with converging movements, which will work against the different
structures of domination and the ways they function within given so-
cieties. It will also facilitate the politics of building ‘new alliances’ that
will finally be capable of challenging and overcoming the combined
structures of domination as they have re-emerged out of the ‘night of
the 20th century’ (roughly from 1914 to 1946). Last but not least, it
will assist us not to forget about the ‘real elephant in the room’, and to
understand the specific requirements of organized political struggles
and struggles within or about the modern state (in its more or less
democratic forms) in the beginning of the twenty-first century.47
44 See the exemplary analysis in Stefano Breda’s Kredit und Kapital. Kreditsystem und Re-
produktion der kapitalistischen Vergesellschaftungsweise in der dialektischen Darstellung
des Marxschen ‘Kapital’ (Würzburg: Königshausen&Neumann, 2019).
45 This seems to be the underlying project in Krätke, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie
heute: Zeitgenosse Marx, which I find, indisputably, attractive, but far too limited, with
regard to the tasks of analysis that lie ahead.
46 See e.g. Riccardo Bellofiore, ‘Taking Up the Challenge of Living Labour: A
“Backwards-Looking Reconstruction” of Recent Italian Debates on Marx’s Theory of
the Capitalist Mode of Production’, in The Unfinished System of Karl Marx: Critically
Reading Capital as a Challenge for our Times, ed. by Judith Dellheim and Frieder Otto
Wolf (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 31–89.
47 Decisive parts of the research underlying this essay were realized in cooperation with
Danga Vileisis, to whom I am grateful for many insights. And the critical remarks to
earlier versions of this essay provided by the editors have certainly helped me to find a
clearer expression of my thinking, for which I am grateful.
Materialism, Politics, and the History of
Philosophy
French, German, and Turkish Materialist Authors in the
Nineteenth Century
AYŞE YUVA
In contemporary materialist traditions such as Marxism or neo-
materialism, reference to pre-nineteenth century philosophers is often
limited to a small number of authors: Spinoza, sometimes Democritus,
Epicurus, and Lucretius. It is striking that other traditions, such
as eighteenth-century materialism, when the very category of
‘materialism’ was forged, or late nineteenth-century scientist
materialism, which loudly proclaimed this label, are generally put
aside or deemed obsolete. The terms of the accusation are well known:
these materialisms are, according to many Marxist materialists, too
mechanistic, reductionist, insufficiently emancipatory and subversive,
and even judged ‘ideological’ for having justified the capitalist order
that was being established at the time. But if we want to understand
the philosophical and political reasons for these judgments, it is
necessary to take the ‘materialist’ categorization of these doctrines
seriously, not to judge them as more or less materialist according
to their approximation to a current model. My methodology is, in
some way, a nominalist one, since my point of departure is not the
universal idea of ‘materialism’ but what has actually been categorized
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as such. I will take both a historical and a transnational perspective,
briefly analysing some of the alliances of materialism and politics
since the eighteenth century in France, Germany — in Karl Marx,
Friedrich Engels, and Ludwig Büchner — and in some Turkish
Ottoman authors. This broader view is important so as to not remain
stuck in the identification, which has become commonplace, of an
eighteenth-century mechanistic and reductionist materialism as a
solely European endeavour. More specifically, my aim is to analyse
the political uses of the categorization of materialism as mechanistic
and reductionist. I would like to show how, regardless of the current
or outdated character of these materialisms, their rejection has often
also had an ideological character, as has the narratives that have
endorsed these judgments of reductionism and mechanism. To
understand how this can be the case, one should bear in mind that
materialism is not only about ontological questions relating to the
relationship between matter and spirit, but it has also been radically
critical of religion, which has led, among other things, to Marx’s
and Engels’ critique of ideology as the dominant form of thought.
This point also concerns the teaching of philosophy: materialism has
been significantly marginalized in universities and in the history of
philosophy until the middle of the nineteenth century at least, and
arguably later as well. In return, materialist authors have not spared
universities and the specific history of philosophy that they teach
from a major critique regarding the separation of this teaching from
reality. Thus, the erasure of certain materialist traditions is a question
that concerns both politics and the history of philosophy. Following
authors such as Louis Althusser and Pierre Macherey,1 one may
wonder to what extent it is possible to adopt a materialist perspective
while being a scholar of the history of philosophy, i.e. studying ancient
texts, which cannot be transposed as such to the present day — which
does not mean that materialism was not somehow efficacious in this
time, or that the texts are no longer relevant for us. My own approach
is, therefore, to critique the ideology that permeates the practices of
the history of philosophy. This is, incidentally, a materialist approach.
1 Cf. PierreMacherey,Histoires de dinosaure: Faire de la philosophie (1965–1997) (Paris:
PUF, 1999).
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EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH MATERIALISM AND THE
CRITIQUE OF ORTHODOXY
The Connection between Ontology and Politics
‘Materialism’, a term which in French dates back to the early eight-
eenth century in a text Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz wrote against Pierre
Bayle from 1702,2 was then applied retrospectively to a number of
doctrines that emerged since Democritus and Epicurus. In the eight-
eenth century, the polemical and politically subversive meaning of
the term ‘materialism’ could hardly be separated from its ontological
meaning.3 In France, materialism only came out of hiding, and still
only partially, in Julien Offray de La Mettrie’s books L’Histoire naturelle
de l’âme (1745) and L’Homme-machine (1747).4 The association of
‘materialism’ with ‘fatalism’ and ‘atheism’, for example in the thought
of Paul Thiry, baron d’Holbach, was at least as subversive as monism.5
This is not the place to discuss the association, which was made as early
as the eighteenth century, between Spinozism and materialism, or the
distinctions often made by some materialist authors between Spinoza
and their own doctrines. Rather, I would like to point out that the
definition of eighteenth-century materialism in terms of mechanism,
reductionism,6 and utilitarianism does not do justice to the complexity
2 According to the etymological dictionary, it is necessary to go back in French to
Leibniz’s text of 1702 Réplique aux réflexions de Bayle to find the word ‘matérialisme’,
which was then translated into English. The adjective ‘materialist/matérialiste’ is a
little older and appeared in English around 1660 (in Ralph Cudworth, Henry More
and Robert Boyle), in French in 1698 (in Bonaventure de Fourcroy) and in 1700 in
the first French translation of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding
by Coste. Cf. <http://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/matérialisme> and <https://www.
cnrtl.fr/etymologie/matérialiste> [accessed 1 November 2020].
3 Cf. Franck Salaün, L’Affreuse Doctrine: Matérialisme et crise des mœurs au temps de Di-
derot (Paris: Kimé, 2014); the classicwork ofDanielMornet,LesOrigines intellectuelles
de la Révolution française (Paris: Armand Colin, 1933) should be mentioned as well.
4 Jean-Claude Bourdin, Hegel et les matérialistes français du xviiie siècle (Paris: Klinck-
sieck, 1992), p. 23.
5 This term was used only from the end of the nineteenth century, based on the work of
Ernst Haeckel.
6 Even in the work of Julien Offray de La Mettrie, the very complex mechanism cannot
be reduced to the model of shocks and to one simple explanation. Cf. La Mettrie,
L’Homme-machine (Paris: Fayard, 2000 [1747]), p. 49, translated in The Monist, 3.2
(April 1913), p. 300: ‘Man is so complicated a machine that it is impossible to get
a clear idea of the machine beforehand, and hence impossible to define it. For this
reason, all the investigations have been vain, which the greatest philosophers have
made a priori, that is to say, in so far as they use, as it were, the wings of the spirit.
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of materialist texts from the eighteenth century. In these texts the living
character,7 not the inert character,8 of matter9 is often discussed; far
from referring only to Newtonian physics,10 these texts also use the
model of chemistry and the natural sciences to oppose any kind of
teleology in living beings. While d’Holbach did write a Système de la
Nature, the materialisms of this time are far from always being in a sys-
tematic, even dogmatic form. For example, Denis Diderot’s conjecture
that matter could be endowed with sensibility is sometimes presented
using a literary model, notably in the form of fiction and dream, and not
that of a first principle from which everything else could be deduced.11
According to many commentators, Diderot’s ontology also has a plural
character, which precisely derived from the plurality of possible ap-
proaches to matter using different sciences.12
Thus it is only a posteriori or by trying to disentangle the soul from the organs of the
body, so to speak, that one can reach the highest probability concerning man’s own
nature, even though one cannot discover with certainty what his nature is.’
7 Cf. Denis Diderot, Letter to Sophie Volland, 15 October 1759, in Œuvres complètes
de Diderot, 20 vols (Paris: Garnier, 1876), xviii, pp. 408–09. This is the famous letter
whereDiderot dreams that his asheswillminglewith those of his lover, suggesting they
might still have ‘a remnant of warmth and life’.
8 Cf. Paul Thiry, baron d’Holbach, The System of Nature, 2 vols (Kitchener: Batoche
Books, 2001), i, p. 20: ‘If they [natural philosophers] had viewedNature uninfluenced
by prejudice, they must have been long since convinced, that matter acts by its own
peculiar energy, and needs not any exterior impulse to set it in motion.’
9 Cf. Claude A. Helvétius, De L’Esprit; or, Essays on the Mind, and its Several Faculties
(London: Albion, 1810), p. 27: ‘all that remained was to know […] whether the
discovery of a power, such for instance as attraction, might not give rise to a conjecture
that bodies still had some properties hitherto unknown, such as that of sensation,
which though evident only in the organizedmembers of animals,might yet be common
to all individuals.’
10 Cf. Jean-Claude Bourdin, Les Matérialistes au xviiie siècle (Paris: Payot, 1996), p. 31.
On the contrary, Mario Bunge could argue that Kant understood Newtonian physics
as saying that matter was inert. Cf. Mario Bunge, Scientific Materialism, Episteme, 9
(Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1981), p. 4: ‘Kant, who could not read Newton’s
equations for lack of mathematical knowledge, misunderstood Newtonian physics as
asserting that whatevermoves does so under the action of some force, be it attractive or
repulsive. And Voltaire, who did so much for the popularization of Newtonian physics
in his Cartesian country, was struck by the pervasiveness of gravitation but could not
understand it adequately because he, too, was unable to read Newton’s equations of
motion. So neither Voltaire norKant realized that the inertia of bodies and light refutes
the belief that matter is inert, i.e. incapable of moving by itself.’
11 Cf. Jean-Claude Bourdin, Diderot et le matérialisme (Paris: PUF, 1998), pp. 75 and
79; Jean-Louis Labussière, ‘Diderot métaphysicien. Prédication, participation et exis-
tence’, inLumières, matérialisme etmorale: Autour deDiderot, ed. byColasDuflo (Paris:
Editions de la Sorbonne, 2016), pp. 21–72 (p. 70).
12 Cf. François Pépin, ‘Le Matérialisme pluriel de Diderot’, in Lumières, ed. by Duflo, pp.
73–95 (pp. 85 and 94).
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However, this ontology is connected to a radical critique of spir-
itual orthodoxy. This connection is not only a contingent historical
fact in the history of ideas that could be explained by the censor-
ship of that time, but has a philosophical basis. In eighteenth-century
France, materialism was both a dangerous theory to defend publicly
(and therefore marginalized by the official authorities) and a theme
that occupied the public space since at least 1751. We must add, how-
ever, that this polemical dimension is present in the texts themselves,
and their radical critique of spiritual orthodoxy is what makes these
theories immediately political. As Bertrand Binoche has underlined,
they are political not in the sense that their authors would have held
a revolutionary or even reformist political position, or acted in such a
way, but in the sense that their materialist critique immediately placed
them in a combative and destructive position both in the Republic of
Letters and in society.13 The ontological thesis of materialism con-
cerning the relationship between body and mind can be said to be
particularly important at that time precisely because of its subversive
charge against religion and the immortality of the soul, and because it
was associated with atheism and held a controversial position on the
question of free will. The power to overturn dogmas — upon which a
state’s false spiritual social harmony is based — is an integral part of
these materialisms.
This first detour through the history of materialism allows us to
reaffirm something that is perhaps self-evident: the polemical dimen-
sion of materialism is an integral part of it. Certainly, all philosophical
systems are engaged in theoretical conflicts; as early as the eighteenth
century, even before Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, the in-
cessant ‘struggles’ between systems became a philosophical problem.
But materialism is distinctive because it not only presents itself as a
generator of conflict in the philosophical field, but is also at risk of
spreading this conflict into the political and social fields, as Kant him-
self asserted:
Through criticism alone can we sever the very root of material-
ism, fatalism, atheism, of freethinking unbelief, of enthusiasm and
13 Bertrand Binoche, ‘Ecrasez l’Infâme!’. Philosopher à l’âge des Lumières (Paris: La Fab-
rique, 2018), p. 23.
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superstition, which can become generally injurious, and finally
also of idealism and skepticism, which are more dangerous to
the schools and can hardly be transmitted to the public.14
The reason why the ontological theses of materialism concerning the
relationship between body and mind, and between extension and
thought, are so important is that they imply atheism and the denial
of free will, which in turn calls into question the foundations of (spir-
itual) harmony in European states.
The Practical Effects Attributed to ‘Materialism’ after the French Revolution
Concerning the attribution of political subversion and atheism to ma-
terialism, the French Revolution and the repercussions it had through-
out the nineteenth century radicalized this polemical perspective on
materialism and determined how it is still approached today. As early
as 1789, a thesis emerged that would go on to become a commonplace,
according to which the writings of eighteenth-century philosophers
had provoked the French Revolution.15 This revolution was, accord-
ing to many contemporaries, unparalleled since it was an example of
the application and realization of philosophical principles. The au-
thors mostly targeted here, Voltaire and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, were
certainly not explicit materialists,16 nor were they atheists; yet, quite
quickly, and particularly after the Terror, an argumentative strategy
emerged which consisted in making ‘materialism’ the quintessence
of French philosophy in the eighteenth century. This was the means
whereby authors could then make these ‘materialist’ doctrines re-
sponsible for the wrong-doings of the French Revolution, and even
later for the Empire’s.
14 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Bxxxiv, p. 119.
15 One of the first to evoke the responsibility of ‘philosophism’ was Abbé Barruel, as early
as the summer of 1789, in Le Patriote véridique (The True Patriot); he would later
become a follower of the theory of the ‘conspiracy of the philosophers’ that provoked
the French Revolution.
16 Although Rousseau’s position on materialism may have been judged ambiguous, he at
least affirms his willingness to refute it. Cf. Franck Salaün, ‘Les Larmes de Wolmar.
Rousseau et le problème du matérialisme’, in Rousseau et la philosophie, ed. by Jean
Salem and André Charrak (Paris: Editions de la Sorbonne, 2004), pp. 71–86.
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This is not an anecdotal fact that is only of interest for the history
of ideas, but a vision that has influenced the image we still have today
of French materialist philosophies in the eighteenth century. It consists
of applying the label ‘materialist’ to authors who have sometimes not
claimed this term for themselves systematically, as well as in diluting
their theses into a form of mechanism and reductionism, as well as
fatalism and atheism. Moreover, it consists in judging the entire French
‘materialist’ philosophy of the eighteenth century through the light of
its supposed revolutionary consequences (and failures).
This criticism is not only to be found among some counter-
revolutionary or reactionary authors. For instance, during the first Re-
public Germaine de Staël wrote a moderate criticism of the philosoph-
ers of the Enlightenment, praising their combativeness but deploring
their irreligion. However, in that time she nevertheless established
(this is around 1796–1800) a continuity between certain eighteenth-
century doctrines and the one she believed would be appropriate for
the Republic in France.17 But things changed with Napoleon Bona-
parte’s founding of the Empire: Staël attributed the submission of the
French to despotism, to a selfish, utilitarian state of mind, the roots of
which she found in the eighteenth century. Under the term ‘material-
ism’, she combined ontological theses on the nature of substance, epis-
temological empiricism, and a moral approach based on self-interest
and the satisfaction of needs. According to Staël, this materialism had
its roots in English philosophy, particularly John Locke, but it had only
showed its full destructive effects in the institutional and intellectual
context specific to France.18 She wrote her book On Germany partly
because she saw in German ‘idealism’ a spiritual remedy to this Anglo-
French ‘materialism’. Idealism could provide the courage needed to
sacrifice oneself to justice, while materialism encouraged careerism,
petty calculations of interest, and submission to force.19 The current,
non-philosophical use of the terms ‘materialism’, ‘materialist’, and ‘ma-
terialistic’ is certainly still affected by this association, according to
which theoretical ‘materialism’ is linked to a ‘materialistic’ attitude.
17 Cf. Germaine de Staël, De la littérature (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1991), p. 287.
18 Cf. Germaine de Staël, De l’Allemagne, 2 vols (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1968), ii,
p. 110.
19 Cf. Bertrand Binoche, ‘La Faute à Helvétius ou le matérialisme après-coup’, in Lu-
mières, ed. by Duflo, pp. 173–84 (p. 179).
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THE DANGERS OF MATERIALISM AND THE PLACE GIVEN TO IT IN
THE HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
The Marginalization of Materialism by Victor Cousin
The reading of eighteenth-century materialism which Staël construc-
ted along with other theorists spread widely in the nineteenth century
and still influences our vision of how eighteenth-century materialism
inspired the French Revolution, with its various achievements and lim-
itations. The writing of the history of philosophy, in particular, played
a crucial role in this marginalization.
For example, such a reading was conveyed by Victor Cousin in the
French university culture in the nineteenth century. Cousin (1792–
1867), who had a great influence on the teaching of philosophy in
France in the first half of the nineteenth century, gave a major role to
the history of philosophy. After Joseph Marie Degérando, who was the
author of the first modern history of philosophy in French in 1804,
he encouraged a reading of the history of philosophy which aimed
to refute materialism and, in general, any philosophy which would
claim to have revolutionary consequences.20 As Pierre F. Daled noted,
Cousin undermined the importance of materialist authors, practically
silenced the names of d’Holbach and La Mettrie, or made Claude-
Adrien Helvétius a disciple and successor of Étienne Bonnot de Con-
dillac, which is historically and philosophically untrue.21 Cousin made
‘materialism’ a subcategory of ‘sensualism’, that is, a doctrine according
to which all ideas come to us from the senses. He believed that this
doctrine dominated the eighteenth century, first in England and then
20 Cf. Victor Cousin, Manuel de l’histoire de la philosophie. Traduit de l’allemand de
Tennemann (Paris: Sautelet, 1829), preface, pp. v–vi: The history of philosophy is a
way of exposing the ‘terrible consequences’ of Condillac’s sensualism and of Locke’s
philosophy, which at the end would lead to ‘Holbach and La Métrie [sic] and all the
saturnals of materialism and atheism’.
21 Cf. Pierre-Frédéric Daled, Le Matérialisme occulté et la genèse du ‘sensualisme’. Ecrire
l’histoire de la philosophie en France (Paris: Vrin, 2005), p. 237. See also the founding
work of Olivier Bloch, ‘Sur l’image du matérialisme français du xviiie siècle dans
l’historiographie philosophique du xixe siècle: Autour de Victor Cousin’, in Images au
xixe siècle du matérialisme du xviiie siècle, ed. by Olivier Bloch (Paris: Desclée, 1979),
pp. 39–54.
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in France through Locke’s reception in that country.22 However, to
make materialism a subcategory of sensualism is to think of it through
an epistemological criterion rather than a practical one. Ultimately,
Cousin presented sensualism as a timeless trend of the human mind
and one of the four doctrines (beside ‘dogmatism’ divided between
‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, ‘scepticism’ and ‘mysticism’) that regularly ap-
peared in the history of philosophy.23 Cousin’s goal, which we can date
to around 1829, was then to present his own doctrine as a ‘middle
ground’, both philosophically and politically, between Republicans
and Catholics, and between the French philosophy of the eighteenth
century and German metaphysics. His strategy consisted in placing
his philosophy on the seemingly depoliticized ground of the history
of philosophy, something which would in fact lay the foundations for
a new spiritual harmony that would destroy the danger represented by
materialism (and, on the other side, by ultra-conservative Catholics).
Finally, we can see that this discrediting of the eighteenth-century ‘ma-
terialists’ lives on in today’s academic institutions, in a way, without
any explicit awareness of its political origins, which in the French case
emerged, as we have seen, in the post-revolutionary context.24
The Revival of a Certain Image of Eighteenth-Century French Materialism by
Marx and Engels
As paradoxical as it may seem, it appears that the authors of the
Vormärz, some of whom emigrated to France — including the young
Marx and Engels, but also, for example, Heinrich Heine — were not
entirely detached from these patterns of interpretation of eighteenth-
century materialism. A recurrent question in the materialist texts of the
nineteenth century is to know which relationship — whether of con-
tinuity or rupture — must be established between eighteenth-century
22 Of course, the importance tomaterialism of English authors such asDavidHartley and
JosephPriestley cannot be denied.However, retrospectively, in the nineteenth century,
the rise of materialism in France in the eighteenth century was linked to the reception
of Locke’s work, rather than that of other authors.
23 Cf. Victor Cousin, Cours de l’histoire de la philosophie. Histoire de la philosophie du
xviiie siècle, 2 vols (Paris: Pichon et Didier, 1829), i, p. 178.
24 Cf. Une arme philosophique. L’éclectisme de Victor Cousin, ed. by Delphine Antoine-
Mahut and Daniel Whistler (Paris: Éditions des Archives contemporaines, 2019).
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materialism and the theory that would be appropriate for a nineteenth-
century revolution. For example, Heine, in his book On the History
of Religion and Philosophy in Germany, which was written in response
to Staël’s book on the same topic and with the same title in French
(De l’Allemagne), states that Spinoza’s pantheism should inspire the
revolution in Germany, unlike the ‘materialism’ which was the doc-
trine of the revolution in France, which could not suit Germany.25 In
Heine’s work, materialism was not only defined by atheism (in contrast
to Spinoza’s pantheism), but by a principle of frugality that Heine
considered politically insufficient and unsatisfying.26
In The Holy Family, on the contrary, Marx and Engels acknow-
ledged the contributions of eighteenth-century French materialism.
Against Bruno Bauer, Marx asserted the eighteenth-century source of
materialism (inaugurated by Bayle) rather than the Spinozist source
of nineteenth-century materialism. According to The Holy Family,
this eighteenth-century materialism drew upon Cartesian mechan-
istic physics and Hobbesian nominalism. As with Staël (whose value
judgements are, however, reversed in the work of Marx and Engels),
seventeenth-century metaphysics (restored by German idealism) is
opposed to the subversive materialism of the eighteenth century. Marx
and Engels recognized the superiority of eighteenth-century moral
theories based on the particular interest of individuals over those
theories which were based on an abstract general political interest.
However, Olivier Bloch has shown that the categories included in this
text by Marx and Engels come from the history of Charles Renouvier’s
spiritualist philosophy, parts of which they copied.27 Admittedly, in-
voking paradoxical sources is not enough to criticize a text or deem
it inconsistent, but it should be said that the positions proposed by
Marx and Engels in the Holy Family were quickly overtaken by The
25 Cf. Heinrich Heine, De l’Allemagne (Paris: Gallimard, 1998 [1855]), pp. 81 and 83.
26 Ibid., p. 93, translated in The London and Paris Observer, 12 (Paris: Galignani, 1836),
p. 84: ‘We want neither sans-culottes, nor frugal citizens, nor parsimonious presidents;
we desire to found a democracy of terrestrial gods, all equals in happiness and holiness.
You ask simple raiment, austere manners, and cheap pleasures — we, on the contrary,
wish for nectar and ambrosia, mantles of purple, the voluptuousness of perfumes, the
dancing of nymphs, music and comedies.’
27 Olivier Bloch, ‘Marx, Renouvier et l’histoire du matérialisme’, La Pensée, 191 (Febru-
ary 1977), pp. 3–42.
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German Ideology, where they claimed the character of French ma-
terialism in the eighteenth century was insufficient. La Mettrie and
Cabanis, for example, were now seen as shifting to the side of ‘ideology’,
but in the new sense of a doctrine that forgets the material anchor-
ing of ideas and the relationships of social domination.28 Marx and
Engels considered the materialist doctrines of the eighteenth century
insufficiently transformative. However, in The Holy Family, they saw
Helvétius as a ‘materialist’ because of the weight he gave to external
circumstances in education.29 Later Marx judged such a position to be
insufficient in the third thesis on Feuerbach, written shortly before The
German Ideology.30
To interpret the materialist philosophies of the eighteenth cen-
tury as ‘ideologies’ is certainly profoundly innovative. The political
effects attributed to these doctrines are thus almost reversed: from
being seen as destructive and revolutionary, they now appear to be
vectors for the promotion, or even justification, of a new bourgeois
order. During the quarrel of materialism that shook Germany from
1847 onwards, Marx and Engels stood aside and criticized authors
such as Büchner, Carl Vogt, and others who themselves stood on the
side of materialism, but whom Marx criticized harshly in letters31 and
whom Engels described as ‘vulgar materialists’.32 Engels also somehow
associated these thinkers with the materialists of the eighteenth cen-
tury. What these old and new materialists had in common, according
to Marx and Engels, was that they did not measure the importance
28 Cf. Pierre Macherey, Études de philosophie ‘française’. De Sieyès à Barni (Paris: Public-
ations de la Sorbonne, 2016), pp. 87–109.
29 See also Claude A. Helvétius, Œuvres complètes d’Helvétius, 3 vols (Paris: Lepetit,
1818), ii: De l’homme, p. 3, where he claims that the humans are the result of their
education, and that improving the science of education is therefore an important
means of happiness for the nations.
30 About the materialist use of this thesis, see Marlon Miguel’s contribution in this
volume.
31 Cf. Marx to Engels, 14 November 1868, in MEW [Marx-Engels-Werke, see abbrevi-
ations], xxxii (1974), pp. 202–03 (p. 203) and Marx to Kugelmann, 5 December
1868, in MECW [Marx & Engels Collected Works, see abbreviations], xliii (1988),
pp. 173–75 (p. 173).
32 Cf. FriedrichEngels, ‘LudwigFeuerbach and theEndofClassicalGermanPhilosophy’,
in MECW, xxvi (1990), pp. 353–98 (p. 369): Engels associates Feuerbach with ‘the
shallow, vulgarised form in which the materialism of the eighteenth century continues
to exist today in the heads of naturalists and doctors, the form inwhich it was preached
on their tours in the fifties by Büchner, Vogt and Moleschott’.
304 MATERIALISM, POLITICS, HISTORY
of social relations — or, in the case of their contemporaries, misap-
plied Darwinism to social relations — and therefore remained within
an ahistoric materialism based solely on the natural sciences. In this
way the dichotomy between scientist materialism, based on the natural
sciences, and Marx and Engels’s materialism, which was later given the
general label of ‘Marxist materialism’ in the twentieth century and was
generally coupled with the economic and social sciences, was consti-
tuted. However, Engels, who was more interested in these questions
than Marx, reinforced the image of a mechanistic eighteenth-century
materialism. His article ‘Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of German
Philosophy’ illustrates this view well.33 Engels did not forget or erase
the theses of The Holy Family: his book is even closer to this text than
any work by Marx himself. For instance, a certain cultural and national
affiliation of materialism remains; in his 1880 text Socialism: Utopian
and Scientific, and more precisely in the introduction to its first English
edition, Engels reproduced some passages from The Holy Family and
was amused that the English people of his time were still horrified
by the thesis that modern materialism had its roots in their country.
According to Engels, Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke were the founders
of English materialism and the ancestors of the eighteenth-century
French materialists.34
33 Cf. ibid., p. 370: ‘The materialism of the last century was predominantly mechanical,
because at that time, of all natural sciences, only mechanics, and indeed only the
mechanics of solid bodies — celestial and terrestrial — in short, the mechanics of
gravity, had come to any certain conclusion. Chemistry at that time existed only in
its infantile, phlogistic form. Biology still lay in swaddling clothes; plant and animal
organisms had been only crudely examined and were explained as the result of purely
mechanical causes. What the animal was to Descartes, man was to the materialists of
the eighteenth century — a machine. This application exclusively of the standards of
mechanics to processes of a chemical and organic nature— inwhich processes the laws
of mechanics are, indeed, also valid, but are pushed into the backgrounds by other,
higher laws— constitutes one specific but at that time inevitable limitation of classical
Frenchmaterialism. |Theother specific limitation of thismaterialism lay in its inability
to comprehend the world as a process, as matter undergoing uninterrupted historical
development.This accorded with the state of the natural science of that time, and with
the metaphysical, that is, anti-dialectical manner of philosophising connected with it.
Nature, so much was known, was in eternal motion. But according to the ideas, this
motion turned just as eternally in a circle and therefore never moved from the spot; it
produced the same results over and over again.’
34 Friedrich Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (London: Swan Sonnenschein,
1892), p. xiii.
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My aim here is not to dwell on the current understanding of
eighteenth-century materialism, but to stress that under different mod-
alities, defining a theory that leads to transformative practice has
implied a reconstruction, sometimes partial and lapidary, of the his-
tory of materialism. It seems that in this reconstruction the image
of eighteenth-century materialism has become fixed, even in Marx
and Engels, into categories inherited from a polemical and post-
revolutionary interpretation of the subject. A certain number of com-
monplaces have therefore emerged about it and been expanded be-
yond the original context that gave rise to them. The history of philo-
sophy has been one of the main instruments of this marginalization,
even in authors such as Marx and Engels, who were most critical of the
classical history of philosophy.
This insight leads me to deepen, in the following section, the
problem of the relationship between the history of philosophy and the
materialism of the nineteenth century, and to sketch how materialism
has both criticized and used the history of philosophy. If this history
has been one of the places where a certain ideological or dogmatic
reading of eighteenth-century materialism has imposed itself, leading
many materialist authors to criticize the history of philosophy for being
too idealist and orthodox, it has nevertheless also been taken up in a
view that claimed to be a materialist one.
CRITICISM AND MATERIALIST USES OF THE HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY
The Critique of the Academic History of Philosophy by Marx, Engels, and
Büchner
Regarding the relationship between the writing of a history of philo-
sophy and materialism, I can only give a concrete and single answer,
which cannot claim to be universal. The fact that Marx and Engels took
up certain categories of the French debate does not mean that they
were not radically critical of a certain practice in the history of philo-
sophy, notably in The German Ideology. Therefore, they considered a
history of philosophy that would claim complete autonomy, or would
make ideas the driving forces of any history and overestimate the im-
portance of philosophical conflicts in history, to be insufficient. This
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is, in a way, what Althusser later affirmed by writing that ‘the history
of philosophy, in the strict sense, does not exist’.35 According to Marx
and Engels, one cannot expect the outcome of a philosophical conflict
to lead to any real emancipatory effect, since philosophical criticism,
which focuses on purely ideal philosophical struggles, blinds itself to
the conflicts of civil society. Any criticism of the history of philosophy
cannot therefore be separated from the criticism of an ‘idealist’ philo-
sophy of history, which is itself a prisoner, in the Hegelian sense, of its
restoration of the religion it claims to override. What is left, in Marxist
terms, is the overcoming of a philosophical history of philosophy in
favour of the ‘materialist conception of history’ and then the ‘critique
of political economy’.
I would like to note, however, that criticism of the ‘pure’ history
of philosophy is also found among the authors that Marx and En-
gels classify as reductionist, ‘vulgar’ materialists. Büchner, for example,
overcame the ‘pure’ philosophy of history, even if he did so in a way
that Marx and especially Engels contested. In Kraft und Stoff (Force
and Matter), Büchner criticized the historical study of materialism,
sensualism, and determinism the thinkers of the Schulphilosophie.36 In
his opinion, a kind of ‘thorough’ materialism and good methodology
imply, in their own way, the necessity of departing from the history
of academic philosophy. Like some eighteenth-century materialists,
Büchner aimed to conquer the public space outside of universities
rather than the academic institution itself, as well as to subvert or-
thodoxy.37 Certainly, the criticism of Kraft und Stoff that Marx and
Engels noted, which concerned its justification of the organization of
the modern world, cannot be denied. In particular, it is evident that
Büchner, using a model inspired by Feuerbach, thought that humans
had separated themselves from religion in their practices, and had be-
come atheists by enjoying all kinds of material comfort, which is an
evolution he praises, even if he remarks how contradictory most of his
contemporaries still are. He thought that their practice contradicted
35 Louis Althusser, Pour Marx, intro. by Étienne Balibar (Paris: La Découverte, 2005),
note 48, p. 80.
36 Ludwig Büchner, Kraft und Stoff. Empirisch-naturphilosophische Studien (Frankfurt
a.M.: Meidinger Sohn, 1855), p. 13.
37 Ibid.
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the beliefs they upheld: in spite of claiming to be Christians, they were
actually atheists.38 In my opinion, it is clear that he believed that the
good materialist also tends to be materialistic. But in arguing for such
things, Büchner still maintained a certain criticism of common beliefs.
In saying this, I am not denying the ruptures between the different
forms of materialism, but rather examining at which levels the materi-
alist criticisms of spiritual orthodoxy are situated.
The following three levels of criticism should not be confused:
First, materialism contributes to criticizing religious harmony or even,
more generally, the dogmas that prevail in society. This criticism, as
it is outlined by Marx and Engels, loses the central character it had
among eighteenth-century materialists, as well as in Feuerbach and
among some representatives of the quarrel of materialism. Second,
materialist criticism targets certain philosophical systems that support
common social and religious beliefs; it is subversively positioned in
philosophical conflicts, and often holds a marginal position in relation
to academic philosophy, while seeking to engage with other areas of
the public sphere. This can be seen in the work of Staël and Cousin, but
also in the young Marx and in later texts from Engels. Third, materialist
criticism develops, particularly in Marx and Engels, as a critique of
philosophical conflicts in terms of viewing them as a new form of
orthodoxy or ideology hiding other more significant types of conflicts.
Does this mean that a thorough materialist position must abandon
the field of pure philosophy, and a fortiori its history, to open itself
up to other sciences — whether to the natural sciences or the social
sciences? The natural sciences would have the privilege of grasping the
ontological foundation on which philosophical materialism is based;
and the social sciences would have the privilege of directly addressing
social conflicts that are of more direct importance to practice. How-
ever, I would like to conclude by showing, through a single historical
example, how materialism has viewed both the history of philosophy
and materialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from a
non-European lens, namely a Turkish-Ottoman one.
38 Ibid., p. 27. Büchner wrote that ‘No one crucifies himself anymore; no one seeks to be
deprived instead of enjoying/benefiting [geniessen]. But each one hastens and hunts
with the best forces of his life for the material goods and possessions of the earth, for
the joys and pleasures which the material, refined and refined a thousand times over,
offers him’ (my translation).
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The Possible Use of the History of Philosophy in a Materialist Project: The
Case of Beşir Fuad
The French philosophy of the eighteenth century, as well as French
and German materialism, was received in the Turkish-Ottoman intel-
lectual arena from 1859 on, when Münif Paşa published translations of
Fénelon, Fontenelle, and Voltaire. The study of Turkish texts makes it
possible to show the subversive charge that many stories of philosophy
retain from a ‘materialist’ point of view. At the end of the nineteenth
century, Turkish materialists were not Marxists, due to the relative
absence of Marx’s and even Hegel’s texts in the Turkish speaking world
at the time. While Beşir Fuad (1852–1887) associated Büchner with
Voltaire, the Encyclopédistes, and La Mettrie in the same scientific
programme,39 Baha Tevfik (1884–1914), a high school teacher and
publisher, associated Büchner with Haeckel and even Nietzsche in his
materialist project. Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932), to give one last
example, discovered Büchner during his medical studies, translated nu-
merous works, went back to Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis to define his
own materialism, before finally claiming his intellectual lineage from
Gustave Le Bon. Whether it is consistent or logical is of little interest
here. What could be considered here as a doctrinal confusion — and
will sometimes be criticized as such by later Turkish philosophers, and
particularly some Turkish Marxists — is interesting through the very
categorization it produces. One hypothesis to be tested would be ask-
ing whether the histories of philosophy, which are certainly not only
received by ‘materialist’ authors in the Turkish-Ottoman intellectual
sphere,40 have the advantage of offering a philosophical space that is
not subordinate to religious orthodoxy. The study of the Turkish texts
makes it possible to understand that the autonomization of philosophy
and its history need not only be thought of, as Marx and Marxists have
done, as an abstraction of philosophy to be criticized in relation to its
historical roots, but can instead also be seen as an opportunity given to
philosophy to distinguish itself, in its history, from the spiritual realm
defined as religious. The materialist philosophers of the eighteenth
39 Cf. Beşir Fuad, Şiir ve hakikat (Istanbul: I.k.y., 1999), p. 493.
40 Cf. Ahmed Midhat (1844–1912), who held more conservative positions, translated
for instance Alfred Fouillée’s history of philosophy which had been translated in a
summarized version by Baha Tevfik before.
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century may have had a relevance for such a project that cannot be
summarized as a desire for Westernization or as a simple promotion of
a mechanistic or reductionist philosophy — and even less an alienation
of identity.
To illustrate this idea, I will briefly focus on Beşir Fuad (1852–
1887). He became famous for his critical monograph Victor Hugo,
published in 1885, in which he criticized literary Romanticism.41 After
his suicide in 1887,42 many of his writings were collected under the
title Şiir ve Hakikat (Poetry and Reality). He was neither a scientist
nor a philosopher, but rather a translator and mediator who made
many French, English, and German theories accessible in Turkish. The
concern for the popularization and dissemination of knowledge was
essential to his work. For example, he translated popular and didactic
works on physiology, such as Emil Otto’s German grammar and Jean
Macé’s Histoire d’une bouchée de pain, an educational work, in whose
preface Beşir Fuad insisted on the need to have books that everyone
can understand.43 Although he preferred the theses of La Mettrie, he
prioritized Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists because of their efforts
to popularize science: this didactic dimension was constitutive of his
materialism. His first imperative was to enable the acclimatization and
appropriation of these theories in the Ottoman Empire.
From an epistemological point of view, Beşir Fuad can be placed
with Comte and Émile Littré since he positioned himself as an oppon-
ent to all metaphysics and any search for final causes or origins. But he
also insisted on the combative dimension of science and the gallery of
‘heroes’ who fought on the side of scientific truth against the Church.
We are certainly dealing here with a commonplace idea, one which
is partly inherited from the eighteenth century, but Beşir Fuad gave
an original interpretation of it which he hoped would be adapted to
41 He was educated as a member of the Ottoman elite. First an officer, he began, in the
last three years of his life, prolific activity as a writer, journalist, and translator in fields
ranging from physiology to literary theory.
42 Beşir Fuad’s suicide is a very important aspect in the reception of his work and
reinforced his image as a ‘materialist’, as he held, until he lost consciousness, notes that
were meant to be objective about the sensations he felt after taking drugs and cutting
his veins.
43 Cf.OrhanOkay,Beşir Fuad Ilk türk pozitivisti ve natüralisti (Istanbul: Dergah yayinlari,
2008 [1969]), p. 99.
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the reality of Turkish-Ottoman society of its time. Thus, his ‘heroes’
of modern Europe who fought against the priests are first of all loc-
ated in an original history of the Enlightenment which is not reduced
to a purely European phenomenon: Beşir Fuad sketched a history of
philosophy in which the Arabs, heirs of the Greeks, transmitted know-
ledge and enlightenment to a Europe that the Church had plunged into
darkness. Thus, according to his reading, the encounter of Christianity
and Islam in medieval Spain was at the origin of the Renaissance in
Europe. In a similar way, Beşir Fuad reinterpreted Voltaire’s criticism
of the Church and Voltaire’s strategic use of Islam in the second part
of his work, to turn Voltaire into a defender of Islam.44 One point
where Beşir Fuad’s theory would be opposed to Büchner’s concerns the
Western character of this struggle for truth. Whereas Büchner opposes
the calm of the East to the struggle for truth in the West,45 and thus
makes the history of philosophical and scientific conflicts something
strictly European, Beşir Fuad presents a completely different thesis.
He portrayed the Church’s oppression of science in Europe and the
transmission of the Enlightenment to Europe through an encounter
with Islam. Here Beşir Fuad’s strategy is clear but complex: it is by no
means a question of putting his own philosophical position under the
authority of Muslim sacred texts and one must also, in practice, take
into account the censorship imposed on writers of that time. But he
wishes to introduce such doctrines cautiously into an Empire where
Islam is the dominant religion. The first Turkish materialists (among
whom we could include Baha Tevfik, Büchner’s translator) were de-
termined to question a certain orthodoxy but without attacking the
dominant religion head on. In this regard, the discursive strategies of
eighteenth-century European materialists were interesting to them.
With this in mind, we can see how the historical presentation of
philosophy, whether in the form of short historical sketches or bio-
graphies, held a twofold interest. On the one hand, it made a real
appropriation (and not just a reception) of French and German ma-
terialist doctrines possible by blurring at least part of the intellectual
boundaries between East and West. It also revealed an openness, in
44 Beşir Fuad, Voltaire (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2011), p. 170.
45 Büchner, Kraft und Stoff, p. 269.
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these European theories, to the East or Islam. Beşir Fuad did not
wish to alienate his Ottoman political identity and knew the difference
between the works published by French and German authors and the
imperialist policies of France or Germany in his time. On the other
hand, Fuad wished to create, through this historical presentation of
philosophy, a space where philosophy can, in the spiritual domain, dis-
tinguish itself from religion, and destabilize dominant ways of thinking
without having to attack them head-on. Although Beşir Fuad appeared
to erase the practical stakes of the historical presentations of philo-
sophy in France, this is in fact what allowed him to move forward with
caution. If his definition of materialism as a critique of orthodoxy and
his concern for popularization placed him in continuity with a tradi-
tion inaugurated in the eighteenth century, his way of blurring borders
without situating himself in one cosmopolitical universal space also
distinguished him from that tradition. He used the history of philo-
sophy to undermine the subversive charge of his materialist theses by
blurring the boundaries between ‘European’ and ‘Eastern’ philosophy
without making them disappear.
I conclude with some general and methodological remarks. It
seems to me that materialism does not necessarily have to be op-
posed to the history of philosophy. Studying materialist doctrines is
not enough to immanently establish the possibility of a materialist
history of philosophy. Writing a social history of philosophy, its in-
stitutions, and its actors’ strategies, as Jean-Louis Fabiani has done
following Pierre Bourdieu, is certainly a possible way forward. But a
materialist perspective does not necessarily require setting aside the
study of concepts and arguments. I remain convinced that the ma-
teriality of the history of philosophy also lies in its concepts, which
are not merely a simple translation of structures of domination, but
attempts to address conceptual problems that have arisen in a social
and economic context. It also seems to me that one of the historically
foundational elements of materialism, namely the criticism of dogmas
and a certain ideological orthodoxy, must also be applied through the
history of philosophy. With this thought I do not seek to produce a
new great teleologically oriented narrative myself; rather, I mean to
study a succession of significant moments which are certainly distinct
but which can be articulated around the problem of the relationship
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between materialism and the history of philosophy. Historical study
also seems to be a means of preserving the plurality of the materialisms
and materialities in question and of not falling back into a dogmatic
materialism that would be unaware of the ideological aspects it has
inherited from its history. If one of the challenges of a materialist ap-
proach is to blur the boundaries of philosophy, of what lives in it but
is also external to it, then the history of philosophy has its part of the
work to do here as well.
The Historicity of Materialism and the
Critique of Politics
ALEX DEMIROVIĆ
In the first part of this chapter, I argue that materialism is not an
alternative form of metaphysics and philosophy, but rather it opens up
the space for an analysis of concrete historical contexts. Materialism
thus moves in opposition to metaphysics, idealism, or spiritualism.
It only becomes necessary under certain historical conditions. The
tradition of critical theory aims at a concept of social development
that renders the necessity of materialist thinking superfluous. In the
second part, based on various authors from Karl Marx to Theodor
Adorno and Michel Foucault, I discuss the ways in which politics
should become the object of materialist criticism, which not only (with
its contradictions) makes freedom possible, but also blocks it.
MATERIALISM
Since Marx’s Feuerbach theses, critical theory of society has under-
stood itself as a critical continuation and renewal of the tradition of
materialism. This has meant that it criticizes aspects of idealist philo-
sophy including its denial of matter, its claim that matter is unknow-
able, and the constitutive role of consciousness. Within the context of
this tradition, materialism means, first of all, making nature the object
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of inquiry. Max Horkheimer emphatically emphasized that material-
ism is not another type of metaphysics or philosophy. It is always
— and this is my first thesis — a political-strategic intervention that
contests religious and spiritualist explanations of the world because
such explanations have always been closely connected to domination
and exploitation. Materialism does not aim to create a comprehen-
sive philosophical system of thought, nor is it connected to a body
of philosophical texts; instead, it is concerned with praxis and tries to
contribute to its further understanding.
However, ever since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries ma-
terialism has been predominantly mechanistic and deterministic, and
for that reason it has been criticized by critical theory. While it was fit-
ting that materialism was mechanistic and deterministic in the Renais-
sance and afterwards, such definitions have proven inadequate for
more modern phases of social development. Marx criticized the mater-
ialist tradition up to the philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach for tending
to turn materialism into a philosophy. He wrote that sensuousness,
when viewed philosophically, was conceived as the form of the ob-
ject, or of contemplation, rather than as ‘sensuous human activity’, as
‘objective activity’, which is a practice performed by active people.1 In
opposition to deterministic materialism, Marx argued that this active
side was abstractly developed by idealism. Marx rejected the kind of
naturalism according to which society is constituted as it is because it
is determined by nature, a perspective which included ideas like: tools
as the extension of organs, the genetic determination of individuals,
the existing social division of labour between above and below, women
and men, the powerful and the subaltern, or all such hierarchies that
are given based on the argument that the collective cannot survive
unless the many do not subordinate to the command of the few. As
the contrary of this position, materialism wants to understand natural
and social processes in order to be in a position to push back against
the realm of nature as ‘wholly determined’, and in this way make room
for freedom.
1 This is the first thesis on Feuerbach. Cf. Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, ed. by
Friedrich Engels, in MECW [Marx & Engels Collected Works, see abbreviations], v
(1976), pp. 6-8 (p. 6); in German: Karl Marx, ‘Thesen über Feuerbach’, in MEW
[Marx-Engels-Werke, see abbreviations], iii (1975), pp. 5–7 (p. 5).
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Against the background of this criticism, materialism — according
to Horkheimer and Antonio Gramsci — represents an immanent-
philosophical understanding of humans in relation to the world. This
means that materialism is not about the reduction of society, of
thought and meaning, or of individual or collective action to matter
that is ‘out there’. What is important about Marx’s argument here is that
he understands human practice and the external world as a unity, or,
to use Gramsci’s phrase in the Prison Notebooks, as a ‘historical block’.
Accordingly, nature is not grasped as an ‘object’, that is, as an
already-and-always-to-be-found object of rule. Individuals are purpos-
ively active towards nature, that is, towards the ‘outside’. This ‘outside’
is the concrete outside of a historically specific ‘inside’ that people
appropriate and transform through their terms, theories, technologies,
and practices. Indeed, Marx characterizes labour as a ‘process between
man and nature’ in which man ‘mediates his metabolism with nature
through his own action’ (seinen Stoffwechsel mit der Natur durch seine
eigne Tat vermittelt).2 Furthermore, through their activity they also
change, to various degrees, themselves, their thinking, their sensual
experiences, nature, other people, and, finally, the concrete species
itself.
Material practices, it is important to note, include thought and
discourse as social activities and not only as physical and neuro-
physiological processes. The senses, perceptions, experiences, and
concepts all represent concrete practices; each are connected with
specific aesthetic, discursive, or scientific relations, or with conceptual-
theoretical-technical means of production. Because material practices
intervene in these relationships, they can also be said to shape them.
Materialism opposes the school of thought that subordinates hu-
man practices to metaphysical principles, norms, or universals. It views
the practices themselves as being historically specific, which includes
the metaphysical and idealist practices and habits of thought that
people engage in within concrete historical relationships. There is
no search for an origin or a primal position, principles from which
everything else can be deduced, or norms that can provide a conclusive
2 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 3 vols (London: Penguin, 1976),
i, trans. by Ben Fowkes, p. 283; translation modified.
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reason for morally correct action. Contrary to what even critical mater-
ialism and its followers often claim, economics is not a primal reason
either. It is itself contingent, something that can appear as conditioned
by specific power relationships. Materialism, I argue, does not deal
with desires, projections, or value judgments that deny or gloss over
reality, but rather with the concrete thinking and acting of concrete
people at a particular historical point in time. This kind of materialist
immanence is often subjectively experienced as unsettling and difficult
to bear because there is no ontological assurance, no foundation, no
bottom line in nature and its supposedly eternal laws, no universal
truth, and no sense to history or even to individual existence.
CRITICAL MATERIALISM
Above all else, materialism is critical and historical — and this, follow-
ing Horkheimer, is my second thesis — because what is considered
matter changes historically. Materialism refers to the concrete prob-
lems and challenges that specific people in specific social relations have
to deal with at a certain point in time. This can include the cosmos,
the body, the economy, modes of communication, gender, or the en-
vironment. The appropriation of nature always takes place within a
concrete division of labour among people and the connection of their
actions with tools and nature to form a ‘historical block’; one which
is, under the conditions of ‘pre-history’, not organized rationally but
rather in terms of economic exploitation as well as political or cultural
domination. The decisive materialist-historical question is, therefore,
which of the different materialities is dominant in a given conjuncture
of the circle as a whole: the appropriation of nature, health, science
and technology, state power, culture and consensus, gender relations,
or racism.
To the extent that property relations rule over human beings it is
true to say that they are forced to submit to those who claim ownership
of the means of production and, in the name of the self-maintenance
of the collective, claim that freedom for all is not yet possible and
the majority of people must therefore be led by a minority in order
to guarantee the survival and welfare of all. According to this view,
sacrifices are expected to maintain the collective. The most recent
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evidence of this practice can be seen in the appeals from US politicians
for workers to return to work even if this poses, in the context of the
Sars-CoV-2-pandemic, a threat to their health and life. As President
Trump put it, going back to work could hit individuals hard but what
mattered was reopening the American economy.
Even under this hegemony of capitalist owners there are elements
of freedom in the planning and design of products, in the work process
itself, or in the forms of social cooperation. Critical materialism thus
raises the question of the order of priority of one practice over another.
It criticizes the fact that under conditions of domination the intellec-
tual competencies and practical activities of most people are formed in
such a way that enables and sustains the reproduction of domination.
Freedom, thought, concepts, and sensory experiences are of second-
ary importance for many people because they have no control over
fundamental relations, and therefore they distance themselves from
their own capabilities for critical thinking. Materialism thus criticizes
any dependence on the appropriation of nature and argues for an his-
torical change in the order of practices such that people can freely
shape the conditions under which they live. Therefore, materialism is
transformed into what can be paradoxically called material idealism.
POLITICS
Political philosophy often views politics as the sphere of freedom.
Accordingly, politics is not conceived of as a matter of an instrumental
disposition over nature, which would involve the creation of objects,
but rather a challenging collective discussion of issues concerning
living together and the common good. Critical materialism doubts
the validity of such an emphatic conception of politics. Horkheimer
pointedly formulated an opposing position: politics is the epitome of
all the paths that lead to the domination of humans over nature, and of
humans over other humans, and the means by which this domination
is sustained.3 Critical materialism opposes Hegel’s idea that, at least
in the case of the state, there can be an instance of the general and
3 Max Horkheimer, ‘Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie’, in Gesammelte
Schriften, 19 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1987), ii, pp. 177–268 (p. 183).
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an embodiment of a general will, for according to this tradition there
is no overall subject of society or united and reconciled humanity.
Under conditions of market competition and the private ownership
of the means of production, interests are tied together in multiple
ways. Individual self-preservation in the face of possible destruction
depends on others being materially worse off and dependent, and
staying that way. The policies that the state pursues by means of a
multitude of apparatuses are only the result of short or medium-term
compromises between powerful individuals and groups; therefore,
they can be highly diverse and contradictory. Domination prevents
questions concerning the public good from being freely discussed
and decided for in favour of the good of all. Private actors, pursuing
particular interests, make decisions affecting the public good and the
development of society as a whole. In a market, economic freedom is
limited to those few who have asserted themselves within the struggle
over the surplus product and economic competition.
The numerous discussions of this minority, which the bourgeoisie
support within an array of organizations within civil society, repres-
ent a pursuit in which individuals attempt to position themselves
favourably within the struggle over the surplus product and economic
competition; that is, they try to avoid mistakes, anticipate future de-
velopments, pre-empt competitors, and structure actors’ expectations.
Private actors — such as corporations or owners of capital — de-
termine the resources available to society (for example, machines or
raw materials) according to certain paths of development, and compel
others to accept this determination or to assert their private interests.
In the event of disappointments, action turns into silence, apathy, and
political distance, or takes the form of protest, which in turn can be
devalued as isolated, and thus inconsequential, events. If all goes ac-
cording to plan, government policies accompany and coordinate these
investment and structuring processes throughout the different areas of
society — that is, industry, finance, development of technology, raw
materials, transport, production of knowledge, work skills and a work
ethic, nutrition, health, housing, and mobility — in order to avoid
too much friction or even setbacks in development (such as when a
factory cannot find the necessary qualified workforce, cannot trans-
port products, has no legal certainty, cannot count on credit, or faces
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bankruptcy). Policies and policy makers must be carefully informed,
influenced, monitored, tested, and evaluated by society’s dominant
actors, because activities within the political sphere are carried out by
individuals unilaterally and according to particular interests: income,
career, or influence. In such a system, inability, ignorance, inefficiency,
corruption, arbitrariness, and conflicts among politicians can affect
political decision making and administration.
Marx described the consequences of this chiasma of factors for
capitalist-bourgeois society very well: Firstly, at the level of private
owners of capital seeking their own benefit, decisions important to
society as a whole are constantly being taken at a sub-political level.
With the increasing centralization of corporate power, the effects of
these decisions constraining the public good continually expand over
time: they more greatly affect both nature and people and reach further
and further into the future. Secondly, the political community in which
man behaves as a communal being in terms of the general public serves
only to protect the private interests and needs of citizens as selfish
individuals. This also applies to those who act on behalf of the general
public. The common good is the subject of private calculations by
officials and representatives; it is a practical illusion of the state. In
Marx’s words, the state can be considered an ‘illusory general estate’.4
For, under the conditions he outlined, what is supposed to be general
is not decided upon on the basis of general considerations, but rather
represents a compromise between different powerful groups which is
formed under the leadership of one of these groups. The state is the
particular social practice that enables such compromises between the
individual market players.
Politics is thus bound up with something illusory, something fab-
ricated, and with Marx’s help I would like to explain this idea further. In
his analysis of the French Revolution, Marx argues that in revolution-
ary processes lower classes become political idealists and feel that they
are the representatives of general social needs. Because these classes
see themselves as representing the generality of each particular his-
torical moment, they shape, in each historical moment, the formulas
4 Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in MECW, iii, pp.
3–129 (p. 50).
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embodying common goals which mobilize the short-term enthusiasm
and agreement of large crowds of people. But the political enthusiasm
of the constitutive moment which seizes people, their political slogans
and formulas, and their coalitions and alliances immediately disperses
in light of the goals and needs of other classes or groups, for whom
the common goals turn out, as the political process continues, to be
deceptions: women (who do not appear at all), urban workers, the
veterans of the revolutionary army, farm workers and small farmers,
and colonized people. That is why Marx criticized ‘political reason’
[politischer Verstand, translated by ‘political mind’] in principle.5
The French revolutionaries of 1789 were paradigmatically tied to
such ‘political reason’. They believed in political power and political
will; therefore, they could not recognize that the source of social de-
ficiencies was to be found in the state, but believed instead that social
deficiencies were the source of political evils. They thought they could
eliminate these evils through politics by trying to establish equality at
the low level and form of a petit-bourgeois equality. This led to politics
becoming more and more authoritarian, because revolutionary leaders
such as Robespierre suspected individuals of deliberately opposing
this politics of equality.
Against this viewpoint, Marx argued that no government in the
world can eliminate pauperism — and we can say today that Marx was
right.6 And the same can be said for the exploitation of nature: despite
many political assurances and treaties, no government in the world will
prevent climate change. Therefore, according to Marx, it is wrong to
appeal again and again to a political will. Instead, it would be better to
analyse the material practices of politics and pursue other practices.
5 Karl Marx, ‘Critical Marginal Notes on the Article “The King of Prussia and Social
Reform. By a Prussian”’, in MECW, iii, pp. 189–206 (p. 199); ‘Kritische Randglossen
zu dem Artikel “Der König von Preußen und die Sozialreform. Von einem Preußen”’,
in MEW, i (1981), pp. 392–409 (p. 402).
6 China confirms this insight once again: The Communist Party continues the Jacobin
tradition. However, invoking Communism proves to be in vain if the private or state
disposition over living labour is not eliminated; poverty is renewed and returns at a
higher level, as it always will in all capitalist societies.
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POLITICS AS ILLUSION
Marx has been critically interpreted in such a way that portrays him
as reducing politics to mere appearances and therefore not taking
them seriously enough. Along these lines, Slavoj Žižek has accused
Marxism of understanding politics merely as shadow theatre, but this
kind of criticism is paradoxical and quite contradictory.7 For, when
Marx is properly understood according to a critical materialist theory
of society, ‘illusions’ and ‘shadow theatre’ must be taken very seriously.
They represent their own practices and social realities, which in turn
have effects in the real world.
I want to argue that Marx really did condemn politics as an il-
lusion. He thought of ‘political reason’ [‘political understanding’] as
‘spiritualist’,8 and he meant that seriously and critically, for politics
consumes a lot of time and produces extensive material effects with
its own kind of spiritualism. Marx’s critical point here is that political
reason obscures the roots of social distress and falsifies the insights
of those who really want to change social reality, because thinking in
terms of politics suggests that all surface phenomena are founded on
the will of individuals who do not do what they could or should do.
Everything is transformed into a will; objective processes are person-
alized. The remedy for such a situation seems to be the overthrow of
certain forms of the state. As I already explained above, the spiritualism
of the political does not only act as an obstacle to knowledge but also
represents an additional moment in the reproduction of the separation
of the general from the particular, in this case, the community from the
unique life of the individual. In other words, the very illusion of politics
is a material practice; and it poses a problem in that it impairs emanci-
patory action because it pursues goals that must remain fruitless.
Although, when speaking of illusion, it would seem to make sense
to look for the reality behind it, critical materialism asks a different
question; what reality requires these illusions and, contra the Enlight-
enment, always produces them?9 A basic premise of this question
7 Cf. Slavoj Žižek,TheTicklish Subject:The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London:
Verso, 1999).
8 Marx, ‘Critical Marginal Notes’, p. 203.
9 Cf. KarlMarx,Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction, in
MECW, iii, pp. 175–87 (p. 176).
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is that a certain reality cannot exist without the illusions also found
within it. Marx’s own research did not only lead him to hard facts, to
economic matters, to nature and work, but instead to another meta-
physical, theological, spiritual level of reality: the metaphysics of the
value of commodities and money. This is the illusion he was interested
in. Marx saw money and value as kinds of religious transubstantiation
and also as irrational objects, given his view that human labour has
no value and no price. However, it is characteristic of the capitalist
appropriation of surplus labour from those subjected to domination
that the relations of concrete people — those who perform particular
tasks within the division of societal labour as a whole — take the form
of value, a created thing, with the expended labour power presenting
itself as the value of a commodity. With such a system, people face their
own cooperative labour as an objective relation that unfolds following
the dynamic of the play of supply and demand of the market. What
Marx has discovered has a specific ontological status. For the value of
the human capacity for work is something irrational, something non-
existent and fictitious which nevertheless determines the actions of
people.
To make this insight even clearer, one can turn to Louis Althusser’s
explanation of the concept of ideology using the example of religion.
If one were to follow the Enlightenment’s critique, one would ar-
gue that there is no God. In this case, the expectation is that people
will no longer believe in Him because, based on scientific, evidence-
based knowledge, one can say that there is no such world above the
clouds. However, surprisingly, one finds that people continue to be-
lieve in God, in the power of the star constellations or in natural forces.
Here it is a matter of how religions are criticized, for according to the
Enlightenment’s understanding, belief in God is described in the psy-
chological and philosophical terms of a philosophy of consciousness:
it is understood as something that takes place sensibly in the flow of
thought of the individual and that refuses to reason and reflect empir-
ically.
From the perspective of critical materialism, one would speak of a
false consciousness that should in fact dissolve. But the deeper ques-
tion is to ask why the belief in God persists, reproduces, and even
spreads. This is the starting point of Althusser’s theory of ideology.
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Its decisive modification in the conception of materialism consists in
precisely the sort of analytical shift I have outlined regarding religion.
According to his theory of ideology, religious beliefs and attitudes
must be taken seriously: God exists simply because He is a worldly
practice of individuals and collectives. Practices take place as though
He existed: people kneel, fold their hands, sing hymns, kill others in
the name of God, or have their children baptized. Althusser carries out
a materialist proof of God by showing how He exists in all these prac-
tices, rituals, and discourses. Althusser’s theory is useful to show how
these processes reproduce certain kinds of subjectivization which, at
the same time, subjugate people and make them into the free subjects
of their actions, which in turn isolates them from each other and brings
them under a collective ‘third term’, whether it be God or nation or
gender.
I think a distinction made by Foucault would be helpful here to
understand the peculiar ontological distinction between being and
consciousness which is at play here. Foucault argues that one has to
leave aside universals such as the people, state, or civil society, and
start instead with concrete practices. Pursuing this line of thought, he
claims that madness, delinquency, and sexuality do not exist as such
[as ‘ready-made object’] and yet are nevertheless something.10 He is
gesturing toward those ‘interferences’, which make ‘something non-
existent still something while remaining non-existent’. Analogously, he
also says that the economy and politics do not exist, as they are not
existing things, errors, illusions, or ideologies. They are ‘things that do
not exist and yet which are inscribed in reality’.11
POLITICS AS ILLUSION: TWO MISUNDERSTANDINGS
According to critical materialism’s understanding of things, politics is
really a kind of spiritualism and it is illusory. It does not exist, but with
10 Cf. Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France,
1977–78, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 118;
andMichel Foucault,TheBirth of Biopolitics: Lectures at theCollège de France, 1978–79,
ed. by Arnold I. Davidson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 19.
11 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 20.
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its interferences it is and does something. This point is made with three
arguments that I would like now to briefly repeat and expand on.
a) The political community appears as the authority of the general
and confirms individuals in their bourgeois, selfish isolation from each
other. Individuals experience their social context through money and
the state. They only experience their connection — entirely in the
religious tradition — through a third, a general, to which they have
to submit and over which they have hardly any influence. Individuals
always remain particular and face the state as the general, and the state
as general confronts them in the form of legal norms or administrative
power as a foreign force. This still applies even if you can identify with
individual regulations and measures, or if you also enjoy advantages.
For just as they can favour an individual or a group in the name of
the general public, they can also disadvantage them in the name of the
general public.
b) Politics personalizes social processes because everything ap-
pears as a result of a will of individuals, their power, their special ability
or inability. The general cannot appear directly as a general, but must
always take the form of individual actors. This gives the impression
that political goals are not being pursued, or are not being pursued
adequately, because the wrong person is responsible or is doing the
wrong thing and vice versa: if a policy is to be prevented, it appears as
if a concrete person is the obstacle and must therefore be pushed out
of the political function (‘Merkel must go’).
c) There can be no collective subject and no collective will under
capitalist conditions, the general is illusory. Powerful particular forces
agree on a compromise on how to divide and use the power of the state.
I would like to now briefly address two possible misunderstand-
ings. The first misunderstanding is that the state is associated with
the claim to generality: it is the means through which generally bind-
ing rules are created and enforced. However, these rules, which af-
fect many social contexts, always represent compromises that relevant
forces can agree upon at a certain point in time. The struggle for the
establishment of general rules and their use is an ongoing one, so they
are never, in fact, general. The general is constantly being postponed.
For example, bureaucracies can undermine it, powerful social actors
can ignore a rule, try to enforce new rules, make use of grey areas of
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existing rules, or use laws to dominate weaker social agents, who then
have to fight for new rules but cannot prevail for years or decades. In
this way the generality of the law becomes a powerful force against the
subaltern.
The second misunderstanding concerns the illusionary general.
When using this term, I do not draw upon the Rousseauian expecta-
tion of a real, uniform general public, as if there could be a people’s
sovereign who was not shaped by many different interests and ways
of life. However, I also do not draw on the expectation that discursive
decision-making in the public sphere could solve the problem of the
illusory character of the general. Rather, from the point of view of crit-
ical materialism, we are concerned here with two things. Firstly, new
forms of coordination must arise from within the social processes of
work, whereby those who do socially performed work also coordinate
themselves, and no longer fall under the command and control rights
of powerful owners. Secondly, there will be different interests, but
these will be coordinated according to the nature of the specific socially
performed work to be done by those performing it. Coordination does
not take place under the aegis of the (national) state as the general,
but is a collective will that is determined by those who take part in
decision-making from the perspective of their contribution to overall
socially performed work.
THE REALITY OF GHOSTS
Critical materialism can be said to be concerned with the reality of
ghosts and the undead precisely because the political mind is spiritual,
and because the economy is theological and metaphysical, and there-
fore involves the rule of the dead over the living. The consequences
for a materialist relationship to politics is obvious. It is critical of and
dismissively hostile to politics as well as the economy. Marx, as well as
Althusser and Foucault, all argue against acting politically, for politics
represents an imaginary, that is, a metaphysical form of practice, one
which has far-reaching consequences for people, especially in its ima-
ginary, metaphysical form. Since Marx, critical materialism has been
concerned with not restricting itself to prehistory, but to give space
instead to world-opening practices — that is, to a freedom that is no
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longer restricted by the ‘prehistory’ of the preservation interests of the
owners of dead capital.
Foucault argues that criticizing the local power of psychiatric prac-
tices and institutions of prisons, or blaming reason in general, is not
enough. According to him, one must ask how such power relations
are rationalized. Asking this question ‘is the only way to avoid other
institutions, with the same objectives and the same effects, from taking
their stead’.12 Liberation is achieved only by attacking the roots of
political rationality itself.
But for the time being, politics cannot be avoided, as Foucault
proved beyond measure with his own engagement. In a similar vein,
Adorno argued for a dialectical understanding of the nature of the
political. Although politics is ideological and an epiphenomenon, it
is in fact covering up what is actually going on: it has, in short, real
effects. But politics also has the potential to act on the societal sub-
structure and change it.13 That is why the decisive practice takes the
form of politics — but with the aim of abolishing this form.14 It is a
Beckett-like situation: even if you cannot go on, you have to go on; so
that, paraphrasing Marx,15 once humans [the world] awaken from the
dream about themselves that they live in, and with their last rather than
their first political act enter into their own, self-created reality, they
will become materialists — but this will only be possible if they have
moved beyond both idealism and materialism.
TRANSLATED BY RON FAUST
12 Michel Foucault ‘“Omnes et Singulatim”: Toward a Critique of Political Reason’, in
EssentialWorks of Foucault 1954–1984: Power, ed. by Paul Rabinow, James D. Faubion
(New York: New Press, 2001), pp. 298–325 (p. 325).
13 Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophische Elemente einer Theorie der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2008 [1964]), footnote, p. 67.
14 Letter from Adorno to Horkheimer 11 March 1957, in Adorno, Theodor W., and Max
Horkheimer, Briefwechsel, 4 vols, in Theodor W. Adorno. Briefe und Briefwechsel, 8vols
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1994–), iv.4: 1950–1969 (2006), p. 454.
15 Karl Marx, ‘Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher’, in MECW, iii, pp.
133–45 (p. 144).
On Populist Illusion
Impasses of Political Ontology, or How the Ordinary
Matters
FACUNDO VEGA
The theoretical and political reasons that animate radical thought
today are products of a past glory based, to a great extent, on the fas-
cination with ‘the extraordinary’. Images of the break, of the act that
disturbs regularity, are what mostly draw the attention of those who
ascribe to a way of thinking politics that claims to be radical. At the
crossroads of our time, however, we find the absence of such images of
breaks and new political beginnings.
The generalization of this landscape within critical theory is con-
comitant with the replacement of faith in the great political act with
faith in the power of ontology. The post-Marxist variants that pointed
out the closed-mindedness of economism, determinism, and histor-
ical materialism in leftist tradition sought to overcome a new crisis
in Marxism by appealing to the notion of ‘the political’. This extra-
polation of ontological analysis onto the territory of politics has led
to a new exaltation of ‘the extraordinary’. The issue is no longer to
postulate a beginning as a great political act guided by historical ma-
terialist motifs, but, in a Heideggerian fashion, to establish ontological
foundation as the abyssal dimension of politics as such. Despite the
philosophico-political transformations that derive from this theoret-
ical novelty, what really animates it is the condemnation of what is
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conceived as ‘ordinary’. In sum, ‘the political’ seems to reinvigorate
radical thought after determinism has exhausted the leftist tradition —
but at what cost?
This essay will consist of three sections in which I follow the
conviction that Ernesto Laclau’s discursive materialism and later inter-
ventions on ‘populism’ offer important insights into these topics but
that they also catalyse blind spots on the ordinary matter of life in
common. First, I show how Laclau’s post-Marxist theory is based
on the idea that social division is the ground of politics and there-
fore is inscribed within an ontology-oriented (post‐)metaphysics. In
this context, it makes sense that Laclau operates a Heideggerian re-
articulation of the notion of ‘the political’. Second, I examine how this
philosophico-political move is exasperated by the Laclaudian under-
standing of populism. In particular, in the terms laid out by the later
Laclau, all radical politics requires the figure of the populist leader who
points towards the path of emancipation. However, while accepting
the productivity of ‘political difference’ — that is, the binary distinc-
tion between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ — under a populist inflection,
I argue that Laclau both restrains his previous ‘deepening of the materi-
alist project’1 and consecrates ‘political exceptionalism’. Faced with the
assumption that the body of the populist leader as the epitome of ‘the
political’ primordially animates political beginnings, the last section of
this essay offers, as an alternative, the contours of an ordinary politics
of ‘the many’ as the territory par excellence of democratic foundations.
THE ‘DISCREET’ CHARM OF ‘THE POLITICAL’
A number of works in contemporary thought have vindicated the
contentious character of politics by pointing out the dangers of con-
1 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Political Significance of theConcept ofNegativity’,Vestnik, 1, (1988),
pp. 73–78 (p. 76). See also Ernesto Laclau, ‘La Politique comme construction de
l’impensable’, in Matérialités discursives, ed. by Bernard Conein, and others (Lille:
Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1981), pp. 65–74; ‘The Controversy over Materialism’,
in Rethinking Marx, ed. by Sakari Hänninen and Leena Paldán (Berlin: Argument,
1984), pp. 39–43; ‘Ideology and Post-Marxism’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 11.2
( June 2006), pp. 103–14 (p. 104); Ernesto Laclau andChantalMouffe, ‘Post-Marxism
without Apologies’, in Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time (London:
Verso, 1990), pp. 97–132 (pp. 105–12).
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sensualism.2 The focus on such notions as ‘conflict’ and ‘contin-
gency’ was aimed at shedding light on the mutability of political acts
while challenging the analytical stagnation of philosophies of progress
and deterministic economism. In other words, the impugnation of
a consensus-based theory and the concomitant vindication of social
division as the ground of politics sought to respond to the barren
summaries given by traditional perspectives that rested on invocations
of metaphysical foundations and political essentialism. Remarkably,
in the case of Laclau, his radical democratic critique of essentialism
staged a controversy over materialism. In fact, he claims that ‘the
only meaning of the term “materialism” which seems valid to me is
that which opposes the reduction of the real to the concept; this im-
plies that we must radically abandon the idea of a unifying essence of
society’.3 The tone of Laclau’s dispute engendered high expectations
for his radical democratic project and its extolment of ‘the political’.
By seeking to supersede all essentialism, that project migrated to the
territory of (post‐)metaphysics.
One of the most sophisticated attempts to explain how social div-
ision is at the basis of politics will illustrate the kind of problems I refer
to. In one of the prefaces to Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau
and Chantal Mouffe argue that they ‘conceive of the political not as
a superstructure but as having the status of an ontology of the social.
From this argument it follows that […] social division is inherent
[…] in the very possibility of a democratic politics’.4 There can be
no radical politics, Laclau and Mouffe add, without the identification
of an adversary. Their theory of politics is grounded on the assertion
that antagonism is the realization of the indeterminacy of the social.
Thus, they characterize radical democracy as a political form ‘which
is founded […] on affirmation of the contingency and ambiguity of
2 See, among others, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 2001); Alain Badiou,
Peut-on penser la politique? (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1985); Jacques Rancière, La
Mésentente. Politique et Philosophie (Paris: ÉditionsGalilée, 1995); Étienne Balibar, La
Crainte des masses. Politique et Philosophie avant et après Marx (Paris: Éditions Galilée,
1997).
3 Laclau, ‘TheControversy overMaterialism’, p. 43; emphasis in the original. See the im-
portant addition to Laclau’s rendition of ‘materialism’ by FriederOttoWolf, ‘Summary
of Discussions’, in Rethinking Marx, ed. by Hänninen and Paldán, pp. 52–53.
4 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. xiv. Emphasis in the original.
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every “essence”, and on the constitutive character of social division and
antagonism’.5
This sui generis reinvigoration of the materialist repertoire trans-
formed certain presuppositions of the Marxist debate — the ‘onto-
logical’ supremacy of the working class, the conception of Revolution
as a founding moment, and the prospect of collective will as unitary, to
name a few. Such an undertaking demanded new theoretical postulates
— among others, the idea that, hegemonically, ‘the political’ is con-
stitutive of the social. The re-centring of ‘the political’ in Laclau’s work
is not a merely disruptive operation, but instead leads him to embrace a
singular intellectual perspective: post-structuralist thought. Hegemony
and Socialist Strategy, in fact, can be characterized as the epitome of the
post-structuralist political turn developed by Laclau in his later work,
which is crowned with two movements: an attachment to the lack and
excess of ‘the ontological’ and its extrapolation onto the political realm.
‘Lack’ and ‘excess’ as two necessary moments of a unique onto-
logical condition are essential to Laclau’s understanding of politics.
Laclau himself asserts that ‘lack and excess enter into the determin-
ation of social ontology’, operating with respect to a ‘failed unicity’ or
‘absent fullness’. Insofar as, for him, ‘every identity is a threatened iden-
tity’, then ‘antagonism is ontologically primary’.6 The onto-political
horizon described by Laclau is animated by the inevitable gap between
‘fullness of being’ and ‘actual being’. He views ‘lack’ and ‘excess’ as
the raison d’être of hegemony, that is, the moment when a particular
symbol or actor becomes representative of the universality of the com-
munity. Ultimately, ‘lack’ and ‘excess’ appear as originating principles
of the merger of ontological postulates and socio-political relations.
This ambitious combination, however, necessitates a supplement-
ary mechanism. Laclau’s post-structuralism requires constitutive foun-
dations for the abyssal ground of politics, and because social relations
are in the last instance contingent, ‘the political’ plays that structur-
ing role. Vis-à-vis historical materialism, and understood as ‘radical
5 Ibid., 193. On antagonism vis-à-vis class struggle, see Ernesto Laclau, ‘Antagonism,
Subjectivity and Politics’, in his The Rhetorical Foundations of Society (London: Verso,
2014), pp. 101–25.
6 Ernesto Laclau, ‘The Future of Radical Democracy’, in Radical Democracy: Politics
between Abundance and Lack, ed. by Lars Tønder and Lasse Thomassen (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2005), pp. 256–62 (p. 257).
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relationalism’, Laclau’s post-Marxist materialism proposes that ideas,
including those related to political grounding, ‘do not constitute a
closed and self-generated world, but are rooted in the ensemble of
material conditions of society’.7 His invocation of ‘the political’, then,
is the backbone of a situation traversed by the impossibility of total-
ization. The resolution of this stalemate has a precise significance in
Laclau’s project: ‘radical democracy is the first strictly political form
of social organisation, because it is the first one in which the pos-
ing and the withdrawal of the social ground is entirely dependent on
political interventions’.8 On the one hand, Laclau establishes the im-
possibility of an ultimate foundation of the social, and does so in a
post-structuralist fashion that seeks to avoid the limitations inherent
to the contraposition of classical idealism and materialism.9 On the
other, this operation is consolidated by appealing to ‘the political’ as
the moment of institution of the social.
Notably, Laclau’s onto-political operations rely on a return to
Martin Heidegger’s thought. In particular, Heidegger’s ‘ontological
difference’ appears profusely in Laclau’s work after Hegemony and So-
cialist Strategy to conform what was called ‘political difference’: while
‘politics’ refers to the concrete realm of decision making, ‘the political’
would be the sphere from which politics originates. Laclau — some-
times defined as a ‘leftist Heideggerian’ — forges a post-foundational
theory that seeks to comprehend the ontological ‘un-grounding’ of
political principles.10 By vindicating the conflictual and contingent
character of politics under the aegis of anti-essentialism, Laclau claims
that ‘since, for essential reasons […] the fullness of society is un-
reachable, this split in the identity of political agents is an absolutely
constitutive “ontological difference” — in a sense not entirely unrelated
7 Laclau and Mouffe, ‘Post-Marxism without Apologies’, p. 110.
8 Laclau, ‘The Future of Radical Democracy’, p. 261.
9 Neither related to the problem of the external existence of objects, nor to a contrapos-
ition of form and matter in which the latter is conceived as the ‘individual existent’,
Laclau is more interested in suggesting that ‘a world of fixed forms constituting the
ultimate reality of the object (idealism) is challenged by the relational, historical and
precarious character of the world of forms (materialism)’ (Laclau and Mouffe, ‘Post-
Marxism without Apologies’, p. 110; emphasis in the original).
10 See Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy,
Lefort, Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).
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to Heidegger’s use of this expression’.11 Laclau’s radical-democratic ap-
proach relies on stressing the difference between Sein and Seiende.
When ‘ontological difference’ is extrapolated onto the political realm
it becomes a necessary moment of Laclau’s ‘ontology of the social’.12
It is remarkable how Laclau’s invocation of democracy as a radical
order that resists the imprisonment of essentialist foundations repro-
duces ‘political difference’ over and over again. Laclau’s onto-political
instances are recurrent: ‘“Politics” is an ontological category: there is
politics because there is subversion and dislocation of the social.’13
Laclau’s analysis, to be sure, not only extrapolates ‘ontological differ-
ence’ onto ‘political difference’ but also, in particular, elevates one of
the structuring principles of the former, ‘the ontological’. Concerning
the allegation that his oeuvre focuses on the ontological dimension
of social theory and not on ontic research, Laclau replies that ‘this is
a charge to which I plead happily guilty, except that I do not see it
as a criticism at all. I have located my theoretical intervention at the
theoretical and philosophical level and it is at that level that it has to
be judged’.14 Laclau’s celebration of ontologism reaches a climax in
his later published works — to the extent that, in his own reckoning,
they show the ‘ontological centrality of the political’.15 His argument
is simply supernumerary insofar as ‘the ontological’ plays the role of a
ubiquitous Deus ex machina.
By pointing out these deficits in Laclau’s work, I do not mean
to minimize his influence over contemporary thought. Some of the
interest that Laclau’s intervention has aroused derives from his per-
ception that hegemonic politics moves from the struggle against the
11 Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996), pp. 60–61. Emphasis added.
12 See, among others, Ernesto Laclau and Lilian Zac, ‘Minding the Gap: The Subject of
Politics’, in The Making of Political Identities, ed. by Ernesto Laclau (London: Verso,
1994), pp. 11–39 (p. 30); Laclau, ‘Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universal-
ity in the Constitution of Political Logics’, in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality:
Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, ed. by Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj
Žižek (London: Verso, 2000), pp. 44–89 (pp. 58, 71, and 84–85); Laclau, ‘Glimpsing
the Future’, in Laclau: A Critical Reader, ed. by Simon Critchley and Oliver Marchart
(London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 279–328 (pp. 307–11 and 323); Laclau, ‘Antagon-
ism, Subjectivity and Politics’, pp. 112 and 115.
13 Ernesto Laclau, ‘New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time’, in New Reflections
on the Revolution of our Time, pp. 3–85 (p. 61).
14 Laclau, ‘Glimpsing the Future’, p. 321.
15 Laclau, The Rhetorical Foundations of Society, p. 8.
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rigidities of historical materialism toward the reference to fundamental
ontology. ‘Like the Heideggerian Abgrund’, Laclau claims, ‘the hege-
monic operation consists in a radical investment which, at the same
time as it attempts to establish a bridge between the ontic and the
ontological, reproduces their impossible convergence.’16 At this stage,
we should note that the invocation of ‘political difference’ conflates
two distinct strands in Laclau’s oeuvre: on the one hand, his emphasis
on the ‘dissolution of the myth of foundations’17 as a radicalization of
emancipatory thought attentive to a post-Marxist ‘materialism’, and,
on the other, the inscription of that abyssal nature of political founda-
tion on the altar of ontology. Laclau’s theory thus leads to a specific
impasse, in which a kind of post-structuralism conceived as post-
metaphysical is actually erected upon the essentialist coordinates of
fundamental ontology.
By examining Laclau’s attribution of an ontological character to
politics, I intend to note his ‘forgetfulness’ of the power and action of
‘the many’. That ‘forgetfulness’ is remarkable, especially since, accord-
ing to Laclau, his theorizations were in large measure derived from his
youthful activism. As Laclau explains:
when today I read Of Grammatology, S/Z, or the Écrits of
Lacan, the examples which always spring to mind are not from
philosophical or literary texts; they are from a discussion in
an Argentinian trade union, a clash of opposing slogans at a
demonstration, or a debate during a party congress. Through-
out his life Joyce returned to his native experience in Dublin;
for me it is those years of political struggle in Argentina of the
1960s that come to mind as a point of reference and compar-
ison.18
Rather than reading these recollections as manoeuvres concerning the
exoticism of a native land and of youthful political practice, I would
rather conceive of them as invectives with respect to a philosophico-
political plexus in crisis. Laclau himself notes that ‘the loss of collective
16 Laclau, ‘Antagonism, Subjectivity and Politics’, p. 121.
17 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Politics and the Limits of Modernity’, in Universal Abandon? The
Politics of Postmodernism, ed. by Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1988), pp. 63–82 (p. 81).
18 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Theory, Democracy and Socialism’, in New Reflections on the Revolu-
tion of our Time, pp. 197–245 (p. 200).
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memory is not something to be overjoyed about. It is always an im-
poverishment and a traumatic fact. One only thinks from a tradition’.19
In the next section, I show that Laclau’s defence of the ontological
embodiment of the populist leader constitutes a renewed stage of his
Auseinandersetzung with the Marxist legacy — and that the tradition
that Laclau never abandoned is that of ‘political exceptionalism’, one
in which political beginnings are ontologically constituted and extra-
ordinary in nature.
THE LEADER’S NEW ONTOLOGICAL CLOTHES: POPULISM AND
THE POLITICAL EXCEPTION
In this section I examine how, in Laclau’s theory, the radical-
democratic ‘praise of the political’ takes a populist form. Laclau’s
considerations on populism are not restricted to his later work. In
fact, such reflections began during his political activism in Argentina
and coalesced with the publication of Politics and Ideology in Marxist
Theory in 1977. While there are exceptionalist constants in Laclau’s
work, his later encomium of ‘the political’ in a populist sense adds
a fundamental ingredient to his theoretical position: the supposed
radicalization offered by ‘ontological difference’ in its political
inflection.
According to this later Laclau, populism, understood as a ‘way of
constructing the political’20 that is clearly different from institutionalism
and its emphasis on gradualist administration, remains ‘an ontological
and not an ontic category’.21 Étienne Balibar has incisively summarized
the spectrum of Laclau’s theoretical attempt in the following terms:
‘populism, rethought and generalized according to a modality that
is no longer normative but ontological, is not a marginal, still less
a pathological, phenomenon. It is a presupposition of politics itself ’.
19 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Building a New Left’, inNew Reflections on the Revolution of our Time,
pp. 177–96 (p. 179; emphasis in the original).
20 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005), p. xi; emphasis added.
21 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Populism: What’s in a Name?’, in Populism and the Mirror of Demo-
cracy, ed. by Francisco Panizza (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 32–49 (p. 34).
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Hence, Balibar concludes, ‘its denial […] appears as itself the effect of
society’s blindness to its own bases’.22
For Laclau, undoing this blindness with respect to the constitu-
tion of the social involves moving toward a definition of populism as
a ‘political logic’ and a ‘performative act endowed with a rationality
of its own’.23 On the one hand, Laclau asserts that the ‘dismissal [of
populism] has been part of the discursive construction of a certain
normality’;24 while, on the other hand, Laclau argues that confront-
ing this situation endows the difference between ‘the ontic’ and ‘the
ontological’ with a political significance, giving primacy to the second
term.25 In a world in which politics is conceived as mere adminis-
tration, it is imperative to solve the theoretical impasse around ‘the
political’ in a populist vein. The condition for this solution that is not
asserted categorically, however, is that populism must be understood
with reference to the command of the leader. According to Laclau,
administrative politics, which is opposed to populism, embodies the
myth of the ‘totally reconciled society — which invariably presupposes
the absence of leadership, that is, the withering away of the political’.26
Inversely, for Laclau leadership is constitutive of ‘the political’ and
expresses the nature of ‘political difference’ in the highest sense.
Both undertheorized and omnipresent, the populist leader offsets
the dispersion of ‘the people’. The notion of ‘social demand’ is essential
in this regard, for, according to Laclau, it remains the smallest unit
to analyse the constitution of ‘the people’. Although ‘demand’ may
equally refer to ‘request’ as it may to ‘claim’,27 it should not be neces-
sarily restricted to the domain of the antagonism of ‘the people’ against
the power bloc. Rather, Laclau himself stresses that ‘the people’ neces-
sitates a specific ‘other’ to catalyse its demands: the leader. Without
the leader’s acts, in fact, ‘democratic demands’, which are of an isolated
22 Étienne Balibar, La Proposition de l’Égaliberté (Paris: PUF, 2010), p. 232; Equaliberty:
Political Essays, trans. by James Ingram (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013),
pp. 189–90.
23 Laclau, On Populist Reason, pp. 117 and 18.
24 Ibid., p. 19.
25 See ibid., pp. 4, 67–68, 71–72, 87–88, 94, 103, 111, 114–16, 127, 132, 160–61, 163,
222, 224–26, 229, and 245–46.
26 Ibid., p. 63; emphasis in the original and added.
27 Ibid., 73.
336 ON POPULIST ILLUSION
nature, could never become ‘popular demands’, which help ‘to consti-
tute the “people” as a potential historical actor’.28
Laclau is cautious regarding the idea that the love of the leader
might be the only libidinal tie of a group. Nonetheless, he also argues
that the elimination of ‘the need for a leader corresponds, almost point
by point, to a society entirely governed by what I have called the logic
of difference’. He then adds that ‘such a society is an impossibility’.29
The emergence of ‘the people’, according to Laclau, entails the inter-
vention of something ‘qualitatively new’. In this vein, he asserts that
the constitution of popular identity, as a symbol, does not express in
a passive way but actually constitutes what it expresses. Laclau’s dis-
cursive materialism conveys, in his own words, ‘the attempt of showing
how the being of objects, far from being fixed and simply “given” to the
contemplation of human beings, is socially constructed through their
actions.’30 And yet, the process that he describes cannot establish ‘the
many’ as protagonists of democratic politics.
The obliteration of the role of ‘the many’ in populist politics is
even clearer when Laclau decrees that ‘an assemblage of heterogeneous
elements kept equivalentially together only by a name is […] necessar-
ily a singularity’. Asserting that individuality is the most extreme form
of singularity, Laclau arrives at a corollary that reveals the ‘truth of
populism’: ‘In this way, almost imperceptibly, the equivalential logic
leads to singularity, and singularity to identification of the unity of
the group with the name of the leader.’31 In sum, although Laclau’s
analysis is sparse on this point, we can infer that the figure of the leader
animates the populist phenomenon — which is remarkable, since,
for him, ‘populist reason […] amounts […] to political reason tout
court’.32 Populism, then, stages the subjection of ‘the people’ to the
dictates of popular ‘authority’, forging a unity based on the power of
the ‘great man’ which vanishes once this figure passes away.
The invocation of the extra-quotidian character of the leader
within Laclau’s construct deserves further scrutiny. It is possible to
28 Ibid., pp. 74 and 120.
29 Ibid., p. 82.
30 Laclau, ‘Political Significance of the Concept of Negativity’, p. 76.
31 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 100.
32 Ibid., p. 225; emphasis in the original.
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address this issue by observing that, aside from the notions of ‘de-
mands’ and ‘the name of the leader’, the concept of ‘representation’
is central to Laclau’s understanding of populism.33 Laclau’s discussion
of representation is primarily aimed at comprehending the leader as a
symbol maker. His or her activity, Laclau argues, ‘no longer conceived
as “acting for” his constituents, becomes identified with effective lead-
ership’.34 Laclau emphasizes that ‘identity’ does not precede the ‘pro-
cess of representation’ but rather results from it. Mutatis mutandis,
representation is the premise for the constitution of a ‘popular will’.
In Laclau’s terms, the construction of a ‘people’ cannot but take place
through representation.
Critics have pointed out the fallacy in the assumption that the rep-
resentative articulation of demands necessarily leads to the emergence
of a cohesive political entity. As Slavoj Žižek suggests, ‘there is nothing
in the heterogeneity of demands that predisposes them to be unified
in people’.35 Certainly, Laclau understands representation as having a
performative character. Populism, in this sense, becomes a discourse
that brings into being what it claims to represent, namely ‘the people’.
But even considering populism within the domain of political perform-
ativity is not a sufficient basis to conclude, as Laclau does, that every
will is constituted as such after representation. And if representation is
by and large equivalent with the expression of the leader’s will, then it
is restricted to playing the role of a unifying force.
Be that as it may, Laclau’s defence of the role of the populist leader
is even more questionable given the author’s familiarity with Ernst
Kantorowicz’s theory of the King’s two bodies.36 Though I cannot
scrutinize the implications of this debate around political legitimacy
and corporality here, I would like to return to Laclau’s last dictum:
‘the logic of the King’s two bodies has not disappeared in democratic
society: it is simply not true that pure emptiness has replaced the
33 On ‘representation’ in his work, see, among others, Laclau, ‘Power andRepresentation’,
in Emancipation(s), pp. 84–104; On Populist Reason, pp. 157–71.
34 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 160.
35 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Against the Populist Temptation’, Critical Inquiry, 32.3 (Spring 2006),
pp. 551–74 (p. 564); emphasis in the original.
36 Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).
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immortal body of the King. This immortal body is revived by the
hegemonic force’. Laclau adds:
What has changed in democracy, as compared with the anciens
régimes [sic], is that in the latter that revival took place in only
one body, while today it transmigrates through a variety of bod-
ies. But the logic of embodiment continues to operate under
democratic conditions and, under certain circumstances, it can
acquire considerable stability.37
It is surprising that Laclau, an author who is so prone to conceptual
constructs, does not specify the nature of the democratic ‘variety of
bodies’ to which he refers. Whisking this specification away, Laclau
neglects a radical materialist consideration of ‘the many’ — an over-
sight that leads him to focus on the corporality of leaders. His thesis
is that hegemonic force rekindles a sort of immortal ‘energy’. Even if
we accept this proposition, it seems difficult to see where the limits
of that ‘extraordinariness’ might be — especially when Laclau himself
assumes that democratic incarnations are always contingent and that
there is no ultimate guarantee or transcendental source of legitimation
that might structure life in common.
BETWEEN THE ORDINARY AND THE EXTRAORDINARY: THE
COMBINED POWER OF ‘THE MANY ’
Beyond the equivalence between populism and politics and its hypo-
stasis in the body of the leader, I want to argue that life in common
does not have impregnable origins waiting to be disinterred. Political
beginnings are nothing but a complex of intertwined ordinary and
non-ordinary moments which evade all confinement in the binary edi-
fice erected between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’. The extolment of ‘the
political’, and particularly the proverbial instantiation of exceptional-
ism in radical thought, cannot account exhaustively for the emergence
of beginnings enacted by the politics of ‘the many’.38
37 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 170.
38 To avoid the idealization and aestheticization of ‘lack’, the phrase ‘the ordinary’ is used
in this essay to refer to a realm of action and not to ‘the many’ themselves. At the same
time, ‘the many’ indicate that democracy is evasive vis-à-vis the sanctification of the
will of ‘the people’. To put it differently, the appeal to ‘the many’ acknowledges the
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In Laclau’s later works, this neglect is embodied in his enthroning
of the populist leader and is also apparently compensated for by the
author’s interest in the constitution of a political ontology. While in
his early work Laclau focused on the multiplicity of struggles inscribed
in the democratic revolution and then confronted the narrative of the
great emancipatory act with a variety of emancipatory movements,
in his later work he moved away from pluralized radical politics. In
fact, for Laclau, the construction of a popular subjectivity ‘reaches
a point where the homogenising function is carried out by a pure
name: the name of the leader’.39 What remains to be understood here
is why populist hegemony is the form of expression par excellence of
an antagonistic excess with respect to the democratic institutions that
normally regulate political conflict or why, as Laclau claims, ‘radical
democracy is always “populist”.’40
Laclau’s populism implies de-substantializing ‘the people’ and
then, in a (post‐)metaphysical and discursive vein, re-substantializing
this collective through the figure of the leader. In such theoretical ges-
tures, we can still detect Laclau’s Auseinandersetzung with materialism
through his invocations of the ‘materiality of the signifier’ or the ‘ma-
teriality of language’.41 However, Laclau’s ‘rhetorical materialism of the
subject’ might resemble ‘a voluntarism of sorts’.42 More importantly,
his operation of de-substantializing and re-substantializing ‘the people’
leads to a disdain for the autonomy of ‘the many’. It is true that the
view of ‘the people’ as irrational plebs has persisted even after the con-
solidation of modern and contemporary revolutions. Going against
this tendency, Laclau’s populist project invokes radical democracy to
centrality of political subjectivity without somehow acceding to the idea of ‘a good
people’.
39 Laclau, ‘Populism: What’s in a Name?’, p. 40; emphasis added.
40 Laclau, ‘The Future of Radical Democracy’, p. 259; emphasis added.
41 See, among others, Laclau, ‘Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?’, in Emanci-
pation(s), pp. 36–46; The Rhetorical Foundations of Society.
42 John Kraniauskas, ‘Rhetorics of populism’, Radical Philosophy: A Journal of Socialist
and Feminist Philosophy, 186 ( July/August 2014), pp. 29–37 (p. 33). On the relation
between discourse andmaterialism in Laclau, see, among others, RosemaryHennessy,
Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp.
59–64; Benjamin Glasson, ‘Unspeakable Articulations: Steps Towards a Materialist
Discourse Theory’, in Material Discourse-Materialist Analysis: Approaches in Discourse
Studies, ed. by Johannes Beetz and Veit Schwab (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2017), pp. 81–94.
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revalue the politically marginalized: And yet, rather than considering
the underdog as autonomous, he suggests that it is the extra-quotidian
nature of the body of the leader which brings the marginalized into
actual political existence.
It may be that these elaborations are aimed at extricating ‘the
people’ of populism from the danger of ‘homogeneity’. But after the
foregoing analysis, we may discern an additional motif of the ‘political
exceptionalism’ that consecrates the disdain for the autonomy of ‘the
many’ in the work of Laclau and other theorists of populism. ‘The
people’, or rather their ‘people’, is not only subordinated to the figure
of the leader; it is also an intellectual construct. ‘A first theoretical
decision’, Laclau declares, ‘is to conceive of the “people” as a polit-
ical category, not as a datum of the social structure.’43 In this way,
‘the people’ is not just born from the political will of the populist
leader. More fundamentally, this collective originates from the analyt-
ical design of the populist intellectual who places his or her principles
beyond the immediate historical context and ‘mere’ empirical reality.
Vis-à-vis this triple imprisonment — by the figure of ‘the people’, the
decisions of the populist leader, and the judgments of the populist in-
tellectual — ‘the many’ must return to the central scene of democratic
politics.
Thus far, we have seen how Laclau, by adopting ‘political differ-
ence’, endowed the body of the populist leader with an ontological
status. But he also goes further than that. His use of ontological jargon
to define politics is not merely descriptive but symbolizes his intention
to lay out a ‘political ontology’ and to elaborate a general theory of
‘the political’. Laclau’s endeavour to address ‘the political’ is charac-
terized by a polarity: Marx (deconstructed) with Heidegger. Within
that dichotomy, Laclau seems to privilege Heidegger, which affects his
radical materialist project.44 In his last published work, he asserts that
his aim is ‘the construction of a political ontology which can respond
43 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 224; emphasis in the original.
44 By embracing Heideggerian ‘ontological difference’, Laclau avoids a thematization of
Heidegger’s derogatory rendition of materialism. See, among others, Martin Heideg-
ger, Gesamtausgabe, 102 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1975–) viii, pp. 27, 160,
and 208; ix, pp. 268, 340, and 365; x, pp. 131 and 179–80; xv, pp. 352–53 and 387–89,
xvi, p. 703; xxxvi/xxxvii, p. 211; xl, p. 50; l, p. 154; lxv, pp. 54 and 148; lxxviii,
pp. 12–14 and 190; lxxix, pp. 88 and 94–95; lxxxiii, pp. 179, 209, and 508; lxxxix,
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to the challenges presented by the post-Marxist and post-structuralist
situation within which we are operating’.45 For Laclau, returning to
the Marxist legacy requires appreciating its inherent plurality. But the
trajectory he delineates, from the vindication of ‘post-Marxism’ —
understood by Laclau himself as the reformulation of ‘the materialist
programme in a much more radical way than was possible for Marx’46
— to his final encomium of populism, proves to be an attempt to think
beyond the ‘relationalist’ universe.
Having left class struggle far behind, the plot of Laclau’s political
drama is neither based on the plural struggles of social movements
nor on so-called materialist ‘democratic radicalization’. Instead, rad-
ical thought is enacted on the stage of a ruptured metaphysics. The
establishment of a ground as abyss, together with the understanding
of representation as a process of de-grounding, are made legitimate
through Laclau’s recourse to the notion of ‘post-foundationalism’. But
due to the abyssal conditions being constitutive, this lack requires an
excess. Previously, we have examined how, in Laclau’s later works, pop-
ulist leadership necessitates a supernumerary recourse to ontology.
We are now ready to assess a crucial addendum: the essential contin-
gency of political foundation requires a particular stabilization that, for
Laclau, must come from the political ontology that he has forged — a
political ontology that claims to univocally identify ‘the political (in the
ontological sense of the term, which has little to do with political or-
ganizations and structures)’47 and might re-stage a faith in a totalizing
moment with idealist effects.48
The transition from Marx (deconstructed) to Heidegger is not
restricted to Laclau’s work. This is why the present examination of
his theoretical edifice has a broader scope. As we problematize the
pp. 461–62 and 527; xciv, pp. 143, 424, and 428; xcv, pp. 40, 129, 149, and 360; xcvi,
p. 150; xcvii, pp. 28 and 127; xcviii, pp. 382 and 398–99.
45 Laclau, The Rhetorical Foundations of Society, p. 1; emphasis added.
46 Laclau and Mouffe, ‘Post-Marxism without Apologies’, p. 112.
47 Laclau, ‘Antagonism, Subjectivity and Politics’, p. 123; emphasis in the original.
48 This result is at odds with Laclau’s previous insistence on moving away from idealist
instances, which would consist ‘in showing the historical, contingent and constructed
character of the being of objects; and in showing that this depends on the reinsertion of
that being in the ensemble of relational conditions which constitute the life of a society
as a whole’ (Laclau and Mouffe, ‘Post-Marxism without Apologies’, p. 111; emphasis
in the original).
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fascination with ‘the extraordinary’ inherent in ‘political difference’,
the point is to set out the bases for a renewed reflection on the ordinary
irruption of ‘the many’ in democratic politics.49 As a propaedeutic
for this task, in the preceding pages I have established how Laclau’s
‘populist illusion’ — not meant in terms of a deception but instead as
a high aspiration and unreachable dream — is an outstanding example
of ‘political exceptionalism’. The bases for that exceptionalism are the
conception of division and contingency as the ground of politics, the
equation of political reason with populist reason, the figuration of the
leader as the guarantor of populism vis-à-vis the postulated ‘people’
as a counterpart with demands, and the invocation of a Heideggerian
‘ontological difference’ for the elaboration of a political ontology.
When we challenge exceptionalism and understand the distinction
between the politically normal and exceptional as a matter that is up
for debate, we can hardly take the onto-political stabilization offered
by Laclau for granted. Beyond this operation, the leader seems to
lose his/her ‘extraordinariness’ and his/her body becomes the very
manifestation of human frailty. In turn, ‘the many’ — those who are
presumably subjected to authority — no longer merely express de-
mands and gain an ‘ordinariness’ to shape common beginnings. All
in all, this non-exceptionalist reconfiguration shows that the tasks of
the materialist programme that Laclau initiated and, unfortunately,
interrupted, can and should move forward.
Throughout this essay, it has become clear that Laclau’s narration
of populism contains an ambivalent gesture. On the one hand, he re-
pudiates all determinism, and especially the dogma of normality in
both the liberal and Marxist traditions. On the other hand, he praises
the forces of ‘the extraordinary’ and forges an ontological essential-
ism which, reversing his previous ‘radical materialism’, reinvigorates
the idea of having control of the totality of reality and its historical
49 That irruption does not necessarily amount to political empowerment. Although the
jargonof ‘the ordinary’, and ‘themany’ can hardly bemobilized to promote the order of
rank, the praise of ‘the commonman’ has not always constituted a call to emancipation.
From the Fronte dell’UomoQualunque in Italy to recent populistmovements, including
the notion that ‘everyone’ is an entrepreneur of his/her/their own life, the ‘common
man’ may well be the subject invoked by regressive political currents. See, among
others, Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), p. 3.
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development. A critical analysis of Laclau’s account yields a valuable
lesson for contemporary approaches to grounding politics in a way that
is animated by ‘the extraordinary’.
Let us now return to the question posed at the beginning of this
essay regarding which principle can govern radical democratic politics
when its old foundations seem to have vanished. Our examination of
Laclau’s exceptionalism has offered clues that allow us to avoid the
impasse that ensues when we totalize ‘the political’. One way to eschew
this philosophico-political dilemma is to accept that ‘the ordinary’ is
not the negation but the matter of the politically extraordinary. In
this light, we may understand not only that ‘“emancipation” is a per-
formance to which we always arrive late and which forces us to guess,
painfully, about its mythical or impossible origins’,50 but, especially,
that the unfolding of a new beginning also depends on the combined
power of ‘the many’.
50 Laclau, Emancipation(s), 82.

Theory’s Method?
Ethnography and Critical Theory
MARIANNA POYARES
INTRODUCTION
Methodological debates in political philosophy and political the-
ory have been gaining increasing importance in academic and non-
academic spaces alike.1 Whether in the ongoing dispute between
moralism and realism or in newer formulations such as avant-garde
political theory,2 it is true to say that the debate concerning the epis-
temological and ontological commitments of research methods seems
to be experiencing a renewal after a period of relative paralysis, a
hibernation period arguably stemming from the domination of the
Rawlsian framework over mainstream Anglophone political theory.3
One particular topic of interest has been the use of ethnographic
methods, broadly understood, in political theory and political philo-
sophy.4 A number of articles have been published recently both using
1 I would like to acknowledge the crucial input, critical comments, and encouragement
provided by Edward Guetti and Tatiana Llaguno Nieves. I am also grateful to Marcos
Nobre for sending me his paper, and to Robin Celikates for his support and his push
for fine-tuning. Finally, I would like to thank the blind reviewers for their engagement.
2 Lea Ypi, Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011).
3 On the dominance of Rawlsianism over the political theory and political philosophy,
see Katrina Forrester, In the Shadow of Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2019).
4 MatthewLongo andBernardo Zacka, ‘PoliticalTheory in an Ethnographic Key’,Amer-
ican Political Science Review 1130.4 (2019), pp. 1066–70.
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and defending the use of ethnography in political theory and political
philosophy: some have adopted a tone like a manifesto while others
have made the case for its epistemic advantages. In this paper, I would
like to join this emerging trend by establishing a firmer ground that
supports the use of ethnographic methods, making clear which norm-
ative and epistemic commitments lie in the background of my claim.
My goal here is not to formulate a defence of the research method itself
(which would entail an uncritical understanding of the ‘purity’ of the
method), but a defence of the use of political ethnography by critical
social theory. I will contextualize the topic within a longstanding de-
bate in Critical Theory regarding the relationship between theory and
practice, a meta-critical stance towards research methods in general,
and the issue of emancipation.
I will start by dispersing the aura of novelty or innovation pro-
posed by some supporters of the use of ethnography in political theory
and political philosophy. The recovery of certain theoretical tropes has
commonly been misidentified as innovation. This has been the case
with ethnography in social theory, which has been celebrated by virtue
of either its apparent novelty or its attachment to so-called New Mater-
ialism. I will show that the use of such a method has been longstanding
for feminist and postcolonial theorists, and that it also played a crucial
role in the intellectual development of authors associated with the first
generation of the Frankfurt School. My goal is to show the longstand-
ing relationship between the use of such methods by theorists that
are, in one way or another, associated with the tradition of historical
materialism. Secondly, I would like to address and criticize the associ-
ation, usually attached to the ‘novelty’ tendency outlined above, that
connects the use of ethnography with so-called ‘New Materialism’. As
‘new materialism’ is an incredibly large umbrella term encompassing
different positions, my goal here is to oppose the specific claim that
ethnography would serve the purpose of bringing the theorist closer
to ‘matter itself ’. I will do this by highlighting what ethnography within
a framework of historical materialism looks like, and what its specific
epistemic, normative, and, ultimately, (socio‐)ontological commit-
ments are. I will primarily outline the commitments of certain strands
within the large denomination of New Materialisms in terms of their
conceptions of agency, epistemology, and transhumanism. I argue that
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such commitments are radically different from the ones I am proposing
as productive for the use of ethnography within historical material-
ism as a materialism that, as pointed out by Étienne Balibar, makes
no reference to matter itself.5 Finally, I will show that the notion of
social form is pivotal for the tradition of historical materialism, arguing
that ethnographic methods, and the use of thick descriptions, can be
useful tools for investigating social formations while avoiding certain
ideological traps and maintaining emancipation as a goal for theory.
AGAINST NOVELTY
In his famous essay Critical and Traditional Theory, Max Horkheimer
outlines four elements that differentiate critical theory from other
types of social theory: critical theory is self-reflexive, insofar as it takes
into account its own history and conditions of theoretical formation;
it is interdisciplinary insofar as it integrates social theory, empirical
research, and philosophical analysis; it is emancipatory insofar as its
goal is the production of theory in the service of social emancipation,
stressing the connection between the production of theory and that of
liberating social change; and, finally, it is materialist in the sense that
‘it is anchored in oppositional experiences and forms of consciousness
as well as social and political struggles, from which it takes its cue, but
which it does not uncritically follow’.6
Instead of focusing on ‘simplistic questions of conscience and
clichés about justice’, taking refuge from history in morality and ‘re-
lying on the armoury of its moral indignation’, Horkheimer argued
that critique has to be based on the analysis of social reality and its
contradictions, and that it can only find its research criteria in the so-
cial practices, struggles, experiences, and self-understandings to which
critique is connected.7 Discussions over the method or methods of
empirical research, resulting from a meta-critical stance on research
methods has been a constitutive element of Critical Theory.
5 Cf. Étienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx (London: Verso, 1995).
6 As appears in Robin Celikates, ‘Critical Theory and the Unfinished Project of Medi-
ating Theory and Practice’, in The Routledge Companion to the Frankfurt School, ed. by
Espen Hammer and Axel Honneth (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 206–20 (p. 208).
7 Ibid., p. 206.
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Critical thinking is the function neither of the isolated indi-
vidual nor of a sum-total of individuals […]. The subject is no
mathematical point like the ego of bourgeois philosophy; his
activity is the construction of the social present. Furthermore,
the thinking subject is not the place where knowledge and ob-
ject coincide, nor consequently the starting point for attaining
absolute knowledge.8
Following these guidelines, it is important to note that the relevance
for social theory of conducting ethnographic research should not be
understood as a consequence of the inherent superiority of this re-
search method as such. Rather, the relevance is brought out by the
methodological scepticism towards the purported autonomy of theory
from its social present. Ethnographic research should be understood
here in a broad sense and, while participatory observation still remains
the central element, different attitudes, including (but not limited to)
historical ethnography, the observation of artefacts, or interviews, are
also essential to include when detailing the approach. However, the de-
scription of such research strategies, although relevant, does not fully
capture what is specific about ethnographic sensibility when it comes
to the engagement between the theorist and her object. Instead, it is
precisely the constant renegotiation of these stratifications insofar as
the object is not merely passive, but also defines the scope, nature, and
questions pertinent to the research, that is central to establishing this
ethnographic sensibility. Therefore, it is crucial that the relationship
established between the theorist and her ‘object’ is a dialectical one
and not one based on mere reporting or calculation. As a result, ethno-
graphic methods serve as a strategy for theory to ‘enter into a dynamic
unity’9 with practice, not as a privileged standpoint for the instanti-
ation of theory, but as a starting point for the constitution of theory.
Ethnographic research, in other words, constitutes an opportunity for
developing a relation between theory and practice, between the theor-
ist and the object of study, and ‘in so doing, it serves as an antidote to
analytic specialization by alerting us to the remainder — dimensions
of social reality that our existing categories fail to capture’.10
8 Max Horkheimer, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, in his Critical Theory: Selected
Essays (New York: Continuum, 2002), pp. 188–243 (p. 210).
9 Ibid., p. 215
10 Longo and Zacka, ‘Political Theory in an Ethnographic Key’, p. 1067.
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Thus, despite its announcement by some as a great novelty or a
new movement within political theory and political philosophy, the
use of ethnographic methods within empirical research is not a novelty
within the field. Here we could mention Adorno’s use of interviews
in The Authoritarian Personality and Marcuse’s analysis of capitalist
consumerism in One-Dimensional Man as examples; however, ethno-
graphic forays have not been as present here as within Feminist and
Postcolonial theory. Ethnographic approaches have been extensively
employed by Feminist and Postcolonial scholars ever since the 70s
because they are particularly fruitful when challenging universal norm-
ative claims: they can reveal the internal biases of theory and the
internal contradictions within praxis itself. Examples from these dis-
ciplines include, but are not limited to, the various contributions to
critical historiography made by the Subaltern Studies collective, Gloria
Anzaldúa’s use of autobiography to examine the condition of Chicana
women in the United States, Judith Butler’s analysis of various media’s
portrayals of state violence during the War on Terror to establish the
notion of grievability as a marker for radical equality, or Banu Bargu’s
work on Turkish political prisoners’ use of death fast struggle as a way
of weaponizing one’s body in an act of resistance. In spite of adopting
radically different methods, these examples coalesce under a broad
definition of ethnography. I would like to call attention to works —
best exemplified here by Bargu’s — that use political ethnography as
their main methodological framework.
Political ethnography is based on the contextual immersion of the
researcher through a number of strategies founded upon ethnographic
sensibility, such as participatory observation, first-hand interaction,
and conversational interviewing, with the goal of articulating an in-
terpretative framework for the meaning of specific social and political
practices in order to intervene in a broader theoretical debate.11 This
11 Banu Bargu provides an illuminating description of the relationship between political
ethnography and critical theory in the context of her book Starve and Immolate:
The Politics of Human Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016): ‘The
contextual immersion, observation and interaction with the participants of the death
fast struggle grant us access to highly personal, differentiated, involved narratives,
which complicate the conventional approach tohumanweapons that simply folds them
into a fear-mongering discourse of national security and terrorism. But the voices of
those near or at the helm of the state also show how the participants of the death fast
350 THEORY’S METHOD
kind of research allows critical social theory to ‘problemati[ze] re-
descriptions’,12 that is, to challenge theoretical presuppositions and
vocabularies. Additionally, ‘to adopt an ethnographic sensibility is to
remain open to the idea that our object of study is not just a “case”
to examine in relation to theories we hold independently, but some-
thing that tells us more than we knew to ask’.13 In other words, the
use of political ethnography in social theory moves beyond traditional
inductive methodological frameworks, where empirical research is
structured to respond to a previously assembled set of questions whose
‘sources’ or points of conflict have been previously diagnosed or pre-
dicted and merely await empirical confirmation. On the contrary, the
usefulness of ethnography for critical social theory is precisely that it
enables a reciprocal relation between theory and practice. When the
four distinctive elements of critical social theory mentioned above —
interdisciplinarity, materiality, emancipation, and self-reflexivity —
are brought into relation with ethnography, three important elements
of the latter approach come to light. The first, which I have just men-
tioned, is empirical research without the reduction of the object of
analysis to the mere instantiation of theory, such as in a case study.
The second is the insistence on thick, detailed descriptions as a starting
point for theoretical inquiry. The third positions the theorist not as
a universal subject but as an individual belonging to a specific class,
gender, and race while arguably maintaining a speculative vantage
point.
Political ethnography is a useful tool for social theory given its
insistence on not grounding the field of research upon the primacy of
a priori, abstract, notions of justice or equality, for instance, but rather
by looking at how such notions are articulated in the social vocab-
ulary, and how they are enacted and performed by different social
groups. It does not begin with an abstract concept but with a ‘concrete’
concept, so to speak, insofar as it relies on thick descriptions of the
struggle and their actionswere perceived […]bringing into light the articulation of the
historical, structural, ideological and pragmatic reason for the choice of strategies that
were deployed by the state to address the struggle. […]The resulting analysis troubles
an easy judgement, I think, and thereby aspires to keep open a space in which critical
theory can operate’ (pp. xiii and xiv).
12 Longo and Zacka, ‘Political Theory in an Ethnographic Key’, p. 1066.
13 Ibid., p. 1067.
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rsocial and political arena. The starting point here described as ‘thick
descriptions’ should be understood both as a description itself as well
as a critical availability to the act of describing on the part of the the-
orist, which can possibly include the reformulation of her theoretical
vocabulary. The availability of such a critical perspective also allows
for further possible identification of contingent phenomena within
established orders, opening up the space of normative inquiry towards
unforeseen circumstances. In other words, it allows for the possible
identification of internal contradictions within normalizing structures,
whether in the realm of political phenomena, normative vocabulary,
or by highlighting the intrinsic forms of violence and exclusion within
such structures.
Finally, a distinctive element of political ethnography that is ex-
tremely relevant for empirically engaged social theory is the issue of
positionality. The position of the social theorist is neither camouflaged
in order to endorse a specific or exemplary kind of objectivity nor,
by means of its affirmation, is it considered to signify an automatic
embrace of relativism — both of which are equally symptomatic of
an understanding of theory that stands above and outside relations of
power and ideological structures. Therefore, the emphatic inclusion
of positionality must entail more than just a mere addition of a few
descriptive lines containing the private history of the scholar, or some-
thing like a private confession of the individual in question alongside
or within their research findings. What positionality ‘positions’ is not
the theorist as an individual but theorizing as a practice. A critically
engaged use of positionality serves to dispel the aura of epistemic priv-
ilege of the theorist by including her self-understanding as an element
of analysis insofar as this understanding constitutes a reflection on the
conditions of the actuality of the research itself. It represents a break
with the dogmas of objectivism and scientism while, at the same time,
avoiding falling into relativism.
Positionality — just like thick descriptions — places the focus on
the dialectical and relational aspect of the research. This element is
one that has had very little historical resonance amongst philosophers,
even those that did engage with empirical research. Adorno and Mar-
cuse, for instance, despite their critical eye towards positivism in the
social sciences, and their insistence on the dual character of empirical
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research (both normative and descriptive), have not included what
I am here defining as positionality in the scope of their methodolo-
gical inquiries. Postcolonial and feminist theorists, on the other hand,
have engaged extensively with positionality, showing how supposedly
impartial and universal normative standards are biased in relation to,
mainly but not exclusively, gender and race.14
A RETURN TO MATTER
The concern with providing clarity for the relational constitution of
the research itself is particularly relevant when working with social
movements and oppressed groups. However, in recent years, many
projects within the humanities and the social sciences have developed
an increasing interest in non-human objects and nature, advocating a
return to materiality in order to provide new interpretative frameworks
for the social world. The so-called New Materialism consists of a het-
erogeneous field and assembles under this umbrella term a number of
thinkers and theories that do not necessarily stand in perfect harmony
with one another. Given the range of the term, I do not claim that all
authors identified as New Materialists strictly follow or would even
necessarily agree with the description I offer below, and if I did not
properly acknowledge this fact it might render my criticism unfair or
irrelevant for some positions. What I offer is a defence of ethnographic
methods within critical social theory that stands in contrast to some
descriptions that have been offered as paradigmatic in the New Ma-
terialist Turn. The reason I bring this dialogue into the debate about
the relevance of ethnographic research methods within critical social
theory is precisely because this move has, on multiple occasions, been
identified as a trend within new materialism, understood as a strategy
of approximation between the researcher and ‘matter itself ’. I would
like to mark the difference between this trend and the use of such a
method within canonical examples of historical materialism precisely
to provide a sharp distinction in what is considered to be the relevance
of such a method: while New Materialists claim that ethnographic
14 See, for instance, Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1997).
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research enables the coming into relation with material agency, the one
that I am proposing, associated with historical materialism, claims no
reference to matter itself.
The New Materialist Turn is usually associated with two areas
‘where there is sufficient overlapping around a distinctive reorienta-
tion for these areas to serve as identifying markers of new materialist
thinking’.15 The first is a renewed interest in non-anthropocentric,
matter-oriented ontology. This ontological commitment arises out of
what is portrayed to be a rupture with the Kantian paradigm that,
it is claimed, inaugurated a ‘general anti-realist trend’ marked by a
strong representationalism that emphasizes the mediation of reality
by epistemic and linguistic processes. The main charge against rep-
resentationalism, however, seems to lie not so much on the grounds
of this mediation as it does on an unargued (in the case of Kant) yet
historically entrenched understanding of matter as, itself, passive. The
excessive weight conferred, amongst others by the Kantian tradition,
upon a nexus of normative interaction, between what is supposed to
be inert matter and the spiritual bestowals that grant matter its proper
dynamicity, is identified as a questionable theoretical assumption un-
derpinning the anthropocentric character of Western thought. In an
effort to dislocate and challenge this tradition, one of the main argu-
ments of the New Materialists — one that serves to dismantle binary
distinctions such as nature/culture and organic/inorganic — is their
emphasis on matter’s agency. This is the second distinctive area of
interest for New Materialists.
New Materialist ontology, also known as vital materialism or ma-
terial vitalism, does not understand matter as fixed and inert but as a
continuous and, more importantly, as a contingent process of materi-
alization. According to Diana Coole:
Firstly, this is not about Being, but becoming: crucially, what is
invoked is a process not a state, a process of materialisation in
which matter literally matters itself. Secondly, this is not, then,
the dead, inert, passive matter of the mechanist, which relied
on an external agent — human or divine — to set it in motion.
15 DianaCoole, ‘AgenticCapacities andCapaciousHistoricalMaterialism:Thinkingwith
NewMaterialisms in thePolitical Sciences’,Millennium: Journal of International Studies
41.3 (2013), pp. 451–69 (p. 452).
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Rather, it is a materialisation that contains its own energies and
forces of transformation. It is self-organising, sui generis.16
Therefore, contingent processes of self-constitution are expressions of
the intrinsic constitution and rationality of matter, understood here
not only as sui generis but, more importantly, as causa sui. The argu-
ment that matter, itself, is agential and not inert references the philo-
sophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari as laying the foundations for
vital materialism. This is seen in the case of Rosi Braidotti’s argument
for the intelligent vitality, or self-organizing capacity, of matter, which
leads to a ‘zoe-centred egalitarianism’ wherein the shift from agency
to agentic capacities stands against a tradition that associates agency
with (human) volition, deliberation, and intellect.17 By moving from
agency to agentic capacities, new materialists have argued that ‘agentic
capacities are diffused across many different types of material entity’
and that this ‘decouple[s] agency from humans while raising questions
about the nature of life and of the place or status of the human within
it’.18 Such capacities are, according to this view, proper to matter itself;
they are contingently revealed in interactions, which, understood here
beyond the anthropocentric fixation on agency, allows for a collapsing
of the traditional dualisms such as nature/culture which I referred to
earlier.
The transhumanist and vitalist focus on agentic capacities arises
out of very different arguments. My concern here is with the so-called
neo-ontological materialisms which draw upon quantum physics or
upon general descriptions of biological processes that understand
vitalism to occur in a spontaneous speculative organization of nat-
ural processes. In this perspective matter is conceptualized under the
framework of relational ontology in the sense that being, or matter,
is constituted by dynamic relationships between elements. Susanne
Lettow has argued that this position results in two shortcomings. The
first concerns epistemology, which, in this context, is no longer under-
stood as the critical interrogation of knowledge claims, including the
claim to know matter itself. Lettow takes issue with Karen Barad’s
16 Ibid., p. 453
17 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 60.
18 Coole, ‘Agentic Capacities’, p. 457.
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important contribution by highlighting how, despite her attention to
distinct features of human cognition, she positions intelligibility as an
expression of matter’s agency. Therefore ‘practices of knowing cannot
be fully claimed as human practices, not simply because we use non-
human elements in our practices but because knowing is a matter of
part of the world making itself intelligible to another part’.19 Life, as
matter, is understood here as a cosmological force, as the unfolding
of natural processes, as an expressions of the intelligent organization
and reorganization of matter, and generically described as a primordial
logic of being where ‘epistemic practices are articulated as part of a
metaphysical, even cosmological logic of anonymous forces that shape
the world’.20 The problem with this kind of approach is that by assum-
ing material agency to be conceptually expressive, it not only rejects
the Kantian paradigm under which there is no unmediated knowledge,
no knowledge of things in themselves, but actually brings us to a pre-
critical standpoint in which the refusal of mediation becomes a totality
of theory or, from a different perspective, the intelligible organization
of nature.
This epistemic immediacy — one could even say, epistemic trans-
parency — of matter forecloses a deeper engagement with critical epis-
temology. ‘With regard to epistemology, the attempt to conceive of the
totality of being, the quest for a direct and immediate access to being
or the real rejects the always precarious and partial position of the
epistemic subject’.21 Material vitality does not, per se, entail the dissol-
ution of epistemic questions regarding the production of knowledge,
the categorization of phenomena and its social-historical conditions
— not unless we also adopt substantive metaphysical or epistemic
commitments such as understanding intelligibility as an expression of
material vitality. In the same vein, a rejection of the nature/culture div-
ision does not entail an adoption of posthumanism in which we erase
the very specific relationships at play between human and non-human
actors. Donna Haraway, in her essay ‘Situated Knowledges’, reminds us
19 Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward anUnderstanding of HowMatter
Comes to Matter’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28.3 (2003), pp.
801–31 (p. 829).
20 Susanne Lettow, ‘Turning the Turn: New Materialism, Historical Materialism and
Critical Theory’, Thesis Eleven, 140.1 (2017), pp. 106–21 (p. 109).
21 Ibid., p. 110.
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that ‘the world neither speaks itself nor disappears in favour of a master
decoder’.22 The issue of a presumed disappearance is precisely why I
call this erasure of epistemology in favour of the intelligible immediacy
of matter ‘dogmatic’ in the Kantian sense of the term.
Furthermore, there is a second problematic element associated
with this reading of material vitalism, represented by theories such
as Braidotti’s zoe-centred egalitarianism. By uncritically adopting a
supposedly generic language such as ‘flows’, ‘exchanges’, and ‘fields of
forces’ to describe all phenomena, such theories violently flatten rad-
ically different phenomena, especially social phenomena. By assuming
ontological parity between the vitality of atoms in their exchange of
electrons and the vitality of social interactions, equating them under
generic descriptions such as ‘agential assemblages’, one assumes that
power relations and physical forces are both epistemically transparent
and ontologically analogous. This kind of interpretation blurs the dis-
tinction between (socially and historically constituted) human agency
and non-human agency, and thereby creates a second foreclosure: that
of the normative, political, dimension of human agency.23 As a result,
the normative and emancipatory character of theory are eclipsed.
It is important to note that a critique of discrete matter along the
lines of the critique of the Newtonian model doesn’t of itself amount
to the speculative transparency of material vitality, nor to a description
of agency that collapses the structural disparities between human and
non-human agency. Such a position is not the first awakening from the
22 Donna Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the
Privilege of Partial Perspective’, Feminist Studies 14.3 (1988), pp. 575–99 (p. 593). I
use Haraway here as an example of an author associated with New Materialism who,
nonetheless, does not share the view that I am criticizing in this paper. I do this on
purpose in order to also illustrate that, despite my criticism, given the comprehensive-
ness of the term ‘new materialist’ and the different positions associated with it, there
is certainly a good deal of opportunity for approximations and alliances with historical
materialism.
23 Lettow, ‘Turning the Turn’, p. 111: ‘The general problem here is that agency is trans-
ferred to anonymous, meta-historical forces like matter or life, and this means that
social relations and the practices they result from cannot be adequately analyzed.
This includes the highly specific and historically contingent forms of human-nature
relations and socio-technological regimes that need to be studied with regard to the
very specific and highly stratified assemblages of “human” and “nonhuman” agents. To
analyze such assemblages would require a differentiated theory of subjectivity which
is able to distinguish between the specific forms of dynamics, activity and praxis that
characterize the different entities.’
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great slumber of hylomorphism because critiques of hylomorphism
have been present throughout the history of philosophy. This begs
the question — what kind of materialism is historical materialism if
it is not one committed to an engagement with matter itself? This is
a question surrounded by extensive debate and a longstanding his-
tory. Theorists associated with the first generation of the Frankfurt
School such as Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Adorno, as well as others
who moved away from the scientificism of early historical materialism,
sought to emphasize the social and historical aspects of theory as such,
and not only of social theory. This does not necessarily imply the denial
of material vitality, but it does insist that any understanding of material
vitality is socially and historically determined.
A RESEARCH METHOD FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL FORM
I would like to call attention to a crucially relevant distinction within
Marxist theory, namely the focus on the commodity form as a real
phantasmagoria.24 In his writings regarding the current status of
idealism and materialism, Marx alluded to the pitfalls of the ideal-
ist/materialist debate of his time by stressing the well-known short-
comings of idealism along with those of a materialism that makes direct
references to bodies and objects as haunted by an idealist founda-
tion.25 The famous passage on the fetishism of the commodity, usually
read as the intervention of the notion of praxis over idealist structural-
24 This specific focus on the commodity, and its concern with labour as the kind of prac-
tice that institutes it, has been identified by some, e.g. Bruno Latour, as fundamentally
anthropocentric. Judith Butler has recentlymade the case against this interpretation by
recuperating Marx’s notions of the organic and the inorganic body stressing how the
kind of agency that is actualized in labour is dialectically constituted by non-human
agency as well. Cf. Judith Butler, ‘The Inorganic Body in the Early Marx: A Concept-
Limit in Anthropocentrism’, Radical Philosophy, 2.6 (Winter 2019), pp. 3–17.
25 ‘He also saw very clearly that, from this point of view, the “old materialisms” or
philosophies of nature, which substitute matter for mind as the organizing principle,
contain a strong element of idealism and are, in the end, merely disguised idealisms
(whatever their very different political consequences). This enables us to understand
why it is so easy for idealism to “comprehend” materialism and therefore to refute it or
integrate it (as we see inHegel, who has no problemwithmaterialisms, except perhaps
with that of Spinoza, but Spinoza is a rather atypical materialist … )’ (Balibar, The
Philosophy of Marx, p. 24).
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ism, can also be read as an argument against a reductionist ontological
materialism.
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists
therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the
social characteristics of men’s own labour as objective char-
acteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the social-
natural properties of these things. Hence it also reflects the
social relation of the producers to the sum total of labour as
social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart
from and outside the producers. Through this substitution,
the products of labour become commodities, sensuous things
which are at the same time supra-sensible or social.26
Furthermore, the mystery of the commodity form cannot be solved
by redirecting our gaze to the object as ‘simple’ matter, or to the body
as a ‘simple’ body, precisely because bodies are already constituted
by systems of differential categorization, articulation, identification,
and hierarchization, and it is not in the ‘materiality of the body’ that
one would find the justification for, or grounding principle of, its
commodification.
[T]he commodity form, and the value relation of the products
of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no con-
nection with the physical nature of the commodity and the
material [dinglich] relations arising out of this. It is nothing
but the definite social relation between men themselves which
assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between
things. […] As the foregoing analysis has already demon-
strated, this fetishism of the world of commodities arises from
the peculiar social character of the labour which produces
them.27
The object of critical social theory, therefore, cannot be matter itself,
given that the significance of material reality as such is already de-
termined by social and historical relations. The very impetus to find
the ground of social formations in ‘pure matter’ is already a symptom
of fetishism. For example, a body that is marked as female ‘expresses
26 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 3 vols (London: Penguin, 1976),
i, trans. by Ben Fowkes, pp. 164–65.
27 Ibid., p. 165.
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female experience at a particular time and place, located within a par-
ticular set of social relations’.28 By understanding the commodity form
as a social form and focusing on this ‘real abstraction’ as one of the
central elements of his theory, Marx implodes the old antagonism
between idealism and materialism by showing how the two are not
mutually exclusive but mutually dependent.
What concerns us here is the objectivity of the ‘phantasmagorical’
phenomenon of the commodity. By shifting the focus of inquiry from
matter ‘itself ’ or reason to social formations, and by understanding
social formations not as instantiations of abstract categories but as
historically determined, real abstractions, Marx collapses the apparent
division of matter/form into the unity of a social form. Additionally,
abandoning the paradigm of individual agency as foundational for ac-
tion and focusing on the conditions of possibility of action means that
the urge to liberate agency from the schema of subjective volition and
deliberation — which some have associated with the Kantian tradition
— appears incredibly superfluous, given that representations, even
those of ‘matter itself ’, are already expressions of a collective life. Crit-
ical social theory fulfils the dual criteria of being aware that it emerges
out of the same object that it enquires into — that is, social form —
and it is only by virtue of this that it can satisfy the four elements
mentioned earlier: being emancipatory, interdisciplinary, materialist,
and self-reflexive.
Historical materialism stands, therefore, as a ‘materialism that
has nothing to do with a reference to matter’. The term ‘materialism
28 Nancy Hartsock, ‘The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically
Feminist Historical Materialism’, in Disovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epis-
temology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. by Sandra Harding
and Merrill B. Hintikka (New York: Kluwer, 1983), pp. 283–310 (p. 303). On this
topic, Joseph Fracchia makes an important argument regarding the contribution of
historical materialism: ‘Although gender is a cultural construct, if humans reproduced
asexually, there would be no foundation for its construction. The problem lies not in
the recognition of physiological differences, but in the issuance of hierarchical ver-
dicts on their significance that both produce and support exploitation, oppression and
discrimination. The particular content of those semiotic forms cannot be predicted
by any general theory. But it can be analysed in a historical-materialist manner and
understood as the particular product of people living within a specific set of social
relations inscribing particular meanings onto what are constructed as racialised or
gendered bodies’ ( Joseph Fracchia, ‘Beyond the Nature-Human Debate: Human Cor-
poreal Organization as First Fact of Historical Materialism’, Historical Materialism,
13.1 (2005), pp. 33–62 (p. 56)).
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without matter’, used by Balibar in his The Philosophy of Marx, was
borrowed from a letter from Jacobi to Fichte. The object of historical
materialist critique is a (real) living phantasmagoria created by the
inversion between labour and value, where labour seems to have been
socialized by the value-form. The reference to ‘materialism without
matter’ contains the need for a profound rethinking of the constitution
of (social) objectivity as well as that of subjectivity. These debates
about the mutual constitution of objectivity and subjectivity, as well
as that of theory and practice, have been longstanding and must be in-
terpreted as developments of the debate concerning form and matter,
where the notion of social form, or ‘social formations’ — to avoid a
language that could be interpreted as reificatory — is the object of his-
torical material critique. If the objects of critique are social formations,
then such formations are not transparent because their constitutive
processes of inversion, such as that of labour and value, are made
opaque, among others, by ideological structures. The question here
is not one of proceeding by assuming the falsity of social form and
searching for its origin or genetic code hidden within the mere illusions
of social formations, but rather of analysing its internal contradictions.
To put it another way, contradictions are not the expression or the
explosion of a hidden, suppressed, raw genetic element, but rather
developments which potentially expose the social and historical char-
acter of the phantasmagoria at play, potentially leading to change.
The four elements of critical social theory outlined in the first sec-
tion of this paper (reflexive, interdisciplinary, materialist, and emanci-
patory) stand not as a mere list of intentions but as a development of
this notion of social form as well as what theory, and its relationship to
practice, entails. From the elements mentioned, the element concern-
ing the emancipatory character of theory has generally been regarded
as aspirational when it is, in fact, structural. As Balibar writes,
the theme of domination must thus be at the centre of the
discussion. Marx does not produce a theory of the constitution
of ideologies as discourses, as particular or general systems of
representation and then merely retrospectively raises the ques-
tion of domination: that question is always already included in
the elaboration of the concept.29
29 Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, p. 45.
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Moreover, the recent dominance of debates concerning the normative
standards of critique has eclipsed the traditional discussion regarding
the relationship between theory and practice, which has led to accus-
ations of stagnation within critical theory. The return to such a debate
is crucial because of its ability to fulfil the emancipatory potential
of theory through simultaneously placing the relationship of theory-
making and practice at the centre, avoiding the dogmatic separation
between theorist and non-theorist, and denying the premise that the
self-understanding of agents is irrelevant, or even detrimental, to em-
pirical research.
As these challenges and the foundational problems they stem
from — that of the methodological status of critical theory, its
relation to practice, and the corresponding role of the critical
theorist — are still with us today, one hopes they will no
longer be pushed into the background by the dominance of the
debate on the normative standards of critique but be discussed
in their own right. […] This suggests that the emancipatory
orientation of critical theory is internally linked to its double
reflexivity: only reflection on the context in which a theory
emerged and in which it is used — a twofold dependency of
theory on practice — enables an adequate understanding of
the practical character of theory itself, and thus a break with
the dogma of scientism and objectivism.30
The re-awakening of the question of the relationship between theory
and practice entails, necessarily, a re-awakening of the discussion re-
garding methodology. And it is equally interesting to note how the
prevalence of debates concerning the normative standards of social
theory has also side-lined the discussion regarding empirically engaged
research methods. Although social movements and institutions have
been a preferential object of research for critical theorists, a number of
questions remain regarding the actualization of research: how to pro-
ceed, and how to select which social struggles to focus upon, in a world
of total administration and totalizing domination? In a world where, in
contrast to fifty years ago, ‘socialism is no longer the focus of emanci-
patory hopes; social movements have proliferated in a decentred way;
30 Celikates, ‘Critical Theory’, pp. 217–18.
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and value horizons have been pluralized’?31 How can critical social
theory be pursued in a society where domination is experienced as
freedom? Or should critical theorists, as Nancy Fraser suggests, not
only engage with normative analysis but also with proposing program-
matic and institutional solutions?32 I do not wish to claim that the
adoption of a specific methodology alone would supply an answer to
such questions, although the reflection on the importance of method-
ology constitutes part of the theorist’s commitment to answering such
challenges. Nonetheless, whether or not critical theorists have a norm-
ative or more programmatic goal they definitely benefit immensely
from empirically engaged research, maintaining the old ‘unity between
practice and theory’ as a central concern.
If critical theory is sequestered from social engagement and
activism, vacating the very domain from which the political
problematic emerges, it deprives itself of the capacity to trace
that very emergence. This important relation between work-
ing inside and outside of the academy is linked to the further
problem of the border between the university and its world.
Such a critical practice neither takes distance from facts nor
negates their existence or importance; on the contrary, a con-
stellation of such ‘facts’ impresses itself upon our thinking, and
so the world acts on us and exercises a historical demand on
thought.33
By understanding theory as the relation between theorist and object,
and by relying on thick descriptions as the starting point of theoretical
inquiry, political ethnography provides a useful platform for social
theory while having real current struggles as its main focus point.
Moreover, such research disavows any presupposition of ‘automatic
translation of social position into epistemic privilege, and of epistemic
31 Marcos Nobre, ‘How Practical Can Critical Theory Be?’, in Critical Theory and the
Challenge of Praxis, ed. by Stefano Giacchetti Ludovisi (New York: Routledge, 2016),
pp. 159–72 (p. 167).
32 Cf. Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political- Philo-
sophical Exchange (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 198–99: ‘Unlike their predecessors,
finally, today’s critical theorists cannot assume that all normatively justified claims will
converge on a single programme for institutional change. Rather, they must take on
the hard cases — those, for example, in which claims for minority cultural recognition
conflict with claims for gender equality — and tell us how to resolve them’. Also in
Nobre, ‘How Practical Can Critical Theory Be?’, p. 167.
33 Butler, ‘The Inorganic Body’, p. 4.
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privilege into political progressiveness’,34 which, alongside the use of
naïve and vague descriptions of social movements — either through
superficial or instrumental engagement with such movements, when
the theorist engages with political practice only to locate his already-
tailored research questions — constitute two extremely problematic
features of empirically engaged theory. Ethnographic research is par-
ticularly attentive to ideological traps that may not only be invisible
to the theorist but also to the activist while, arguably, maintaining
a specifically emancipatory role for critique. On the other hand, the
critical theorist must enter a relation of partnership with those around
her, ‘a dialogical struggle for appropriate interpretations and the real-
ization of transformative potentials’,35 for which positionality, under-
stood here not as mere subjective expression, but also as attention
to unforeseen biases and blockages while also engaging in dialogical
interpretations and realizations of emancipatory potentials, is an im-
portant element. Finally, it makes the speculative vocabulary available
to redescriptions, as well as to the reflections and input made by those
engaged with the social struggle. Political ethnography is a fruitful
method for transforming the asymmetry between theorist and activ-
ist into a dialogical relation, but only if we understand critical social
theory as already being a social practice.
34 Celikates, ‘Critical Theory’, p. 217.
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